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M anagement control is an in teg ra tive  force in the  managem ent process 
and a  vehicle for feedback in the m anagem ent cycle. In a widely embraced 
delineation of the principal functions o f m anagem ent, the  control function—in 
application with the other four functions of planning, organizing, staffing, and 
d irec tin g —facilita tes  the synergism th a t results from cooperative interaction of 
th e  functions. Management control, as an activ ity , is a  tool of ail of the 
functions of management and, as a  function, is a user of the  tools of the o ther 
four functions. Viewed in this con tex t, the control function introduces the 
e lem en t of closure to m anagement action , enhances ra tionality  in the decision­
making process, and underscores the search for order in complex endeavors.
Purpose
The manifold tools and techniques of m anagem ent control are  a 
reflec tion  of many managers' recognition of the  need to  m easure perform ance 
and red irec t deviations in diverse and complex m anagerial environments. The 
a rray  of currently available tools and techniques ranges in complexity from 
sim plistic to in trica te ; in precision, from  stochastic to determ inistic; in cost of
^Harold Koontz and Cyril J . O'Donnell, eds., M anagement: A Book of 
Readings, 3d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), pp. xi, 649.
development and operation, from inexpensive to  expensive; in time-span 
coverage, from less than a day to many years; in form and type, from reflective 
to  predictive; in breadth of coverage, from specific to corporate; in depth of 
coverage, from m inute to  general; in participative considerations, from uni­
la te ra l to  mutual; and in methodology from, manual to autom atic. These 
illustra tive  descriptors suggest polarized as opposed to  dichotomized states and 
imply existence of numerous continua along which specific  tools and techniques 
may fall. The reaction of managers and non-managers to  many of these tools and 
techniques is frequently clouded by am bivalence. Some may see controls as 
repressive, negative, and coercive while others may view them as constructive, 
affirm ative,, and supportive. Some may see them as replacem ents for human 
decision-making; others may see them  as synthetic aids tha t enhance man-made 
decision-making; s till other m anagers may view the form al tools and techniques 
of control as affording little  o r no im provem ent over venerated rules of thumb.
While m anagem ent control activ ity  is conceptuaily integrative in 
in teraction with the  other principal functions, the tools and techniques are not 
necessarily, in and of them selves, in teg ra tive . As an example, a  management 
control technique associated with tim e perform ance is not necessarily inherently 
in teractive  with a control technique designed for technical perform ance. 
Similarly, a control tool aim ed at cost perform ance is not necessarily inherently 
in tegrative in nature with technical perform ance control mechanisms. Alterna- 
tiveiy, techniques for checking and red irecting  technical perform ance frequently 
to tally  disregard both cost and tim e param eters. S tated  in different term s, 
specific control tools seldom cut horizontally across functional lines. As a 
consequence, many contro.! tools frequently  do not perm it a to ta l systems view 
nor enhance coordination of in terre la ted  functional activ ities. In short.
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individual control techniques are  seldom naturally  in tegrative; in tegrating 
threads capable of transcending organizational dimensions m ust be constructed  in 
the  tools through affirm ative design.
S tatem ent of In ten t
This brief pream ble begs the questions of whether in tegrated  system s 
really exist as such and whether they should. In this regard, a  question m ight be 
posed as to  w hat in tegrated  control systems mean in the context used herein: 
Are they available and viable, and what is their worth or value if they do exist?
In consideration of these fundam ental issues and questions and the lack 
of existing theory or science, it is the specific in tent of this study to discuss, 
analyze, and evaluate  the reality  of and the  need for an in tegrated  control 
system in a large-scale  endeavor. F urther, it  is the concurrent and equally 
im portan t in ten t of this study to examine m anagem ent control throughout the 
life cycle of a  complex m ilitary weapon system to discern changes in 
m anagem ent control philosophy as a function of project m aturity . Finally, it is 
the purpose of this study to  examine the consideration th a t m anagem ent can and 
should have a base line for integrated control th a t is transferable, adap tive, and 
dynamic.
In order to emphasize the th rust of th is study, it  is deemed prudent to  
enhance specificity  by noting several considerations tha t underscore the essence 
of the in ten t. F irst, it  is suggested th a t m anagem ent thought has moved from a 
period in which it was deemed inherently desirable to  construct, im plem ent, and 
opera te  highly s tructu red  control systems into an era tha t postulates th a t it is 
not p rac tica l to define specific omnibus control systems for large-scale 
endeavors. This may signal a  sh ift from more certain  to less certa in
environm ents. In other words, the idea of con tro l system universality is being 
questioned in view of the typical uniqueness of individual needs and the  wide 
diversity of control tools and techniques available. Secondly, it  appears th a t the 
m anagem ent environm ent has grown increasingly complex, especially during the  
past several decades. This observation seems particu larly  true  in the m ilitary  
and aerospace arenas. Finally, it is suggested th a t  large-scale endeavors stress 
the tools and techniques of management control to  the very boundaries of their 
specifications. That is, large-scale endeavors p lace fa r g rea ter demands on the 
in tegrative requirem ents for the tools and techniques than do less complex 
activ ities. This is due prim arily to  the  in te rre la tedness of larger numbers of 
individual activ ities  or issues tha t m ust be perform ed or coordinated in complex 
programs if the end product is to be achieved.
In sum, i t  is the purpose of this study to  exam ine a m ilitary weapon 
system in term s of the management control function. This exam ination will 
assess the use of in teg ra ted  control in the  project, analyze changes in 
m anagem ent control throughout the life cycle of the system , and suggest 
notional considerations with regard to  the  transferab ility  of an in tegrated  control 
base line.
Study Target
The ta rg e t of this study is program m anagem ent of the Safeguard 
Missile D efense O rganization (BMDO) and its  predecessors. A ctivated  in 
November, 1967, as the Sentinel System O rganization,^ the BMDO evolved over 
tim e with the many redefinitions of weapon system  objectives. The m anagem ent
^U.5., D epartm ent of the Army, G eneral Orders No. 48 (Washington, 
D.C.; Governm ent Printing Office, 15 November 1967), p. 1.
philosophy enunciated and exercised by the BMDO also changed as a function c f 
both the redirections of weapon system objectives and organizational realign­
m ents. The changes in organization structu re  and m anagem ent doctrine th a t 
have occurred since the  inception of the Safeguard and its predecessor programs 
a re  reflective of the volatile political environment in which they  existed.
The Safeguard program was selected for study for a  number of reasons. 
F irst, it represents one of the most complex large-scale  programs ever 
undertaken by the D epartm ent of Defense (DoD). In commenting on Safeguard 
m anagem ent before a  House Subcommittee, Deputy Secretary  of Defense 
Packard stated :
I am convinced th a t this is a sound program from  the engineering 
standpoint. I think we have, w ithout any question, excellent 
m anagem ent in th is program, even though it is a large and complicated 
one.
In a more explicit vein. Dr. John S. Foster, J r., D irector of Defense Research and
Engineering, DoD, s ta ted  in 1971:
It seems to me tha t most people in the Congress and in the 
developm ent business know that about the biggest R&D enterprise tha t 
the D epartm ent of Defense has just now is the  development and 
deployment of Safeguard. Certainly it's about the  toughest. N^ne is 
b e tte r or m ore successful and probably none gets m ore attention.
A second reason for selecting the Safeguard program attaches to  the
fac t th a t it  and its  predecessor programs span the to ta l life-cycle spectrum of a
weapon system, and Safeguard is a recent program . O rdered into production
Statem ent of the Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard before 
the  Subcommittee on D epartm ent of Defense of the C om m ittee on Appropri­
ations, House of R epresentatives, Washington, D.C., 10 April 1970.
^Address by John S. Foster, J r., D irector of Defense Research and 
Engineering, DoD, before the Safeguard Manager's Meeting, St. Louis, Missouri, 
17 November 1971.
under the  name Sentinel in 1967, realigned under the name Safeguard in 1969, and
term inated  in 1977, Safeguard experienced program adolescence, m aturity , and
decline in approximately ten years. The m anagem ent concepts th a t followed this
sam e pa ttern  are of in terest.
Third, Safeguard was a highly visible program in term s of public and
Congressional in terest. The in tensity  of this in te re s t perhaps is best illustrated
by opening remarks made by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of the
Subcom m ittee on Military Applications of th e  Joint C om m ittee on Atomic
Energy, several weeks a fte r  the deployment decision announcement:
We want to bring to  the Congress and the public the  la te s t information 
on plans by the executive departm ent concerning the U.S. antiballistic 
missile program. The decision, announced on Septem ber 18, 1967, tha t 
our Government would undertake the  development of a so-called thin 
ABM defense has significant im plications for our national security . We 
expect the responsible officials, w ithin the bounds of security , to 
discuss in public and in detail this recently announced program. I 
believe it is im portant th a t as much inform ation as possible should be 
made available to the American people so th a t they can better 
understand the issues involved.
The Safeguard program is singular in DoD in term s of long-range national and 
Congressional visibility and was the only s tra teg ic  weapon system in the 
D epartm ent of the Army while an active program .
Finally, the Safeguard program was designated for "system manage­
m ent" as opposed to "project m anagem ent." This exceptional designation makes 
specific and critical chain-of-command distinctions in establishing D epartm ent 
of the  Army policies, responsibilities, and procedures re la tive to  weapon system 
program management. As an example, a t the tim e of the original determ ination.
U.S., Congress, Joint C om m ittee on Atomic Energy, Scope, Magni­
tude, and Implications of the United S tates A ntiballistic Missile Program, 
Hearings, before the Subcommittee on M ilitary Applications, 90th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1967, p. 2.
system m anagement^ was reserved for weapon system s, the development and
deployment of which, "...would significantly influence elem ents of the national
2in terest o ther than the purely m ilitary for an extensive period in the future." 
Further, th is designation could be made in addition to  a project m anager.^ In 
term s of responsibility, a  project manager was responsible for "...full line 
authority for the centralized managem ent of a  specific  project."^ On the other 
hand, a system manager "...exercises coordination and directive authority over 
nonm ateriel-oriented activ ities associated w ith the  to ta l system development 
and operational control over m ateriel developm ent itself."'^ The greater 
responsibility of the  Safeguard System Manager above a typical project manager 
inherently demanded higher order m anagem ent control than that required in 
"project" managed weapon system s.
The four factors just cited make Safeguard a unique and complex 
m ilitary weapon system program. The m anagem ent task imposed by adding 
production and deployment to  the existing ongoing development, the high 
national priority of the program, and the extraord inary  investment of resources 
coupled with the need for significant advances in technology made Safeguard a 
managem ent control challenge of sizable proportions.^ As Johnson, Kast, and
The t i tle  "System Manager" and the designation "system management" 
have been redesignated "Program Manager" and "program management" respec­
tively pursuant to U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Research and Development; 
Project M anagem ent, Army Regulation No. 70-17 (Washington, D.C., 16 June 
1975), pp. 1-2, A—2 -  A-3.
^U.S., Departm ent of the Army, System /Project Management, Army 
Regulation No. 70-17 (Washington, D.C., 19 January 1968), p. 3.
^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^Ibid.
^U.S., Army M ateriel Command, O rganizational Plan for U.S. Army 
Support of Nike-X Deployment (Redstone A rsenal, Alabama; Nike-X Project 
Office, 20 January 1965, revised 19 March 1965), p. 4.
Rosenzweig stress, civilian projects, fo r all of their m agnitude, "...do not 
approach the  com plexities invoived in th e  m anagem ent of m ilitary and space 
programs."^
Research Methodology
This study examines m anagem ent control in the Safeguard Ballistic
Missile Defense System Program. In order to approach this task  effectively , it
was necessary to subdivide the to ta l e ffo rt in to  com fortable e lem ents of
meaningful dimensions. To this end, a  three-dim ensional, tw enty-four cell
analysis m atrix  was developed; i t  is consistent both with the  program
managem ent of Safeguard and with sim ilar large-scale endeavors. Specifically,
the m atrix  rows (the horizontal planes) are  defined by s tructu red , functional
param eters; the m atrix  columns (the vertical planes) are defined by sequenced,
program lif e-cycle phases; and the m atrix files (the depth planes) a re  defined by
hierarchic, decision-m aking levels. The param eter-phase-level (PPL) analysis
m atrix  is fully developed in Chapter IV. It is discussed briefly in the  following
few paragraphs of this section to provide insight into the research methodology.
Functional structuring of the m atrix  rows was selected  as a  result of
th ree pertinen t considerations. F irst, functional departm entalization  is one of
2
the most widely used forms of organizational s tru c tu re , and this design form is
Richard A. Johnson, Fremont E. K ast, and James E. Rosenzweig, The 
Theory and M anagem ent of Systems, 3d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1973), p. 391.
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This conclusion is suggested by such authors as Jam es L. Gibson, 
John M. Ivancevich, and James H. Donnelly, J r., Organizations: Structure,
Processes, Behavior (Dallas: Business Publications, Inc., 1973), p. 147; and
William H. Newman, Charles E. Summer, and E. Kirby Warren, The Process of 
M anagement: Concepts, Behavior, and P rac tice , 3d ed. (Englewood C liffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-H ali, Inc., 1972), p. 27.
found extensively In manufacturing firm s. ̂  As a consequence, the  functional 
breakout enjoys established acceptance as a  recognized departm entalization 
schem e. Secondly, the  functional organization is typically the  base over which 
the  program  m anagem ent organization is super-imposed in a m atrix form of 
organizational design.^ The fac t th a t p rivate  industry frequently  makes use of 
the  m atrix  organization design adds fu rther emphasis to the  use of the functional 
breakout for m atrix  row definitions. Finally, th e  B allistic Missile Defense 
O rganization is functionally oriented, and selection of a  functional base 
fa c ilita te s  the evaluative processes of this study.
The use of a tim e dimension for column definitions is an aid in 
evaluating m anagem ent control dynamics during the life cycle of the Safeguard 
program . Most complex systems evolve from s ta te  to s ta te  through some 
ordering of ac tiv ity  over time, with each phase suggesting its own unique 
requirem ents and creating revised or new priorities.^  Viewing management 
control in term s of program lif e-cycle  phases perm ited  exploration of the 
techniques and requirem ents in their natural s ta te , which is a dynamic one.
The third dimension in the m atrix is decision-making level, and i t  is 
used to  define the m atrix  files. All managers exercise some form of control in 
th e  accom plishm ent of their assigned responsibilities.^ Not only does this
Jam es H. Donnelly, J r., Jam es L. Gibson, and John M. Ivancevich, 
Fundam entals of Management: Functions, Behavior, Models, rev. ed. (Dallas: 
Business Publications, Inc., 1975), p. 80.
^David I. Cleland and William R. King, M anagement: A Systems
Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), pp. 337-39.
^Ibid., pp. 149-51.
^R obert J . Mockler, The M anagement Control Process (New York: 
A ppleton-C entury-C rofts, 1972), pp. 4-7.
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norm ally vary by function; it also varies by some form of institutionalized
hierarchic level. ̂  In many instances, the control mechanisms a t  the lower levels
2
may be Integrated in to  the corporate  controls a t the upper levels, but the 
m anagem ent levels a t  which actions may be initiated or decisions made is a  
function of the gravity or significance of the issue. Gibson, Ivancevich, and 
Donnelly sum the role of decision-making in the  organization by emphasizing tha t 
"...decision-making is the crux of organizational life."^
The PPL analysis m atrix  used in this study is depicted in Figure 1. It 
will be noted tha t the functional categories are a synthesis of typical 
m ilitary/aerospace f unctionalization —finance, engineering, manufacturing, 
quality control, and so forth . This specific delineation was used in order to  keep 
th e  analysis at a m anageable level w ithout detracting from its utility or 
au then tic ity , provide coverage of the principal functional ac tiv ities  inherent in 
in teg ra ted  control, and perm it rapid association with a varie ty  of functional 
breakouts. With regard to this last point, the cost param eter is generally 
equated to  the finance or financial management functions; the schedule 
param eter is generally equated to  schedule control functions; and the technicai 
perform ance param eter generally equates to  a  combination of functions such as 
system engineering, configuration m anagem ent, product assurance, and logistics 
support.
Army managem ent doctrine requires tha t the decision-making author­
ity  be ciearly identified in the chain of command. See U.S., D epartm ent of the 
Army, Management: Army M anagement Doctrine, Army Regulation No. 5-1
(Washington, D.C., 6 August 1973), p. 2.
^Mockler, The Management Control Process, p. 5.
^Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly, Organizations: Structure,
Processes, Behavior, p. 187.
G ra p h ic  c o n c e p t  I s  a d a p t e d  from an  I l l u s t r a t i o n  by 
G o idan  0 .  P e h r s o n  In " M a n a g e m e n t  C on tro l  In the  
M ilr ta ry  D e p a r t m e n t s , "  In Managerrrent C on tro l  Systerr rs,  
e d s .  D o n a ld  G. M alco lm  a n d  A lan  J .  R ow e  (N ew  York; 
J o h n  Wiley & S o n s ,  In c . ,  i % 0 ) ,  p .  80 .
PARAMETER
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Fig. 1. Param eter-Phase-Level (P PL) Analysis Matrix
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These three critical param eters are  widely accepted as general
dimensions for measuring program perform ance.^ It is recognized tha t
organizational perform ance m easurem ent might include to ta l system standards
such as ethical standards, organizational m orale, personnel development, and
other adm inistrative fac to rs, but these a re  not d irectly  associated with project
perform ance. As a consequence, they a re  outside the  scope of this study. It is
also apparent tha t these three param eters w ere notionally constructed and
related  in defining the general objectives of the management information
2
automation requirem ents.
The lif e-cycle phases portrayed in Figure 1 are generally representa­
tive of weapon system evolution. While o th e r means utilizing other variables are 
available,^ large-scale endeavors typically evolve through identifiable phases 
from conceptualization to term ination.^ The schem e selected for this study
See, for example, David I. Cleland and William R. King, Systems 
Analysis and Project Management, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1975), pp. 191-92; Logistics M anagement Institute, Introduction to 
Military Program Management (Washington, D.C., March 1971), p. 26; and 
] . Stanley Baumgartner, "Why Project Management?" National Defense 60 
(September-October 197 5): 112.
2
U.S., Army Sentinel System Command, D ata Automation Require­
ment (PAR) (Huntsville, Alabama, 9 April 1968), p. B-1.
^As an example, the phase variables might be ordered to  fiscal 
appropriation categories, skill categories of personnel assigned through tim e, or 
operational readiness characteristics.
3
See, for example, other identity  schem es in Daniel D. Roman, 
Research and Development Management: The Economics and Administration of 
Technology (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey: P rentice-H all, Inc., 1968), pp. 232- 
39; and Richard B. Chase and Nicholas J . Aquilano, Production and Operations 
Management; A Life Cycle Approach (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1973), pp. 13-15. Additionally, a brief but enlightening summation of the Air 
Force Life Cycle may be found in Lee V. Gossick, "Management of System 
Acquisition Programs in the Air Force," Defense Industry Bulletin 7 (Summer 
1971): 23-29.
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provided maximum distinction between phases w ithout distorting accuracy. 
While activ ities relating to weapon feasibility such as the conceptual phase, 
validation phase, and advanced developm ent typically precede the  in itiation  of 
the research, developm ent, te s t , and evaluation (RDT&E) phase, they have been 
om itted  from the life  cycle depicted in Figure 1. The phasing depicted is 
consistent with Safeguard program evolution, from the original deployment 
decision in 1967 through term ination a c tiv itie s 'in  1977. While i t  is recognized 
th a t control must begin a t  the point of conceptualization of an idea requiring 
expenditure of organization resources, ̂  the  selection of this point in the 
Safeguard life cycle reflec ts  the departure from relatively  routine to  relatively  
complex control requirem ents, and from relatively  inform al to relatively form al 
control methods.
The fac t th a t the phases are portrayed as being separate  and d istinct 
should not be construed as suggesting th a t concurrency between phases does not 
exist, for it frequently does occur. Concurrency in large-scale endeavors, 
particu larly  in weapon system s, is prevalent.
The two decision-making levels specified in Figure 1 a re  active levels 
of specific  in terest in this analysis. The relationship of these two levels to a 
continuum of levels is depicted in Figure 2. The levels are in descending order of 
long-term  im portance and scope from top to bottom  correlated to a  sty lized, 
broadly defined organizational hierarchy sim ilarly depicted in descending order.
It will be noted th a t the "suprastrategic" decision-making level is 
re la ted  to the political s truc tu re  composed, in p a rt, of the citizenry  and the











































































Fig. 2. Decision/Organization Hierarchy
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Congress. This Is considered the  exogenous environm ent. While it  certainly 
influences program direction, i t  is relatively unstructured and broad in scope. 
The program m anager had only lim ited ability to influence this decision level; as 
a  consequence, it  was not a  pivotal factor driving the  development of program 
control philosophy. The "suprastrategic” decision-m aking level is not directly 
addressed in this study.
The endogenous environm ent includes the linking structu re  tha t acts  as 
the  prim ary in teg ra to r betw een the political s tru c tu re  in the exogenous 
environm ent and the program structu re . The s tra teg ic  and tac tica l decision­
making levels are operative in the  endogenous environm ent and are  fundamental 
to  the analysis in this study. The operational level of decision-making a ttaches 
to  activ ity  or process e iem ents of control and is driven, in large measure, by the 
philosophies and actions em anating from the s tra teg ic  and tac tica i decision­
making levels. Since actions a t this levei tend generally  to underscore and be 
reactive  to conceptual and methodological s tra teg y  defined for higher decision 
levels, the operational decision-making level is not a  specific level of in terest in 
this study.
It may be seen in Figure 2 tha t the levels of decision-making overlap. 
This is intended to portray both the lack of precise definition of the levels at 
the ir boundaries and th e  fac t th a t some individuals consistently operate in more 
than one level. As an example, the  Ballistic Missile Defense System Manager 
normally operated  in the  s tra teg ic  and tac tica l levels, but he occasionally 
e lected  to  opera te  in th e  operational level as well. These decision-making levels 
a re  conceptually fashioned in concert with th e  pyramid model of the
16
organization. They also suggest a fram ew ork for development of structu red  
decision models in m anagem ent control. ̂
The foregoing description of the PPL analysis m atrix is intentionally 
brief. I t is intended as an overview to provide prelim inary insight into the  
research methodology. The com plete m atrix  is developed in detail in C hapter IV.
One final point needs to be m entioned here, and th a t concerns the 
sequence in which ceils are  analyzed. Four of the  tw enty-four cells in th e  m atrix  
are depicted in exploded views in Figure 3. The cells were randomly selected  to 
dem onstrate specific cell dimensioning. Random selection of cells will not 
suffice, however, for system atic analysis of the m atrix . R ather, analysis 
ordering is priority  sequenced through the p a ram ete r dimension, then through the 
phase dimension, and then through the level dimension. In other words, the  cost 
param eter was examined first a t the RDT&E appropriation for both decision 
levels. Next, production costs were examined a t  both levels of decision-making. 
This sequence ordering continued until all costs had been examined, and then the 
schedule param eter was examined. This process continued until all tw enty-four 
cells had been com pletely explored.
Boundaries of Inquiry 
This study was bounded by th ree  m ajor considerations: quan tita tive  
and behavioral, public and private sector, and definitional. These boundary 
conditions are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
An inform ative artic le  on decision models in management inform ation 
systems may be found in Ralph H. Sprague and Hugh J . Watson, "MIS Concepts," 
Journal of Systems Management, P art I, 26 (January 1975): 34-37 and P a rt II, 26 
(February 1975): 35-40. In addition, an excellen t discussion th a t considers the  
same concept, but from a difference approach, is by Franz Edeiman, "The 
Manager Looks a t MIS," Computer Decisions 3 (August 1971): 14-13.
RDT&E
S TR AT E GI C
P RO D UC T IO N
ST R AT E GI C
D E P L O Y M E N T
T A C T I C A L
TERMI NATI ON
T A CT I C A L
Fig .  3. P P L  A n a l y s i s  Mo tr ix  Ce l l  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
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Q uantita tive  and Behavioral Considerations 
One of the m ajor expectations of m anagem ent control is tha t i t  will 
guide appropriate individual behavior. Tannenbaum equates control with 
influence and suggests th a t appropriate behavioral response to  control mecha­
nisms and the ir outputs is the logical goal of control systems.^ He views
m anagerial control, in its  most elem ental form , as an intent-influence-response
2
cycle th a t is a ffec ted  by many elem ents of "social causation." Newman endorses 
the behavioral aspects o f m anagerial control and argues th a t m anagement 
frequently becomes so involved in th e  techniques and m echanics of control th a t 
it loses sight of its  purpose.^
Various conceptions of control involving behavioral considerations of 
power, authority , and influence give rise to a m ultitude of in terre la ted  issues 
such as appropriateness of divergent leadership styles, in terpersonal and group 
dynamics analysis, m otivational effectiveness, communications techniques, and 
organizational conflict. While these issues are  of v ita l concern to the logical 
progression and extension of management thought, they tend  to  diffuse the 
central th ru st of this study. In sim ilar fashion, the  inherent validity of Newman's 
argum ent is not denied, but the behavioral im plications are not of im m ediate 
concern. The boundaries of this study are lim ited essentially to  the quan tita tive  
and m echanistic aspects of m anagerial control. G ranted, the success of
^Arnold S. Tannenbaum, Social Psychology of the  Work Organization 
(Belmont, California; Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), p  ̂ 84.
^Arnold S. Tannenbaum, Control in O rganizations (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), pp. 5-7.
^William H. Newman, Constructive Control: Design and Use of
Control Systems (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey; Prentice-H all, Inc., 1975), p. 4.
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m anagem ent control u ltim ately  lies with people, but good people alone do not 
solve m anagem ent control problems effectively w ithout order. R eferences are 
occasionally made to  behavioral considerations, but only in a tangential and 
concom itant manner. The behavioral considerations a re  le ft for pursuit by 
behavioralists, in the hope th a t they will in tegrate  system s theory into a  body of 
knowledge relating  m anagerial control to human response and organizational 
functioning.^
Public and Private Sector Considerations 
M anagement theory and practice have undergone significant change 
since the conclusion of World War II. This change has been particularly  evident 
in m anagem ent of our m ajor defense program s. As a consequence, the 
government of the United S tates (with particular refe rence  to  the  DoD and the 
National A eronautics and Space Administration) has been instrum ental in 
stim ulating th e  developm ent of many innovative and c reative  management 
control tools and techniques. This situation was largely  a consequence of 
changes in technology th a t occurred during the  1950s. Weaponry and peripheral 
equipment becam e extrem ely complex. Additionally, weapons came to be viewed 
as "systems" involving not just individual components of hardw are, but integrated 
items of to ta l weaponry; support and m aintenance equipm ent; real e sta te  for
Some existing works on personal responses to  m anagem ent control 
include R obert Dubin, Human Relations in A dm inistration, 4th ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: P rentice-H all, Inc., 1974), Chap. 19; Fred Luthans,
O rganizational Behavior: A Modern Behavioral Approach to M anagement (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), Chap. 12; Newman, Summer, and 
Warren, The Process of Management: Concepts, Behavior, and P rac tice , Chap. 
26; Tannenbaum, Control in Organizations; and Joan Woodward, ed.. Industrial 
Organization: Behavior and Control (London: Oxford U niversity Press, 1970).
^Cleland and King, Systems Analysis and P ro ject M anagement,
pp. 211-12.
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launching sites; selection, train ing , and care  of operating and m aintenance 
personnel and their dependents; preparation of technical documentation; and 
developm ent of relationships in te rm s of companion s tra teg ic  and tac tica l 
offensive and defensive systems.^
The system s concept becam e a "way of thinking" about the manage- 
2
m ent process. Application of this systems approach in the  m ilitary services is a 
prime example. Applied to  adm inistration of large-scale, complex, m ilitary 
projects, the use of the basic concepts of integration, coordination, and concern 
with the to ta l en tity  over its full life cycle has been separately  defined as 
"weapon system m anagem ent." The terminology is somewhat new, but the  
concept has evolved with technological change.^ While some of the newer 
techniques of m anagem ent control were fostered by the public sector, the  
developm ent and application frequently  occurred in the private sec to r. The use 
of the "weapon system m anagem ent" concept was not lim ited to the  DoD, but 
was implemented in such agencies as the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration as well. Additionally, many of the  original techniques have been 
refined in the private sector for to ta lly  private sector application.^ The civilian
^J. Stanley Baum gartner, The Lonely Warriors; Case for the M ilitary- 
Industrial Complex (Los Angeles; Nash Publishing, 1970), pp. 128-29.
^David I. Cleland and David C. Dellinger, "Changing Patterns in 
Management Theory," Defense Industry Bulletin 2 (January 1966): 2.
^Richard A. Johnson, Frem ont E. K ast, and Jam es E. Rosenzweig, The 
Theory and M anagement of Systems (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., 1963), pp. 113-35 and Frem ont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig, "Weapon 
System M anagement and O rganizational Relationships," Journal of the Academy 
of Management 4 (December 1961): 198-204.
If.
An interesting early analysis of weapon system managem ent in 
nonm ilitary applications may be found in Frem ont E. Kast and Jam es E. 
Rosenzweig, Management in the  Space Age (New York: Exposition Press, 1962).
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counterpart to the term  "weapon system m anagem ent" has been referred  to  as
I
the "product mission concept."
In light of this background, it  does not seem  inappropriate to utilize
large-scale endeavors as typified by a complex public sec to r project as a vehicle
for examining m anagem ent control. Without the public sector requirem ent, in
most cases, the private sec to r would not have had m anagem ent control problems
2
of the magnitude typified by "weapon system" m anaged projects. On the other 
hand, without private sec to r active participation, the  public sector, in all 
probability, could not have developed the sophisticated m anagement control 
methodologies required. In sum, for purposes of this study, th e  program 
management control techniques of the two sectors in managing a  complex 
weapon system are essentially inseparable. In this case , "pride of authorship" is 
not an elem ent germane to  the analysis, and the distinction between public and 
private sector activ ities is evident only in th e  governm ent-contractor 
relationship.
Definitional Considerations 
It is necessary a t  this point to survey briefly  the major relevant 
philosophical considerations and definitions frequently associated with the term s 
"control" and "controlling" as used in a management theory  context.
Managerial control is variously defined by d iffe ren t authors and is used 
in diverse connotations.^ There are  a  number of popular definitions; and while it
^James E. Rosenzweig, "The Weapon Systems Management Concept 
and Electronic Data Processing," Management Science 6 (January 1960): 149.
2
K ast and Rosenzweig, Management in the  Space Age, p. 49.
3
Clayton R eeser, Management; Functions and Modern Concepts 
(Glenview, Illinois: S co tt, Foresman and Company, 1973), p. 352.
22
is generally accepted th a t the control function is inherent in many forms of
human endeavor and is a p a rt of the management process, specific definitions
frequently vary significantly both in term s of content and in ten t. For example,
Donnelly, Gibson, and Ivancevich in the revised edition of th e ir principles tex t
define the controlling function as "All managerial ac tiv ity  th a t is undertaken to
assure th a t actual operations go according to plan."^ They s ta te  fu rther th a t
2
"...control was the emphasis of scien tific  management." Drucker distinguishes 
between controls and control. Controls re la te  to m easurem ent and inform ation 
attaching to means while control is synonymous with direction and pertains to  an 
end; th a t is, it is "...norm ative and concerned with w hat ought to  be."^ For 
Drucker, real control in an organization is "...the ground of behavior and the 
cause of action."^ In o ther words, u ltim ate  control lies in human decisions for 
"...controls must become personal motivation th a t leads to control."^ Bedford 
defines two primary tasks in m anagerial control: f irs t, a  m otivational function 
to  prevent variation; second, a corrective function seeking to  re-establish 
planned activity  if and when deviations occur.^ His definition also underscores 
the concept of more than human activ ity  involvement:
^Donnelly, Gibson, and Ivancevich, Fundamentals of Management: 
Functions, Behavior, Models, p. 415.
^Ibid., p. 99.
^Peter F. Drucker, Management; Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974), p* 494.
^Ibid., p. 504.
^Ibid., p. 495.
^Norton M. Bedford, "Managerial Control," in Contem porary Manage­
m ent: Issues and Viewpoints, ed. by Joseph W. McGuire (Englewood C liffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-H all, Inc., 1974), p. 512.
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M anagerial control is the process of directing a set of persons, 
equipm ent, and m aterials according to  an established plan of action 
toward a specified objective. Essentially, managerial control functions 
by com paring achieved outcomes with desired outcomes and adjusting 
operations so th a t the gap between the two is reduced.
Thus, Bedford suggests a system  or in tegrated view of control involving a  "set" of
input resources. Koontz and O'Donnell generalize control as th a t function tha t
insures th a t plans succeed. They regard the function "...as one of establishing
standards against which perform ance can be m easured, measuring perform ance,
2
and correcting deviations from the standards or plans." Gross asserts  the 
"domination over" connotation of control,^ and th is  definition is also recognized 
by Resser as a candidate in the  m elee.^ Newman specifically suggests tha t 
confusion may be avoided by "...not using 'control' loosely to embrace power, 
authority , influence, and leadership."^ He stresses the  futur e-orientation, 
behavioral, and cybernetic  aspects of control.^
Sherwin em phasizes the assertion th a t controlling and managing are 
not the  same thing and should not be equated. Sherwin s ta tes  tha t "The essence 
of contrr)! is action which adjusts operations to predeterm ined standards."^
^Ibid.
^Koontz and O'Donnell, Management; A Book of Readings, p. 649.
^Bertram M. Gross, The Managing of O rganizations: The Administra­
tive Struggle, Vol. 1 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 264.
4
Reeser, M anagement: Functions and Modern Concepts, p. 352.
5
Newman, Constructive Control: Design and Use of Control
Systems, p. 5.
Sb id ., pp. 3-6,
^Douglas S. Sherwin, "The Meaning of Control," Dun's Review and 
Modern Industry (January 1956), pp. 44 ff., reprinted by Koontz and O'Donnell, 
M anagement: A Book of Readings, p. 652.
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Emch also em phasizes the dynamic nature of contro l by equating it with action. ̂
Goodwin takes the position th a t the etymology of the  English verb "to control"
(from its original French contrôler) requires, in the in te re st of clarity and
accuracy, th a t contro l be equated with checking, te stin g , or verifying only and
th a t adjustm ent is not a proper task of controlling. Goodwin suggests
substitution of the word "surveillance" for the word "control" in management 
2
theory. Urwick takes specific and em phatic exception to  Goodwin's analysis by 
stressing the d ifference  in the  vernacular and techn ical (management) senses.^ 
Urwick sees the  vernacular meaning of control as to restra in , d irect, or 
dominate.^ He supports the technical definition o f control meaning to check, 
te s t, or verify as the proper management form .^ Tannenbaum notes this 
definitional d istinction , but indicates th a t the  word "control" is now commonly 
used in a broader sense in m anagement theory synonymously with the "...notions 
of influence and power."^
Some authors have explored the subject of management control 
attem pting to develop comprehensive foundations for principles, theory, and 
practice. Koontz was one of the  first contem porary authors to  seek a  conceptual
^Arnold F. Emch, "Control Means A ction," Harvard Business Review 32 
(July-August 1954); 92-98.
2
E. S. L. Goodwin, "Control: A Brief Excursion on the Meaning of a 
Word," Michigan Business Review 12 (January 1960): 13-17, 28.
^Lyndall F. Urwick, "The Meaning of Control," Michigan Business 
Review 12 (November 1960): 9-13.
^Ibid., p. 11.
^Ibid.
^Tannenbaum, Control in Organizations, p. 5.
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fram ework by identifying four principles of control,^ which he expanded to 
fourteen in a subsequent a rtic le .^  Luneski described "broad" and "narrow" 
classifications of definitions of control.^ Powell a ttem pts to form ulate a  
working philosophy of m anagem ent control, "...which lies in decisions 'by people 
harmoniously a t  work' a t  all levels of the  organization."^ The G raduate School of 
Business of Stanford University sponsored a Seminar on Basic Research in 
M anagement Control in 1963 to  perm it researchers in management control to 
discuss their work with each o ther.^  Some six years la te r, Mockler edited a book 
of readings th a t brought together articles addressing both theory and articles 
aimed at the many techniques of m anagem ent control.^ Mockler's 1972 tex t 
presents an in tegrated view of m anagem ent control activities in a  business 
setting.^
^Harold Koontz, "A Prelim inary S ta tem en t of Principles of Planning 
and Control," Journal of the Academy of M anagement 1 (April 1958): 45-61.
2
Harold Koontz, "M anagement Control: A Suggested Formulation of 
Principles," California Management Review 1 (Winter 1959): 47-55.
^Chris Luneski, "Some Aspects of the  Meaning of Control," Accounting 
Review 39 (July 1964); 591-97.
h
Ray M. Powell, "Principles of Modern Management Control," Finan­
cial Executive 34 (April 1966): 54, 56, 58, 60.
^Formal papers presented during the  th ree  day sem inar are contained 
in Charles P. Bonini, R obert K. Jaedicke, and Harvey M. Wagner, eds.. 
M anagement Controls: New Directions in Basic Research (New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 1964).
6Robert J . Mockler, ed., Readings in M anagement Control (New York; 
A ppleton-Century-Crofts, 1970).
^Mockler, The M anagement Control Process.
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In consideration of the differing definitions utilized by various 
au th o rs / it appears tha t th ree  categories of definitions accom m odate the 
majority of common usages:
(1) Adm inistration, supervision, or domination in the sense of power 
and authority  over subordinates. It should be noted th a t in the business setting , 
this function is referred  to by some authors as "d irec t” or "lead."
(2) M easurement, reporting, or surveillance in the sense tha t the 
function is lim ited to the flow and collection of inform ation only, implying th a t 
regulation, adjustm ent, and correction occur as a  consequence of o ther functions 
or self-control.
(3) Regulation in the  sense of assessing, evaluating, or checking status 
and directing corrective action if and as necessary based on feedback. This use 
of the term  generally suggests control as the final and integrating function in the 
management cycle th a t closes the loop.
In a  broad sense, there  exists a definitional trichotom y which involves 
widely divergent definitions and a m ultiplicity of im plications. Pursuit of these 
ambiguities in search of a codifying definition would be most interesting, but 
such a task is outside the scope of this study. The third of the three categories 
of definitions, which equates control with regulation, is the one generally 
embraced by this study. This usage highlights the  in tegrative aspects of the
An excellent classic synthesis of significant conceptualizations of 
managerial functions, with specific emphasis on planning and control definitions, 
may be found in Robert N. Anthony, Planning and Control Systems: A
Framework for Analysis (Boston: G raduate School of Business Adm inistration, 
Harvard University, 1965), pp. 129-47. A com prehensive review of existing 
lite ra tu re  on management control may be found in Giovanni B. Giglioni and 
Arthur G. Bedeian, "A Conspectus of M anagement Control Theory: 1900-1972," 
Academy of Management Journal 17 (June 1974): 292-305.
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control function and encompasses the tasks of evaluation o r m easurem ent of 
sta tus and adjustm ent or correction of deviations. Equally im portant, it provides 
the  foundation for adaptive, dynamic, and fu ture-orien ted  regulation of organ­
ized endeavors, thereby enhancing the ir constructive and m eaningful functioning.
One distinction is made in this study, however, th a t is a t  variance with 
authors who s ta te  or imply th a t the basis of control is a standard or s ta tic  plan. 
This concept of the control process denies the dynam ic nature of many complex, 
large-scale endeavors, or suggests the  availability  o f om niscient planners, or 
both. This interpretation is a  sta tic  view and argues tha t the  them e of control is 
to assure the closest possible compliance of ac tua l perform ance to  plans. This 
res tric tiv e  view is referred to as the  "conform ance fallacy" by Anthony.^ He 
suggests that:
Management control is the  process by which m anagers cissure that 
resources are obtained and used e ffec tive ly  ^ d  efficien tly  in the 
accomplishment of the organization's objectives.
Mockler amplifies this view o f management control in these term s:
Management control is a  system atic  e ffo rt to set perform ance 
standards consistent with planning objectives to  design information 
feedback systems, to com pare actual perform ance with these prede­
term ined standards, to determ ine w hether there are any deviations and 
to measure their significance, and to  take  any action required to 
assure tha t all corporate resources a re  being used in the most 
effective  and effic ien t way possible in achieving corporate  objectives.
Both of these definitions stress the  positive ch arac te ris tic s  o f the control
function.
^Anthony, Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for Analysis,
pp. 28-30.
^Ibid.. p. 17.
^Mockler, The Management Control Process, p. 2.
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The concept used throughout this study envisions a  dynamic environ­
m ent with the adjustm ent or correction facet of th e  control process potentially 
applicable to  all param eters of the  situation, not ju st the operational factors. It 
means th a t all variables are considered a t each decision point in a dynamic, 
proactive manner. This concept suggests adaptive tools and techniques utilized 
by cognitive human managers in a partic ipative  m anagem ent environment 
involving all resources associated with the endeavor. It assures the inclusion of 
human beings in the control process w ithout denying the possiblity of autom ated, 
au tom atic  controls and control techniques. This concept highlights the potential 
applicability of the adjustm ent process to  all pertinen t resources and implies the 
prospective aspect of the control process. It also underscores the compelling 
nature  of control suggested by Murdick and Ross; "Plans are not self-achieving 
or decisions self-im plem enting; carrying them out means prescribing the 
ac tiv ities  of personnel a t designated tim es."^ In sum , the essence of this concept 
of control is the regulation o r rrdered  progression of an endeavor toward its 
desired goals, based on to ta l situational assessm ent and optim al corrective 
action . As s ta ted  a t the ou tset of this chapter, m anagem ent control, as an 
ac tiv ity , is a tool of all functions of m anagem ent, and controlling, as a function, 
is a  user of the other four functions. This view of controlling and m anagem ent 
control is graphically illustrated  in Figure 4.
While this conceptualization of the control function is broader than is 
generally proposed, it does not m aterially  com plicate the already difficult task 
of defining practical separation between the five principai functions of 
m anagem ent. This observation is particulariy  pertinen t in regard to  the planning
^Robert G. Murdick and Joel E. Ross, Inform ation Systems for Modern 
M anagement (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey: Prentice-H all, Inc., 1971), p. 49.
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and control functions, but the sem antics problem is not the issue. It is necessary 
only th a t the  distinguishing charac te ris tics  of the control function, as used 
herein, be recognized; for the body of the study presupposes this framework.
Major Sources of M aterial 
This study made maximum use of prim ary source m aterial for the 
form ulation of a  cogent factual fram ework th a t served as the basis of analysis. 
Secondary source m aterial was used both to  support study contentions, as 
appropriate, and to provide insight in to  a lte rnative  and differing views.
Prim ary Sources
Primary source m aterial consisted predominantly of official plans, 
reports, studies, research docum ents, le t te rs , memoranda for record , trip  
reports, m inutes of meetings, fa c t sheets, s ta f f  studies, and speeches. M ateriais 
from both government files and industry files were utilized. Due to  the  national 
security sensitivity of the weapon system program , some pertinent m ateria l was 
classified in accordance with Executive O rder 11652.  ̂ This lim ited direct usage to 
a "need-to-know" basis and precluded such inform ation from inclusion in this 
study. While this restriction hampered the research activ ity  slightly, it was not 
an insurmountable obstacle.
Secondary Source M aterial 
Secondary source m aterial consisted of the published works of. known 
experts in the  field of management control. Both tex ts  and professional journals 
were examined and analyzed. This m ateria l was used either to  collaborate 
conclusions drawn in this study or to  dem onstrate  a lternative  conclusions th a t
^U.S., President, Executive Order 11652, "C lassification and D eclassifi­
cation of National Security Information and M aterial," 8 March 1972.
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have been ex tracted  from  similar inform ation. The basic in ten t in the use of this 
type of source m aterial was to  put this study  in perspective with conventional 
wisdom.
Relationship to  Sim ilar Studies
This study represents an original and unique approach to  the analysis of 
m anagem ent control and differs in several particu lars from major works on the 
subject th a t are currently  available. F irst, th is study utilizes a tw enty-four-cell, 
three-dim ensional m atrix  composed of a  s tru c tu red , functional array overlay on 
the  project life cycle interposed against a  decision hierarchy. Use of this 
technique perm itted analysis of functional ac tiv ity  as i t  was im pacted by status 
of the project in the life-cycle and the decision level. C ritical selection of the 
m atrix  dimensions resulted  in a balanced com partm entalization of typical project 
activ ity . Establishm ent of a m anagem ent control base line against these 
activ ities will perm it translation of individual cells or the to ta l m atrix s truc tu re  
to fu ture large-scale endeavors. Additionally, it perm itted  dem onstration of the 
e ffec ts  of project lif e-cycle phase concurrency and the im pact of changes in one 
phase on the remaining phases.
The development of a base line fo r in tegrated  control th a t represents 
an adaptive and dynamic management posture is a second difference. It is not 
suggested (as it  was under Scientific M anagement) th a t there  is only "one best 
way" in which to accom plish a given objective. N either, however, is it implied 
th a t the range of alternatives then available (given th a t the number is g rea ter 
than one) is infinite. The thrust of this study is to  dem onstrate th a t management 
can and should have a base line for in teg ra ted  control of complex projects. 
Further, the contention th a t the base line does accom m odate pro ject turbulence 
and typical dynamics will be explored.
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Third, the specific analysis of the control function, operating through 
tools, techniques, and systems, as both a  horizontal (functional) and vertical 
(hierarchic) in teg ra tive  force in the  m anagem ent of large-scale endeavors is a 
departure from existing works. In this study, the concept of to ta l integrated 
managem ent control attaches to  a  theoretical fram ework of "pure integration" 
concerned with relating  cost, schedule, and technical perform ance param eters to 
each other. This would perm it qualified analysis of any one of the three 
param eters in term s of the other two and would re la te  ail three in term s of to ta l 
program or project activity . Analysis stresses the  horizontal integration of 
functional ac tiv ity , the  vertical integration of h ierarch ic  decision and organiza­
tional levels, the  "problemistic search" (search prom pted by th e  existence of a 
problem and aimed a t  problem resolution) and "opportunistic surveillance" 
(search activ ity  not by a problem, but by the  desire to avoid problems and seek 
opportunities).^ The context of the  analysis and not the  issues suggests the tone 
of the difference betw een this study and other works.
In sum, this study is unique in several major respects. Its utility 
a ttaches to this uniqueness and the fac t th a t th e  findings and conclusions may 
serve as guides in developing in tegrated  control systems for fu ture large-scale 
endeavors.
Organization of the Study
This study consists o f eight chap ters, including th is introductory 
chapter. The organization of the m aterial is in te rre la ted  with the methodology
Jam es D. Thompson a ttrib u tes  the concept of "problem istic search" to 
C yert and March and coins the terminology "opportunistic surveillance" himself 
in Organizations in Action (New York: M cGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967),
pp. 151-52.
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of the study and stem s from the use of the s truc tu red  functional param eters in 
the anaiysis m atrix . This form at balances the need for analytical c larity  with 
the natural sequential a ttractiveness of a chronological technique.
C hapter II synthesizes salien t m ilestones in the  evolution of manage­
m ent control from its  early  pragm atic origins to its  present s ta te . The emphasis 
of the  chapter will be on tw entie th -cen tury  achievem ents and contributions.
C hapter III is a  h istorical account of the Safeguard program. The 
chapter traces the m ajor milestones in the evolution of the program from its 
inception, emphasizing the organizational changes th a t paralleled system 
evolution. This background will enable the reader to  gain deeper insight into why 
the m anagem ent doctrine m atured as it  did.
The analysis m atrix is fully developed in C hapter IV. The basic 
objective of the  chap ter is to construct the foundation for the subsequent 
analysis. A logical co rre la te  to th is objective is to  provide for smooth transition 
from the in troductory  and prerequisite m aterial to  the  body of the study.
Chapters V, VI, and VII address the s tru c tu red  functional phases of 
cost, schedule, and technical perform ance, respectively . The form at of these 
th ree  chapters is sim ilar, but emphasis is on those factors critical to  the 
pertinen t anaiysis.
Finally, study summary and conclusions are  presented in Chapter VIII. 
It is a synthesis of the  study proper and an a rticu la tion  of major conclusions. 
Appendices are utilized to present supportive secondary m aterial.
CHAPTER II
MANAGEMENT CONTROL: SOME HISTORICAL MILESTONES
This chap ter synthesizes m ilestones in the evolution of management 
control chronologically, from its  pragm atic origins to  its  present s ta ted  
M anagement control as a distinguishable field of m anagem ent is relatively new, 
bu t its  origins are  deeply rooted—not just in growth of the management 
discipline, but in the  evolution of mankind itse lf. Control, in varying forms and 
degrees, is a  necessary process in the  fundam ental functioning of family, church, 
governm ent, m ilitary, academ ic, and business organizations. In essence, it is 
found throughout social, economic, and political system s and institutions. 
Significant historical contributions to  m anagement control techniques have come 
from many fields o f endeavor and much of what is form ally known today about 
m anagem ent control has been derived from earlier theory and methodology.
Many of the individual theories and applications discussed in this paper 
a re  considered by modern scholars to  be original and unique contributions to  the 
field of m anagem ent control. In some cases, contributions consisted prim arily of
The course of m anagem ent thought through the ages is frequently 
d ifficu lt to perceive due to  the  myriad of exogenous influences, the complex 
interrelationships o f sim ilar conceptual approaches, and the need to analyze 
contributions not only in light of h istorical perspective but also in the existing 
environm ent of their conception. A fram e of reference serves to neutralize 
these many fac to rs , thus perm itting clearer definition and sharper focus. The 
following tex t was utilized for such a  purpose in the  research underlying 
preparation of this paper: Daniel A. Wren, The Evolution of Management
Thought (New York: Ronald Press, 1972).
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expanding an original concept or p rac tice  by extending its dimensions or by 
providing keener and more persuasive insight as a resu lt of broader application or 
g re a te r  depth of analysis. A dvancem ent of the s ta te -o f- th e -a r t also occurred 
through the novel integration o f specifically selected  aspects of several theories 
or applications, often with a resu ltan t synergistic e ffe c t. The substance of 
individual contributions often varied in m agnitude, but viewed in perspective, 
these historical milestones form , underscore, and reinforce a  continuously 
evolving body of knowledge.
It is difficult to determ ine consistently and conclusively the  relative 
significance and m erit o f all individual contributions to  management control. In 
the  research e ffo rt associated with the developm ent of this chapter, deliberate 
decisions had to be made regarding inclusion o f germ ane information and 
exclusion of less relevant m aterial. This is a  subjective m atte r and the threshold 
of accep tance or rejection may vary with individual scholars. Because of the 
scope of the subject, this chapter is not a  structu ralized  and institutionalized 
exam ination. The purpose is not encyclopedic conprehensiveness, but an 
intensive e ffo rt was made to  include m ajor contributions tha t had e ither 
significance to  the tim e or were the  foundation for la te r theory or application. 
In many cases, the m aterial included fulfilled both conditions since the 
developm ent of managem ent in general and m anagem ent control in particular has 
been an evolutionary process. Especially in recen t years has our progress been 
built upon the  foundation of prior thought. Many tex ts, artic les, and papers were 
reviewed and were deemed to  be prim arily documentation of, ra ther than 
extension of, the body of knowledge relevant to m anagem ent control. R eference 
to these less pertinent m aterials was om itted  and emphasis placed on the more 
germ ane contributions.
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Ancient Thought and P ractice  
In searching for the origins of m anagem ent control, it is necessary to 
look beyond current terminology and conceptual boundaries of the field for such 
an envelop would be fa r too restric tive . It would reduce the primary search area 
to this century and elim inate from consideration earlie r activ ities tha t form 
elem ents of a broader and historically more accu ra te  p icture. While it  is 
difficult to  determ ine the  true  beginnings of m anagem ent control or, for th a t 
m atte r, the genesis of the managem ent discipline itse lf, management control had 
its origins in the applied ingenuity of early  man solving the problems of his day. 
In this sense, m anagem ent control had no single, tangible, in itial milestone, but a 
series of early  m ilestones th a t are  fragm entary  and som ewhat blurred by tim e 
and lack of detailed accounts of ancient man. The inform ation that is available, 
however, points to  the fac t tha t control in various forms was in evidence in a 
number of early  cultures.
Sumeria^
In the Sumerian civilization of approxim ately 5000 B.C. it was the 
responsibility of specified tem ple priests to manage the worldly goods and 
business functions of the religious institu tion. Taxes were levied on the people 
and paid in varying forms of tangible property, including livestock. Loans made 
by the religious organizations to  its people were also repaid in like manner. 
These "manager" priests thus were in the  position of not only having to keep 
track of income and expenditure item s, but periodically to give an account of
This subsection is based largely on V. G. Childe, Man Makes Himself 
(New York; The New American Library, 1951), c ited  by Claude S. George, J r., 
The History of M anagement Thought, 2d ed. (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-H all, Inc., 1972), pp. 3-4.
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their stewardship to  the chief priest. Accounting practices of the tim e , utilized 
by individuals for their own m anagem ent purposes (the use of notched sticks as 
an example), were insufficient for the array  of accounts controlled by the  p riest. 
Additionally, the accounts frequently survived the priest a t his death , and it 
became difficult for successor m anager priests to  determ ine account s ta tu s. 
Memory simply did not suffice under these complications of periodic audit and 
demise o f the manager.
It was this need for inventory control tha t led to  the developm ent of 
an early system of writing by the Sumerian priests to  record the m ultitude of 
individual transactions occasioned by the  taxation and lending practices of the 
culture. This early recognition of the need for and desirability of m anagem ent 
control served the day-to-day transactional requirem ents of the priest and 
perm itted  transition to  another m anager as the need arose.
Egypt
The Egyptian culture is frequently  remembered prim arily for its  
accomplishments in the construction of the pyramids and canals, but it  was also a 
culture of ’’bureaucratic  s ta te  adm inistration.”  ̂ The pyramids stand in silent 
testim ony to  the construction skills of the  Egyptians and such mammoth 
undertakings undoubtedly required extensive control m easures.^ It is in the  
"bureaucratic s ta te  adm inistration," however, th a t an equally im portant 
contribution was made.
^Gross, The Managing of Organizations: The A dm inistrative
Struggle, p. 35.
^George, The History of M anagement Thought, pp. 4-5.
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The s ta te  adm inistrative structure  was large and taxation widespread. 
Government bookkeeping grew to  large proportions because of the extensiveness 
of the adm inistrative s truc tu re , the number of em ployees on the payroll, and the  
fac t th a t records were kep t of many d ifferen t activ ities throughout the  s ta te . 
As an example, records were kept on harvesting operations, wages paid, slaves, 
and worker perform ance. These la tte r  records, re la tive  to perform ance, w ere 
kept as marginal notes, in red, and contained inform ation concerning the worker's 
absences, If he had been lazy, and finally his death . The clerks and scribes In 
Egypt enjoyed a  high station  In life, and governm ent service was a ttra c tiv e  for 
both free  men and slaves. To be appointed as a  w rite r or clerk to  the Pharaoh 
was a  high and desirable honor. In essence, th e  Pharaoh functioned as the head 
of a large business activ ity  Involving control o f th e  waterways, taxation, and 
Internal adm inistrative concerns as early as perhaps 4000 B.C.^
Babylonia
The Babylonian civilization was approxim ately chronologically parallel 
to  the Egyptian culture and dates back to  4000 B.C. It also dem onstrated early  
recognition of the  desirability of record-keeping. Whether the  Egyptians and 
Babylonians developed th e ir systems Independently or one taught It to the o ther 
Is unknown, but many of the  control mechanisms and account classifications were 
sim ilar.^
I
C. B ertll Nystrom er, Four Thousand Y ears In the Office (Stockholm; 
National Office M anagement Association, 1940), reprinted in p a rt by Edward C. 
Bursk, Donald T. Clark, and Ralph W. Hidy, eds., The World of Business, Vol. I 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 66-68.
^Ibld., p. 67.
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About 2000 B.C., Hammurabi becam e King of Babylon and established 
a cen tral governm ent. He is probably most rem em bered for the code he 
developed for the  dispensing of justice throughout the Empire. The code 
contained over th ree  hundred separa te  en tries and covered many facets of 
secular activity , including trad e  and business.^
Com m ercial control mechanisms were evidenced in the code by
requirem ents for w ritten  and sealed receip ts, co n trac ts , and witnesses to
transactions. Many form s o f transactions such as loans, leases, and mortgages
w ere covered by the code. As a  consequence, there were many official
documents in the  form of clay tab le ts  th a t were filed in a fashion similar to
curren t index card system s. The bookkeeping system covered both cred it and
cash transactions and incom e and expenditure accounts. While not a double entry
form  of accounting, the  system  was used as a  control technique and a method for
periodically determ ining the p ro fit and loss of business or individual 
2
transactions.
The use of color coding for inventory control was evidenced some 
years la ter during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar (605-562 B.C.). As grain from 
the fields was harvested, i t  was placed in large earthenw are containers and a 
colored reed placed in the  seal of each. It was advantageous to d ifferen tia te  
containers by year of harvesting and each year was assigned a  d ifferen t color.^
Hammurabi, The Oldest Code of Laws in the World, translated  by 
C. H. W. Jones (Edinburgh; T. and T. Clark, 1903), reprinted in p a rt by Bursk, 
C lark, and Hidy, eds.. The World of Business, p. 9,
2
N ystrom er, Four Thousand Years in the O ffice, pp. 64-66.
^L. P. Alford, Laws of M anagement Applied to Manufacturing (New 
York: Ronald Press, 1928), p . 37.
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This simple yet serviceable means perm itted  easy identification of th e  age of the 
grain inventory lo ts. It dem onstrates an early recognition of the effectiveness of 
color coding as a control technique.
China ̂
Two contributions of the Chinese culture deserve brief mention. The
firs t, the C onstitution of Chou, was basically a  combined job descriptions catalog
and standard operating procedure for the  em peror's civil servants a t all levels. In
describing the  responsibilities and powers of the  prim e m inister, i t  defined his
power in term s of control over the king's officers—th e  ultim ate power being
2
death, " ...th a t controls the ir excessiveness." Regulatory aspects re lative to the 
position of prim e m inister dealt with in ternal adm inistration of the governm ental 
departm ents and included regulations concerning organization, functions, in te r­
departm ental relationships, procedure, the appearance of permanency in the 
s tructu re , control, punishment, and auditing. Finally, th e  constitution provided 
for methods by which the prim e m inister should govern the empire. This aspect 
covered such factors as control of ritual and worship, taxes and tribu tes, 
punishment and reward, and control o f employment. This law was w ritten  about 
1100 B.C. and displays a perceptive grasp of the  need fo r and use of pervasive 
control processes both in the in ternal adm inistrative and external governing 
functioning of the empire.
Approximately 600 years la te r the Chinese philosopher Mencius, in 
describing the wisdom required of a leader, urged the use of systems, procedures.
^This subsection is based largely on George, The History of Manage­
m ent Thought, pp. 11-13.
^Ibid., p. 12.
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and models generated by specialists. He advised th a t not only business concerns, 
but individual craftsm en as well, needed a system in order to  succeed. He drew 
an analogy between th e  craftsm an using a compass to inscribe a circle and the 
king using a system to  govern the em pire. He asserted  tha t occasionally the  
skilled artisan could draw  a circle without the use of a  system, but tha t with a  
system or model even th e  unskilled could achieve th e  perfection of the specialist. 
Thus, Mencius cogently argued, the  leader would be less perceptive than the  
craftsm an to a ttem p t to  govern without a system as a model. The inherent 
sim plicity of the analogy underscores the fundam ental implications of using 
control processes developed by specialists.
Greece
The contributions of Socrates are m anifest in many areas of thought,
and A ristotle, by re jecting  mysticism , has been given recognition as "the fa ther
of the scientific  method."^ Socrates recognized the  universality of management
2
in describing the  expertise  required in adm inistration. He spoke of control in the 
connotation of m anagem ent or direction of organized units such as esta tes , 
choral groups, and a rm ies. He emphasized th a t managerial skills w ere 
transferable and th a t those who understood how to  apply them would be 
successful managers of both public and private a ffa irs  and th a t those who did not 
would fa il in e ith e r. In Socrates' mind the d ifference between the managem ent 
or control of public and private a ffa irs  differed only in magnitude.^
^Wren, The Evolution of Management Thought, p. 17.
^Ibid., p. 16.
^Gross, The Managing of O rganizations; The Administrative 
Struggle, p. 94.
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A ristotle held views sim ilar to  those of Socrates concerning the 
universality of management between th e  private sector and the  public sector of 
ac tiv ity . Additionally, he sought tru e  knowledge by questioning through reason, 
and "...th is spirit of scien tific  inquiry would form a basis for scientific 
management."^ From these two g reat philosophers came concepts tha t carry to 
this day.
India
Kautilya was an Indian statesm an and vizier to King Chandragupta 
around 300 B.C. Like others th a t followed la te r  in history, he wrote his 
A rthasastra (the oldest book in ex tan t Sanskrit litera ture)^  21s a comprehensive 
account of general principles and specific  rules concerning th e  governing of an 
em pire's internal adm inistration and foreign affairs.^  It seems unorthodox to 
characterize  Kautilya as "M achiavellian," yet this reference aptly describes his 
approach to  adm inistration and the tenor of his advice for "He was unscrupulous
à
and treacherous, but never to  his King."
Kautilya was concerned with the difficulty of securing men of 
sufficient trustworthiness to serve the s ta te  with integrity . He saw this as a 
basic problem of adm inistration, and his solution was one of extensive 
adm inistrative control and perform ance assessm ent. As an example, he specified
^Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 17.
2
Will Durant, The Story of C ivilization, Vol. I: Our Oriental Heritage 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 443.
^Gross, The Managing of Organizations: The Administrative
Struggle, p. 92.
a
Durant, Our Oriental H eritage, pp. 441, 443.
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daily analysis of empioyee results in term s of cost, tim e, and functions 
perform ed. Carelessness and e rro r were to  be dealt with harshly through fines 
and punishment. An even more e laborate  p a rt of his schem e, however, involved 
an extensive netw ork of spies and covert a ttem p ts  to compromise s ta te  officials. 
The spies were not only to  secure inform ation and report it  to the king, but were 
also charged to  m ake calcu lated  and deliberate a ttem p ts  a t entrapm ent.^ While 
the  methods proposed m ay seem unduly harsh, there  can be little  doubt 
concerning the value th a t K autiiya placed on the  perform ance m easurem ent, 
feedback, and co rrec tiv e  action  face ts  of adm inistrative control.
Rome
The adm inistra tive s truc tu re  of the Roman Empire a tta ined  vast 
proportions,^ and the  basic control mechanism of the s ta te  was its  m ilitary 
s treng th . The geographic dispersion of the colonies presented probiems initially, 
and the governm ent sought to ease the burden by contracting out such public 
activ ities as collection of custom s duties, tithes, and fees; mining operations; and 
provisioning of field forces of the Roman Army.^ This system ultim ately  proved 
unsatisfactory and, under Augustus, pubiic functions th a t had been con tracted  
out reverted  to  in ternal s ta te  activ ity  by making civil servants of the 
businessmen involved. This adm inistrative reform  proved highly successful.^ It
^Gross, The Managing of Organizations; The A dm inistrative Struggle, 
pp. 102-3. ; -----------------------------------------------------
^Ibid., p. 34.
^Arnold J . Toynbee, "Thinking Ahead: Will Businessmen Be Civil
Servants?" Harvard Business Review 36 (Septem ber-O ctober 1958): 34.
^Ibid., p. 38.
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is in teresting to  note th a t the proper balance between government "in-house" 
activ ity  and con tracted  activ ity  is still a  m a tte r of attention in the  federal 
governm ent.
Communication could have been a  problem in control, but the
"consular roads" aided communication and transport alike. The Roman road
system has been described as " ...th e  tenacles of Roman law, the members by
which the mind of Rome became the will of the  realm."^
Evidence is found in Roman civilization of guaranteed currency, an
early corporate  form of joint-stock companies operating under s ta te  control,
s tr ic t s ta te  regulation of economic life  coupled with liberal com m ercial policy,
2
and a governm ent of separated executive and legislative powers.
The Roman Empire was the  most advanced government the world had 
seen. It developed a  system of m unicipalities and a  communication and transport 
system of roads th a t were unexcelled in term s of speed of travel until the advent 
of the railroads.
Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
A ncient man was predom inantly reactive  and his response to the 
environm ent dem onstrated a pragm atic approach to coping with his problems. 
The means devised for record-keeping and inventory control a re  specific 
examples. Contributions to theory w ere lim ited  and th e re  Is scant evidence to  
suggest any interchange of ideas or techniques between cultures. In g rea t 
measure, con tro l was equated to coercive power in large-scale organizations with 
complex adm inistrative hierarchies.
^Will Durant, The Story of C ivilization, Vol. Ill: C aesar and C hrist 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 324.
^Ibid., pp. 79-80, 670.
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Early man was handicapped by his cu ltu ral environm ent, by his lim ited 
ability to  com m unicate, and by his methods of gathering, storing, and retrieving 
inform ation. M anagement control is a varied and complex problem, and the 
quality and effectiveness of the  control mechanism is re la ted  to  the  fidelity of 
the data^ and the instrum ental means of control. Early man was restric ted  both 
by the lack of high fide lity  da ta  and by the synthetic  aids of control processes.
The Middle Ages began with the fall of the Roman Empire, and the
outlook fo r civilization for the next eleven centuries was bleak. Conditions
during this period w ere hostiie and were marked by conflict and struggie. The
primary need of the populace was survival. This need for self-preservation gave
rise to  the feudal system  th a t lasted until approxim ately A.D. 1500. In return for
protection by the landowner, the serf worked the  soil and gave a share of his
output and a significantly larger portion of his individual freedom to  the feudal
lord. This period was one of stagnation, with education all but forgotten , and
in tellectual life was centered on preparation for the hereafter. Original
2
contributions to  m anagem ent thought were virtually non-existent.
The Renaissance ended the period of stagnation. In terest in trade was 
revived as a consequence of the desire for goods from the East, which was 
prompted by the  Crusades; the restoration of political order quelled some of the 
hostility of earlier years. This stim ulation of com m erce produced new m arkets 
th a t becam e new c itie s  and a  revitalization of old c ities th a t were given new
^B. G. Schum acher, Computer Dynamics in Public Administration 
(Washington, D.C.: Spartan Books, 1967), p. 48.
2
This contention is supported by both A. C. L ittleton, Accounting
Evolution to  1900 (New York; American Institu te  Publishing Co., Inc., 1933),
p. 16, and Wren, The Evolution of Management Thought, pp. 19-20.
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birth . Earlier concepts of property and money took on new and added 
significance beyond th a t of ancient tim es. The sp irit of the  Renaissance gave 
b irth  to  the concept of the creation of capital through productive use of labor 
and resources.^
Double Entry Accounting 
Ancient civilizations m aintained bookkeeping records prim arily in 
te rm s of receipts and expenditures, and they d ifferen tia ted  betw een cash and 
c red it transactions. The system  did not use double columns, and even precise 
placem ent of en tries In single columns may have been more a  penchant for 
neatness than a  device for ease  of com putation.^
The w ealth of th e  ancient world was s ta tic  in the form  of temples, 
palaces, and precious gems and m etals, but the  w ealth of com m erce was 
dynamically and productively employed in creating additional cap ita l. It was this 
creation  of capital th a t perhaps generated the final spark tow ard double entry 
accounting.^
Littleton described seven fac to rs as necessary prerequisites to the 
inevitability of double entry accounting; the art of writing, a rith m etic , private 
property, money, c red it, com m erce, and capital. These e lem ents, activated  by 
conducive social and economic facto rs, produced a methodology; i.e ., double 
en try  bookkeeping.^ Probably the most conducive social fa c to r was the
1
Littleton, Accounting Evolution to 1900, pp. 18-19, and Wren, The 
Evolution of Management Thought, pp. 20-21.
^G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "Greek and Roman Accounting," in Studies in 
the History of Accounting, ed . by A. C. Littleton and B. 5. Yamey (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956), p. 14.
^Littleton, Accounting Evolution to  1900, p. 15. ^Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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partnership form of business since it c reated  the distinction betw een the firm 
and the owners. ̂
These prerequisite factors and the ca ta ly tic  social and economic
elem ents began th e ir  convergence as early as A.D. 1200 in the  c ity -sta tes  of
Italy, where cap ital form ation was developing through trading and lending.
Investm ent banking was found as early as A.D. 1171, when the  m erchants of
Venice advanced gold to  the government and were provided transferable  credit in
return . The existence of business partnerships as early as A.D. 1157 has been
established from records of th a t period. C apital began accum ulating in sizable
amounts, and a crude form of commercial banking grew from a necessity for
2
physical security of monetary assets.
It appears tha t double entry bookkeeping developed simultaneously in a  
number of trading cen ters in Italy . Evidence as early  as A.D. 1300 indicates that 
m erchants were utilizing equity and expense accounts, which is only a thought 
away from mandatory use of debit and cred it en tries. As with many different 
types of systems, th is last remaining hurdle was m ost likely overcome gradually 
through a process of tria l and error as opposed to  enunciation of specialized 
theory. Evidence of specific use of double en try  bookkeeping occurred as early 
as A.D. 1390 in the records of Datini, a Pratese m erchant-banker, although it is
3
possible th a t it may have em erged even earlier.
Raymond de Roover, "The Development of Accounting Prior to Luca 
Pacioli According to  the Account Books of Medieval Merchants," in Studies In the 
History of Accounting, ed. by Littleton and Yamey, p . 115.
^Ibid.
^Cosmo Gordon, "The First English Books on Book-Keeping," in Studies
in the History of Accounting, ed. by L ittleton and Yamey, p. 202.
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The earliest known w ritten  te x t on double entry  bookkeeping was
published in Venice in A.D. 1494. W ritten by Luca Pacioli, the  Summa de
A rithm etica, G eom etrica, Proportioni e t  Proportionalita was the result of work
over a th irty -year period. Truly one of the  g reat classics, the  tex t is not an
original work (Pacioli did not claim  it to be), but a collection of p ractices from
many sources. Pacioli indicated th a t his prim ary source m ateria l was from the
works of Leonardo da Pisa, who w rote in approximately A.D. 1200.^ The te x t was
translated  into German, Bohemian, Russian, Dutch, and English. The first
English tex t. Keeping the Reckoning Called D ebtor and C red ito r, by Hugh
2
O ldcastle, was published in A.D. 1543 w ithout acknowledgem ent of Pacioli. 
L ittle ton  suggests th a t a carefu l reading of the Summa will reveal "...how little  
basic change there  has been in bookkeeping..." due to  the simple and s ta tic  
nature of the principles involved.^
M anagement Control in Large Scale Production 
The arsenal in Venice was founded in A.D. 1104. While its functions 
always included construction and arming of Venetian warships, its  main mission 
was to serve as a munitions and naval stores depot. Initially it covered about 
eight acres, but additions in A.D. 1303 and A.D. 1325 increased its  size to  about 
30 acres in order to  increase its  productive capacity. This need was prompted by 
a decision to  concen tra te  galley building in the government shipyard. In addition, 
the arsenal was assigned the new function of maintaining a portion of the
^R. Em m ett Tayior, "Luca Pacioli," in Studies in the History of 
Accounting, ed. by L ittleton and Yamey, pp. 179-80.
^Gordon, "The F irst English Books on Book-Keeping," p. 202.
^L ittle ton , Accounting Evolution to  1900, p. 77.
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m erchant marine fle e t. The arsenal's mission then rem ained unchanged for the
next one hundred and fif ty  years.^
Beginning In about A.D. 1470, the Venetians, spurred by the advance of
the Turks, began the form ation of a  formidable naval f le e t.  The decision to arm
100 light galleys and 20 g rea t galleys required addition to the arsenal, which
doubled Its size to approxim ately 60 acres of ground and w ater. At Its zenith In
the mid 1500s the A rsenal of Venice employed 1,000 to  2,000 men and had
2expenditures of 100,000 to  200,000 ducats annually. This budget equates to 
approxim ately $2,250,000 to  $4,500,000.^
The direct m anagem ent of the arsenal was vested  In "Commissioners 
of the  Arsenal" responsible for mission activ ities and Lords of the Arsenal 
responsible for "...financial m anagem ent, the collection of funds, the purchase of 
supplies, and the  sending of munitions."^ Two Commissioners acted as liaison 
between the arsenal and the  Senate. Since the arsenal was considered the heart 
of the  power of the s ta te , the Senate and the secretaries of s ta te  participated 
directly In its m anagem ent. This extensive and overlapping authority  m eant tha t 
no single Individual or even a single group had full command authority or 
responsibility, but this system  of control was by design and not by accident.^
^Frederic C. Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), pp. 129-31.
^Ibld., pp. 137-40, 146.
^The gold ducat contained 3.5 grams or 54 grains of gold, which 
equates to  0.1125 oz. (Troy weight). A ducat would equate  to  approximately 
$22.50, with gold a t $200.00 per oz.
^Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance, p. 143.
^Ibld., pp. 146-52.
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The growth of the arsenal resu lted  in s tric t regulation of the 
accounting process. All records were consolidated in two journals and one 
ledger. One journal was kept by an accoun tan t and th e  chief accountant en tered  
item s in the  ledger from this journal. The second journal was kept by a Lord of 
the Arsenal and used periodically to check the  ledger. The ledger was balanced 
annually, balances carried  over to  a new ledger, and the old books sent to  the 
treasury  for audit. Com plete and accura te  records w ere of prim ary concern.^
The system  was sufficiently detailed  th a t an accountant in 1564
determ ined th a t internal movement of lum ber within the arsenal cost 500 ducats
annually and th a t the  clearing of wood kept in fro n t of the slips (to perm it
launching of a ship) cost 1,200 ducats annually. This analysis ultim ately led to
revision of the casual methods used in storing lum ber. It appears th a t com pleted
item s of inventory such as benches, oars, sails, rigging, m asts, rudders, and spars
were controlled in a far more orderly and system atic  fashion. These finished
inventory item s were arranged in order in designated warehouses, with the item s
to be issued la s t c losest to  the exit. The oarm akers' shop had an opening in the
wall near the ex it for issue of oars, one of the  last item s to be distributed to
2
galleys being launched.
S tric t physical security of the arsenal was maintained. Visitors were 
not perm itted  and all workers were searched upon leaving. All m aterials leaving 
the  arsenal required w ritten  authorization of the Lords and the fac t of release 
and destination of the  goods was recorded. In sim ilar fashion, all m ateria l 
received was duly recorded.^
^Ibid., pp. 153-55. ^Ibid., pp. 158-60, 175.
% id .,  pp. 156-57, 193.
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The A rsenal of Venice, In the  six teen th  century, was perhaps the 
largest industrial fac ility  of the  time. It was e ffic ien t; it maintained physical, 
inventory, and v isitor control; i t  had standards of quality for acceptance and 
rejection of raw and finished m aterials; and it m aintained com plete and accurate  
accounting records.^ Its combination of accounting and inventory procedures, 
coupled with departm entalization of the construction process, perm itted estim a­
tion of status of com pletion of each galley under construction and calculation of
2
its cost when fully equipped and ready fo r serv ice. While no mention is made of 
the cost-effectiveness or perform ance m easurem ent aspects of arsenal activ ity , 
its  accomplishment of its mission was highly successful when measured by 
standards of the tim e.
Information in M anagement Control^
The availability of timely, accu ra te , and pertinen t information is 
essential to the contro l function. Evidence of this fac t was dem onstrated by the 
Romans and their e laborate road system used for both transport and communica­
tion. In the fiercely com petitive commerce of the  six teenth  century, the timely 
availability of a d ifferen t breed of inform ation could, indeed, result in major 
advantage over com petitors.
The Fugger family achieved prominence in cen tral Europe with a 
diversity of in terests  including banking, mining, spice trading, and weaving.
4bid ., pp. 143-46, 153, 158-60, 193-95.
^Ibid., pp. 158-60.
^This subsection is based largely on Rodger Burlingame, Endless
Frontiers: The Story of McGraw-Hill (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1959), pp. 13-15.
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ranging geographically from China to Peru. With headquarters in Augsburg, it  
had agents in the larger cities such as London, Paris, Antwerp, and Venice. The 
geographic dispersion of its in terests, the heavy com petition from its business 
rivals, the political environment of war and in ternational intrigue, and the 
existence of piracy made timely information concerning political and financial 
s ta tu s im perative to continued success.
The House of Fugger developed the  equivalent of a manual information 
system  centralized  in Augsburg and fed by sa te llite  centers in the larger cities 
th a t were, in turn, subcenters receiving inform ation from throughout the 
country. Input took the form of handwritten le tte rs , subm itted regularly, 
concerning c ritica l issues of in terest to  the firm . The inform ation contained in 
the  le tte rs  was highly sensitive and dealt with local political conditions, 
activ ities of com petitors (one le tte r  in 1585 forwarded a com plete inventory of 
the  contents of ships outbound from India), inform ation concerning prospective 
custom ers and their in terests, and m atters of calcu lated  speculation.
Received in the "Golden Counting-House," as the headquarters in 
Augsburg was called, the  new sletters were analyzed, da ta  from various parts  of 
the  world com pared, and conclusions drawn regarding appropriate action. 
L etters of instruction were then prepared and returned to  the agents for 
im plem entation. While the techniques of Information processing have improved 
in the tw entieth  century, the fundamental mechanics of the operation are not 
unlike those employed by the House of Fugger alm ost five hundred years ago.
Political Control
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) served for a number of years as a 
minor civil servant in the c ity -s ta te  of Florence. He was an idea-man and 
perform ed adm inistrative work for the politicians of the  government. He was
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adept a t diplomacy and frequently was sen t on diplom atic missions outside
Florence. He was in a position to  analyze power, and did so by observing "behind
the scenes" activ ity . He was removed from  office  when the Medici fam ily was
restored  to  power and it was during this period of enforced inactivity  th a t  he
w rote The Prince in 1513 in an unsuccessful a tte m p t to regain the favor o f the
Medicis and thus reinstatem ent.^
M achiavelli took a dim view of the basic nature of man and made
numerous references to  man as "bad," On the  assumption th a t men would not
keep faith  with the ruler, he argued tha t the  ruler need not keep fa ith  with them
if i t  was against his own in terests. He advocated d ece it as required, the allusion
of good qualities as favorable to  actually possessing and observing them , and the
2
abiiity to do evil if constrained in order to  m aintain control of the populace. On 
in ternal adm inistration, Machiavelli suggested th a t it was im portant for a prince 
to assert his authority by rewarding or punishing any extraordinary ac t of good or 
evil in a way th a t would be well publicized.^
Machiavelli equated control to power and fe lt th a t the ends always 
justified the  means. Because of his w ritings, his name is now frequently 
synonymous w ith "unscrupulousness." But it  is in teresting to note tha t politics 
was M achiavelli's "bag" and he was an experienced political observer, ambassa­
dor, and adm inistrator. The tone of his work was in keeping with the ac tua l, but 
never openly adm itted , practice  of the tim es. In essence, he put into w ritten  
form the real political spirit of his age, and this c rea ted  more enemies for him
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, trans. by Luigi 
R icci, rev. by E. R. Vincent with an introduction by Max Lerner (New York; 
Random House, 1940), pp. xxv-xxviii.
^Ibid., pp. 63-68. % id „  pp. 63-68, 82.
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than e v e r /  Regardless of one's reaction  to  Machiavelli's precepts, his works 
stand as classic lite ra tu re  of the  tim es.
Production Economies
In 1776, the  g rea t econom ist Adam Smith (1723-90) published his Wealth
2
o f Nations and thus established the "classical" school of economic thought. 
Smith was one of the firs t to  provide specific  insight into the division of labor by 
recognizing th ree  fundam ental econom ic advantages from such prac tice : the 
developm ent of dexterity  and skill through repetitive perform ance of a single 
task , a savings of tim e by not having to  switch from one activ ity  to  another, and 
th e  fac t th a t the development of tools and machines seemed normally to  follow 
when men concentrated  on tasks o f re s tric ted  scope. It is interesting to note 
th a t these were not hypotheses of a  theorist, but conclusions based on em pirical 
studies.^
Adam Smith's recognition of the  existence of a  basis for economies of 
production through division of labor accelerated  the specialization of labor 
process and gave impetus to th e  fac to ry  system .^ Adam Smith had a supply 
oriented view of macroeconomic theory based on an assumption tha t aggregate 
demand was dictated by aggregate  supply. While his to ta l view of economic 
theory was macro in scope, his analysis of the division of labor was a m icro view 
o f the production process.
^Ibid., pp. xxviii, xxxii.
^Wren, The Evolution of M anagem ent Thought, p. 23.
^Elwood S. Buff a , Modern Production Management, 2d ed. (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 4.
'^Ibid.
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Period  of Transition
The period of history just discussed began in despair and ended in the
first stretchings of awakening. The Crusades rev ita lized  in terest in trad e , the
productive use of cap ita l resulted in new business form s and a shift from b a rte r
economy, and the com plexities o f commerce urged improvement in control
techniques. Improvements occurred, but these were largely the outgrow th of
practice  as opposed to  development of pre-established theory. T ransm itta l of
ideas and practices between cultures was still v irtually  non-existent, but the
invention of the Gutenberg printing press in 1450 was to  have a dram atic im pact
on the transmission of information.^
Many of the  restrictions of ancient man continued through this period.
Efficient control was s till hampered by the lack of e ffec tiv e  synthetic aids to the
control process and information technology was nebulous a t  best.
The Industrial Revolution in England, spurred by the developm ent of
Watt's steam  engine in 1765, marked a period of transition  in the technology of
man. It underscored the shift in emphasis from s ta tic  technology involving
instrum ents of little  or no motion to  dynamic technology characterized by energy 
2
converters. It diminished his dependence on agriculture and opened the door to  
economic growth. The essence of the  Industrial Revolution was the substitution 
of machine power for the  prime movers of human, anim al, and natural power, but 
two other revolutions also occurred simultaneously in England. The firs t was a
1
Burlingame, Endless Frontiers; The Story of McGraw-Hill, p. 23.
2
Morris C. Leikind and Wyndham Miles, "The N ature of Science and 
Technology," in Science and Technology; Vital N ational Assets, eds. Ralph 
Sanders and Fred R. Brown (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces, 1966), pp. 7-8.
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scientific  revoiution during which man began to  sh ift from the Bible and look 
around him. This revolution broke with the  idea of science for the sake of 
science and turned toward science for the sake of technology and advancem ent. 
The second was the agricultural revolution, in which land previously utilized for 
agricultural purposes was turned into pasture for the  grazing of sheep. As wool 
grew in im portance, enclosures o f common land used for public farming w ere 
increasingly converted. This closing of farm land, coupled with im provem ents in 
farm  machinery, forced farm ers to  seek other employment. It was this ready 
force th a t f irs t began to fill the  labor needs of the new factories.^
Early Factory System 
The early factory  system  of the Industrial Revolution had its origins in 
the "domestic," or "cottage," or "putting-out" system  of the Renaissance. Under 
this system , a  m erchant purchased raw m ateria ls and distributed them to 
individual workers or fam ilies. These in turn m anufactured the  product and sold 
it back to the merchant to recover value added. The m erchant needed sufficient 
capital for the purchase of raw m aterials and finished goods; the workers needed 
sufficient capital for purchase of the tools of the ir trade. The fac to ry  system 
brought together capital, raw m aterials, tools of m anufacturing, and workers; 
and separated ownership from m anagem ent of the enterprise. Traditionally, the 
three  elem ents of land, labor, and capital had been recognized as the  factors of 
production. A French economist, Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832), was the first to 
recognize management as an explicit fourth fac to r of production.^
^Wren, The Evolution of Management Thought, pp. 36-38.
^Ibid., pp. 21, 42.
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The problems presented by the factory  system were unique in the 
history of man. The new manager could not rely on devotion, dogma, or military 
discipline as had his fo refathers. Additionally, he had to  com pete in the m arket 
place and make a profit. These problems w ere made more complex by the fac t 
th a t labor was unskilled, untrained, and undisciplined in relation to the rigors of 
factory  production. The lack of knowledge on management methods and of codes
I
of management behavior fu rther compounded the problem.
The growth of the facto ry  system led to  many new difficulties, not the 
least of which was the control of perform ance. The complexities of 
industrialization and organizational size precluded the manager's ability to 
personally supervise all activ ity . This is not to imply th a t personal observation 
of all operations had been the unanimous p rac tice  of m anagem ent prior to this 
period, for it was not. The significance, however, was in the skill of the 
workman. Whereas the earlier workman was basically skilled in his particular 
c ra ft, the workman in the early factory  system was generally not well trained. 
The need for close observation to insure satisfactory  perform ance and quality 
added to the continuing need for close supervision to insure physical security.
The factory  system resulted in some improvements in protection of 
m aterials and physical security, but quality control did not improve much over 
earlier system s. Control over raw m aterials and supplies was slack and 
manufacturing methods lacked standardization. These fac to rs  coupled with a 
lack of skilled workers often resulted in products of varying quality. Financial 
control in the form of double entry  bookkeeping was one of the more advanced
^Ibid., pp. 43-50. ^Ibid., pp. 54-55.
^George, The History of M anagement Thought, p. 53.
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techniques of m anagem ent control, but th e re  is lit t le  evidence th a t the 
accounting function was utilized in decision-making in the  early  factory  system.^
Textile M anagement
Jam es Montgomery of Glasgow, Scotland, was "the” authority  on 
2
tex tile  mills of his tim es. Writing in the 1830s, his works may be the first 
"managem ent” tex t;^  a significant milestone in history.
Montgomery's firs t advice to the mill m anager was tha t he have a 
detailed knowledge of the business including how to regulate  the speed of the 
machine, adjust the "draught" (i.e., pull or tension) of the machines, and make 
changes in the size of the yarn and quality of th e  fabric. Montgomery argued 
th a t without a  thorough knowledge of the operation, the m anager "...will not be 
so able to  d e tec t the deficiencies of others, and therefore  be more liable to  be 
taken advantage o f.”^ He also recommended th a t  the m anager keep accurate 
records of cotton of unacceptable quality produced as a result of any altera tion  
of process or technique, in order th a t the full im port of such changes on 
profitability  be ascertainable.
The advice on control of workers showed elem ents of both an economic 
and social nature. Montgomery discussed the use of fines as negative sanctions. 
He also stressed being "firm and decisive" but no t "overbearing and tyrannical,”
4b id .
2Jam es Montgomery, The Carding and Spinning M aster's A ssistant; or. 
The Theory and P rac tice  of Cotton Spinning (Glasgow; 3. N. Niven, J r ., 1832), 
reprinted  in part by Jam es P. Baughman, ed., "Jam es Montgomery on Factory 
M anagement, 1832,” Business History Review 42 (Summer 1968): 219-26.
^Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 45.
ijL
Montgomery, The Carding and Spinning M aster's A ssistant, p. 221.
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"easy of access" without being "too fam iliar," and guarding both against "too
much lenity" and "too much severity ." He also suggested tha t male workers were
m ore self-regulating in term s of both quality and quantity than fem ale workers
"...whom it  is difficult to  make sensible of the ir responsibility, and the evils
resulting from carelessness on th e ir  part." Hence, fem ale employees required
constan t supervision.^
Montgomery also provided keen insight into the very essence of control
by any m anagement definition in his advice th a t the manager be "...always on the
2
a le r t to  prevent rather than check faults, a f te r  they have taken place..." thus 
underscoring the  prospective and preventive aspects of control.
Railroad Management^
While the tex tile  industry was growing and flourishing in the United 
S ta tes, it never reached the proportions of Am erican railroads, which "...were 
truly America's first 'big business.'"^
Daniel C. McCallum (1815-78), a  Scot who m igrated to  the United 
S tates and became general superintendent of the Erie Railroad in 1854, developed 
a m acro system of managem ent based on micro control mechanisms. His system 
included such micro control elem ents as "...detailed  job descriptions, frequent 
and accu ra te  reporting of perform ance, ...a  clearly defined hierarchy of 
au tho rity ..., and the enforcem ent o f personal responsibility and accountability
^Ibid., pp. 224-26.
^Ibid., p. 226.
^This subsection is based largely on Wren, The Evolution of Manage­
m ent Thought, pp. 84-92.
^Ibid., p. 84.
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throughout the  organization."^ He also drew up and published an organization 
chart of the railroad th a t, in addition to  organizational relationships, depicted 
lines of com m unication for control reporting. In this connection, he utilized the 
telegraph fac ilities as an integral part of his communications network, thus 
exhibiting once again the  necessity of inform ation to  control.
Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905), ed ito r of the  American Railroad 
Journal, was im pressed with McCallum's im provem ents in management of the  
Erie Railroad. Influenced by McCallum's in ternal operating procedures. Poor 
sought "broader principles" and a system ization of m anagem ent. In so doing, he 
expanded McCallum's work particularly in the a rea  of information and described 
a need for compiled financial data "...to  analyze the present system and to  
provide a base for changes to improve service."^
It would appear th a t McCallum's system  of control coupled with Poor's 
call for a  "data base" lacked only the advent of autom atic data processing 
techniques of the tw entie th  century to be transform ed into a skeletal framework 
of system s requirem ents for an autom ated m anagem ent information system.
Arsenal Management^
Captain Henry M etcalfe (1847-1917) graduated from the M ilitary 
Academy a t West Point, New York, in 1868 and was assigned to the Ordnance 
D epartm ent. In 1881 while stationed a t  Frankford Arsenal outside of
4bid ., p. 86. ^Ibid., p. 90.
^This subsection is based largely on Henry C. M etcalfe, The Cost of 
M anufactures and the  Administration of Workshops, Public and Private (New 
York; John Wiley and Sons, 1885), reprinted in p a rt by Harwood F. Merrill, ed.. 
Classics in M anagem ent (New York: American M anagem ent Association, 1960), 
pp. 46-56.
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, he developed and installed a unique and highly 
effective control system . The system was devised as a  method of controlling 
activ ity  a t  the arsenal workshops, and its  development resulted from the 
Inconvenience of the  existing system .
The system which M etcalfe developed was, in essence, a card  system  
consisting of serialized order ticke ts  for each activ ity  in the workshop, m ateria l 
cards documenting activity  against the work orders, and tim e cards for recording 
expended labor hours. It was in restricting  the cards to a  single entry  each th a t 
the system developed its g rea tes t potential. The cards were used to  replace all 
regular transitory papers and records, with only permanent records, required by 
army regulations, remaining.
M etcalfe's system was used to  control activ ity  from the tim e an order 
was received by the workshops until the finished product was dispatched. His 
system atic use of cards for individual transactions also perm itted cards to be 
combined through mechanical sorting. M etcalfe subsequently installed his 
system at other U.S. Army arsenals.
Conspectus of Additional Contributions
The emphasis of the Industrial Revolution was on technology ra ther 
than on management,^ but the  m anagem ent control process continued its 
evolution.
John S tuart Mill (1806-78), an English economist, in addressing the 
cause of superior productivity, identified skill and knowledge of both workers and 
managers, economies of tim e and m aterial, and "the general diffusion of
^Wren, The Evolution of Management Thought, p. 56.
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intelligence" as factors. He also deplored the "waste of wealth occasioned to
society by human improbity" and the nonproductive but necessary e ffo rt involved
in watching workmen as a result of th is human failing.^
R obert Owen (1771-1858), an English entrepreneur, sought to change the
conditions o f the worker occasioned by industrialization and the specialization of
labor by improving his environment from within the  factory  and through social 
2
reorganization.
Charles Babbage (1792-1871), an English m athem atical scien tist, was 
the firs t to w rite about scientific  management. He "...a ttem pted  to  show the 
m utuality of in terests between the  worker and the facto ry  owner somewhat 
sim ilar to w hat Taylor was saying 75 years later..."^ and was on the  edge of 
probability theory in his thinking.^ In 1822, Babbage developed a working 
"difference engine," the  forerunner of the electronic data  processer. As a 
scien tist, however, he was concerned only with the underlying principles. He had 
no im m ediate or la ter intention of com m ercial application, and the machine was 
never com pletely finished.^
Early Modern Thought and Its Amplification 
The Industrial Revolution led to  the creation of the factory  system 
th a t, in turn, compounded the demands on management. Primary atten tion  was
^Tohn S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Vol. 1, 3d ed. (London: 
John W. Parker and Sons, 1852), pp. 131-35.
2
Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 63.
^Ibid., p. 72.
^Ibid., pp. 68-72.
\y n d a l l  F. Urwick and E. F. L. Brech, The Making of Scientific 
M anagement, Vol. 1 (London: Management Publications Trust, 1949), pp. 21-22.
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focused on solution of technology problems, and resolution of the parallel 
managem ent control problems were secondary. Control was still thought of 
prim arily in te rm s of physical security , but was expanded to  include control of 
the  m anufacturing process. Double en try  bookkeeping was slowly pointing the 
way to  cost accounting and financial control, but the  full im port of these 
techniques for developing proper cu rren t and fu tu re  costs was not recognized.
This section covers the f ir s t  half of the tw entie th  cen tury . Viewed 
from the perspective of technique and technology, i t  spans the  period of 
scien tific  m anagem ent to  the  advent of au tom atic  data processing. This period 
was one of significant vertical growth in term s of theory and p rac tice  and of 
accelerated  horizontal growth in term s of d ifferentiation  and specialization.
The Industrial Revolution had increased the actual and potential 
productivity of man to new heights and yet man was still not in com plete control 
of the helm . The concentration of e ffo r t on industrial and productive technology 
with m anagem ent techniques receiving only secondary emphasis resu lted  in the 
form er outdistancing the la tte r , but full realization of the potential of the 
machine was a  function of the m anagem ent process. The task was one of 
integrating the  new m achinery of the Industrial Revolution into an anthropo- 
cen tric  environm ent.
During the f irs t half of the tw entie th  century the pace of progress 
quickened and m ilestones were more closely spaced. Management began to  come 
into its  own and to  exercise control with g rea ter confidence and precision. The 
developm ent of synthetic  aids to  m anagem ent assumed new dimensions.
The control problems generated by the  new industrialization were 
alm ost innum erable. Just as surely as necessity precip ita tes the  need for
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invention, the  conditions of the Industrial Revolution precipitated th e  need for 
system atic  thinking.
Advent of Scientific Management
Frederick Winslow Taylor
Frederick Winslow Tayior (1856-1915), an American engineer, produc­
tion m an, executive, and consultant, is the  recognizee fa ther of scientific 
m anagem ent." Taylor w ent to  work a t an early  age, temporarily bypassing higher 
level education, and becam e fam iliar with the  habits and environm ent of the 
worker. Realizing his lim itations due to  his lack of formal higher level 
education, he received a degree in m echanical engineering from Stevens Institute 
of Technology in Hoboken, New Jersey , in 1883, through correspondence study 
com pleted in only two and one half years. He also became president of the 
American Society of M echanical Engineers in 1906.^
Taylor's quest for science in m anagem ent was based on his conviction 
" ...th a t m anagem ent ought to be tre a te d  as an in tegrated  whole." He wanted to
find an answer to  what he considered the  fundam ental question; "What is a fair 
2
day's work?" In essence, Taylor sought " ...to  determ ine scien tifically  what the 
men ought to  be able to  do with their equipm ent and m aterials."^
Taylor's approach to  m anagem ent was originally term ed "task  manage­
m ent," and his basic m otivation was to  improve worker perform ance by showing
1Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, pp. 112-14, 133.
^L. M. G ilbreth and W. J. Ja ffee , "Management's Past—A Guide to  Its 
Future," in F ifty  Years Progress in M anagem ent, ed. by Oliver J . Sizemore and 
Marshall Anderson (New York: Am erican Society of Mechanical Engineers,
1960), p. 6.
^Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 116.
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him how to  perform  more effic ien tly  and effectively  without injuring his physical
being or his health . He utilized tim e study as a means of analyzing worker
activ ities and then determ ined the best way to perform  a job. His was a  view of
micro control a t th e  worker level in its most elem ental form.^ I t is in teresting to
note th a t Taylor mentions Henry M etcalfe's work a t  Frankford Arsenal in his tex t
Shop M anagement. In discussing the system , Taylor said th a t it "...represents
2
another such d is tinc t advance in th e  a r t of m anagement."
Taylor emphasized the need for planning and rigorous control of tasks 
and called for the establishm ent of a  special planning departm ent. He listed 
seventeen leading functions for the departm ent which included; com plete 
analysis of ail orders; balance of all m aterials, raw m aterials, stores, and finished 
parts; analysis of all inquiries for new work; cost of all items m anufactured, with 
com plete expense analysis and com plete com parative costs on a  monthly basis; 
inform ation bureau (for all drawings, records, and reports); and control of system 
and plant, including a "tickler" follow-up.^ His idea of the mission of such a 
departm ent was summed in his sta tem en t: "The shop, and indeed the whole
works, should be managed, not by the manager, superintendent, or forem an, but 
by the planning departm ent."^ It may be seen th a t many of the functions of the 
planning departm en t would curren tly  be considered functions of managem ent 
control.^
Frederick W. Taylor, Shop M anagement (New York: H arper &
Brothers Publishers, 1919), pp. 45-58. This te x t was first published in 1903 under 
the auspices of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
^Ibid., p. 202. ^Ibid., pp. 64, 110-20.
^Ibid., p. 110.
^Harlow S. Person, "The Origin and N ature of Scientific Management," 
in Scientific M anagement in Am erican Industry, ed. by Harlow S. Person (New 
York: H arper & Brothers Publishers, 1929), p. 5.
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In 1929, the  Taylor Society expressed the following principle of 
management control as consistent with Taylor's idea of scien tific  management;
There must be established a system atic  procedure, based on the 
defined standards, for the  execution of work; a procedure which 
directs the researches, establishes and m aintains the standards, 
in itia tes operations and controls work in process; which fac ilita tes  
each specialized e ffo rt and coordinates all specialized efforts, to the 
end th a t the common objective may be achieved with a minimum of 
waste of human and m ateria l energies, and with a  maximum of human 
welfare and contentm ent.
The depth of perception in this principle exem plifies the spirit of Taylor's
scientific m anagement.
Taylor also discussed the  principle of m anagem ent by exception
coming into use a t  the tim e. He argued th a t the  m anager should receive only
summarized inform ation covering all aspects of business and that even the
summaries should be reviewed by an assistant before submission to the manager.
All exceptions, both good and bad, to previously established standards or past
averages were to be highlighted.^
The tap root of Taylor's concept lay in the need for "mental
revolution" by both worker and m anagem ent. The essence of the  change was th a t
the worker and m anagem ent would stop arguing over the division of corporate
surplus and work together in harmony to increase the surplus.^ It is perhaps this




Taylor, Shop M anagement, p. 126.
^Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, 
reissued as part of Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific Management (New York: 
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 10.
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The advent of scientific  m anagem ent was an evolutionary process.
Taylor did not invent scien tific  m anagem ent as he himself te s t i f ie d /  and he
2
acknowledged sim ilar advanced work of o thers. But he did synthesize and apply 
the concepts a t  a tim e when widespread industrial expansion was taking place. 
His work had a  profound and lasting influence on modern management thought. 
Boddewyn synthesized Taylor's work on control with the  observation: "His
fundam ental insight tha t control res ts  on measurement was simplicity itself."^ 
Taylor's work represents one of our tru ly  significant management milestones.
While Taylor had a  number of close associates who assisted dram ati­
cally in the  development of scien tific  m anagem ent, th ree  in particular made 
major contributions to  the  specific field of management control.
Harrington Emerson
Harrington Emerson (1853-1931) was a disciple of Taylor and one of the
If,
emerging group of "efficiency engineers." His book, The Twelve Principles of 
Efficiency, outlined twelve principles for study and classification. His thrust was 
based on the premise th a t by knowing exactly  actual status and comparing i t  to  
what ought to be, i t  would be possible to determ ine a d irect relationship of 
efficiency. For Emerson, efficiency was necessary for the to ta l organization
U.S., Congress, House, Special Com m ittee, Hearings Before the 
Special Com m ittee of the House of R epresentatives to Investigate the Taylor and 
O ther Systems of Shop M anagement Under Authority of House Resolution 90, 
reprinted as part of Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific Management, pp. 5-6, 282.
^Taylor, Shop M anagement, pp. 201-2.
Boddewyn, "Frederick Winslow Taylor Revisited," Journal of the 
Academy of Management 4 (August 1961): 100.
Cl
Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 169.
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from top to  bottom . He clearly delineated the need for specific objectives; 
discipline; com parative records with reliab le, im m ediate, and accu ra te  informa­
tion; and specific standards and schedules. ̂
His book is also of significance due to his suggested introduction of the  
concept of m ilitary  s ta f f  into the industrial setting . He recognized the 
inevitability of line and s ta ff conflict, and his proposed solution gave insight into 
his idea of executive control;
For these clashes of line with line as to authority , of s taff with 
s ta f f  as to  knowledge and plans, for these clashes of each member of 
the  line with each separate m em ber of the  s ta ff, there  is only one 
rem edy—namely, the strong, governing and controlling executive, who 
need not be an expert in e ith e r s taff or line, but who must have those 
qualities th a t fit him to d irec t, to harm onize, to  convert a close 
parallelogram  of forces into an open stra igh t line along which all 
forces are  summed in the sam e direction. Everywhere this executive 
ability  is needed.
His concept of m anagerial ability was rem iniscent of th a t of Socrates in 
expression of the  universality of m anagem ent.
Frank Bunker Gilbreth
Frank Bunker Gilbreth (1868-1924) and Lillian Mollar G ilbreth (1878- 
1972) formed a ra re  husband and wife team  in the annals of the history of 
m anagem ent. G ilbreth admired Taylor, but worked in a field th a t he made his 
own, th a t of motion study. His wife was his constant companion "...whose work 
and record are inseparable from his."^
1H arrington Emerson, Thé Twelve Principles of Efficiency (New York: 
Engineering M agazine Company, 1912), pp. 59, 135, 205, 261.
^Ibid., pp. 413-14.
^Urwick and Brech, The Making of Scientific M anagement, p. 126.
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Frank Gilbreth's m otion studies were a form of micro production 
control much in the manner of Taylor's tim e studies. His analysis of micro 
motion movements of workers was aimed a t the  elimination of avoidable e ffo rt. 
According to  G ilbreth, "Motion-study, tim e-study, m icromotion-study, fatigue- 
study, and cost-study are  im portan t measures of scientific  m anagement by which
the efficiency of each function and subfunction is determ ined, tested , and
1 2 checked." Scientific m anagem ent was m anagem ent based on m easurem ent.
Mrs. G ilbreth described it as an a r t  of directing based upon a science of
m easurem ent. While she shared her husband's in te rest in motion study, she
emphasized the  relationship betw een psychology and management.^
Gilbreth also applied his call for elimination of needless motion to
managers and executives in advising th a t "The personal work of the executive
should consist as much as possible of making decisions and as little  as possible of
making motions."^ He argues, th e re fo re , th a t managers should utilize methods
of graphic control based on the exception principle with predeterm ined "zones."
Analysis of charts containing data  within the zones was to be handled by lower
level m anagers, with only those ch arts  containing points outside the  zone being
sen t to the executive. He also recommended tha t exceptionally large positive
^Frank B. G ilbreth, Applied Motion Study (New York; Macmillan 
Company, 1919), p. 35.
^Ibid., pp. 3, 35, # .
3
L. M. G ilbreth, The Psychology of Management (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1919), p. 6.
a
Frank B. G ilbreth, "G raphical Control on the Exception Principle for 
Executives," American Society of M echanical Engineers Transactions 38 (1916): 
1213-19.
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deviation evidencing unusual efficiency be recognized by the executive and th a t 
he tak e  a personal interest in such cases. ̂
Henry Lawrence G antt
Henry Lawrence G an tt (1861-1919), a  m echanical engineer, was another
of Taylor's disciples. Gantt was orthodox Taylor in his early  caree r, but in his
2
la te r  life  he began to  develop m ore of his own thinking. For G antt, the human 
elem ent was all im portant, and he was a  forerunner in the developing idea of 
"industrial democracy." His contributions included such face ts  as task and bonus 
plans, train ing , and production control. While in some respects these and others 
were g rea ter contributions in the  form ation of scien tific  m anagem ent thinking, 
he is best rem em bered for the  development of executive control charts and in 
particu lar for the  type th a t bears his nam e.^ Much of his original work is 
reprin ted  in a book edited by R athe.^
G antt was task and method orien ted . He believed th a t task setting  
required knowledge, not guesswork—the ab ility  to distinguish between fact and 
opinion. He also believed th a t methods were more im portant than results since if 
the proper methods were devised, the desired results would be obtained. These 
concepts, coupled with his s tress  on fair com pensation, natu rally  led to accurate
■ 5
procurem ent of individual output, which G an tt put in graphic form .
76-77.
^Ibid., pp. 1213, 1215, 1217-18.
2
Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, pp. 149, 156.
^Urwick and Brech, The Making of Scientific M anagem ent, pp. 71,
^Alex W. Rathe, ed ., G antt on M anagement (New York: American
M anagem ent Association and American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1961).
5
Henry L. Gantt, Industrial Leadership (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1916), pp. 57-58, 71, 62.
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Gantt made his m ost memorable contribution in th e  form of the Gantt
C hart while working as a consultant a t  Frankford Arsenal. I t was while on this
activ ity  th a t G antt revolutionized graphic scheduling techniques;
We have all been wrong in scheduling on a basis of quantities; the 
essential e lem ent in the situation i |  tim e, and this should be the  basis 
in laying out any programme [sic ].
The basic ingredient of the G antt Chart was born with this unique concept.
A G antt C hart depicts work scheduled and accomplished in relation to
each o ther and in relation to  tim e. On the chart itse lf, tim e is depicted by equal
divisions of horizontal spacing (representing equal tim e increm ents) and work
planned and com pleted by a simple combination of num erical da ta , solid lines of
varying widths, and mnemonic symbols. Gantt C harts fa ll into three basic
categories of Man and Machine Record C harts, Layout and Load C harts, and
2
Progress C harts, with the la tte r  being perhaps the best known.
It was this technology and the relationship of scheduling on the basis of 
tim e th a t is trad itionally  credited  as the foundation for subsequent developments 
such as production control boards and methods of network planning.
Of in te rest is the fa c t tha t prior to G antt, but unknown to  him, Karol 
Adamiecki (1866-1933) of Poland had developed a form of graphic aid called the 
"Harmonogram." It was in use in Poland in 1896 and was described for the first 
tim e in 1903,^ but his work was not translated  into English until 197^.^
^Urwick and Brech, The Making of Scientific M anagem ent, p. 79.
^Wallace C lark, The G antt C hart (New York: Ronald Press, 1923),
p p .  V , 5, 1 ^1 5 , 17.
^Lyndall F. Urwick, ed.. The Golden Book of M anagement (London: 
Newman Neame Lim ited, 1956), pp. 107-8.
^Edward R. Marsh, "The Harmonogram of Karol Adamiecki," paper 
presented before the  Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Seattle , 
Washington, August 1974.
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Conceptually, the various Harmonograms were utilized as work-flow netw ork 
diagrams for the analysis of production processing and for recording s ta tu s  of 
work in process. They were actually  m ore sophisticated than the G antt C hart in 
th a t they depicted event priorities and th e  sequential aspects of work-flow, a 
technique of conceptualization not found in the G antt methodology. Harmono­
grams, in fa c t, closely resem ble curren t network planning techniques such as 
critical path and PERT networks. ̂
In this country as well, recognition to the necessity of establishing the
sequence of operations in construction was evidenced in an article in Engineering
2
Magazine in Septem ber, 1909. In his artic le , H erbert F. Stimpson discussed the  
disparity between the emphasis placed on graphic aids in the form of blueprints 
and bills of m aterial and the lack of system atic  planning in the apportionm ent of 
tim e. He likened the  situation to attem pting to  clothe a two-legged man with a 
pair of trousers with one leg in tac t (m aterial) and the other leg missing (tim e). 
His solution to this dilemma was the use o f  equivalent graphic aids for estim ated  
tim e, handled with the same care  and precision as those for m aterials, broken 
down to  each subordinate group, and with the relationship of tim es betw een 
subgroups identified. Stimpson argued th a t this was the direct cause of men 
being "blindly switched" from one operation to another, explained why some 
machines were consistently idle while others were continually overloaded, and 
th a t work was often  delayed awaiting critically  required m aterials.^
4 b id .
^H erbert F. Stimpson, "Graphical Helps for Apportioning Time in 
Constructive Operations," Engineering Magazine 37 (September 1909): 955-59.
^Ibid., pp. 955-57.
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Stimpson summed his argum ent with this perceptive thought;
We wish to know not only the tim e th a t will be necessary for the 
com pletion of the operation and of the  en tire  work, but also the 
sequence in which each p a rt and group m ust be begun in order th a t 
they may be combined a t the  proper tim es and in the proper sequence, 
so th a t the whole work may be finished a t  the tim e which is desirable 
or has been agreed upon.
While Stimpson's a rtic le  was not accompanied with illustrations, it  is c lear tha t
he, like Adamiecki, dem onstrated insight into concepts of prospective sequential
flow and tim e analysis in construction where PERT, in la te r  years, has been used
effectively .
Graphic Methods of Analysis 
G antt provided the visual evidence of the  logical appeal of charts for 
control purposes, and system atic thought paved the way for increased use and 
application of the graphic aid to  m anagem ent. C harts offered advantages in 
term s of dem onstration through visual comparison with known fram es of 
reference, conveyed trends more readily than columns of figures, and fostered 
com putation and analy tical analysis. During the early  1920s a host of texts 
appeared on the construction of graphs, and artic les in periodicals covered 
graphic techniques applied to graphic s ta tis tic s , accounting, advertising, analysis 
of costs, general business and financial data, inventory control, organization and 
management, personnel, planning, sales, and production control and scheduling.^ 
Willard C. Brinton, one of the pioneers in charting techniques,^ 
devoted a chapter in his classic tex t Graphic Methods for Presenting Facts to
^Ibid., pp. 958-59.
^Allan C. Haskell, Graphic C harts in Business (New York: Codex Book 
Company, Inc., 1922), pp. 1-5, 239-46.
^Karl G. K arsten, C harts and Graphs (New York: P rentice-H all, Inc.,
1923), p. ix.
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the subject of "Records fo r the Executive."^ In this chapter he provided keen 
insight into the value of cen tralized , summarized, in teg ra ted  data and suggested 
the use of a  card system  with data filed both by departm ent and by function. He 
outlined the procedures of how to establish a records room including responsibili­
ties of room m anager, security  and retention of original records, lim itation of 
access, methods of tem porary and perm anent visual display, procedures fo r 
obtaining copies of original records, and m aintenance of tim ely data.^ He 
suggested fu rth er th a t th e re  was a danger in providing too much inform ation to  a  
m anager of "small brain capacity ." He said th a t such a man would use the tool as 
a  means of unjustly critic iz ing  his subordinates, thus ultim ately drying up th e  
basic flow o f data  from  sub managers, who would regard the system "...as a new 
form of diabolical to rtu re ."^
Brinton's insight into inform ation technology was lim ited only by the  
available synthetic aids. With this single addition, his description would read like 
the specification for one of our cu rren t control rooms. Even his warnings on the  
potential danger of too much inform ation fo r narrow-minded managers has 
changed only through increases in m agnitude.
C harts of all types were described by various authors. In a two p a r t 
a rtic le  appearing in M anagement and A dm inistration, David B. P o rter described 
both "historical" charts  depicting a f te r - th e -fa c t da ta  and "frequency" ch arts  
depicting the  present and im m ediate fu ture;^  A rthur R. Burnet discussed th e
^Willard C . Brinton, Graphic Methods for Presenting F ac ts  (New York: 
Engineering Magazine Company, 1914).
^Ibid., pp. 288-306. ^Ibid., p. 302.
h
David B. P o rte r, "Application of Charts in Industry," M anagement and 
Adm inistration, P art 1, 7 (January 1924): 65-72, and P a rt II, 7 (March 1924):
^ 9 -3 6 .
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growing use of charts as m anagem ent tools; ̂  Wallace C lark discussed their use
2
In forecasting and m anagem ent by exception; and William C. Marshall Inte­
grated the m athem atical and business aspects of a graphic represen tation .^
The breakeven ch art^  also cam e Into being during th is  period. While 
not referring to  It as a breakeven chart, Henry Hess described the basic concept 
In 1903^ and then refined i t  In a  series o f artic les the following year.^ Hess
recognized the  value of th e  technique as a  control device. In later years the
7 8concept was fu rther developed by C. E. Knoeppel and W alter R autenstrauch.
^Arthur R. Burnet, "Charts as M anagement Tools," Management and 
Adm inistration 9 (January 1925): 55-58.
2
W allace Clark, "E ffective Control of Future R esults," Management 
and A dm inistration 7 (February 1924): 179-82.
^William C. Marshall, Graphical Methods for Schools, Colleges, 
S tatisticians, Engineers and Executives (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Î92D :
^An analytic technique for studying the relationships among fixed and 
variable costs, sales, and profit.
^Henry Hess, "M anufacturing; C apital, C osts, P ro fits  and Dividends," 
Engineering Magazine 26 (December 1903): 367-79.
^Henry Hess, "Wage-Paying Methods from the View-Point of the 
Workman," Engineering Magazine 27 (April 1904): 27-35; "Wage-Paying Methods 
from the Vlew-Polnt of the  Employer," Engineering M agazine 27 (May 1904): 
172-86; and "Wage-Paying Methods from th e  Vlew-Polnt o f Invested Capital," 
Engineering Magazine 27 (June 1904): 409-16.
^See for example: C. E. Knoeppel, Managing fo r P rofit (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937).
g
See for example; W alter R autenstrauch and Raymond Vlllers, The 
Economics of Industrial M anagement (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company,
1949) and W alter R autenstrauch and Raymond Vlllers, Budgetary Control (New 
York: Funk Sc Wagnalls Company, 1968).
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More recen t improvements include integration of breakeven analysis with linear
. 1 programming.
Continued Emphasis on Scientific Management 
The scientific m anagem ent method influenced many w riters and 
practitioners of the time, as is evident from their work. The purpose of this 
subsection is to  summarize th e  concepts of some of the additional influential 
w riters of the  tim es.
Alexander Hamilton Church
Alexander Hamilton Church (1866-1936), a  lecturer and author, was
2
concerned with conditions of industrial confusion and disorder. He critic ized  
scien tific  management on the basis th a t in its rush to  "apply" i t  neglected the 
necessity to  "construct," and he believed th a t the form er had been mistaken for 
the  la tte r . His book, The Science and Practice of M anagement, was w ritten  to 
consolidate the regulative principles of m anagement.^
Church summarized control as "...the organ concerned with duties, 
responsibilities, and the exercise  and lim itation of initiative" (original ita li­
cized).^ He also s ta ted  tha t control was the function of the "boss," and th a t it 
varied depending upon the com plexity of the operation.^
^R. H. Parker, M anagement Accounting; An Historical Perspective 
(New York: Augustus M. Kelly, Publishers, 1969), p. 72.
2
Joseph A. L itterer, "Alexander Hamilton Church and the Develop­
m ent of Modern Management," Business History Review 35 (Summer 1961): 212.
^A. Hamilton Church, The Science and Practice of Management (New 
York: Engineering Magazine Company, 1914).
^Ibid., p. 77. ^Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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One of Church's contributions was to  w rite Volume I of The
Cumulative Loose-Leaf Business Encyclopedia.  ̂ This volume contained an
extensive discussion on the  subject of control. Of particular in te re s t is Church's
discussion on the  use of schedule control boards. He described the need for tim e
estim ates, sequencing of in terre la ted  activ ities, and identification of "steps" in
the process. His illustration and description strongly suggest tha t his "steps"
2
were, by modern standards, milestones and his control board, a  milestone chart. 
This is one of the  earliest narrative and graphic references made to a technique 
sim ilar to modern m ilestone charting techniques.
Church was one of the earliest w riters to look a t the to ta l managerial 
process^ and to  recognize the salient factors of m anagement control.^
Leon P ra tt Alford
Leon P ra tt Alford (1877-1942), engineer, editor, and w riter, was also 
concerned with the im plications of scientific m anagem ent. He coauthored an 
a rtic le  with Church in 1910 in which they a ttem pted  to  form ulate a basis for an 
a r t of m anagement somewhat in counteraction to the implied "science" of 
management under Taylor. The authors defined broad principles of the 
system atic use of experience, the economic control of e ffo rt, and the promotion
A. Hamilton Church, "The Executive" and "Business Administration," 
The Cum ulative Loose-Leaf Business Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 (Philadelphia: ]ohn C. 
Winston Company, 1928).
^Ibid., pp. 183-85.
^L itte re r, "Alexander Hamilton Church and the Development of 
Modern M anagement," p. 275.
Giglioni and Bedeian, "A Conspectus of M anagement Control Theory: 
1900-1972," p. 294.
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of personal effectiveness. Under the economic control of e ffo r t they stated;
"Most of the discussions about management are , in fa c t, discussions about various
methods and degrees of controlling e ffo rt and fixing its regard;"^ a broad but
comprehensive definition of control.
In his te x t Laws of Management Applied to  M anufacturing, Alford
continued his desire to  form ulate principles and he enum erated some fifty  laws
2
of m anagem ent. In his la te r tex t Principles of Industrial Management, he 
expanded the  meaning of control to include not only the commonly understood 
considerations of d irec t, govern, influence, restra in , but also added the facets  of 
determining objectives, program and plan to be adopted, leadership, and 
unification.^
Further Definitions and Approaches
In addition to  Church and Alford, o ther authors offered individual 
views on m anagem ent control. Hugo Diemer called for clearly defined 
departm ental lines.^ John Lee wrote on the im plications of a growing trend 
toward industrial dem ocracy whereby workers w ere becoming interested in 
adm inistrative questions previously the sole domain of the manager. In this 
environm ent, au to cra tic  m anagement would no longer be effec tive  and the
A lexander H. Church and L. P. A lford, "The Principles of Manage­
m ent," American M achinest 36 (May 30, 1912), reprin ted  in M erril, ed.. Classics 
in Management.
2
L. P. A lford, Principles of Industrial M anagement (New York; Ronald 
Press Company, 1940).
^Ibid., p. 164.
^Hugo Diem er, Factory Organization and Adm inistration (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1910), pp. 38-39, 45.
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m anager, therefo re , m ust be "...exquisitely sensitive to  the  thoughts and feelings
of the worker."^ For Lee this suggested an a r t  of new adm inistration where the
adm inistrator "...w ill realize th a t his control m ust be rather radiation than 
2
domination." Lee also suggested th a t m anagem ent by exception necessitated 
use of sum m arized d a ta  by the m anager, with his com m ents on reports annotated 
and returned to  subordinates to avoid the danger of "dead data."^ Benjamin A. 
Franklin approached the  subject of costs and cost reports  from the viewpoint of 
the executive in order to  dem onstrate the invaluability of cost data as an aid to 
management contro l. He clearly recognized the m anagerial benefits of a 
predictive cost system , and the fa c t th a t executive indifference would weaken 
the  effectiveness of a cost system .^ Henry P. D utton grouped aii of the 
operations and functions of industrial m anufacturing into the four categories of 
design, supply, contro l, and operation.^ Control called for a system for issuing 
orders, follow-up, and checking resu lts with the  supervision function resting with 
"...the executive who exercises the final control function."^ In a la ter tex t 
Dutton defined m anagem ent control as consisting of supervision, program
^3ohn Lee, M anagement; A Study of Industrial Organization (London: 
Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1921), p. 4. '
^Ibid., p. 10.
^Ibid., pp. 4, 10, 35.
if,
Benjamin A. Franklin, C ost Reports for Executives as a Means of 
Plant Control (New York; Engineering Magazine Company, 1913), pp. 28, 143.




control, quality contro l, and control of expenditure.^ W ebster Robinson 
identified eight fundam entals of business organization, the sixth of which was 
control. He defined control as " ...tha t fundam ental of organization which 
comprises the means of providing the manager and the executives of an 
organization with continuous, prom pt, and accura te  inform ation concerning the
efficiency of operation, what the  business is doing, what it  has done in the past,
2
and what i t  can be expected  to  do in the future." He also described a system of 
control as th a t which "...collects the details of operation , segregates them , 
combines them , and classifies them into a form suitable for use."^ Erwin Schell 
w rote from the viewpoint of the executive and saw the adm inistrators or 
executives as determ ining policy and guiding and controlling the  to ta l en ter- 
prise. T. G. Rose described a theory and system of higher control for the 
manager as " ...a  monthly survey of the functional ac tiv itie s  of a com m ercial 
undertaking, carried  ou t from the business, technical, trading, and financial 
viewpoints, and based upon direct trend comparison betw een the position a t  the 
moment and the position a t the last financial year."^
^Henry P. D utton, Business Organization and .Management (Chicago; 
A. W. Shaw Company, 1927); pp. 24-2j.
^W ebster Robinson, Fundamentals of Business O rganization (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1925), p. 147.
^Ibid.
Erwin H. Schell, The Technique of Executive Control (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1924), p. 5.
^T. G. Rose, Higher Control in M anagement, 4th ed. (London: Sir Issac 
Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1947), p. 61.
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Four Individualists 
Much of the w ritten  work on m anagem ent during the first half of the 
tw en tie th  century focused on, or was largely influenced by, the scientific  
m anagem ent movement. Four individuals, however, stand out as not exactly 
fittin g  this mold and all made significant contributions to the theory of 
m anagem ent. Two were Europeans whose work was not Immediately recognized 
in th e  United S tates, and two were native Americans with ideas of their own.
Henri Fayol
Henri Fayol (1841-1925), a highly successful French adm inistrator and
executive, originated the first theory of adm inistration. ̂  He had a long and
successful business career. His historic work, G eneral and Industrial Manage- 
2
m ent (published in France in 1916 and f ir s t  transla ted  into English in 1930), was 
the resu lt of analysis of his own duties and responsibilities as a top executive.^ 
Fayol identified fourteen principles of m anagem ent th a t he had most frequently 
applied in his own activ ities. These principles were neither exhaustive nor rigid, 
but were intended to dem onstrate the conditions or ground rules of the 
m anagem ent process and were adaptable to circum stances. Of in te rest was 
Fayol's description of the  management process, in which he identified five 
elem ents: planning, organizing, command, coordination, and control.^ As defined.
^Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 209.
2Henri Fayol, General and Industrial M anagement, trans. by Constance 
Storrs (London: Sir Isaac Pitm an & Sons, L td ., 1949).
^Urwick and Brech, The Making of Scientific Management, pp. 40, 44.
4
Henri Fayol, General and Industrial M anagement, pp. 19, 41, 43, 53, 
97, 103, 107.
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"...control consists in verifying w hether everything occurs in conformity with the
plan adopted, the  instructions issued and principles established."^ For Fayol,
control perm eated all elem ents of the undertaking including personnel, execution
2
of plans, quality, financial activ ities, security , and inform ation. Control was to  
be tim ely and had as its objective "...to  point out weaknesses and errors in order 
to rec tify  them and prevent recurrence."^ Some years la te r  Fayol described the 
in tegrative e ffec t of control on the o ther four elem ents by saying th a t control 
"...tends to stim ulate planning, to  simplify and strengthen organization, to  
increase the efficiency of command and to  fac ilita te  co-ordination [s ic ]."^
Max Weber
Max Weber (1864-1920), a  German sociologist, w rote extensively in a 
scientific sense in the social field. He distinguished between managers who were 
at the same tim e owners, and pure owners outside the m anagem ent structure who 
exercised a wide degree of control over the  m anagers by virtue of their control 
over financing and cred it. For Weber, the separation of ownership and 
m anagement was rational and perm itted  managers to be selected  on the basis of 
qualifications of profitability. Weber identified three pure types of managerial 
authority  as rational-legal, trad itional, and charism atic, recognizing that the 
"pure" or ideal types were seldom found in history.^ Under rational-legal
4bid ., p. 107. ^Ibid., pp. 107-8. ^Ibid., p. 107.
If,
Henri Fayol, "The Adm inistrative Theory in the  State," in Papers on 
the Science of Adm inistration, trans. by Sarah Greer, ed. by Luther Gulick and 
L. Urwick, 2d ed. (New York: Institu te  of Public Adm inistration, 1947), p. 103.
^Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. 
by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1947), 
pp. 4, 7, 248-49, 328-29.
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authority , there existed "...com plete separation of the property belonging to  the
organization, which is controlled within the sphere of the  office, and the  personal
property  of the official, which is available for his own private  uses."^ He
believed th a t "The purest type of exercise of legal au thority  is tha t which
2
employs a bureaucratic adm inistrative staff."  Weber described ten  c rite ria  for 
the  adm inistrative s ta ff  under a single "supreme authority ." The last one 
contains the essence of his concepts of control for the individual official: "He is 
sub ject to s tric t and system atic  discipline and control in the conduct of his 
o ffice."^ ^
Mary Parker Fo llett
Much of the w ritten work on m anagem ent in the United States during 
the  f ir s t  half of the  tw entieth  century  focused on (or was largely influenced by) 
th e  scien tific  managem ent movem ent. There was a growing concern, however, 
for the  social side of man in industry. This was reflec ted  in the work of Mayo 
and Roethlisberger, based predominantly on their activ ities a t the  Hawthorne 
Plant of the Western E lectric Company in Chicago, Illinois, beginning in 1924. 
Although the work did not become well recognized until the 1930s, it had an 
im pact on management thinking. Mary F o lle tt was a contem porary of Taylor's, 
but philosophically she belonged to  the social man era , and her work is 
representative of the human relations m ovem ent.^
Mary Parker F o lle tt (1868-1933), political sc ien tist and philosopher, was 
prim arily in terested  in the phychological basis of human ac tiv ity  and group
^Ibid., p. 331. ^Ibid., p. 333. ^Ibid., p. 334.
If.
Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, pp. 275, 300.
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interaction.^ She briefly defined control as "...pow er exercised as means toward 
a specific end..." but added th a t power and streng th  were "...not always 
synonymous." She went on to  suggest th a t pow er-w ith (co-active) was to  be 
desired to power-over (coercive). F o lle tt called fo r "fact-contro l" rather than 
"man-control" and "correlation of control" ra ther than  a "superimposed control." 
The situational environment generated collective con tro l, based on fact and se lf- 
control of the  individuals concerned. Control, then, was based on a philosophy of 
coordination and integration, no t on compromise and abandonment. In this 
con tex t, the object of organization was control, and subelem ent viewpoints w ere 
to be reconciled w ith each o ther and in teg ra ted  into a composite and 
com plem entary over-all point of view. In essence, for F o lle tt, control was a 
"self-generating process" of "collective self-contro l" reflective  of current 
m anagem ent-by-objectives thinking.
C hester Irving Barnard
C hester Irving Barnard (1886-1961), an executive of American Tele­
phone and Telegraph, had a significant im pact upon management theory, 
particularly with regard to  organizational theory and human relations thinking. 
His to ta l volume of w ritten work was small, but he is quoted frequently.^
^Urwick and Brech, The Making of Scientific M anagement, p. 48.
^Mary P. Fo lle tt, Dynamic A dm inistration; The Collected Papers of 
Mary Parker F o lle tt, ed . by Henry C. M etcalf and L. Urwick (New York: Harper 
<5c Brothers Publishers, 1940), p. 99.
^Ibid., p. 101.
Mary P. F o lle tt, "The Process of Control," in Papers on the Science of 
A dm inistration, ed. by Gulick and Urwick, pp. 161-69.
^William B. Wolf, "C hester I. Barnard," Journal of the Academy of 
Management 4 (December 1961): 167.
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Sociologists frequently  consider Weber as the "father of oranizational theory," 
but for many m anagem ent theorists and practitioners th a t t i t le  belongs to 
Barnard.
In his classic The Functions of the Executive, ̂  Barnard developed his
theory of organization. He described form al organization as " ...th a t kind of
2 'cooperation among men th a t is conscious, deliberate, purposeful." For Barnard, 
control " ...re la tes  directly , and in conscious application chiefly, to  the work of 
the organization as a  whole ra ther than to  the work of the executives as such."^ 
Deeper insight into this definition may be gained by Barnard's unique concept of 
au thority . In his mind, the te s t  of w hether an order had au thority  was based on 
w hether or not i t  was accepted  and carried  out. In other words, the basis of 
authority  did not reside in th e  "persons of authority" or the order-giver, but 
ra ther in the person to whom the order was directed or order-receiver. This
If.
concept was, a t  the tim e, in d irect opposition to  conventional wisdom.
Last of th e  Period 
In closing this discussion of the  firs t fifty  years of this century, two 
additional individuals deserve mention: Lyndall Urwick and Ralph Davis. While 
their work actually  occurred in both th is and the period covered by the next 
section, i t  seems appropriate to  include their work of the period as the final note 
to the  f ir s t  half of the 1900s.
^Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, 






Lyndall Fownes Urwick (1891- ) was a prolific w riter in his own right
I
and also coedited a number of classic te x ts  in m anagem ent.
Urwick was perhaps the f irs t to  author a  set of control principles. By
his definition, control was "...concerned with the reaction of persons and
m aterials to the decisions of d irection, with the m easurem ent of such reactions
in term s of space, tim e, and quantity , and with methods of securing th a t the
2
results of such reactions shall be in line with those contem plated by direction." 
The five principles to be observed in exercising control over activities were the 
principles of responsibility, evidence, uniform ity, comparison, and utility .^ In a 
la ter te x t, he defined the principles of control as the principles of uniform ity, 
comparison, u tility , and exception. He also provided a definition of control as: 
"To control means to  see th a t everything is done in accordance with the rules 
which have been laid down and the instructions which have been given."^ This 
definition he ascribed to Fayol's aspects of adm inistration.
Ralph Currier Davis
Ralph Currier Davis (1894- ), an engineer and educator, in his tex t
The Principles of Factory Organization and M anagement, defined control in an 
individual environment as " ...the  instruction and guidance of the organization and
^Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 357.
2Lyndall F. Urwick, "Principles of Direction and Control," in Diction­
ary of Industrial Adrninistration, Vol. 1, ed. by John Lee (London: Sir Isaac
Pitman and Sons, 1928), p. 163.
^Ibid., p. 179.
^Lyndall F. Urwick, The Elements of Administration (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1943), pp. 107-12.
^Ibid., p. 122.
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the direction and regulation of its activ ities."^ The process of control involved
the  four steps of "...the predeterm ination of reasonable accomplishment, the
issuance of definite and com plete w ritten  instructions, the analysis of reports
and the comparison of actual and predeterm ined accomplishments to  determ ine
2
the  cause of variations, and the  recognition of responsibility for final results." 
In what amounted to  a second edition of this tex t (with a revised title) he defined 
planning, organizing, and controlling as the th ree  organic functions of the 
executive. He defined control as " ...the  regulation of activ ities in accordance 
with the requirem ents of a  business plan, to  the end th a t the final objectives of a 
project may be achieved properly."^ Control was considered as consisting of the 
th ree phases of assurance of proper perform ance, coordination, and removal of
If,
obstacles preventing execution.
R ecent Initiatives 
The Industrial Revolution s ta rted  in England, spread to the United 
S tates, and created  the im petus for new thinking about management. This early 
emphasis on industrial technology resulted  in significant strides being made in 
the development of the technical m ethod of achieving or producing goods and 
services. At the  same tim e, however, i t  did so partially  a t the expense of the 
human elem ent of the factors of production. It becam e management's role to
^Ralph C. Davis, The Principles of Factory  Organization and Manage­
m ent (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1928), p. 84.
^Ibid.
^Ralph C. Davis, Industrial Organization and M anagement, rev. ed. 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1940), p. 22.
^Ibid., pp. 35-36.
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in teg ra te  the capital and human elem ents into a harmonious, productive, and 
e ffic ien t whole, with all forces moving tow ard the sam e objective.
The f irs t concerted  e ffo rt in this direction was the application of 
system atic  thought to  the  technical problems of industry. The scien tific  
m anagem ent movement was concerned prim arily with the establishm ent of 
standards, m easurement of perform ance, and the advancem ent of technology. 
There was also a growing call for a broader and more hum anistic look a t  the 
m anagem ent process. The control function was not an explicit elem ent of the 
m anagem ent process for many of the  early human relationists. Hugo 
M unsterberg (1863-1916), the  fa ther of industrial psychology,^ worked to
"...strengthen the bridge betw een scien tific  m anagem ent and industrial e ffic-
2 3iency..." through the study of psychological man. George Elton Mayo (1880-
1949) and Fritz Roethlisberger began the inquiry into the human aspect of the
managem ent process with the ir famous Hawthorne research activ ity .^  The work
of these two researchers contributed significantly  to  the human relations school
of management thought.^ The work of F o lle tt and Barnard, previously
m entioned, contained nuggets of the human relations philosophy. Of primary
im portance from a m anagem ent control standpoint is the fa c t tha t these early
thoughts would contribute to the concept of self-control in la te r  years.
^Vren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 197.
^Richard M. H odgetts, M anagement; Theory, Process, and P ractice  
(Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1975), p. 66.
^Ibid., pp. 66-67.
i(.
An excellent digest of the Hawthorne studies and criticism s may be 
found in Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, pp. 275-99, 370-81.
^Ibid., pp. 278-79.
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The years since World War II have been years of extraordinary growth 
in the size , scope, and com plexity of business organizations. The population of 
the United States continued to  increase, productivity  steadily  increased, and the 
variety of m anufactured commodities mushroomed. This period witnessed 
reinforced emphasis on task and functional specialization, growth in employment, 
large proliferation  of organizational elem ents and expanded diversification, 
increased geographic dispersion, and am plified concern regarding scarcity of 
productive resources. It was a  period of acce lera ted  growth of management 
control theory and p ractice . The period witnessed introduction of commercial 
electronic data  processing, perhaps the single m ost significant synthetic aid to  
m anagem ent control in history.
The Years Ju st Preceding Autom ation:
Conspectus of Major Contributions
In 1951, Ralph Davis produced a  new te x t, The Fundam entals of Top 
M anagem ent,  ̂ in which he reflec ted  a transition from the industrial orientation 
of his e arlie r works to one more closely a ttuned  to  adm inistration. His purpose 
was to present a "...fundam ental s ta tem en t of business objectives, policies, and 
general methods th a t govern the  solution of basic business problems."^
Davis defined control "...as the function of constraining and regulating
3
activ ities th a t en ter in to  the accomplishment of an objective." He further 
developed this thesis by describing eight control functions th a t normally occurred 
in sequence. The f irs t four were concerned with "prelim inary control" or the
 ̂Ralph C . Davis, The Fundamentals of Top M anagement (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1951).
^Ibid., p. xix. ^Ibid., p. 663.
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tim e period prior to  execution of a  given activity. The second four w ere more 
normally associated with "concurrent control" or the tim e period of execution of 
activ ity . The eight functions w ere; (1) routine planning, (2) scheduling, (3) 
preparation, (4) dispatching, (5) direction, (6) supervision, (7) com parison, and (8) 
corrective action. Having identified functions (l)-(4) as "prelim inary" and 
functions (5)-(8) as "concurrent," he further associated the functions organiza­
tionally by stating th a t the  functions of (5) direction, (6) supervision, and (8) 
corrective action w ere basically line organization functions while the rem ainder 
were predominantly s ta f f  organization functions.^
This analysis of contro l functions and identification in term s of the 
s ta tus  of project activ ity  represented  one of the  most penetrating  and 
comprehensive trea tm en ts  of the control function to that tim e . The te x t is a 
m ilestone in the evolution of m anagem ent control.
Also published in 1951, A dm inistrative Action: The Techniques of
2
O rganization and M anagem ent by William H. Newman presented a principles 
and techniques approach to  adm inistration. He defined the process of 
adm inistration as consisting of the  five elem ents of planning, organizing, 
assembling resources, d irecting, and controlling. Newman defined control as 
"...assuring th a t the perform ance conforms to plan."^ Control was dependent for 
its effectiveness on the o th e r elem ents of adm inistration. Newman further 
defined th ree  steps essen tial to  the control process: se tting  standards a t
^Ibid., pp. 407, 663, 698.
^William H. Newman, A dm inistrative Action: The Techniques of




stra teg ic  points, checking and reporting on perform ance, and taking corrective
action. He also emphasized th a t contro l only becam e truly effective  when
im plem ented on an individual responsibility basis.
E arlier, in 1945, Marshall E. Dimock called  for efficiency through the
application of precise and quan tita tive  units in measuring perform ance, by
reducing functions into their individual parts . Carrying this theme forward, he
defined contro l as "...the analysis of p resen t perform ance, in the light of fixed
goals and standards, in order to determ ine the e x ten t to which accomplishment
m easures up to executive orders and expectations."^ He called for careful
analysis and full responsibility and accountability  of individuals so tha t
supervision could be strengthened if necessary and plans perfected  for the future.
His most concise description of control was In his reference to  the process as the 
2
"check up." In a la te r  tex t. Dimock stressed  th a t "When the emphasis is on the 
means of control ra ther than on its resu lts, the e ffe c t  may be a proliferation of 
paperwork."^
George R. Terry's tex t. Principles of M anagement, was first published 
in 1953 and a  sixth edition was published in 1972.^ Terry was the first author to 
use the specific  title  of Principles of M anagement.^ Terry defines controlling as 
"...determ ining what is being accomplished, tha t is, evaluating the perform ance
^Marshall E. Dimock, The Executive in Action (New York: H arper & 
Brothers, 1945), p. 217.
^Ibid., pp. 145, 217.
^M arshall E. Dimock, A dm inistrative V itality (New York: Harper &. 
Brothers, 1959), p. 91.
^George R. Terry, Principles of M anagement, 6th ed. (Homewood, 
Illinois; R ichard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972).
^Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought, p. 410.
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and, if necessary, applying co rrective  measures so th a t the perform ance takes 
place according to  plans." ̂
2
Koontz and O'Donnell's "principles" tex t appeared f irs t in 1955 and in 
its sixth edition in 1976.^ Koontz and O'Donnell dem onstrate a  high level of 
sensitivity to  the proactive nature  of control in their discussion on "feedforward"
If,
control. Simply stated , feedforw ard control is a system of control tha t informs 
managers, "...in tim e to  take  corrective action, th a t problems will occur if they 
do not do something about them  now."^
In an a rtic le  in The Journal of the Academy of Management Koontz 
outlined four principles of control as the principles of s tra teg ic  point control, 
organizational suitability, fu ture controls, and direct control.^ The basic purpose 
of the a rtic le  was a suggestion th a t more a tten tion  be directed to  management 
fundamentals and, as the t it le  of the artic le  suggested, the four principles were a 
preliminary s ta tem en t. In a subsequent article  in 1959, in the California 
Management Review, Koontz am plified the same plea and enum erated five 
principles of control: assurance of objectives, efficiency of control, control
 ̂Terry, Principles of M anagement, p. 535.
2
Harold Koontz and Cyril J . O'Donnell, Principles of Management: An 
Analysis of Managerial Functions (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
TSW.
^Harold Koontz and Cyril 3. O'Donnell, M anagement: A Systems and 
Contingency Analysis of Managerial Functions, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1976).
Ibid., pp. 646-52. See also; Harold Koontz and Robert W. Bradspies, 
"Managing Through Feedforward Control," Business Horizons 15 (June 1972); 
25-36.
^Koontz and O'Donnell, Management: A Systems and Contingency
Analysis of Managerial Functions, p. 646.
S^oontz, "A Prelim inary S tatem ent of Principles of Planning and 
Control," pp. 57-59.
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responsibility, fu ture controls, and d irec t control.^ Both articles reflected  
conviction tha t control could best be analyzed through three general categories 
of control: nature and purpose, s truc tu re , and process explanation. The second 
a rtic le  reflec ted  additional contem plation and some revision of thinking 
concerning principles from  the earlier a rtic le .
Advent of Autom ation
In the la te  1950s a new synthetic aid to  m anagement was becoming
com m ercially available to  m anagers and businessmen; it  signaled a revolution in
the technology of m anagem ent control. For som e, puppy love developed into a
m ature romance; for o thers, i t  faded rapidly into disillusionment. No m a tte r the
reaction , the  age of e lectron ic  data processing was born. In its infancy it
suffered th e  same growing pains th a t befall many new ideas or technologies, but
i t  is m aturing slowly and is considered to  be one of the  most momentous
occasions in m anagem ent history. E lectronic data  processing provided vigorous
encouragem ent to the pursuit of intensified m anagem ent control.
As m anagem ent control requirem ents grew more complex and the need
for faster response m ore acute, the  problems of da ta  manipulation becam e more
severe. Utilizing e lectron ic  data  processing, it  was possible to  acce le ra te  the
re trieva l and m anipulation functions, and da ta  processing began to  take on the
2
form of a science ra ther than an a r t ,  although the a r t  has not disappeared.
It was during th is period tha t th e  system s managem ent concepts of 
operations research and quantitative methods began to blossom. In large
^Koontz, "Management Control: A Suggested Formulation of
Principles."
2
William C. Wall, J r., Systems M anagem ent in the Urban Environment, 
Monograph 19 (Norman, Oklahoma: Bureau fo r Business and Economic Research, 
University of Oklahoma, August 1973), p. 4.
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measure, these w ere products of m ilitary-aerospace m anagem ent concepts as
m ilitary and space engineers, scientists and m anagers, recognized the awesome
tasks of m anagem ent control th a t confronted th em J The environm ent of large-
scale system s is perhaps best illustrated by a s ta tem en t made by Jam es E. Webb,
form er adm inistra tor of the  National Aeronautics and Space Adm inistration, in
his book Space Age M anagem ent; The Large-Scale Approach.^ In describing the
m anagem ent com plexities and c ritica l need for anthropocentricism  in large-scale
endeavors, he likened the e ffo r t to the early  task of the Wright brothers:
...from  a m anagem ent standpoint the situation is not unlike th a t faced 
by the W right brothers when they decided th a t to  achieve both the 
speed needed fo r takeoff and the necessary three-dim ensional control, 
they had to  couple a human pilot with his senses and muscles to a 
system  of coordinated machine controls. The separa te  elem ents of 
control had to be brought into a system th a t enabled the pilot to relate 
w hat he could see and what he could fee l to  w hat he needed to do. 
Only thus could he maintain flying speed and m aneuver his vehicle to 
overcom e the  hazards of air currents and turbulence he encountered, 
but which he could not predict or assess in advance."
The day of au tom ated  control systems requiring a new relationship between man
and machine had been born.
The Age of Automation 
For perhaps the f irs t tim e in history, m anagem ent found itself in the 
position of having a syn thetic  aid in advance of p rac tica l theory for its use. Here 
was a tool developed not for m anagement per se, but for scien tific  endeavor. 
The challenge then for m anagem ent was to harness this new heuristic  and 
cybernetic tool and in teg ra te  i t  into evolving m anagem ent contro l p ractice .
4 b id .
2
Jam es E. Webb, Space Age M anagement: The Large-Scale Approach 




One of the  m ost fam iliar new applications in m anagem ent control was
the developm ent of various network planning techniques. A Line of Balance
(LOB) technique was developed in 1941 by George Fouch of Goodyear A ircraft, as
a graphic form of depicting the  essential processes of production from receipt of
raw m ateria ls to  com pletion of the product against a  planned tim e-fram e. It
utilized the exception principle and depicted only the most im portant aspects of
the  process. In 1955, the  E. I. DuPont de Nemours Company and Uni vac Division
of the then Rem ington Rand Corporation joined together in an a ttem p t to  apply
the new data-processing technology to  problems of plant m aintenance. This
resulted in the developm ent of what is now known as the C ritica l Path Method
(CPM) of schedule control. The CPM is basically a method of integrating the
sequencing and tim ing fac to rs of a process and computing schedules th a t depict
possible tim e and cost variation in the process.^
The Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) was introduced
in 1958. It was developed by the U.S. Navy in a joint e ffo rt w ith Booz-Allen &
Hamilton and Lockheed A ircraft Corporation in an e ffo rt to  e ffec t drastic
reduction in the estim ated  deployment schedule of th e  Polaris Ballistic Missile.
The e ffo rt was successful for PERT is credited with having achieved a  large
2
reduction in the Polaris development program schedule. PERT is similar to  
CPM in concept, but i t  d iffers in the methodology utilized in the  determ ination 
of tim e estim ate  probabilities.
Thomas V. Sobczak, "Network Planning, The Continuing Evolution," 
Academy of M anagement Proceedings; Annual Meeting (Boston, M assachusetts, 
December 27-28, 1963), pp. 96-105.
^Harry F. Evarts, Introduction to PERT (Boston: AUyn and Bacon,
Inc., 1964), p. 1.
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Extensions of these th ree  basic networking techniques (LOB, CPM, and 
PERT) have evolved in all directions; such system s as PERT/COST, third 
generation PERT/LOB, LESS (Least C ost Estim ating and Scheduling), PACT 
(Production Analysis Control Technique), SCANS (Scheduling, Control, and 
Autom ation by Network Systems), and many o thers have appeared. All a re  
dependent upon com puter processing.
M anagement Information Systems
This brief account of the rapid growth o f networking techniques is 
illu stra tive  of the growth in many areas. Specialized systems in budgeting, cost 
accounting, financial management, procurem ent, quality control, personnel 
adm inistration, m arketing, inventory control, and a  host of others have been 
developed to take advantage of the trem endous potential offered by electronic 
data  processing.
The rapid shift to developm ent of rea l-tim e  and required-tim e large- 
scale integrated m anagem ent control system s began about 1955-60. The general 
in ten t of most of these systems was to in teg ra te  the control function in order to  
provide m anagement with accura te , tim ely, re levant, and summarized inform a­
tion across the to ta l spectrum  of corporate in terest. An added fea tu re  was often 
an a tte m p t to  provide an im pact prediction capability  th a t would assess fu ture 
actions, determ ine probable im pact, and provide rational alternative courses of 
action across the en tire  spectrum of functional activ ity . Cybernetic system s 
based on the exception principle were also developed and, in some cases, the  
com puter system autom atically prepared source data  to be reviewed manually 
and inserted  a t a la te r  date as updated input.
Emphasis was also placed on new methods of integrating and 
controlling cost and schedule data  in the  m ilitary/aerospace arena. Introduction
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of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPB5) by the Departm ent
of Defense in the early  1960s was an example of an e ffo rt to provide:
"...for an orderly progression from national security objectives, 
through s tra tegy , through the development of force requirem ents, 
through the  derivation of force structure and programs under specified 
fiscal constraints to budget preparations, execution and review, and 
resource allocation.
The development of perform ance m easurem ent techniques such as Cost/Schedule
Control Systems C rite ria  (C/SCSC) by the Departm ents of the Air Force, the
Army, and the Navy in 1972 also represented the high priority placed on improved
management. This system was designed primarily in an e ffo rt to  secure more
comprehensive m anagem ent control of prime contractor activ ity  in the major
acquisition con tracts by insuring th a t contractor management systems were
sound. C/SCSC was not designed as a universal plug-in system , but as a
definition upon which to  evaluate con tracto r management control systems and
2
the establishm ent of c rite r ia  that such systems had to  m eet.
The approach of specifying control systems c rite ria  ra ther than control 
systems meant that contractors could use their internal systems for reporting to 
the government if the ir system m et the established crite ria . This was a 
significant departure from past p rac tice  where the government specified the use 
of specific control and/or reporting system s. This earlier p ractice frequently 
resulted in a con tracto r operating two system s—his own and the one specified by 
the government. The move to  C/SCSC was a prudent one.
^U.5., D epartm ent of the  Army, The Army Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting System, Army Regulation No. 1-1 (Washington, D.C., October
1973), p. 1-1.
^U.S., D epartm ents of the Air Force, the  Army, and the Navy, 
Cost/Schedule Control Systems C rite ria  (Joint Implementation Guide), Pamphlet 
AFSCP/AFLCP 173-5, AMCP 37-5, NAVMAT P3240 (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
m ent Printing O ffice, 31 March 1972), pp. 1-1 -  1-2.
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Conspectus of Additional 
Major Contributions
Although c ited  in C hapter I in the  discussion on definitional consider­
ations, the m ajor works of Anthony,^ Newman,^ Mockler,^ and Drucker^ must be 
c ited  again to  establish chronological in tegrity . Each of these w riters has added 
to  the  body of knowledge referred  to in this study as m anagem ent control.
Additionally, o ther authors have suggested varying views on the topic. 
Jerom e introduced the concept of executive control as "...som e sort of 
system atic  e ffo r t to compare curren t perform ance to  a predeterm ined plan or 
objective, presumably in order to  take any rem edial actions required.”"̂  
Vardaman and H alterm an established a relationship between com m unication, 
m anagem ent control, and the m anager in suggesting a framework for improving 
organizational operations.^ Eilon stressed the cen tra l role of control in the  
managem ent task  and the im portance of feedback.^ Strong and Smith provided a 
system s view and defined control as "...a function through which the executive is
Anthony, Planning and Control Systems; A Framework for Analysis. 
See also R obert N. Anthony and Regina Herzlinger, M anagement Control in 
Nonprofit O rganizations (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975).
^Newman, Constructive Control: Design and Use of C ontrol Systems.
^Mockler, The M anagement Control Process. See Also Robert J .  
Mockler, Information Systems for Management (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E.
M errill Publishing Co., 1974).
tf.
D rucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, P rac tices .
5
William Travers Jerom e III, Executive Control: The C atalyst (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 24.
^George T. Vardaman and Carroll C. H alterm an, M anagerial Control 
Through Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968).
^Samuel Eilon, Management Control (London: Macmillan and Co.,
L td ., 1971).
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able to  identify  change, discover its  causes, and provide decisive action in order
to  maintain a  s ta te  of equilibrium within the system for which he has managerial
responsibility and authority."^ Stokes also looked a t control from a systems
viewpoint and suggested various control system  approaches for a  variety  of
2
managem ent tasks and business situations. Boyce emphasized the essentials of 
m anagem ent control in typical business and management applications. He 
dem onstrated his conviction of the  compelling value of visual aids to  control 
through the libera l use of exemplary illustrations in his tex t.^  More recently , 
Cleland and King have expressed a  philosophy associated with the elem ents of 
control in th e  p ro jec t m anagem ent context^ while Johnson, K ast, and 
Rosenzweig have expanded the systems view.^
R ecen t in itia tives have been characterized  by increased vertical and 
horizontal growth of theory; by renewed e ffo rt in the continuing search for 
fundam entals in m anagem ent and estab lishm ent of a conceptual framework; by 
the advent of high speed data processing; and by the em ergence of large-scale, 
complex, in teg ra ted  m anagem ent control system s. Managers, machines, and 
systems are  converging and forming new relationships as theorists and practi­
tioners continue the search for m anagem ent logic.
^Earl P. Strong and Robert D. Sm ith, Management Control Models 
(New York; H olt, R inehart and Winston, 1968), p. 2.
2
Paul M. Stokes, A Total Systems Approach to M anagement Control 
(New York; A m erican M anagement A ssociation, Inc., 1968).
^R. O. Boyce, Integrated M anagerial Controls (New York; American 
Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., 1968).
If.
Cleland and King, Systems Analysis and Project Management,
pp. 324-40.




M anagement theory and practice have undergone significant change in 
recen t years. This is particu larly  evident in the m anagem ent of United S tates 
national defense activities.^ Evolving technology, especially since the  la te  1940s 
and early  1950s, has led to  weaponry and peripheral equipment of increasing 
com plexity. Additionally, weapons came to  be "systems" involving not just 
individual components of hardw are, but in teg ra ted  item s of to ta l weaponry; 
support and m aintenance equipm ent; real e s ta te  for deployment sites; selection, 
training, and care  of operating and m aintenance personnel; repair parts; 
preparation of technical docum entation; and developm ent and im plem entation of 
m ilitary doctrinal relationships between companion strategic and ta c tica l 
offensive and defensive m ilitary weapons.^ The system s concept was m ore than 
a planning convenience; it  becam e a  "way of thinking" about the m anagem ent 
process.^
The following paragraphs of this section briefly describe some 
emerging p a tte rn s  in current m anagem ent control thought with emphasis on the 
to ta l system s concept.
Tools and Techniques 
While many individual tools and techniques have been developed to 
cope with modern m anagem ent problems, reference to  three generic fam ilies
^K ast and Rosenzweig, M anagement in the Space Age, pp. 43-57.
^Baum gartner, The Lonely Warriors; Case for the M ilitary-Industrial 
Complex, pp. 128-29.
^Cleland and Dellinger, "Changing Patterns in M anagement 
Theory," p. 2.
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should satisfactorily  establish the requisite historical base. These th ree fam ilies 
of tools and techniques are com patible with the examination param eters 
identified w ith the PPL analysis m atrix  in C hapter I.
Cost Control
This family is frequently identified by a number of d ifferen t title s , and
there is wide variation in the control ac tiv ities  discussed. O ther words
commonly associated with this specific  param eter are "budget" or "budgetary,"
"finance" or "financial," and combinations thereof. Budgetary, financial, or cost
control systems are among the most common found in business.^
Having their roots in accounting system s, cost control tools and
techniques are  usually designed to  satisfy  particu lar financial managem ent needs.
As an exam ple, Alain Enthoven stressed , in 1966, tha t, ideally, the purpose of a
budget is to  "...convert goals, programs, and priorities into monetary term s
following rational economic analysis and decision on the optimum means of
2
accomplishing an agency's objectives." He adds th a t "...budgeting is an 
im portant device for the review and control of activ ities of the component parts 
of an organization, to the end th a t overall purposes and not parochial ones are 
served."^ Enthoven also notes th a t while the Congress has historically used its 
power to  authorize and appropriate funds as a lever with the executive branch, 
the use of the  system atic budget process as a  "positive instrum ent" of economic 
analysis and decision making is relatively  new.^
^Mockler, The M anagement Control Process, p. 85.
^Alain C . Enthoven, "Introduction," in A Modern Design for Defense 
Decision; A M cNamara-Hitch-Enthoven Anthology, ed. by Samuel A. Tucker 
(■Washington, D.C.: Industrial College o f the Armed Forces, 1966), p. 1.
^Ibid. ^Ibid.
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Anthony and Herzlinger suggest th a t the federal government's contin­
ued reliance upon the accounting technique of obligation and expenditure (focus 
of purchasing and liabilities Incurred respectively) denies it the preferred m ethod 
of accrual accounting (emphasis on resource consumption). They argue also th a t 
general use of the obligation and expenditure technique elim inates the disciplines 
imposed by basic double en try  accounting.^
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act o f 197%
(Public Law 93-344) represents an a ttem p t to bring major reform  to the federal
budget process. Among other reform s, it  established new com m ittees on the
budget in both houses of Congress, established a tim etable for the  Congressional
budget process, provided for im provem ents in the  information to  be included in
the  President's budget submissions to  the  Congress, and improved review and
analysis procedures. While it  is too early to  determ ine the full impact of the
Act, it  may cause significant change in day-ic-day operations within the
2
D epartm ent of Defense.
One point is abundantly c lear: fiscal responsibility is being stressed a t 
the  operating level within the D epartm ent of Defense. Severe penalties a re  
assessed a t the level of the  individual or individuals knowingly taking any action 
resulting  in any over distribution, overobligation, or overexpenditure of funds in 
any fiscal appropriation o r a subdivision of a  fiscal appropriation. Additionally, 
m anagem ent actions involving acciden tal accounting, clerical, recording or
^Anthony and Herzlinger, Management Control in Non-profit 
Organizations, pp. 53-54.
2
James A. Francis, "The Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974: Implications for Program Managers," Defense Systems
M anagement Review 1 (Winter 1976): 1-24.
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reporting errors th a t lead to  actual overobligation and overexpenditure are  
considered violations of regulations.^
Schedule Control
The schedule control family of tools and techniques derives much of its
cu rren t s ta te  of developm ent from th e  early  contributions of the  scien tific
m anagem ent movement and, more recen tly , from the activ ity  in netw ork
planning. Additionally, many of the  quan tita tive  models of operations research
and operations m anagement have constructive application as tools and techniques
in the  schedule control param eter.
Just as money is the common denom inator in cost control, tim e is the
common denominator in schedule contro l. The value of a common denominator is
readily apparent when the inherent in tegrative  properties of such a feature  are
considered. This point is illustrated  by H odgetts in his opening discussion on
tim e-even t analyses;
Some of the m ost successful approaches to  control have been a tta ined  
through techniques th a t perm it the  m anager to  see how all the 
segments of the project in te rre la te ; evaluate  overall progress; and 
identify and take early co rrective  action on problem areas.
H odgetts suggests th a t the G antt C hart is one of the  earlies t techniques of tim e-
event analysis and th a t la te r and m ore sophisticated techniques are based on
these early principles.^
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Executive Handbook for Financial 
Management (Fort Benjamin H arrison, Indiana: U.S. Army Institute of
Administration, April 1976), pp. 3-2 - 3-5. See also U.S., Departm ent of the  
Army, Financial Administration: A dm inistrative Control of Appropriated Funds, 
Army Regulation No. 37-20, Change 1 (Washington, D.C., 24 June 1969).
2
Hodgetts, Management; Theory, Process, and P rac tice , p. 204.
^Ibid.
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Technical Perform ance Control
Technical perform ance is a generic term  applying to  those dimensions
not falling clearly in the  cost or schedule categories, th a t may be used for
controlling project progress. Included are such dimensions as product design
specifications, product im provem ent programs, product assurance and te s t
requirem ents, operational readiness sta tus of deployed system s, and reliability
and m aintainability sta tus and trends.
Where project cost and schedule control have common denominators of
money and tim e respectively, techn ical perform ance has no such single common
tra it .  Cleland and King, discussing technical perform ance in concert with cost
and schedule standards, describe it as "...one of the  least understood of the
standards."^ They provide fu rth er insight into the nature of the technical
perform ance param eter by suggesting th a t it be quantified "...in term s of system
2
weight, speed capability, e tc ., ..." and monitored over tim e. It is clear th a t 
weight and speed have no readily apparent common tra it .
Martin refers to  this param eter as "product perform ance" and defines 
the purpose of m easurem ent as giving "...a  continuing estim ate  during the 
execution of a research or developm ent program as to w hether the perform ance 
goals of the  project end product will be met."^ He concludes th a t "Control of 
product perform ance should follow the best p ractice for the product or in the 
industry."^
^Cleland and King, Systems Analysis and P ro ject M anagement, p. 329. 
^Ibid.
^Charles C. M artin, P ro jec t Management; How to  Make It Work (New 
York; AMACOM, 1976), p. 189.
^Ibid., p. 192.
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C hestnut also d ifferen tia tes betw een cost, tim e, and "system perform ­
ance" as fac to rs  for judging the worth of system s^ Discussing re -en try  vehicle 
technical perform ance. Chestnut suggests th a t "Because of the im portance of
successful com pletion of the desired mission, system  perform ance is considered a
2
prim ary fac to r in the judgement of the  system ." In a  la te r  tex t stressing the  
problems confronted by systems engineers. C hestnut discusses the use of ratios 
or "figures of m erit" as perform ance indices in non-dimensional form as a means 
of re la ting  perform ance of sim ilar system s. The use of ratios thus would 
elim inate masking caused by the size or number of variables.^
Integrated M anagement Control
In tegrated  management control is com patible with systems theory. It 
views m anagem ent control as a system to exam ine, analyze, and explain project 
perform ance fac to rs  in term s of the ir to ta l influence in large-scale complex 
endeavors, to search for constructive patte rn s and trends, and to  suggest 
meaningful relationships and interdependences. Mockler describes in tegrated  
control in broad term s as a " ...sc ien tific  discipline...which has its own 
system atically  organized set of principles and processes to guide the m anager in 
handling all types of business control situations."^ This definition clearly and 
deliberately  breaks with the trad itional focus on financial and monetary
^Harold Chestnut, Systems Engineering Tools (New York; John Wiley 
Sc Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 57-58.
^Ibid., p. 57.
^Harold Chestnut, Systems Engineering Methods (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 145-46.
Mockler, The Management Control Process, pp. vii-viil.
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systems.^ It stresses a  broader, more comprehensive, more pervasive view, one
calculated to bring maximum exposure to the topic.
In Mockler's view, the science of m anagem ent control is not yet fully
developed. He suggests, however, tha t a higher level of m aturity may be
achieved more rapidly and with less lost m otion, if  those theorists and
practitioners working to advance the science of m anagem ent build on prior 
2
works. It is th is task to  which this study is dedicated.
^Ibid., p. viii. ^Ibid., p. 345.
CHAPTER III
A HISTORY OF BMD MISSION AND MANAGEMENT
The deployment of the Safeguard BMD System at the Stanley R.
Mickelson Safeguard Complex, Nekoma, North Dakota, represented the visible
culmination of the m ost massive, complex defensive weapon project ever
undertaken by the U.S. Army.^ It was the tangible product of more than two
decades of ballistic missile defense (BMD) research, developm ent, test and
evaluation activity  by an Army-Industry team  of unprecedented proportions.^ It
has been suggested by Augustine^ tha t this vigorous ac tiv ity  on the Safeguard
program may have m otivated the  U.S.S.R. to join with the United States in the
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) trea ty  and the Interim  offensive weapons 
If.agreem ents.
At the acceptance ceremony, where the Safeguard System was turned 
over to  the  U.S. Army by th e  Safeguard prime con trac to r, the Honorable 
Norman R. Augustine, then A ssistant Secretary of the Army (Research and 
Development) re ferred  to  Safeguard as "...one of the m ost massive, complex 
undertakings in m ilitary  history." Norman R. Augustine, address a t the 
Safeguard System A cceptance Ceremony, U.S. Army Safeguard Command, 
Nekoma, North Dakota, 27 September 1974.
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Safeguard; 
Ballistic Missile D efense, (Huntsville, Alabama, n.d.) p. inside front cover.
^Augustine address, 27 September 1974.
if,
For a concise description of these two m ajor agreem ents and 
discussion of the S trateg ic  Arms Limitation Talks (also known as SALT), of which 
they are products, see Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Irlrangi C. Bloomfield, "Arms
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Initiated by a small study effo rt in 1955,^ the project progressed
through a series of c ritica l technological and m anagem ent phases until, in
December 1975, th e  Congress directed the D epartm ent of Defense (DoD) to
provide the House and Senate Com m ittees on Appropriations a report of plans to
deactivate  and te rm in a te  the  Safeguard complex in North Dakota. The in ten t of
the Jo in t Senate/House Conference action was to close the complex, except for
the  perim eter acquisition radar (PAR) and ancillary  equipm ent, in a  manner
calculated to  insure th a t no fu ture  funding would be required unless directly
associated with com pletion of dism antlem ent and disposal of Safeguard fac ili- 
2
ties. Initiated in the  House, the Congressional action directing term ination of 
operation of the Safeguard System (less the PAR) was officially completed by 
virtue of the fiscal year (FY) 1976-7T^ DoD Appropriations Bill which became 
public law on February 9, 1976.^ This cessation of Safeguard operation, depending
Control,” 1975 Yearbook; Collier's Encyclopedia Yearbook Covering The Year 
1974 (New York: Macmillan Educational Corporation and P. F. Collier, Inc.,
1974), pp. 72-81.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
Management Study (U), Vol. II, Study Report (U) (CONFIDENTIAL), (Washington, 
D.C., 1 September 1972), p. II-l.
2
U.S.,Congress, Senate, debate on Kennedy Amendment on H.R. 9861, 
D epartm ent of D efense Appropriations, 1976, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 18 November 
1975, Congressional Record, pp. S20314-S20320.
^Through June, 1976, the U.S. fiscal year (FY) ran from July 1 through 
June 30 each year preceding the  calendar year by six months. As an example, 
the  firs t half of FY 76 coincided with the last half of calendar year (CY) 1975, 
while the second half of FY 76 coincided with the f ir s t  half of CY 1976. In 
CY 1976, however, the  fiscal year was changed to  run from October 1 through 
September 30; thus each year preceded the calendar year by only three months. 
The transition period occurred In the third quarter of CY 1976 or July 1, 1976, 
through Septem ber 30, 1976. This period is referred  to  as FY 7T. Thus, FY 77 
covers the period O ctober 1, 1976, through Septem ber 30, 1977.
^U.S., Congress, House, H.R. 9861 Pub. L. 94-212 (9 February 1976; 90 
S tat. 153), Federal R egister 41, No. 31, 13 February 1976, p. 11. '
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upon one's m ental persuasion, signaled e ith e r a s trid en t defeat of strong BMD 
advocacy or a  resounding triumph for detente.^
This chap ter is  devoted to  a synthesized history  of BMD mission and 
m anagem ent, from the first form al feasibility study in 1955 through the 
Safeguard term ination decision. The complexity o f technical and stra teg ic  
considerations, the in tensity  of Congressional and public in te re st in the  e ffo rt, 
and the dynamic nature  o f national BMD policy have had a  profound e ffe c t on the 
BMD mission and on the m anagem ent considerations and philosophy attaching to 
the accomplishment of th a t mission. While United S ta tes BMD ac tiv ity  has been 
subject to a  number of significant and influential fa c to rs , six key decisions 
marked the course o f Safeguard progression. Chronologically, these  decisions 
were: ( l ) th e  decision to  study anti-m issile m issile feasibility  in 1955;
(2) appointm ent of a  system m anager in 1966; (3) the Sentinel decision in 1967; 
(4) the Safeguard decision in 1969; (5) the ABM Treaty in 1972; and (6) th e  system 
term ination action in 1975-76. The brief program history  th a t follows focuses on 
these six key fac to rs and emphasizes the in teraction of m anagem ent techniques 
and in itiatives with th e  evolving mission.
Anti-M issile Missile Feasibility^
The developm ent of an effective BMD capability  using ABM tech­
nology has aptly been described by the scientific com m unity as "hitting a bullet
^For an in teresting  observation on the dem ise of Safeguard see Nick 
Lam berto, "How the U.S. Lost a  $5.6 Billion Poker Hand," Des Moines Sunday 
R egister, September 4, 1977, pp. 4-7.
^The term  "anti-m issile missile" was originally used in conjunction 
with early U.S. Army activ ity . This term was generally replaced by the more 
accura te  term  "antiballistic  m issile." Both of these te rm s, however, technically 
re fe r to  the missile m ajor item only of a BMD system . BMD is a broader term
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with a bullet."^ Such an undertaking-in 1955 represented  a  formidable challenge




The form al study by the D epartm ent of the  Army of the feasibility of 
defending against the  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) began as an 
analysis of a  super air-breathing (but high a ltitu d e) class of targets as the 
prim ary objective, with the ICBM ta rg e t as a  concom m itant correlate.^ This 
original em phasis, however, was rapidly reoriented, and defense against the ICBM 
became th e  principle concern with to ta l consideration open to  a wide range of 
ta rge ts.
Genesis
In March, 1955, the Ordnance and Missile Laboratories located at 
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, awarded an eighteen month study contract in the 
amount of $1.65 million to the Bell Laboratories, Whippany, New Jersey, for the 
study of defense against postulated fu tu re  air th re a ts  including ICBM's.'^ In June 
o f th a t sam e year, the  emphasis of the study was d irected  to the  ICBM th rea t at 
the  request of the Army.^
th a t encom passes th e  to ta l program, including hardw are item s (interceptors, 
radars, com m and, control and communications com ponents, e tc .) , softw are item s 
(drawings, technical manuals, field manuals, ta c tica l com puter softw are, e tc.), 
s ite  fac ilitie s , personnel, and services (project m anagem ent, operator and 
m aintenance training te s t and evaluation, etc.). Chronologically and technically 
appropriate  and co rrec t terminology is used in this study.
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Project 
History (Whippany, New Jersey: Bell Laboratories, O ctober 1975), p. I - l l .
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. I- l. ^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 1-2. Sbid., p. I - l .
I l l
This Initiation of Army BMD effort followed the developm ent of the 
highly successful Nike-Ajax missile system which was deployed in urban areas to 
defend against bomber a irc ra f t a ttacks. Ajax's equally im pressive successor, 
Nike-Hercules, emerged as an operational an tia ircraft system in 1958.^
Designated the Nike 11̂  Study, funding for BMD feasibility  was to 
em brace not only the  engineering study effort, but also exploratory hardware 
development in areas deemed critical to  successful developm ent of the Nike II 
system .^
During this same tim e-fram e the D epartm ent of th e  Air Force was 
also concerned with an ABM capability. In this period, the mission of the Army 
was characterized as "term inal" defense while th a t of the Air Force was defined 
as "area defense." While the  rivalry was intense, the  BMD mission subsequently
h
was assigned solely to  the Army. This assignment of the ABM stra teg ic  mission 
to  the Army was consistent with its  traditional role of providing ground-based 
defense against a ttack  from the air.
Early anti-m issile missile activity was managed by the Ordnance 
Missile Laboratory (OML), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. C reated  as a mission 
agency or line organization in 1952, OML was responsible for planning, directing, 
performing, and coordinating research, development, and product engineering
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, BMD M anagement Study, 
Vol. II, p. I I -1.
^System nom enclature in the Nike family was solidified In la te  1956 as 
follows: Nike I was changed to  Nike-Ajax, Nike B to  N ike-Hercules, and Nike II 
to  Nike-Zeus. These changes were announced in: U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, 
C ircular No. 700-22 (Washington, D.C., 15 November 1956).




within the fields of guided nnissiles, JATOs and rockets. Additionally, OML was
assigned responsibility for maintaining a position of leadership in scientific  and
engineering activ ities  within the  same fields. ̂
On December 22, 1955, the D epartm ent of the  Army formally
announced the  establishm ent of the U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA)
as an independent activ ity  a t  Redstone Arsenal, but reporting directly  to  the
Chief of Ordnance, Washington, D.C. The new agency was to be effective 
2
February 1,1956. The prim ary mission of ABMA was to  bring focus and emphasis 
to  a  fam ily of ballistic missiles.^ The establishm ent of ABMA was carefully 
designed to  preclude technical mission conflict with Redstone Arsenal. It was 
during this period tha t Redstone Arsenal began to  achieve national and world­
wide prominence. While the establishm ent of ABMA did not m aterially affect 
the  mission of OML with regard to its anti-m issile missile work, it precipitated
unprecedented continuous national in terest in Redstone Arsenal and its 
5activ ities.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Semiannual H istorical Summary; 
1 January 1953-30 June 1953 (Huntsville, Alabama: Redstone Arsenal, n.d.),
p. 128.
“U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, General O rders No. 68 (Washington, 
D.C., 22 Decem ber 1955).
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Historical Summary: 1 Jul 1955-
31 Dec 1955, Vol. I (Huntsville, Alabama: Redstone Arsenal, n.d.), p. 4.
L
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Historical Summary: 1 Jan 1956-
31 Jul 1956, Vol. I (Huntsville, Alabama: Redstone Arsenal, n.d.), p. 6.
^U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, H istorical Summary: 1 Jan 
1958-30 3un 1958 (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, n.d.), p. 1.
113
Feasibility Study Results
The product of the Army Nike II Study was a new, forward-looking, 
su rface-to -air guided-missile system capable of engaging ta rg e t  th rea ts  (specifi­
cally  the ICBM) postulated for the 1960-70 tim e-fram e. The study, com pleted in 
O ctober, 1956, concluded th a t an anti-m issile missile system  was feasible against 
the specifically defined th rea ts. The study also provided a  phased development 
and production program which, if fully funded and im plem ented as planned, would 
have atta ined  an operational system capability in la te  1962.^ This milestone 
would finally be m et th irteen  years la ter following accom plishm ent of many 
technological advancem ents, much spirited and striden t d ebate , and a  program 
approaching $6 billion. The to ta l approved Safeguard program is depicted in 
Table 1.
As a result of the Army study, the phased developm ent of the Nike-
3Zeus system was in itia ted  in November, 1956.
Nike-Zeus
During the continuing development of Nike-Zeus, the  National Security 
Council assigned the highest national priority to  the program . The management 
of the system  within the office of the Chief of Ordnance, D epartm ent of the 
Army, gradually becam e more sophisticated and progressively more centralized.^
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, BMD M anagement Study, 
Vol. n, p. II-3.
2
Program figure cited  is through 31 March 1977, as depicted in 
BMDPO Form 68, "Continued Management Integration and Control of BMD 
Costs," Action No. BMD 3-47, 31 March 1977.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, BMD M anagement Study, 




SUMMARY OF SAFEGUARD APPROVED PROGRAM 
FISCAL YEARS 1368 -  1977, INCLUSIVE 
(Dollars In Millions as of December 1976)
F I S C A L  Y E A R D E V E L O P M E N T I N V E S T M E N T O P E R A T I N G T O T A L
1968 S 383,5 $ 184.7 $ 10.0 $ 578.2
1969 311.1 512.5 37.2 860.8
1970 399.0 447.7 35.0 881.7
1971 381.8 845.4 54.3 1,261.5
1972 296.0 637.0 74.1 1,007.1
1973 299.2 272.0 71.2 642.4
1974 176.1 130.4 65.6 372.1
1975 33.1 3.0 70.5 106.6
1976 0. 1.9 83.8 85.7
197T 0. 0. 17.6 17.6
1977 0. 4.2 26.7 30.9
TOTAL $2,259.8 $3,038.8 $546.0 $5,844.6
S O U R C E :  c o m p i l e d  F R O M  U . S . ,  D E P A R T M E N T  O F  T H E  ARMY,  B M D P O  F O R M  68 ,  ‘ C O N T I N U E D  
m a n a g e m e n t  i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  C O N T R O L  O F  B MD  C O S T S , '  A C T I O N  N O .  BMD 3 - 4 7 ,  31 M A R C H  1 9 7 7  
A N D  R C S - B M D P M - 8 ,  ‘ BMD P R O G R A M  S T A T U S , *  R E P O R T  N O .  J 1 0 0 4 R 9 ,  31 D E C E M B E R  1 9 7 6 ,  B O T H  
D O C U M E N T S  F R O M  B A L L I S T I C  M I S S I L E  D E F E N S E  O R G A N I Z A T I O N  F I L E S ,  W A S H I N G T O N ,  D . C .
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Redstone Anti-M issile 
Missile Systems O ffice
In O ctober, 1957, the  Redstone Anti-Missile Missile Systems O ffice
(RAMMSO) was established a t Redstone Arsenal to  bring intensive m anagem ent
to  the project in response to  the increasing urgency given the anti-m issile missile
program by higher headquarters.^ Formed from a small anti-m issile missile
office established in OML in D ecem ber, 1956, RAMMSO was a ttached  d irec tly  to
2
the O ffice of the Commanding General and was, in e ffec t, the f irs t form al 
project office for BMD activ ity .
Although th e  Nike-Zeus project had already reached the  developm ent 
stage and was progressing satisfacto rily , the urgency of the ballistic missile 
th rea t demanded th a t the norm al course of development, procurem ent and 
production, and deployment be abandoned in favor of an accelerated  program 
with a high degree of concurrency or overlapping of major program phases. This 
required conceptual changes in normal m anagem ent methods in order to  
in teg ra te  the many diverse functional activ ities and provide for smooth 
establishm ent of a  BMD system in minimum tim e.^ Accordingly, the RAMMSO 
mission was clearly  delineated to  reflec t its  role of program control in m atrix  
overlay with supporting arsenal functional mission organizations, other govern­
ment agencies, and prim e con tracto rs. Initially s taffed  with five Army officers
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, H istorical Summary; 1 Jul 1957- 
31 Dec 1957, Vol. II (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, n.d.), p. 151.
^U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, H istorical Summary; 1 Jan 
1958-30 3un 1953, p. 6.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, H istorical Summary; 1 Jul 1957- 
31 Dec 1957, Vol. H, p. 151.
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and nineteen civilians, RAMMSO had an authorization o f sixteen m ilitary and 
tw enty-four civilians by the end of 1957.^
U,S. Army Rocket and 
Guided Missile Agency
In March, 1958, the  Secretary  of the Army announced the establish­
m ent of the U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) a t  Redstone Arsenal, 
e ffec tiv e  March 31, 1958.^ Major organizational elements of AOMC included 
ABMA; the J e t  Propulsion Laboratory a t Pasadena, California; the White Sands 
Proving Ground (renamed White Sands Missiie Range one month later); and the 
Redstone Arsenal.^ The U.S. Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency (ARGMA)
It,
was activated as a fifth  subordinate elem ent of AOMC, effective  April 1, 1958. 
The prim ary in tention of the sweeping reorganization was to  establish a unified 
command under single direction, coupled with adm inistrative stream lining, to  
manage the entire Army rocket and guided missile effort and assigned portions of 
the national space program .^
The establishm ent of ARGMA erased Redstone Arsenal's identity as a 
commodity arsenai for rockets and guided missiles. All of the Redstone
^Ibid.
2
U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, H istorical Summary; 1 Jan 
1958-30 Jun 1958, p. 1.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, General O rders No. 12 (Washington, 
D.C., 28 March 1958).
U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, General Orders No. 6 
(Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 1 April 1958).
^U.S., D epartm ent of Defense, "Army Ordnance Missile Command 
Established at Huntsville, Alabama," News Release No. 263-58 (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of Public Inform ation, 20 March 1958).
117
technical mission and organization remaining from the establishm ent of ABMA,
including the RAMMSO mission, w ent to  ARGMA. ̂  ARGMA was functionally
organized. A com plem ent of mission divisions performed specific functions for a
number of weapon system s, however, project orientation was used wherever
2
feasible within the  mission divisions. As an example, when RAMMSO was 
abolished shortly a f te r  the  establishm ent of ARGMA,^ research and development 
activ ities pertaining to  the anti-m issile missile effort were transferred to  the 
Anti-Missile Missile Branch within the  Research <5c Development Division.^
From its  inception, ARGMA operated under a prime contracto r 
concept involving technical control and coordination by ARGMA of development 
work actually perform ed by industrial con tracto rs.^  This early ARGMA 
philosophy of heavy reliance on private industry was to  remain a cardinal 
m anagem ent principle in BMD ac tiv ity .^  The management objectives of the 
research and developm ent programs conducted by AOMC were "First, to control
^U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, Historical Summary: 1 Jan 
1958-30 Jun 1958, p. 5.
2
U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, H istorical Summary: 1 April 
1958-30 June 1958 (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama: U.S. Army Rocket & Guided 
Missile Agency, 21 O ctober 1958), p. 26.
^U.S., Army Rocket & Guided Missile Agency, General Orders No. 5 
(Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 11 April 1958).
U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, H istorical Summary: 1 April 
1958-30 June 1958, pp. 25, 64.
^Ibid., p. 27.
^Two excellent contem porary artic les on the subject of the use of 
p rivate enterprise in weapon system  procurem ent are J . Sterling Livingston, 
"Decision Making in Weapons Development," Harvard Business Review 36 
(January-February 1958): 127-36 and J. Sterling Livingston, "Weapon System
C ontracting," Harvard Business Review 37 (July-August 1959): 83-92.
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the  degree to  which the s ta te  of the  a r t was pushed in any given project; second, 
to  project an accu ra te  tim e schedule for the developm ent, production, and 
deployment of a  program; and, th ird , to apply available funds and. manage the 
program with optimum efficiency."^
The commodity m anagem ent procedure involving functional o rien ta ­
tion made e ffec tive  m anagem ent control and internal coordination of mission 
e ffo rt d ifficu lt. While the  commodity m anagement concept provided form al 
guidelines for determ ining the division o f primary in te re s t based on specified
transition points in the  life cycle of the  system, the  need for centralized
2
technical m anagem ent control was recognized. For Nike-Zeus this m eant the 
establishm ent in February, I960, o f a Deputy Commander, ARGMA, for Ballistic 
Missile and Space Defense with full responsibility for the  Nike-Zeus program .^ 
This Deputy Commander was delegated authority  for Nike-Zeus to: "Issue in his 
own name directives and instructions to all ordnance agencies engaged in the
à
execution of support actions and services." The title  was subsequently changed 
to  Project D irector for Ballistic Missile and Space Defense.^ The responsibilities 
assigned this f irs t genuine BMD project adm inistrator were prophetic of a 
m anagem ent trend  toward continuing centralization  of BMD activ ity .
The sensitivity  of the BMD e ffo rt to  the balance of world power was 
succinctly s ta ted  by the  then Chief of S taff of the Army when, referring  to  the 
Nike-Zeus, he s ta ted :
U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, History of H eadquarters, 
U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command: 1 January-30 June 1959 (Redstone
Arsenal, Alabam a, 1 November 1959), p. 4.
2
U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, H istorical Summary; 1 Jan 
1960-30 3un 1960 (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama: 19 O ctober 1960), pp. 15-19.
^Ibid., p. 3. ^Ibid., p. 4. ^Ibid., p. 3.
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It would be reassuring to  know th a t it  is the  only anti-m issile 
missile system in the  world which has advanced so fa r. It takes little  
im agination to p ic ture  our predicam ent if the Soviets were to develop 
an effective  anti-m issile defense before we do.
This logic, in fa c t, subsequently underscored the negotiations with the  U.S.S.R.
th a t led to  the ABM trea ty  m entioned earlier in this chapter.
During this period th e  program continued to  progress technically  and
the  development e ffo rt rem ained on schedule. Significant technology advance-
2
ments were achieved in many of the major elem ents of the  system .
Nike-Zeus Project Office
The organizational s tru c tu re  of ARGMA rem ained essentially  stab le 
until Decem ber, 1961, when the  m ajor elem ents of AOMC w ere realigned to 
consolidate the  activ ities of ABMA, ARGMA, and AOMC headquarters in 
accordance with D epartm ent of the Army direction.^ An organization chart of 
the period depicts a  Deputy Commanding General for Ballistic Missiles (basically 
ABMA systems) and a Deputy Commanding General for Guided Missiles (basically 
ARGMA system s). Each had a  number of project offices reporting directly  to  
him including a Nike-Zeus Project Office organizationally aligned under the 
Deputy Commanding General for Guided Missiles. Major functional elem ents 
reported d irectly  to  the Commanding General.^ Matrix m anagem ent had arrived 
at AOMC. The major mission of the  Zeus and other project m anagers was to
^Speech by General George H. Decker, Chief of S taff, U.S. Army, 
before the National Press Club Luncheon, Washington, D.C., 15 Decem ber 1960.
2
John G. Zierdt, "Nike-Zeus: Our Developing Missile K iller, Army
Information Digest 15 (December 1960): 2-11,
^U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, O rganizational Manual 
(Interim) (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 26 January 1962), p. 1.
^Ibid., p. 1.
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"...assure most e ffective  m anagem ent of assigned weapon system."^ Project
m anagers were given "...maximum responsibility and broadest possible
authority ..."  in keeping with this com prehensive mission.^ The disestablishm ent 
of ABMA and ARGMA in D ecem ber, 1961, finally solidified the trend toward a 
unified organization for Army missiles and rockets which had been in itiated  m ore 
than th ree  years earlier. The days of AOMC by th a t name were also numbered; 
during an Army-wide reorganization, the  Army Missile Command (MICOM) 
supplanted the AOMC in August, 1962.^
The Army Missile Command was officially established a t Redstone
Arsenal as a subordinate e lem ent of the Army M ateriel Command (AMC),
Washington, D.C., in May, 1962. It did not become operational until three months
la te r  w ith the final transfer of assets such as personnel, records, files, property,
[1
and equipm ent of the old AOMC to MICOM. In the reorganization the Nike- 
Zeus P ro ject O ffice remained in ta c t. The Zeus Project Manager, together w ith 
one o th e r p ro ject,^  were a ttached  to MICOM for adm inistrative support, but 
each reported d irectly  to the Commanding General of the Army M ateriel 
Command.^
^Ibid., p. 380-5. ^Ibid.
^U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command, History of the H eadquarters, 
Army Ordnance Missile Command: 1 January-30 June 1962 (Redstone Arsenal, 
A labam a, 15 November 1962), p. 1.
li
U.S., Army Missile Command, Annual Historical Summary: 1 July
1962-30 June 1963, Vol. I (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 1 October 1963), p. 2.
^The Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System (FABMDS).
^U.S., Army Missile Command, Annual H istorical Summary; 1 July
1962-30 June 1963, Vol. I, p. 5.
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The project managem ent concept continued to m a tu re /  and the
vertical project management concept recognized the project manager as "...the
single individual responsible for accomplishing the objectives of his assigned 
2
program ." Project managers had the authority  to  d irect support elem ents of 
MICOM and also supervised large staffs  organic to their own offices. Technical 
d irection of program activ ity  covered such gross functional a reas  as system 
design, research and developm ent, procurem ent, production, quality engineering, 
reliab ility , system te s t , maintenance engineering, and program resource 
m anagem ent.^
The real additional cost of the m atrix form of management was the
subject of a study a t MICOM in August, 1963. The study concluded th a t the
pro ject m anagem ent concept a t MICOM added costs of $5.7 million and 434
personnel over stra igh t functional m anagem ent. The Commanding General,
MICOM, however, concluded:
Although from the standpoint of in ternal operating costs it  would 
appear tha t considerable money and manpower could be saved by 
reversion to the functional concept, I feel tha t th e  concentrated  
atten tion  to individual system s under the p ro ject management concept 
is effecting savings in money and t^me on our contracts which far 
outweigh the increased internal costs.
Informed, au thorita tive , contem porary descriptions of early Army 
pro ject m anagem ent concepts may be found in Frem ont E. Kast and Jam es E. 
Rosenzweig, eds.. Science, Technology, and M anagement (New Y ork: McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 90-128; Frank S. Besson, Jr., "G eneral Besson 
Highlights Project Manager Duties Under Reorganization," Data 8 (June 1963): 
13-17; and Francis J . McMorrow, "General McMorrow Outlines Missile Command 
Organization and Functions," Data 8 (June 1963): 19-22.
2
U.S., Army Missile Command, Annual H istorical Summary: 1 July
1962-30 June 1963, Vol. I, p. 6.
^Ibid.
U.S., Army Missile Command, Annual H istorical Surnmary; 1 July
1963-30 June 1964 (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 2 November 1964), p. 27.
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This early endorsement of th e  project concept was indicative of the  high esteem 
in which this management technique was held in the Army, particularly  with 
regard to  the Zeus Project. During th is  tim e-fram e, the Zeus P ro ject Office was 
authorized a to ta l of 279 personnel.^
Production Planning
A significant m ilestone in the  evolution of stra teg ic  defensive forces 
was reached in July, 1962, when a Zeus missile, launched from the Kwajalein Test 
Site in the Marshall Islands in the C entral Pacific Ocean, in tercepted  and 
theoretically  destroyed an incoming ICBM nose cone (the ICBM payload) hurled 
into tra jec to ry  by an Air Force Atlas missile launched from Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, California.^
Production planning for Nike-Zeus had reached a  stage of m aturity 
th a t perm itted  the  Secretary of D efense to approve, in Septem ber, 1962, the firs t 
two phases of a three-phase plan for production and deployment of Nike-Zeus. 
D espite the success of the te s t program , however, the Nike-Zeus system was 
lim ited in capability. The slow, m echanically slewed radars w ere lim ited in their 
capacity  to  search and track , and the Zeus missile itse lf responded too slowly to  
be launched and still in tercep t a  hostile ICBM a fte r  the ICBM had re-entered the 
atm osphere. When confronted with a sophisticated a ttack , incorporating 
penetration  aids (decoy warheads) or a great number of actual warheads, the  
defensive Zeus could be ta rg e t sa tu rated  or numerically overwhelmed.^
^Ibid., p. 15.
2
U.S., Departm ent of the  Army, BMD Management Study, 
Vol. n , p . 11-3.
^Ibid.
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The Secretary of Defense reversed his earlier production decision in
January, 1963, and sta ted  th a t the existing Nike-Zeus would not be produced or
deployed. He indicated fu rther th a t the  Nike-Zeus program was to  be reoriented
toward a new system approach and th a t no decision had been made as to the
eventual production and deployment of the new system which was designated




Early in 1963 th e  Secretary of Defense d irected  th a t the Army
commence, with the highest priority, to  develop an advanced concept, Nike-X.^
The new approach was to  include m ore versatile and higher traffic-handling
capacity radars and data  processors and a missile capable of being launched a f te r




Nike-X, by definition, was not a  single system  concept. Unlike its  
predecessor, Nike-Zeus, it was more a generic term  em bracing "...a  number of
Îbid.
2
See, for exam ple, John G. Z ierdt, "Defense in Nuclear War," 
Ordnance 47 (January-February 1963): 413-21; C . A. W arren, "Nike-Zeus," Bell 
Laboratories Record 41 (March 1963): 78-86; Strom Thurmond, "The Gap in
Ballistic Missiie Defense," D ata  8 (June 1963): 42-45; and "BMD in Perspective," 
Data 8 (June 1963): 7-11.
^An interesting comparison of Nike-Zeus and Nike-X is made by the 
then project manager in Ivey O. Drewry, Jr., "Project O fficer Evaluates Zeus and 
Nike-X," Data 8 (June 1963): 24-27.
If,
An authoritative description of this missile may be found in Ivey O. 
Drewry, Jr., "Hot Rod Missile," Army Information Digest 20 (May 1965): 22-26.
m
studies and exploratory developm ents aimed at leading from the then outmoded 
Nike-Zeus to  the next generation ABiVi system."^ In term s of technological 
lineage, Nike-X represented  the fourth-generation Nike. It would build on the 
accum ulated scientific  and engineering knowledge derived from Ajax, Hercules, 
and Zeus.^
Nike-X Project Office
The project o ffice  mission rem ained essentially unchanged during 1963, 
although the Nike-X decision m eant significant technical redirection of the 
program . In fac t, the o ffice  was not renamed the Nike-X Project O ffice until 
F e b ru a ry ,1964.^
The Nike-X P ro ject M anager continued to  report to  the Commanding 
General of the Army M ateriel Command, Washington, D.C. Additionally, a 
d irec t contracting capability  with au thority  to negotia te  and execu te  Nike-X 
con trac to rs  was established within the project o ffice .^  In ]uly, 1964, an 
additional organizational change occurred as the Nike-X Project O ffice assumed 
responsibility for operating  and managing the Kwajalein complex and redesig­
nated i t  the Kwajalein T est Site.^ The project m anager summarized his mission
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Project 
H istory, p. 2-1.
2
Ivey O. D rew ry, Jr., "The Brand Name is Nike-X," Army 14 (February
1964): 53.
^U.S., Army M ateriel Command, General O rders No. 4 (Washington, 
D.C., 30 January 1964).
^"Col. Drewry Confident Nike-X Fills ABM Need," D ata 9 (June
1964): 29.
^U.S., Army M ateriel Command, Annual H istorical Summary: 1 July
1963-30 June 1964 (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama: Nike-X Project O ffice, 10
August 1964), p. 1.
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succinctly  when, in addressing the pjossible fu ture  deploym ent decision of Nike-X, 
he w rote:
Our job a t  the  project m anagem ent office is to summon all the 
technical com petence available to  build the best system possible and 
to  provide those in authority with the best inform ation possible upon 
which to  base such a decision. These tasks a re  being executed under 
the  highest priority .
If co n trac t dollar am ount is any indication of the m agnitude of this job—and it 
undoubtedly is—the Nike-X program achieved distinction in September, 1964, 
when the la rgest single con tract awarded in Army history was signed with the 
W estern E lectric  Company in the am ount of $309,664,200.^ Spanning a one year 
period, the co n trac t covered testing of Nike-X equipm ent a t White Sands Missile 
Range, New Mexico; Kwajalein Test Site; and o ther sm aller te s t sites. While 
certain ly  the  largest of con tracts a t th a t tim e, it was only one of many under the 
purview of the  pro ject office.^
Deployment Planning
Deployment of an active BMD, specifically Nike-X, continued to  be 
the subject of techno-m ilitary  defense policy a rtic les in a variety  of periodicals.^
^Ivey O. Drewry, Jr., "Nike-X: New Look in ICBM Defense," Ordnance 
49 (Novem ber-Decem berl964); 281.
2
U.S., Army M ateriel Command, Annual H istorical Summary: 1 July




See, for example: James Trainor, "Nike-X F a te  Keyed to DoD
Study," Missiles and Rockets 14 (18 May 1964): 14-15; Jam es Trainor, "Missile 
Site Radar Paces Nike-X," Missiles and Rockets 14 (25 May 1964): 14-15;
"Ballistic Missile Defense: The $20 Billion Question," D ata 9 (June 1964): 9-11; 
Freem an J. Dyson, "Defense Against Ballistic Missiles," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 20 (June 1964): 12-18; Jerom e B. Wiesner and H erbert F. York,
"National Security and the N uclear-Test Ban," Scientific American 2 i l  (October 
1964): 27-35; and George A. W. Boehm, "Countdown for Nike-X," Fortune
(November 1965): 132-37, 192, 194, 196, 198, 200.
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The issue was rapidly becoming m ore public and opposing viewpoints were
brought into sharper focus. The f ir s t  major signs of significant opposition to
missiie defense began to  appear In the  1963-64 tim e-fram e.^ The "ABM
controversy," so long waged in the  re lative quiet of the executive branch of
government, was about to  erup t into public view.
In January, 1965, a  com prehensive organizational plan for Army
support of Nike-X production and deployment was prepared by th e  project 
2
office. This plan, with minor m odification, would become the basic blueprint 
for the establishm ent and organization of the Army elem ent formed some three 
years la te r to  manage BMD deployment.^ Additionally, a Nike-X System 
Manager C harter was com pleted in Septem ber, 1965, in preparation for a 
deployment decision. Approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army, it was
h
forwarded to the Secretary of the Army, but the  charter was not acted upon.
In October of th a t same year, the resu lts of an Army study based on 
the postulated future People's Republic of China ballistic missile th rea t was 
presented to the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense. The study 
recommended a tw enty-five-city  defense of the  United S tates, but in December 
the Secretary  of Defense deferred production activ ities for a t least one year.^
^Benson D. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: American 
Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 92.
2
U.S., Army M ateriel Command, O rganizational Plan for U.S. Army 
Support of Nike-X Deployment.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, BMD Management Study, 
Vol. n , p. II-4.
^Ibid. ^Ibid.
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This was done to  perm it more tim e for analysis and study of a lte rnate  
deploym ent models.^
Achievem ent of System 
M anagement Status
In Septem ber, 1966, the ever-expanding program achieved new promi­
nence with the  appointm ent of the Chief of Research and Developm ent as the 
Nike-X System Manager (in addition to  his o ther duties) under the  direct 
command jurisdiction of the Army Chief of S taff. This change raised 
m anagem ent of Nike-X one level higher in the Army hierarchy. It was the only 
m ajor project in the Army to achieve such sta tus. Simultaneously, the Nike-X 
System O ffice was established in Washington, D.C., effective  O ctober 15, 1966, to 
function as the s taff of the System Manager. The Nike-X System Manager 
assumed operational control of the Nike-X Project Office a t Redstone Arsenal, 
but command jurisdiction remained the responsibility of the  Army M ateriel 
Command.^ The principle mission of the System Office was to "...d irect and 
control the  approved development program and to do the necessary planning to
3
im plem ent any production decision made by the Secretary of Defense." In 
November, 1966, the Nike-X Engineering/Service Test Office was established a t 
White Sands Missile Range as a subordinate elem ent of the  System Office. 
Under the System O ffice, the main role of the  Nike-X Project Office was to
An interesting analysis of why this particular decision was made may 
be found in "Why the Nike-X Was Not Ordered into Production," Armed Forces 
M anagement 12 (March 1966); 91-92, 94, 96.
^U.S., Nike-X System Office, Annual Historical Summary: 1 July




provide the primary technical and con tractual in te rface  between DoD com­
ponents and the weapon system contracto r structure.^ The Nike-X Project
O ffice was the central technical arm of the System M anager and continued its
mission for managing development and te s t  activ ity  and production and
2
deployment planning.
The magnitude of the Nike-X program is d ifficu lt to describe in words, 
but the flavor of its  scope may be captured by describing a few of its  more 
unusual face ts . In term s of funds expended, the  BMD e ffo rt had cost the 
government $2.5 billion since its  inception in 1955. In term s of the industrial 
con tracto r s truc tu re , approximately th ree  thousand American firm s were 
producing goods and services used in the program. In physical te rm s, the 
principal radar approached the height of a ten-sto ry  building above the  ground, 
but a c ritica l component of the radar was a dime-sized electronic device of 
which lite ra lly  millions were required. The program required such diverse 
components as a one-hundred-ton perm anent m agnet and m icrom iniature
e lectronic circuitry  so small tha t assembly had to be accomplished under high- 
power m icroscopes.^ Certainly the largest program ever undertaken by the 
Army, Nike-X became the fulcrum of the  BMD deploym ent decision.
Deployment Precursor 
The appointm ent of a System Manager was a precursor of the 
deployment decision. It further centralized m anagem ent of the Nike-X program
^Ibid., p. 4.
2
U.S., Army Materiel Command, Organization and Management 
Manual Nike-X Regulation No. 10-1 (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Nike-X 
P roject O ffice, 30 June 1967), pp. i, 2.
^U.S., Nike-X System O ffice, Annual H istorical Summary; 1 July 
1966-30 June 1967, p. i.
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and was a m ilestone in the history of BMD e ffo rt. In December, 1966, the System 
Manager developed a  Nike-X deployment model d irected  against a  potential 
th rea t through the  1970s from both the People's Republic of China and the 
U.S.S.R. The model was presented to  the Secretary of Defense and approved for 
planning purposes. In July of th e  following year, th e  Secretary of Defense was 
again briefed on severai deployment concepts. He directed th a t a  thirty-day 
study be m ade of the  evolving People's Republic of China th re a t. It was this 
direction and the subsequent study th a t se t the s tag e  for the  forthcom ing 
production and deployment decision.^
Sentinel Decision
The third major m ilestone in the evolution of United S tates BMD
activ ity  was the  Sentinel deployment decision.
Dr. Harold Brown, fo rm er DoD D irector of Defense R esearch and
Engineering, writing on m ilitary forces planning, suggested;
We m ust.be  wise enough to  manage the in teraction  betw een weapons 
developm ent and defense policy so th a t our weapons are  always 
responsive to  policy cind our policy is based on a full consideration of 
the  options made available by technology.
While developm ent of Nike-X was pushed without a deployment decision,^
technology and strategy , weapon and policy, finally coincided in 1967 with the
h
announcem ent of the decision to  proceed with a  lim ited ABM deploym ent.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, BMD M anagement Study, 
Vol. n, p. II-5.
2
Harold Brown, "Planning Our M ilitary Forces," Foreign Affairs ^5 
(January 1967); 290.
^Ibid., p. 224.
^Robert S. McNamara, Address by the Secretary  of D efense (DoD 
News R elease No. 868-67) before  the  United Press International Editors and 
Publishers, San Francisco, California, 18 September 1967.
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Sentinel
The Secretary  of D efense, in a  prepared news release, announced the 
approval of the name "Sentinel" for the C hinese-oriented ABM system a t a news 
conference early  in November.^ He also outlined the framework of the 
organization responsible for Sentinel's developm ent and deployment, but noted 
th a t N ike-X  activ ity  would continue separately . The mission would be continued, 
research and developm ent on system s designed to p ro tec t population centers 
against large-scale a ttack s .^
Deployment Decision
In an exclusive interview  one week following the deployment 
announcem ent, the Secretary  of D efense elaborated on the  terminology 
"lim ited," or (as it  was also re fe rred  to) "light," BMD deploym ent. He indicated 
th a t the  Sentinel mission was first, an a rea  defense of the United States 
population against the  kind of a tta ck  the Chinese Communists might be capable 
of in the  1970s; second, point defense of ICBM underground silos against Soviet 
a ttack ; and third, p ro tection  against accidental launch of a nuclear armed missile 
by anyone possessing the capability .^ In early November, 1967, excellent 
s ta tem en ts  were provided by DoD to the Jo in t Com m ittee on Atomic Energy
 ̂Robert S. M cNamara, News Conference of the Secretary of Defense 
(DoD News Release No. 1059-67) a t the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 3 November 
1967.
^Ibid.
^"Defense Fantasy Now Come True," Life, September 29, 1967, 
pp. 28A-28C.
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outlining the rationale behind the  decision, the technical features of the system,
and the implications of the deployment.^
The deployment decision fanned the heat of the "ABM debate." As one
author has suggested, the ABM controversy was unique "...in its openness and
duration, the  public's awareness of it, the role of non-governmental participants
2
and their influence on the decision m akers, and the roie Congress played." 
Senator Strom Thurmond, staunch advocate, referred  to the ABM as "...a  vital
component of our national security ..."^ and called the decision "...one of the
a
m ost significant U.S. M iiitary decisions of the decade." Dr. Jerom e B. Wiesner, 
an opponent, sta ted  his belief th a t "...a realiy effective anti-m issile system is 
[n o t] rem otely possible..." and suggested tha t the decision "...could be as wrong 
and have as serious dom estic and international consequences as the disastrous 
conclusion...that a few m ilitary advisors and some weapons could lead to an early 
victory for South Vietnam's forces."^ These polemic views on the deployment 
decision a re  representative of the ABM debate rhetoric of the period.
O rganization and Management
With the deployment announcement, the Army moved rapidly to 
im plem ent the new organization designed to  manage the Sentinel program. Of
U.S., Congress, Jo in t C om m ittee on Atomic Energy, Scope, Magni­
tude, and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program 
Hearings, pp. 6-17, 44-47.
2
Adams, Ballistic Missiie D efense, p. xi.
^Strom Thrumond, "ABM; Lessening the Threat of N uclear Blackmail," 
D ata 12 (October 1967): 11.
^Ibid., p. 10.
^Jerome B. Wiesner, "The Case Against an A ntiballistic Missiie 
System," Look, November 28, 1967, p. 26.
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param ount im portance to this effo rt was the appointment of a Sentinel System
Manager (SENSM), reporting directly to  the  Chief of S taff of the Army, with
responsibility for over-all management of the to ta l Sentinel program.^ The
SENSM was provided a broad charter tha t called for the  organization of Sentinel
dedicated elem ents including a System O ffice (SENSO) located in Washington,
D.C.; a System Command (SENSCOM) located in Huntsville, Alabama; and a
System Evaluation Agency (SENSEA) located a t  White Sands Missile Range, New 
2
Mexico. Each of the equivalent organizations within the  old Nike-X System 
O ffice s tru c tu re  was discontinued and its personnel and resources transferred  to  
form the nucleus of the corresponding new elem ent. In addition to the SENSM's 
command authority  over these dedicated organizations, he was given s ta ff 
supervision over all Army s ta ff  elem ents and participating organizations^ and 
operational control of Sentinel-com m itted elem ents of o ther Army major 
commands in the planned deployment.^ At no tim e in the history of the Army had 
a single system -dedicated individual been given such authority  and responsibility 
for a program .^
The Sentinel System Organization, as defined by the Sentinel System 
C harter, included only the dedicated organizations under the d irect command of
Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, "Sentinel System C harter," 
Memorandum for Chief of S taff, U.S. Army, 3 November 1967, Ballistic Missile 
Defense O rganization Files, Washington, D.C.
^U.S., Departm ent of the Army, General Orders No. 48.
^Ibid.
à
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, BMD Management Study, 
Vol. U, p. H-5.
^Ibid.
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the SENSM. The SENSO constituted the  im m ediate s taff of the SENSM. 
Established as an elem ent of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, its 
mission was to  assist the  SENSM in the discharge of his responsibilities. The 
SENSCOM was organized as the design agency of the Sentinel System 
O rganization. The mission of this elem ent included the  developm ent, acquisition, 
and installation of the weapon system. Additionally, m anagem ent of the 
Kwajalein Test Site (organizationally a ttached  to  H eadquarters, D epartm ent of 
the  Army) was assigned to  the Commander, SENSCOM. The SENSEA was 
established to  provide an independent (i.e ., independent of the SENSCOM) 
evaluation and assessm ent program, through d irec t testing  or active participation 
in design agency testing , responsive to  Army Air Defense Command (the combat 
user of the system ) requirements.^ L eft unsettled by the charter was the 
responsibility for continued development of a BMD capability  against large-scale
a ttack . This mission remained tem porarily with the Chief of Research and
2
Development, D epartm ent of the Army, as p a rt of the Nike-X program.
In addition to its primary mission as the field command of the Sentinel 
System Organization responsible for system  developm ent, acquisition, and 
installation, the  SENSCOM was also assigned the lead role in major program 
m anagem ent activ ities. Specifically, SENSCOM was assigned lead responsibility 
for financial m anagem ent and for receipt and distribution of Sentinel funds and 
program authority ; accomplishment of the configuration m anagement program; 
accom plishm ent of the product assurance program; and development.
^Resor, "Sentinel System C harter," Memorandum. 
^Ibid.
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im plem entation, and operation of the Sentinel m anagem ent information system .^ 
The assignm ent of program m anagem ent prim acy to  SENSCOM had two 
significant aspects. F irst, i t  put SENSCOM a t the  focus of all program activ ity ; 
second, it  removed the development of th e  to ta l m anagement control system 
from the d irec t supervision of the  SENSM. These two factors were to  have 
subtle downstream influences on m anagem ent control activ ities.
Following th e  decision to deploy the  Sentinel system and the 
establishm ent of the Sentinel System O rganization, a series of high-level 
conferences was held within the Army and betw een the Army and DoD. As a 
resu lt, the  Army planned to c rea te  the Advanced Ballistic Missile D efense 
Agency (ABMDA) with the mission to: develop modifications to  the planned 
deploym ent th a t might be necessary to  extend the  effective  life of Sentinel, 
develop concepts and technology th a t could provide a defense against more 
sophisticated th rea ts, and provide data th a t would aid the development and 
evaluation of United States offensive penetration  capability. ABMDA was 
officially established in March, 1968, in W ashington, D.C., as a  separate elem ent 
reporting to  the  Chief of Research and D evelopm ent, D epartm ent of the Army. 
In June, 1968, the Nike-X Development O ffice was formed with personnel from 
the SENSCOM Advanced Development D irec to ra te  and a  cadre of personnel from 
the Army Missile Command. Under the command jurisdiction of the ABMDA, the 
Nike-X Development Office was colocated with SENSCOM to fac ilita te  
in terfacing  of programs. This office was subsequently redesignated as the
U.S., Army Sentinel System Command, Organization and Management 
Manual, SENSCOM Regulation No. 10-1 (Huntsville, Alabama, 6 May 1968), 
pp. 4-5 .
135
Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency-Huntsville (ABMDA-H) in May, 1969.^
Thus, the  question le f t  unsettled by the Sentinel ch a rte r was resolved.
Also of significance during this period was the  establishm ent of two
Sentinel com m itted organizations in H untsville, Alabama. The U.S. Army
Engineer Division, Huntsville, was established in O ctober, 1967, under the d irect
2
command of the C hief of Engineers, Washington, D .C. The mission of this group 
was to  provide re a l e s ta te  services and to  execu te  the  Sentinel construction 
program involving developm ental, training, support, and tac tica l facilities.^ The 
Sentinel Logistics Command was established in April, 1968, as a major subordi­
nate command of th e  U.S. Army M ateriel Command, Washington, D.C. The sole 
mission of the new command was to  provide logistical support to  the Sentinel 
system including all aspects of inventory m anagem ent and m aintenance
If.
engineering. Form ed initially in Washington, D .C ., the  new logistics command 
moved to  H untsville, Alabama, in August, 1968.^
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, "Nike-X Development has 
New Name, Same Mission," News Release 69-5-1 (H untsville, Alabama; Informa­
tion O ffice, 7 May 1969).
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, O ffice of the Chief of Engineers, 
General Orders No. 17 (Washington, D.C., 9 O ctober 1967).
^Alfred D. Starbird, Sentinel System M anager, "Sentinel System 
Deployment Task Assignment - Chief of Engineers," le t te r  CSSSO-OP to  Chief of 
Engineers, 23 April 1968, Ballistic Missile D efense Organization Files, 
Washington, D.C.
^U.S., Army Missile Command, News R elease (Redstone Arsenal, 
Alabama: Inform ation O ffice, 1 July 1968).
^U.S., Army Sentinel Logistics Command, News Release (Huntsville, 
Alabama: Inform ation O ffice, 20 August 1968).
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Early planning depicted  Sentinel as a seventeen-site  program.^ The
DoD announced th e  f irs t ten  geographical areas to be surveyed as possible site
2
locations in November, 1967. Selection of the potential locations was based 
prim arily on ta c tica l and techn ical considerations. These considerations included 
both the  fulfillm ent of the im m ediate objectives of a rea  defense and preserva­
tion o f the option for point defense of s tra teg ic  forces.^  In May, 1968, three 
more potential sites were announced by the  DoD;^ two additional sites were 
announced in November, 1968,^ for a total of fifteen sites publicly announced.
Sentinel Review
A m atte r of technical, political, and civic debate before the 
deployment decision, the  Implementation of the  Sentinel program ignited a new 
wave of public and Congressional sentim ent.^ Central to  the technical debate 
was the  basic question of w hether Sentinel was a  m ilitarily effective  weapon or 
would be obsolete when deployed. At the  core of the political issue was the
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, BMD Management Study, 
Vol. II, p. n -2 .
2
U.S., D epartm ent of Defense, "Sentinel System Potential Sites to  be 
Surveyed," News Release No. 1088-67 (Washington, D.C.: O ffice of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, 20 November 1967).
^U.S., Army Sentinel System Command, Summary of the Sentinel 
Program; F Y 68 (Huntsville, Alabama, n.d.), p. 4.
^U.S., Army Sentinel System Command, News Release (Huntsville, 
Alabama: Information O ffice, 27 May 1968).
^U.S., D epartm ent of Defense, News Release (Washington, D.C., 
13 November 1968).
^An excellent account of this controversy during the life of the 
Sentinel Program (September, 1967-March, 1969) may be found in Adams 
Ballistic Missile Defense, pp. 177-97.
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question of w hether Sentinel was, in fac t, a  "thin" defense solely against the 
Chinese Communists or constituted the basis of a  potential "thick" defense 
against the U.S.S.R. C ivic concern focused on ecological, property value, and 
locale endangerm ent considerations. Professional groups joined with civic groups 
to express their adverse reaction to  deployment of an ABM system.^
R esistance to  the  Sentinel system peaked in early  1969, with Boston, 
Seattle , and Chicago being the most active areas. In one two-week period in 
February, 1969, more than tw enty-three hundred pieces of ABM rela ted  
correspondence reached Washington with a ra tio  of tw enty  to  one against 
Sentinel.^
Finally, in February, 1969, by order of th e  Secretary  of Defense, all 
site  acquisitions and construction activ ities were suspended on Sentinel pending a 
Presidential review of the program and its  deploym ent.^ This review 
subsequently led to  the fourth major decision in United S tates BMD effo rt; the 
reorientation of the program to Safeguard.
Safeguard Decision 
The DoD analyzed four basic alternatives as possible resolutions of the 
BMD issue: (1) a  thick defense designed to p ro tec t m ajor population centers;
(2) continuation of the existing Sentinel program; (3) m odification of Sentinel to  
improve point defense of stra teg ic  forces and provide some population protection 
without attem pting  heavy defense of major cities; o r (4) cancellation of Sentinel
^U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary of 
Sentinel/Safeguard Program Progress: FY 69 (Huntsville, Alabama, n.d.), p. 2.
^Ibid. ^Ibid.
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and continuation of research and developm ent only. The analysis also reaffirm ed 
the  technical feasibility of existing Sentinel components.^
Safeguard
In March, 1969, the  President announced the  reorientation of the ABM
program with a  revised deployment plan. R eferring to  the new program as "a
safeguard program," the prim ary defensive mission changed from an area defense




The reoriented BMD program^ had th ree  basic objectives; (1) p ro tec­
tion of the United States d e te rren t system ; (2) defense against any ICBM a ttack  
by the People's Republic of China th a t could be postulated through 1979; and
(3) safeguard against any irrational or accidental a tta c k  of less than massive 
m agnitude. Since protection of m ajor cities was not an objective, BMD sites 
w ere to be placed away from major cities.^
^Statem ent by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, News 
R elease No. 190-69 (Washington, D.C.: Office of A ssistant Secretary of Defense, 
14 March 1969).
2
Richard M. Nixon, President of the United S tates (Press Conference 
No. 4), a t the White House, Washington, D.C., 14 March 1969.
^An excellent, au thorita tive  presentation of the Administration's 
rationale for the Safeguard decision may be found in U.S., Congress, House, 
Com m ittee on Appropriations, Safeguard A ntiballistic Missile System. Hearings, 
before the subcom m ittees on D epartm ent of Defense and on M ilitary Construc­
tion , 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969. A contem porary evaluation by critics of 
Safeguard may be found in Abram Chayes and Jerom e B. Wiesner, eds., ABM: An 
Evaluation of the Decision to  Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System, (New York: 
H arper <5c Row, 1969). An essentially friendly exam ination may be found in 
Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr., eds.. Why ABM? Policy Issues in the 




An elem ent of the decision th a t differed markedly from the Sentinel
program involved the deployment schedule and a  requirem ent fo r annual program
reviews. In discussing th is  point, the  President s ta ted ;
The Sentinel system called for a fixed deployment schedule. I believe 
th a t because of a  number of reasons, we should have a phased system . 
That is  why, on an annual basis, th e  new Safeguard system  wi|l be 
review ed, and the review may bring about changes in the system ...
The President pointed out th a t the annual evaluations would be based
on th ree  m ajor points: (1) the  magnitude of th e  offensive th re a t, (2) s ta tu s  of
arm s control ta lks , and (3) technological progress in the developm ent of BMD
com ponentry.^
The revised deployment plan dropped the number of po tential sites 
from seventeen to  tw elve. Sites were to be authorized increm entally  based on 
the annual evaluations with only two sites initially  authorized. Of the original 
seventeen sites se lec ted  for deployment, five rem ained unchanged and seven new 
sites were identified  regionally.^ The change in mission prom pted a nam e 
change, and Sentinel was renamed "Safeguard."^
One partisan w riter, in discussing the announced decision, s ta ted  th a t 
it  " ...represents an astu te  matching of the th re a t with feasible te ch n o lo g y - 
packaged in language designed to disarm those opposed to any ABM deploy­
m ent."^ This observation hardly proved to  be valid for, some th ree  months la te r ,
4 b id . ^Ibid.
3U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary: FY 69, p. 3.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, G eneral Orders No. 18 (Washington, 
D.C., 25 March 1969).
^W alter Andrews, "Sentinel to Defend ICBM Sites," Armed Forces 
Journal 106 (22 March 1969): 18.
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an advocatory professional journal suggested th a t the modified program was 
"fighting for its  life" and was the most ardent topic of discussion in the political 
and scien tific  com m unities since th e  decision to  develop the hydrogen bomb.^
The controversy was also an issue of intense debate in the Congress. 
Many weeks of Congressional com m ittee hearings and over a  month of floor 
debate in the  Senate preceded the vote on the A dm inistration's proposed 
Safeguard program for FY 1970.^ The im portance of the issue is aptly illustrated 
by the opening rem arks of Congressman George H. Mahon, Chairman, Sub­
com m ittee on D epartm ent of Defense of th e  House Com m ittee on 
Appropriations, a t  a  special hearing on Safeguard:
There a re  many weapon systems for which funding is proposed in the 
fiscal 1970 budget which are  quite im portan t and significant to our 
m ilitary  posture and stra tegy . The ABM is probably one of the most 
im portan t from this point of view of its  e ffe c t on relative m ilitary 
strength  and stra tegy  of the major powers. The system  relates to the 
defense capability which it offers the United S ta tes. We need a proper 
balance betw een offensive and defensive weapons if we are  to achieve 
optimum deterrence . It is clear th a t the proposed deployment of the 
ABM system  known as Safeguard is one of the m ost im portant 
questions to come before the Governm ent in years. It is im portant 
m ilitarily , i t  is im ^ r ta n t  econom ically, i t  is im portan t from the 
political standpoint.
à
R eferred  to  in one professional journal as the "ABM Hassle," the 
controversy peaked on the  Senate floor on August 6, 1969, when the  Safeguard
^Leon Booth, "Missiles and Astronautics: A ttack  on the Sentinel,"
Ordnance 53 (May-June 1969): 554.
2
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary of the Safeguard 
Program: FY 70 (Huntsville, Alabama, n.d.), p. 1. See also R. Jam es Woolsey, 
"Chipping Away a t  the  Bargains," in Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control, ed. 
by Franklin A. Long and George W. Rathjens (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1976), pp. 175-85.
^U.S., Congress, House, Com m ittee on Appropriations, Safeguard 
A ntiballistic Missile System. Hearings, p. 2.
^"ABM Hassle S tarts," Armed Forces Journal 106 (12 July 1969): 11.
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authorization cam e before the Senate for approval. A fter months of intense
debate, the Senate endorsed President Nixon's proposal to  deploy Safeguard by
two votes. ̂  A bipartisan amendm ent to permit continued research and
developm ent, but to  bar deployment and site acquisition was defeated  by a 51
2
against, 49 fo r, vote. A ctually somewhat of an anticlim ax, this critical 
amendm ent would not even have come to  a vote had not an earlier am endm ent to 
bar Safeguard, but perm it other antimissile research, been defeated  by a 50 to  50 
tie  vote.^ This was perhaps the m ost dram atic vote in th e  Senate in many
h
decades. As the passage of tim e has revealed, this was m erely a tem porary 
endorsem ent of BMD deploym ent activ ities.
Organization and M anagement
The program nam e change resulted in all dedicated organizational 
elem ents being redesignated Safeguard. As an example, th e  Sentinel System
This one Senate session did not, by itself, mean victory for the 
Administration's BMD program since both houses must independently approve an 
Authorization Bill and, subsequently, an Appropriation Bill. But the vote did 
spell endorsement for th a t fiscal year because the session represented BMD 
opponents' g rea test concentration of strength for the year. P ertinen t portions of 
the debate may be found in U.S., Congress, Senate, Authorization of Appropria­
tions for FY 70 for m ilitary procurem ent, research and developm ent, and for the 
construction of missiie te s t  facilities in Kwajalein Missile Range, and Reserve 
Component Strength, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 6 August 1969, Congressional Record 
115: S9235-S9283, S93G6-S93G8, S9312-S9315.
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the  Army, BMD M anagement Study, 
Vol. n, p. U-7.
^U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary: FY 70, p. 1.
ii
A concise and accu ra te  account of this series of votes may be found 
in "ABM: A Senate Divided," Armed Forces Journal 106 (16 August 1969): 14-15. 
An excellent presentation of the BMD issue through the tim e of the Safeguard 
decision as viewed by an opponent may be found in Ralph E. Lapp, "From Nike to 
Safeguard: A Biography of the ABM," New York Times Magazine, May 4, 1969, 
pp. 28-30, 32, 121.
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1
Manager was redesignated the  Safeguard System M anager/ Organizational
struc tu res  and major management missions rem ained unchanged for all Safeguard
System O rganizations.
The in itial Safeguard deployment plan consisted of two planned sites in
the vicinity  of two offensive weapon bases. The f irs t s ite  was in the Grand Forks
Air Force Base, North Dakota, area, and the second in the  Malmstrom Air Force
Base, M ontana a rea . Each of these locations w ere to be complete sites with a
2
full com plem ent of equipment.
At this point in the program evolution, a unique turn of events
occurred involving the prime con tractor. In O ctober, 1969, the Executive Vice
President of the Western E lectric Company m et with the Safeguard System
Manager to  discuss ways of limiting and preferably reducing the company's to ta l
com m itm ent to  the program as other con tracto rs became technically qualified
over a period of years. This was unique in th a t  few prime contractors seek to
reduce th e ir  participation in the weapon system acquisition process. In response,
the  Army expressed a willingness to work tow ard an arrangem ent to lim it the
prime's com m itm ent.^ In so doing, the Army re-em phasized its strong concern
th a t the prim e contractor:
...m aintain major responsibilities for the Safeguard system in tegrity  
and integration in conformity with Army technical objectives. The
^U.S., Departm ent of the Army, General Orders No. 18.
2
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary of Program 
Progress Through FY 71 (Huntsville, Alabama, n.d.), p. xiii.
^Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, le tte r  to  Mr. Arthur P. 
Clow, Executive Vice President, W estern E lec tric  Company, 29 January 1970, 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
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continuation of these responsibilities, in addition to reducing system 
perform ance risks, is also necessary to  protect the  governm en t against 
unacceptable schedule slippage and cost increases.
This problem ultim ately resolved itse lf through continued reduction in the
program and an autom atic lessening of Western Electric Company's com m itm ent
to  the BiMD effort.
Presidential Reviews 
The annual P residential Reviews of the Safeguard program becam e the 
basis for the  Administration's BMD budget submissions. In addition to  this top- 
level personal review by th e  President, the BMD program continued to  be the 
subject of intense review in the Congress as well.
F irst Annual Review
Early in 1970, th e  Secretary of Defense announced the resu lts of the
firs t annual Presidential review of the Safeguard program. Appearing before the
Appropriations Com m ittee, Secretary Laird presented the Adm inistration's plan
to seek authority in the  FY 1971 budget to  add one s ite  for the defense of
stra teg ic  offensive forces to  the  two previously authorized and to  begin advanced
2planning for five additional sites. In October of the same year. Congress 
authorized only the one additional site  for offensive weapon defense (for a to ta l 
of three authorized) and advanced planning for a fourth s ite .^
h b id .
2
U.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee on Appropriations, D epartm ent of 
Defense Appropriations for 1971. Hearings, before a subcom m ittee of the 
Com m ittee on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 25 February 1970, pp. 318-21.
3
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary FY 71, p. xiii.
1 #
An im portan t secondary issue in th e  Safeguard dilemma was the 
January, 1971, announcement of an expanded mission for th e  Safeguard System 
Manager. The culm ination of continuing analysis of Safeguard capabilities and 
numerous studies conducted by th e  Army for defense of U nited S tates s tra teg ic  
offensive missiles, th e  expanded mission concerned the  in itia tion  of a  new 
program of developm ent. The program was designed to  augm ent Safeguard
during the la s t half of the 1970s in response to  a  more sophisticated th rea t in the
1 2 form of improved U.S.S.R. technology. F irst designated as H ardsite Defense,
the program was la te r redesignated the  Site D efense Program  and still la te r the
System Technology Program .^
Second Annual Review
In March, 1971, the Secretary of Defense announced the President's 
decision to  request authorization to continue deploym ent of Safeguard a t the 
three previously authorized sites and in itia te  steps tow ard deployment of a 
fourth s ite .^  In November, however. Congress fu rther lim ited  Safeguard by 
authorizing continuing deployment only a t two sites and advanced preparation a t 
two additional s ites.^  Although the number of sites authorized rem ained
^Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.
2
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, G eneral Orders No. 4 
(Huntsville, Alabama, 12 February 1971).
3
The System Technology Program and its  predecessors are not of 
specific in te re s t in this study. Brief reference is made here in the in te rest of 
historical in tegrity .
If.
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, BMD M anagement Study, 
Vol. II, p. n -10 .
^U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary of Program 
Progress Through FY 72 (Huntsville, Alabama, n.d.), p. xiv.
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constant with the previous year's program of four s ite s , the  action resu lted  in the 
shift of one s ite  from  the "deployment authorized" category to  the  "advanced 
preparation only" category—a remission to  a less advanced s ta tu s  of site 
activation activ ity .
Congressional resistance was beginning, once again, to  mount to 
pivotal proportions and diplom atic gains had been made by the  United S tates a t 
the S trategic Arms L im itation Talks (SALT) with the U.S.S.R. It was in this 
environment th a t the  fifth  m ajor decision in United States BMD activ ity , the 
signing of the ABM Treaty, occurred.
ABM Treaty
The b ila tera l SALT between the United S tates and the U.S.S.R. was
in itia ted  form ally in Helsinki, Poland, in 1969.^ A fter some th ree  years of
negotiations, P resident Nixon signed the tre a ty  betw een the  United S tates of
America and th e  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the L im itation of Anti-
2Ballistic Missile Systems on May 26, 1972. While ra th e r broad in scope, but with 
far reaching consequences to  the  United S tates BMD e ffo rt, it  specifically 
lim ited ABM deployment to  only two sites: within a 150 kilom eter radius of an 
ICBM launch complex and of the  national capital.^  For Safeguard, this equated to 
the existing s ite  a t  Grand Forks, North D akota, and a poten tia l National 
Command A uthority (NCA) s ite  within the W ashington, D.C., a rea . Thus, the
1SALT pertains not only to  defensive weapons, but offensive weapons 
as well. The ABM Treaty was merely an in itial m ilestone, the firs t agreem ent, in 
the continuing SALT dialogue. One of the b e tte r  accounts of early  SALT 
activ ities may be found in John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New 
York: H olt, R inehart, and Winston, 1973).
^It is m ore commonly known as the "ABM Treaty."
^Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 274.
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"bargaining chip" a ttribu tes of Safeguard were realized a t  SALT. ̂  Noting some 
of Safeguard's c ritics ' citations of the system 's weaknesses, Newhouse empha­
sized this point in stating:
To th e  Russians, the  Sentinel-Safeguard components—radars and 
missiles alike—w ere not only fa r  more sophisticated than the ir own, 
but a base on ^ h ic h  the Americans might build something th a t would 
actually  work.
As will be shown in succeeding paragraphs, the United S tates Congress 
was less im pressed with Safeguard's potential u tility .
Continuing Redefinition 
The ABM Treaty precipitated a  number of actions within the BMD 
com m unity. While the adm inistration continued to  press the  Safeguard issue, the 
passage of tim e has underscored the significance of the ABM Treaty to the 
Safeguard program. It was the preface to  the continuing reduction in the  scope 
and m agnitude o f the to ta l project and form al recognition th a t ABM was failing 
into increasingly g rea ter disfavor.
ABM Decision
In consonance w ith the provisions of the tre a ty , the Secretary of 
Defense d irec ted  the Army to  continue th e  Grand Forks deployment but suspend 
construction and advanced preparation activ ity  a t ail other s ites. Further, the 
Army was d irected  to  in itia te  planning to  cancel the tw elve-site  program, but 
in itia te  planning to  deploy Safeguard a t the  NCA.^
^Ibid., p. 156.
^Ibid., p. 157.
^U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary of Program 
Progress Through FY 72, p. xvii.
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At this tim e, the Army also in itiated  planning for two major reviews 
designed to  define and propose a lternatives for the fu ture  BMD program, taking 
cognizance of the im pact of SALT on the  continuing ABM program. One of the 
reviews was to  be prim arily technical in nature and was designated as a  System 
Design Review (SDR). The SDR was to  be under the aegis of the Safeguard 
System Manager. The second review, the  BMD Management Study, was under the 
direction of a specially appointed brigadier general from outside of the  BMD 
community. The BMD Management Study was to exam ine th e  organization and 
m anagem ent of the to ta l BMD effo rt as an independent but parallel comprehen­
sive Army-wide m anagem ent review.^
In August, 1972, shortly a f te r  both BMD reviews were underway, the 
Senate, by a vote of 88 to  2, agreed to a resolution of ra tifica tion  of the  ABM 
Treaty. Thus, the fifth  major decision in BMD activ ity  was conclusively made by 
the  United S tates.
BMD Management Study
The BMD Management Study was directed by the Secretary of the 
2
Army on July 10, 1972. Its purpose was twofold; to  guide the  Army in "...any 
necessary revisions in our current assignment of responsibilities and functions for 
m atte rs  re la ted  to ballistic missile defense..."^ and to form ulate alternatives
Ibid. See also R. L. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the  Army 
(Research and Development), "Army BMD Under SALT Lim itations," Memo­
randum for Safeguard System Manager, 23 August 1972, Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
2
Robert F . Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, le tte r  to Brigadier 




"...in organization and procedures th a t would give the  most e ffec tiv e  overall
m anagem ent program to  m ee t the  Army's ballistic m issile defense missions."^
The BMD M anagement Study consumed approxim ately one hundred
fif ty  d irect man-months of e ffo rt in a  three-m onth period. The final report was
2
subm itted to  the  Secretary of the  Army in Septem ber, 1972. It encompassed a 
comprehensive examination of the  to ta l Army BMD m anagem ent organization 
and philosophy and addressed a number of potential organizational struc tu res and 
system  management concepts. The final report postulated th ree  a lternative  
m anagem ent structures calculated  to  provide suffic ien t d ifferences to offer 
meaningful choices. Additionally, th e  study report docum ented actions th a t 
could be taken im m ediately to e ffe c t economies w ithout pre-em pting the final
3
choice as to  organizational s truc tu re .
Concurrently, th e  SDR, com pleted in O ctober, 1972, suggested a  
number of specific recom m endations in the a reas of deployment objectives, 
appropriate funding levels, and concepts of operation.^
Both the SDR and the BMD Management Study were reviewed by the 
Secretary  of the Army, and he found them  to be "com patible and reinforcing."^
4bid .
2
Hal E. Hallgren, Brigadier General, USA, D irector, BMD M anagement 
Study, "Ballistic Missile Defense Management Study-1972," Memorandum 
DACS-BD for Secretary of the Army, 8 Septem ber 1972, B allistic Missile 
D efense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
^Ibid.
If.
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Summary of the  Safeguard 
Program F Y 73 (Huntsville, Alabama, n.d.), p. 2.
^Robert F. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, "D irected Actions 
R elated  to  Ballistic Missile Defense Management," Memorandum for Safeguard 
System Manager, 26 O ctober 1972, Ballistic Missile Defense O rganization Files, 
Washington, D.C.
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As a consequence o f these two studies, the  Secretary  d irected the Safeguard 
System Manager to develop a plan of ac tion  for m ajor reorganization of BMD 
activity.^
Initial Im pact
The m ost im m ediate m anagem ent im pact of the ABM trea ty  had been 
th e  imposition of a  m ilitary and civilian em ploym ent ceiling. Based on the 
number of individuals actually  on the payroll as of May 30, 1972, the  ceiling 
applied to  all Safeguard manpower spaces and anticipated  the manpower 
reductions to  com e.^ Additionally, in O ctober, 1972, th e  U.S. Army Safeguard 
System Command announced th a t it  had term ina ted  major portions of its prime 
co n trac t activ ities and had d irected  the  principal prim e con tracto r to  also 
te rm in a te  major portions of its  subcontracts.^  The Army had recommended 
com pletion of the work and stockpiling of the  hardw are item s in case an NCA 
s ite  should ultim ately be approved, but Congress re jec ted  this notion.^
^Ibid.
2
Employment levels in Safeguard w ere managed by issuance of 
manpower spaces by category; i.e ., m ilitary  (made up of officer, w arrant o fficer, 
and enlisted  personnel) spaces and civilian spaces. Each space represented 
authorization  to hire one individual.
^Safeguard System Manager, "ABM Development and Deployment 
Program s," Message 302148Z May 72, to  Commanding General, U.S. Army 
Safeguard System Command, 30 May 1972, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
F iles, Washington, D.C.
4U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, "USASAFSCOM Term inates 
C ontracts,"  News Release 72-10-1 (Huntsville, Alabama; Information O ffice, 
3 O ctober 1972).
^Ibid.
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In the m eantim e, the  Safeguard facility  a t  Grand Forks, North Dakota, 
was symbolically ac tiva ted  by appropriate m ilitary  ceremonies in 
November, 1972, thus becoming the  Army's newest m ilitary  post.^ Planning a t 
th a t time called for the  s ite  to  be transferred  to  th e  Army Air Defense 
Command as an operational BMD site  in early 1975.^
Organization and Management
Pursuant to  the  instructions of the S ecre tary  of the Army,^ the 
Safeguard System Manager d irected  the major e lem ents of th e  Safeguard System 
Organization to  develop a  three-phase tim e-sequenced reorganization plan to  be 
im plem ented in the  FY 1973 through FY 1975 tim e-fram e. The plan was to stress 
reduction o f organizational layering, overhead, and duplication through consoli­
dation and realignm ent of necessary functions. O rganization and management 
a lternatives w ere to  be a ttuned  to  the austerity  being applied to  the Army in 
general and the BMD community in particular.^
The major th ru s t of the  to ta l realignm ent was to  bring the Safeguard 
System Organization into line w ith a one- to  tw o-site  program . The mission had 
not changed significantly a t  this point, but the scope, m agnitude, and emphasis of
^U.S., Army Safeguard System Site A ctivation Command, News 
Release 7224 (Langdon, North D akota, 9 November 1972).
^Ibid.
^Froehlke Memorandum for the Safeguard System Manager, 
26 October 1972.
n
W alter P. Leber, L ieutenant General, USA, Safeguard System 
Manager, "Ballistic Missile D efense M anagement," le t te r  to  Commanding 
General, U.S. Army Safeguard System Command, 31 O ctober 1972, and Safeguard 
System Manager, "SAFSO Review of SAFSCOM TDA," Message 131450Z Dec 72, 
to  Commanding General, U.S. Army Missile Command, 13 December 1972, 
Ballistic Missile Defense O rganization Files, Washington, D.C.
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the  program had changed dram atically. The action was one of retrenchm ent and
re trac tion  coupled with a reduction of personnel.
In term s of major organizational e lem en ts, the  Safeguard System
O ffice retained its major functions, but reduced th e  number of employees. The
Safeguard Logistics Command combined with the  Safeguard System Command,
with the  la tte r  absorbing the mission and resources of the  former.^ This action
prompted a  reorganization within the Safeguard System Command to  accommo-
2
date  a  new mission. Subsequent to  the m erger, the  m ilitary  and civilian 
strength  of the resu ltan t organization was d rastically  reduced/* The missions of 
the  Safeguard System Evaluation Agency, the  Advanced Ballistic Missile D efense 
Agency, and the  U.S. Army Engineer Division, H untsville, were not m aterially 
im pacted, but Safeguard-sponsored activ ity  was generally reduced in scope and 
magnitude.
In April, 1973, the Secretary of Defense crystalized  BMD guidance of 
the tim e as; (1) a one-site deployment with the objectives of providing defense 
of re ta lia tory  forces and obtaining operational experience; (2) planning for 
application of Site Defense Technology for an NCA site ; (3) preservation of 
options for fu rther deployments,; and (4) continued investigation of new or
^U.S., Army M ateriel Command, G eneral O rders No. 3 (Washington, 
D.C., 4 January 1973).
2
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, General Orders No. 1 
(Huntsville, Alabama, 15 January 1973).
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, USASAFSCOM Reorganiza­
tion Plan (FOUO), Vol. II; Reorganization C oncept (Huntsville, Alabama, 
15 December 1972).
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Improved system  concepts and technological capability within the  lim itations of 
the ABM T reaty  and SALT.^
Thus, with the d rastic  reduction in the  number of deployed sites 
planned, the  advent of the  Site Defense Program, and a continued emphasis on 
reten tion  of a basic BMD technology advancement capability . It was inevitable 
th a t the m anagem ent philosophy would undergo substantial change commensurate 
with the organizational changes.
Term ination Precursor
It should have been abundantly evident th a t the end was in sight for
Safeguard. The U.S. emphasis a t the  SALT had been to fu rther reduce ABM
deployments, and on July 3,1974, President Nixon signed a Protocol to the ABM
Treaty limiting both the United S tates and the U.S.S.R. to  only one ABM site 
2
each. In transm itting  the  Protocol to the Senate fo r ra tifica tion . President 
Ford em phasized his belief th a t i t  would, "...as an in tegral p a rt of the Treaty, 
contribute to  th e  reduction of international tension."^ The Protocol was 
subsequently ra tified  by the  Senate on November 10, 1975.^
Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Defense, "Ballistic Missile Defense 
Guidance," Memorandum for Secretary  of the Army, 3 April 1973, Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
^U.S., President, Protocol to  the Treaty with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the L im itation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Message, 
from the President of the United States Transm itting the T reaty Between the 
United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the  
Lim itation of A nti-B allistic Missile Systems, Signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974 
(Washington, D .C .: Government Printing Office, 19 Septem ber 1974).
^Ibid.
iL
U.S., Congress, Senate, Ratification of Protocol, 94th Cong., 1st 
sess., 10 November 1975, Congressional Record, p. S19557.
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Still, an aura of optimism for BMD in general persisted during 1974. 
The scheduled equipm ent readiness date (ERD) dem onstrating the  satisfactory  
interoperability  of all tac tica l equipm ent at the  Grand Forks site had been m et in 
O ctober, 1974; the Site Defense Program was continuing to  emphasize im prove­
m ents in subsystems and components; and the technology advancem ent aspect of 
BMD remained undiminished. ̂
In mid-1974, the BMD activ ity  could be catagorized Into th ree  principal 
areas. F irst, the Safeguard s ite  a t Grand Forks, North Dakota, nearing 
completion was still assigned the mission to  p ro tec t a  portion of the  land-based 
d e terren t force and to  provide experience in the  ac tua l operation and te s t of a 
deployed ta c tica l s ite . Second, the  Site D efense Program was viewed as an 
orderly development of the next generation BMD system . Finally, the advanced 
technology program (the special province of the Advanced Ballistic Missile 
Defense Agency) represented a  vigorous research e ffo rt embracing all technology 
of BMD.^
Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of D efense, in the sam e memo­
randum, announced the realignm ent of BMD activ ity  under a single Program 
Manager.^ In a broad, sweeping move to  cen tralize  BMD management, all BMD 
e ffo rt, including the ABMDA advanced technology e ffo rt and the  Kwajalein
U.S., Congress, Senate, C om m ittee on Appropriations, D epartm ent of 
Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976. Hearings, before the Defense 
Subcom m ittee, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 12 February 1975, pp. 107-9.
2
W. P. Clem ents, Jr., Deputy Secretary  of D efense, "Reorganization of 
Army Ballistic Missile Defense Structure," Memorandum for Secretary of the  




Missile Range, was placed under a BMD Program Manager. Implemented in 
May, 1974, the  restructuring resu lted  in significant organization and allied name 
changes. The Safeguard System Manager was redesignated the BMD Program 
Manager (BMDPM), while the Safeguard System Organization was redesignated 
the BMD Organization (BMDO). The Safeguard System O ffice was renam ed the 
BMD Systems O ffice, and the Safeguard System  Command was redesignated the 
BMD Systems Command (BMDSCOM). The ABMDA, Washington, D.C., was 
deactivated  and the ABMDA, Huntsville, A labam a, was placed under command of 
the  BMDPM and redesignated the  BMD Advanced Technology C enter (BMDATC). 
The resources of the Safeguard Evaluation Agency (SAFSEA) w ere transferred  to 
the U.S. Army Training and D octrine Command, redesignated, and assigned a  new 
non-BMD re la ted  mission. All BMD activ ity  was consolidated for the firs t tim e 
under a single program m anager reporting d irec tly  to  the Chief of S taff of the 
Army.^
Perhaps one of the m ost succinct analyses of the im pact of the ABM
Treaty on Safeguard was made by R athjens. Writing on arms control, Rathjens
cited  the  fac t tha t trea ties  can im pact weapons acquisition as one of the
trad itional arguments for negotiations. As he put it:
...agreem ents can foreclose significant weapons developm ent gr 
procurem ent. The ABM tre a ty  is usually cited  as an example of this.
U.S., Army Ballistic Missile D efense Systems Command, Ballistic 
Missile Defense Program Summary: FY 74 (Huntsville, Alabama, n.d.), pp. x-xi. 
See also U.S., D epartm ent of the  Army, G eneral Orders No. 12 (Washington, 
D.C., 22 May 1974).
2
George W. Rathjens, "Changing Perspectives on Arms Control," in 
Long and Rathjens, eds.. Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control, p. 204.
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While Congressional and public pressures were also highly influential, it ieem s a 
reasonable argum ent th a t the ABM Treaty had a  profound a ffe c t upon the 
Safeguard program .
Termination and D eactivation
In presenting the proposed defense budget for FY 1977, the  Secretary
of Defense addressed the  Safeguard portion of BMD by s ta ting  simply;
In accordance with FY 76 Congressional d irection , operation of the 
Safeguard system has been term inated . The Missile Site Radar is 
being deactiva ted  and the in tercep to r missiles and warheads are being 
rem oved. The Perim eter Acquisition Radar (PAR) will remain fully 
operational in support of the  NORAD warning and a tta ck  assessm ent 
mission. The PAR will provide m ore a ccu ra te  inform ation on the 
numbers of a ttack ing  RV's and the ir ta rg e ts  than is available from 
other warning system s.
Stated in o ther words, the only operative vestige of the  Safeguard 
system to rem ain would be the perim eter acquisition radar.
The Decision
The decision to  close the Safeguard complex, w ith the exception of the 
PAR, was made by Congress and im plem ented by the  Army. I t signaled a 
defin ite  sh ift in United States BMD policy away from deployment and operation 
back to  research  and developm ent. It was also the sixth and final milestone in 
the  evolution of the  Safeguard program.
Congressional Action
The essence of the Congressional action to  te rm in a te  th e  Safeguard 
program was addressed a t  the outset of this chap ter. L ittle  more needs to  be
U.S., Congress, Senate, C om m ittee on Appropriations, D epartm ent of 
Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977. Hearings, before the Defense 
Subcom m ittee, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 2 February 1976, p. 85.
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added here. Exercising its  power through the defense appropriations process, the 
Congress insured th a t no fu ture Safeguard funding would be required unless 
d irectly  associated with the PAR or th e  completion of dism antlem ent and 
disposal of th e  rem ainder of the  facility . The in ten t of the  Congressional action 
was impressively clear.
Imm ediate Impact
On February 10, 1976, the day following the  enactm ent of the FY 76
and FY 7T DoD Appropriations Bill into Public Law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
directed th a t the operation of the radars a t  the Safeguard complex be term inated
imm ediately and th a t th e  missiles be disarm ed. This direction ended the  ten -
month operational sta tus th a t had commenced in April, 1975, with achievem ent
of the  initial operating capability. This decision was not unexpected by the
Army, and plans already existed for deactivation of the operational facility . In
fac t, initial planning addressing a number of d ifferen t operational a lternatives
and deactivation concepts had begun in 1973. Refined and updated periodically to
conform with possible Congressional direction, planning included a proposal for
transfer of the  PAR to  the  U.S. Air Force.^
Becoming tac tica lly  operational in D ecem ber, 1976, the PAR was
operationally linked to  NORAD in January, 1977. O perational command of the
PAR was assigned to  the  Aerospace D efense Command a t  Colorado Springs,
Colorado. Command of th e  PAR, less operational command, was retained by the
2
U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Huntsville, Alabama.
U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Proposed 
Army Input; PAR Transfer Plan (PARTP), D raft Revision No. 1 (Huntsville, 
Alabama: PAR M anagement Office, 4 February 1977).
^Ibid., p. 3.
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In accordance with the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the 
tran sfe r of the PAR from the U.S. Army to th e  U.S. Air Force was com pleted in 
Septem ber, 1977. The transfer included com plete assignment of responsibility 
for control, operation, and m aintenance of the  radar to  the  Air Force, thus 
term inating  Army involvement totally.^ The ceremony marking the  official 
tran sfe r cam e ten  years and two weeks a fte r th e  original deployment decision.^
Management Response
BMD m anagem ent response to  the Congressional decision m anifested 
itse lf in two ways: firs t in program term s, and second in term s of organizational 
changes. Both topics a re  briefly discussed.
Program
From a program standpoint, deactivation of the Safeguard BMD 
facilities becam e the principal activ ity  following the term ination and deactiva­
tion decision. Equipment disposition occurred quickly, with the m ajority of the 
equipm ent being transferred  to  DoD agencies. Missile warhead removal was 
com pleted in April, 1976, and remaining item s of ordnance were removed by 
O ctober, 1976. The m issile inventory, although dismantled and removed, was 
placed in storage. Support facilities were disposed of, with final disposition of 
all facilities and equipm ent completed in ia te  1977.^
^Ibid., p. 1.
2
For a brief description of the transfer ceremony see "Radar 
Transferred," Huntsville (Alabama) Rocket, O ctober 5, 1977, p. 24.
^Briefing by L. N. Hightower, D irector, Safeguard Project O ffice, U.S. 
Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, a t the Annual Manager's 
M eeting, Huntington Beach, California, 4-5 November 1976.
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Organization and Management
In raid-1976, a  major organizational change occurred when the
Commander, U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, was
designated to  serve also as the BMD Program M anager.^ With duty station in
Huntsville, A labam a, the assignment of the sam e individual to  occupy both
positions signaled a further retrenchm ent of BMD organization, in keeping with
the  reduced scope of BMD activ ity . A t the tim e  of his appointm ent, the new
BMD Program Manager was specifically charged with continued exam ination of
2
possible BMD organization improvements. A summary of the evolution of 
United States BMD activ ity  is depicted a t  Figure 5.
Epilogue
C ertainly the to ta l story of BMD is not com plete a t  this writing. 
Conceived as an anti-m issile missile feasibility program  in 1955, it continues as a 
much m atured and technologically advanced pursuit of "exploratory research and 
advanced developm ent in BMD technology."^ It continues also as the accomplish-
h
ment of "research, development, and support of BMD systems." The venture 
into BMD deployment by the United States represented  a transition of the
Norman R. Augustine, Acting Secretary  of the Army "Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) Program Manager," Memorandum for Chief of S taff, United 
States Army, 6 August 1976, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Files, 
Washington, D.C.
^Ibid.
^U.S., Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology C enter, 
Organization and Management Manual (Huntsville, Alabama, 30 O ctober 1975), 
p. 3.
If.
U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Organization 
and Management Manual, BMDSCOM Regulation No. 10-1 (Huntsville, Alabama, 
10 December 1976), p. 3.
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m ain-stream  th ru st from paper technology and controlled te s ts  to  system 
production and operational capability . It also in itiated  a  period of prominence 
for BMD in s tra teg ic  planning. Paper technology was shunted to  a  siding to  play 
a parallel, but secondary role in  United States BMD ac tiv ity . The term ination 
and deactivation of BMD deploym ent represented a remission of BMD effo rt to 
its original objectives and a  de-em phasizing of BMD as a  conspicuous elem ent of 
United States s tra teg ic  planning. For purposes of this study, the Safeguard BMD 





Having formed the fram e of reference of this study in the preceding 
th ree chapters, a tten tion  is focused in this chapter on the formulation of the PPL 
analysis m atrix. The objectives are to construct the m atrix, to  define precisely 
its  dimensions, and to  explore the manner of its application in this study.
Many of the specifics discussed are peculiar to large-scale complex 
endeavors in general and m ilitary weapon system s in particular. The concepts, 
however, have a  wider application so care  has been taken to provide notional 
insight as well as specific meaning. In this way, a broader view of the PPL 
analysis matrix is projected . Furtherm ore, specific ity  here perm its greater 
preciseness in the  analytical trea tm en t of la ter chapters.
Conceptual Foundation 
The three dimension m atrix is ideally suited  to  the analytic require­
ments o f this study. Use of the m atrix  provides a  vehicle for: (1) stressing the 
unitary wholeness of a system , (2) subdividing a large-scale endeavor into its 
major constituent parts, (3) perm itting portrayal o f interdependences among the 
parts being examined and among the parts and the whole or system, and
(4) potential restructuring of the m atrix following subdivision and examination in 
a form d ifferent from the original. The notional approach to the PPL analysis
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m atrix was discussed in C hapter I; the m atrix is described in detail in succeeding 
paragraphs.
Param eters
The basic prem ise of the param eter dimension of the PPL analysis 
m atrix is to capture those elem ents of program activ ity  essential to determ ina­
tion of project s ta tus. In o ther words, the perform ance param eters encompass 
those elem ents or characteristics of program activ ity  th a t, when measured and 
analyzed, provide insight into the health , s tatus, and progress of the program. 
C haracteristics th a t must be assessed in order to  determ ine program accom ­
plishments and success will vary with the program. In the private sector these 
characteristics might include m arket position, return on investm ent, profit, 
quality, deliveries, productivity, organizational developm ent, social responsi­
bility, corporate growth, and a  host of other param eters. In the public sector 
these characteristics might include inflation ra te s , unemployment ra tes, budget 
deficits, cost overruns, schedule slippages, custom er satisfaction  or dissatisfac­
tion, teacher-studen t ratios, crim e ra te , cost-of-living indices, changes in GNP, 
and many others.
Batten suggests th a t characteristics to  be measured for a  project must 
include all resources of men, money, m aterials, tim e, and s p a c e T h i s  
categorization does not specifically spell out achievem ent of technical perform ­
ance, although i t  is inherent in Batten's thoughts on m aterials. Brandon and Gray 
specify people, tim e, money, equipm ent, and quality as key variables in project
b .  D. B atten, Tough Minded Management (New York: American
Management Association, 1963), pp. 85-93.
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progression.^ M artin discusses the broad categories of product perform ance,
2
schedule status, and costs versus budgets as project variables. In general, the 
characteristics to  be m easured a re  a function of the goals and plans of the 
organization;^ i.e ., the  key variables tha t a re  at the disposal of the program 
m anager.
For purposes of this study, the th ree  principal weapon system 
perform ance param eters of cost, schedule, and technical perform ance were 
selected . As generic variables, these three param eters are  common to complex
If,
weapon systems and, by definition, include all major weapon system program 
characteristics c ritica l to project progression. Consequently, they provide a 
meaningful, constructive, and comprehensive array of key variables or critical 
project control param eters. The param eter dimension of the PPL analysis m atrix 
is depicted in Figure 6.
C ost Param eter
The cost param eter refers  to the m onetary resources budgeted, 
funded, and expended in the execution of the project or program . While the 
program manager normally tre a ts  the cost param eter as if it had only a m onetary 
dimension, i t  does, in fac t, also represent all those assets th a t may be purchased 
with money. In other words, the cost param eter is also a  surrogate for all
^Dick H. Brandon and Max Gray, Project Control Standards (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Brandon/Systems Press, Inc., 1970), p. 41.
2
M artin, Project Management: How to Make It Work, p. 218.
^Johnson, K ast, and Rosenzweig, The Theory and M anagement of 
Systems, p. 83.
If.
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resources such as people, m ateria ls, biiildings and fac ilities, equipm ent, and other 
goods and services th a t may be allocated to  only one a lte rnative  or option a t  a 
tim e.^
It should be evident a t this point th a t the term  "cost" is not being used 
in an accounting sense. As Anthony so aptly  s ta tes ;
...th e  word "cost" is.slippery . It is used indiscrim inately with quite
d ifferen t m eanings...
From an accounting standpoint, co st concepts normally a ttach  to  such categories 
as variable and nonvariable costs, d irec t and indirect costs, h istorical and cu rren t 
costs, controllable and noncontroUable costs, and the like.^ Such distinctions a re  
not inherently germ ane to  this study. At tim es, the program m anager may, in 
fa c t, be vitally  concerned with issues relating to , as an exam ple, d irec t and 
indirect costs. Normally when this occurs, however, i t  is because he is involved 
in an accounting problem as a  subset of a larger m anagem ent problem. It is not 
because he is consistently occupied with the accounting categories of costs. 
When d iscre te  im plications of this natu re  a re  occasionally required for 
specificity  in this study, they a re  appropriately a rticu la ted  a t th a t point.
Similarly, costs a re  not consistently thought of in the fundam ental 
sense in which econom ists view them . To the econom ist, " ...costs have meaning 
only in te rm s of opportunities th a t are  foregone."^ In other words, costs of goods 
or services are viewed by the  econom ist as " ...the  amount of the next most
4 b id ., p. 60.
^Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting: Text and C ases, 4th 
ed. (Homewood, Illinois: R ichard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 451.
^Ibid.
4Jam es E. Hibdon, Price and W elfare Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1969), p. 135.
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valuable good th a t is foregone by using resources of a  given quantity in the 
production of the f ir s t  good."^ While the  program m anager is painfully aware of 
the underlying validity of this concept as he considers various alternative uses 
for his scarce resources, he normally does not define costs in term s of 
opportunities foregone.
To the program m anager, the cost param eter is one of th ree critical 
variable program param eters th a t he must control in order to  control his project. 
Cost data may take many form s, but are normally m easured in dollars.
Schedule Param eter
The schedule param eter is th e  second vital e lem ent tha t must be 
controlled by the program m anager if he is tru ly  to influence the ultim ate 
destiny of his program . It is the easiest of the three param eters to define, is less 
susceptible to critically  divergent in terpreta tions, and is probably the least 
difficult to  measure.
The schedule param eter in th is study refers specifically to  the tim e 
resource required by, available to , and consumed in p ro ject execution. It is 
measured normally in term s of days, weeks, months, quarters, and years as 
appropriate to the p ro ject elem ent under consideration. It is not uncommon th a t 
projects spanning years may still have specific elem ents m easured in all of the 
tim e units c ited . The schedule param eter may be fin ite  through linkage with an 
actual calendar scale, thus establishing specific dates and tim es for accom­
plishment o f project plans. The schedule may be som ewhat more abstract and 
measured on an appropriate tim e scale commencing from tim e zero, where tim e
^Ibid.
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zero is not tied  to  a  calendar da te . This might occur, as an exam ple, where 
p ro jec t time-phasing and task sequencing and interrelationships are  required, but 
p ro jec t go-ahead has not been established as a specific  date.
Schedule control is a v ital program param eter and a meaningful 
ind icator of program perform ance. Time is neither authorized nor appropriated 
by Congress in the  sense th a t the  fiscal budget is, but tim e is budgeted 
nonetheless. While the calendar cannot be changed and there is only a  finite 
am ount available, schedule compression may intentionally be "bought" through 
application of additional fiscal, personnel, or equipm ent resources, innovative 
m anagem ent initiatives or a  combination thereof. In similar m anner, calendar 
tim e or schedule may be slipped, lost, or "squandered" through reductions in the 
same resources just cited, m anagem ent ineptitude, intentional program changes, 
sh ifts in priorities, or a variety  of o ther reasons.
As Chestnut has noted in discussing system s engineering: "The subject 
of tim e is one th a t has received broad philosophical treatm ent."^ From a 
p ragm atic  viewpoint, tim e represents the "other" major resource (in addition to 
money) available to a program m anager.
Technical Perform ance P aram eter
The technical perform ance param eter re la tes to  system  design 
objectives and specifications. The primary purpose of technical perform ance 
control is. the prediction or earliest possible detection of technical (in con trast to 
fiscal or schedule) problems requiring managem ent attention. The technical 
perform ance param eter is perhaps the  most difficult of the three param eters to
^Chestnut, Systems Engineering Methods, p. 221.
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define conceptually, the most likely to  vary qualitatively between program s, the 
most complex in term s of the m ultitude of dimensions of m easurem ent, and the 
most dynamic in term s of which pertinent dimensions or indices to  m easure and 
how to m easure them over the  full life  cycle of the system.
Although difficult to  define. C hestnut places system perform ance^ in 
perspective:
Once the requirem ents for the  overall system and for the corre­
sponding subsystems have been established, it is essential th a t every 
e ffo rt be directed a t  m eeting these requirem ents. One of the most 
im portan t is perform ance because, in the final analysis, the  perform ­
ance represents the reason why the system was built in the  f irs t place. 
H ence, as a rough approximation the value of the system  is strongly a 
function of its  perform ance.
While C hestnut's com m entary is clearly addressed to  system perform ance, the
emphasis suggested is equally applicable to  the slightly broader context of
technical perform ance. The identification of pertinent m easures of technical
perform ance is a  function of such factors as the system being m anaged, the
mission or objectives of the system and/or the organization managing i t ,  the
m aturity  of the system in term s of its  location in the life cycle, and the  degree
of control required or desired. One of the most common methods of
m easurem ent involves specifying levels of performance as e ith e r minimum
acceptable or maximum allowable.^ Due to  the lack of homogeneity in the
In th e  context used in this study, technical perform ance and system 
perform ance are  almost synonymous term s. In a  s tric t sense, however, system 
perform ance normally refers to  the  perform ance of a physical system . The 
technical perform ance param eter is a  slightly broader term  th a t includes 
research, developm ent, te s t, and evaluation; production; and installation  per­
formance considerations.
^C hestnut, Systems Engineering Methods, p. 14J.
^C hestnut, Systems Engineering Tools, pp. 16-17.
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dimensions and units used to m easure these levels, however, no standard common 
denom inator exists as it does with the cost and schedule param eters.
It should be noted th a t cost and schedule are simultaneously both 
resources to be input into project execution and c ritica l dimensions of program 
progress. The technical perform ance param eter is a  means of establishing 
objectives and determ ining program progress only. The significance of this 
d ifference a ttaches to  the manner in which the program m anager evaluates 
trade-o ffs  betw een cost, schedule, and technical perform ance.
Phases
The phase dimension of the PPL analysis m atrix  is concerned with the 
life  cycle of th e  system , program, or endeavor. Complex large-scale endeavors 
a re  dynamic and pass through a series of specific  stages or sta tes  of m aturity  as 
they  evolve. The phase dimension of th e  PPL analysis m atrix  is depicted in 
Figure 7. Within the DoD, the  Ilf e-cycle phases are used to  describe the general 
procedures for the research, developm ent, te s t ,  and evaluation (RDT&E); 
production; deployment; and term ination of system s. Using these major phases 
as a  vehicle for establishing m aterie l acquisition operating policy also perm its a 
balancing of risks through creation of major decision points prior to in itia tion  of 
each  successive phase. These milestones provide a  logical means for checking 
system  status and health prior to transition in to  successively more m ature s ta tes  
of evolution.
The phase dimension of the PPL analysis m atrix has a  m onetary 
im plication since the  proper fiscal appropriations to be utilized fo r funding 
various program activ ities a re  a  function, typically , of the location of the 
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sensitive, but only indirectly. The initiation and term ination of phases are 
typically pegged to calendar dates as a convenience, but the dates are driven by 
the to ta l program planning activ ity . Neither the  cost nor the tim e connotations 
of th e  life-cycle phase dimension are a t vaiance with th e  money and time aspects 
of the cost and schedule param eters. As indicated , the  phase dimension is a 
method for describing system m aturity as it  evolves from s ta te  to  s ta te  through 
some ordering of ac tiv ity  over tim e. It is an event-oriented concept. The 
param eters, on the  other hand, are c ritica l characteristics used to assess 
program status and health .
It should be noted tha t the fac t th a t the life-cycle phases are depicted 
as being separa te  and distinct should not be construed as suggesting th a t 
concurrency between phases does not exist, for i t  frequently does occur. 
Conceptually, concurrency only indicates the in itia tion  of one phase prior to the 
completion of an earlie r phase. Practically , i t  can, and frequently does, cause 
significant technical problems. The tim e-phased conceptual relationships 
between phases are depicted In Figure 8.
Research, Developm ent, Test, 
and Evaluation (RDT&E) Phase
In the development of U.S. Army program s, the RDT&E phase is 
preceded by a conceptual phase and a validation phase.^ The conceptual phase of 
the life cycle is the firs t phase. The principal objectives of this phase are to 
in itia te  concept form ulation by means of technicai studies; to  develop and te s t 
the feasibility  of experim ental prototype hardw are; and to form ulate doctrinal,
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Life Cycle System Management Model 
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operational, and organizational issues pertinen t to  the  proposed system .^ The
validation phase verifies preliminary design and engineering; accomplishes
necessary planning for acquisition, deployment, operation, and logistics support;
analyzes trade-offs and system alternatives; and generally paves the way for
2
full-scale development. The objectives of fu ll-scale development focus on 
determining whether the system is suitable to en te r the  U.S. Army inventory.
During the RDT&E phase, the to ta l system , including all ancillary 
equipment and item s needed for support, is fully developed and tested . 
Concurrently, technical docum entation required for deployment of a  system must 
be developed and finalized. Technical coordination m ust also be m aintained with 
the organizational elem ents responsible for production, deployment, and opera­
tion of the system . Finally, continuing analysis must be maintained to  identify 
any required revisions to  "...funding, schedule, technical planning, and logistic 
support planning tha t will have an e ffec t on production and deployment phase 
plans and estim ates."^
Production Phase
The production phase represents a significant transition from the 
relatively flexible development s ta te  to  the re la tively  more rigid production 
s ta te . During developm ent, system design is m ore fluid because of the inherent 
exploratory natu re  of developm ent. System design is intentionally kept flexible 
to  insure th a t a ll logical alternatives may be explored and th a t m andatory 
changes may be incorporated with minimum e ffo rt. The decision to  produce, 
however, normally involves a com m itm ent of potentially  g rea ter resources, a
4b id . ^Ibid., p. 2. ^Ibid.
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com m itm ent to  a basic system  design, and acceleration  of production quantities 
to  considerably higher ra te s . It norm ally means transition  from model shop or 
job shop type individualized fabrication used during developm ent to  m ore 
sophisticated volume m anufacturing m ethods. The prim ary objective of the  
production phase "...is to  produce effic ien tly  and deliver to  the  operating unit an 
e ffective, supportable system  in a tim ely  m anner and a t  minimum cost."^ In the 
case of Safeguard, it also included construction  of major fac ilities tantam ount to  
the  creation of a  new, perm anent U.S. Army installation.
Concurrency betw een a continuing developm ent e ffo rt (the RDT&E 
phase) and the  production effo rt requires s tr ic t configuration m anagem ent 
control of the base-lined system design. Additionally, during the  early  
production activ ity , many changes a re  also required in perfecting  the m anufac­
turing tooling and the  m anufacturing process. These changes m ust be
implem ented effectively  o r imbalance will resu lt betw een change activ ity  and
2accelerating production ra te s .
Deployment Phase
This phase of the  life cycle defines the period and activ ity  of actually  
delivering the weapon system and all ancillary equipm ent to  the com bat 
operating unit. It also includes assignm ent of qualified and properly tra ined  
com bat operating and m aintenance personnel. All required logistics support 
facilities and activ ities a re  operational and supply pipelines filled.
4b id .
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the  Air Force, Acquisition M anagement; A 
Guide for Program M anagement, AF5C Pam phlet 800-3 (Andrews Air Force Base, 
D.C.; Air Force Systems Command, 9 April 1976), p. 3-1.
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This period also rep resen ts a significant transition  in the evolution of a
new system . A recen t U.S. Air Force publication on program m anagem ent
a ttem p ts  to  capture the  essence of deploym ent in these term s;
Deployment represents the mom ent of tru th  for new system s and 
equipm ent. All of the  laborious acquisition e ffo rts  finally culm inate in 
a  new mission and support capability  provided by the melding together 
of the  many elem ents th a t  toge ther comprise the  system .
It also adds a  new dimension to  th e  program m anagem ent task; com bat troops,
fo r th e  f irs t tim e in th e  life cycle, assume responsibility for operation of the
2system . This may m ean " ...th a t a  whole new family of problems may surface." 
This is due primarily to  th e  fa c t th a t the laboratory and near-laboratory  
conditions th a t prevail to  th is point in the life cycle a re  essentially abandoned. 
Additionally, the logistics support program must begin to  operate , and the 
a typical support enjoyed during developm ent and te s t  activ ity  is no longer 
applicable.
In sum, deployment is the m anagem ent of system activation.
Term ination Phase
The term ination phase for a  U.S. Army system is the final phase in the 
life  cycle. The system being phased out is typically rem oved from the active 
U.S. Army inventory and tran sferred  to  the U.S. Army Reserve Forces. Also 
quite typically, the system is replaced on a  time-phased basis by a new er, more 
modern system or family of system s.
In addition to system phasedown, the term ination phase also includes 
the  tran sfe r, storage, and/or disposal of unneeded fac ilities  and equipm ent. It 
also precip ita tes significant changes both in the governm ent and con trac to r
^Ibid., p. 5-6. ^Ibid., p. 5-7.
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organizations involved in the  program. This phase should also include the 
preparation of "lessons learned" in order th a t technical and management 
knowledge gained will be documented as a guide to those th a t follow. This 
transfer of knowledge m ight result in few er false s ta rts  on new programs and a 
reduction in unprofitable excursions.
The potential benefits of th e  documenting of lessons learned in the 
weapon system s acquisition process was vividly expressed a t  a  1976 Army Project 
Manager's Conference. In discussing th is  issue, the  then Under Secretary of the 
Army s ta ted :
I have always been somewhat disappointed a t the relative isolation and 
insularity th a t exists between the various m ilitary/industrial program 
m anagem ent team s and the ir respective e ffo rts. Consequently, one 
finds some programs continuing to  experience avoidable problems for 
which solutions were previously developed a t considerable expense. I 
believe th a t th e re  is too little  management transfusion of experiences 
encountered and handed down 'from  one generation of program 
m anagem ent to  th e  next both in-house and out-house. Hence, over and 
over again we relive th a t which has been foreto ld—namely th a t those 
who will not exam ine, ponder, and try  to  understand history are 
doomed to  rep ea t i t —only in  our case at trem endous and wasteful 
costs which we can ill afford.
Of course the "lessons learned" concept is applicable to all phases of the life
cycle, but i t  is particularly  appropriate a t  the term ination phase.
Levels
The two levels of m anagem ent control activ ity  of specific in te rest in this study 
are  the  s tra teg ic  and ta c tic a l levels. These levels equate generally to  hierarchic 
decision-making levels. The level dimension of the PPL analysis m atrix is 
depicted in Figure 9.
Address by Herman R. S taudt, Under Secretary of the Army, before 
the U.S. Army M ateriel Development and Readiness Command Project Manager's 
Conference, Orlando, Florida, 19 O ctober 1976.
LEVEL
TA C TIC A L
STRATEGIC
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As with the  phase dimension, the graphic presentation of these two 
levels suggests a clean distinction th a t frequently does not exist in real world 
situations. Such a distinction can be drawn before the  fact on the known 
programmable situations th a t will ultim ately befall a program. These knowns 
may be analyzed prior to  the ir occurrence; m anagem ent thresholds or pars may 
be established, and clear lines of authority may be defined prior to  program 
initiation. This is particu larly  true in the  case of the cost and schedule 
param eters. It is a valid s ta tem en t to a lesser degree with respect to  the  
technical perform ance param eter. Here, the distinctions become less precise 
and the boundaries betw een levels broader and overlapping. C lear distinction 
cannot be drawn with respect to  the unknown or nonprogrammable situations. 
Suffice to  say, the separation between s tra teg ic  and tac tica l managem ent 
control levels is som etim es as distinguishable as a pencil line and som etim es as 
nebulous and ill defined as the  cen ter of a fog bank.
Another fea tu re  of management control levels is of in te rest. It is a 
general concept th a t decision-m akers entitled  by e ither rank, position, or 
responsibility to  operate  normally a t  one level may, on occasion, and generally a t 
their own discretion, opera te  a t a  lower level as well, assuming there is a lower 
level. This method of operation is particularly true in the dynamic environm ent 
of large-scale complex endeavors. The reverse, however, is atypical. Only on 
ra re  occasions will a  m anager consistently operate  a t a level higher than his 
rank, position, and responsibility en title  him to do. This was illustrated  
graphically in Figure 2 in C hapter I. The program m anager operated freely a t 
the  lower end of the s tra teg ic  level and a t the upper boundary of the  tac tica l 
level. On occasion, however, he operated at a level lower than the tac tica l level.
179
Strategic Level
Decision-making levels may most easily be defined for purposes of this
study by viewing the h ierarchic relationship between them , the m agnitude of the
com m itm ent involved, and the  degree of certain ty  associated with the  levels.
The stra teg ic  level is hierarchically  above the  ta c tic a l level. Strategic
considerations generally re la te  to  long-range or broad tim e horizons involving
macro program elem ents; i.e ., norm ally only two or th ree  levels of detail below
the to ta l system level on the  work breakdown structure.^ S tra teg ic  considerations
also normally re la te  to  large com m itm ents of resources, re la tively  inflexible or
essentially irreversible courses of action  concerning major program elem ents, or
actions or activ ities of high public visibility or Congressional sensitiv ity . Lastly,
stra teg ic  concerns typically tend to  have a high degree of uncertain ty  associated
with them . Kast and Rosenzweig define broadly the  arena of stra teg ic
considerations by suggesting th a t they  "...re la te  to  the boundary between the
2
organization and its environm ent." In the case of Safeguard, th is  boundary 
essentially defined the separation between the  Executive Branch and the 
Congress.
Tactical Level
By definition, th e  ta c tica l level of decision-making is lower than the 
stra teg ic  level. It generally re la tes  to  near-term  tim e horizons of approxim ately 
one year. Program elem ents involved tend to  be m ore m icro in n a tu re  and may
^See Appendix II for a description of the work breakdown s tru c tu re .
2
Frem ont E. K ast and Jam es E. Rosenzweig, O rganization and 
Management; A Systems Approach 2d ed. (New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 197^), p. 358.
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extend down five o r six levels into th e  work breakdown s truc tu re . The magnitude 
of th e  resource com m itm ent tends to  be sm aller, courses of available action 
present g reater flexibility  and less sensitiv ity , and the  degree of uncertain ty  is 
lower.
Kast and Rosenzweig refer to  this level as "coordinative" and define 
its prim ary purpose as one of integrating th e  s ta teg ic  level with what they term  
the "operating" le v e l /  i.e ., a  level lower than the  coordinative level on the ir 
continuum .^ The in tegra tive  aspect of the ta c tica l level is a key ch arac te ris tic  
for i t  captures the  essence of this level as pivotal in the decision-making process. 
The preceding discussion of stra teg ic  and tac tica l decision-m aking levels is 
summed in Figure 10.
Examination Considerations 
This section concerns study exam ination considerations. It will be 
noted th a t it  closely parallels a typical problem-solving or decision-making 
process modified to  accen tuate  m anagem ent control activ ity . The f irs t 
consideration involves an assessm ent and definition of the  situational elem ents in 
order to  define the problem. The second consideration a ttach es  to  an 
in terrogation or analysis of the defined problem. The in ten t of this step  was to  
identify  the essential elem ents that m ight potentially  a ffec t the problem, the 
solution, or both. Having f irs t identified and defined the  problem and, second, 
determ ined those elem ents affecting th e  problem or th e  solution, the  th ird  and
hbid .
2
This low est level of decision-making was term ed "operational" in 
C hapter I of this study. The operational level of decision-making is generaily 
reactive  to the higher levels and, as discussed in C hapter I, is not of specific 
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final step  was to  assess m anagem ent control requirem ents as precisely as 
possible.
Assessment and Definition
The assessm ent and definition of the situational elem ents facing the 
program m anagem ent team  are essential to definition of the problem. The 
s ta tem en t of a problem, out of con tex t, is of l ittle  value. The purpose of fully 
form ulating the dimensions of the problem is to fac ilita te  the  subsequent 
exam ination of fac tors affecting  the problem or its  solution and the m anagem ent 
response to  the problem.
Influences
Any m anagem ent control situation is subject to a  variety of exogenous 
and endogenous influences. To the ex ten t th a t these influences had an e ffec t on 
the m anagem ent control situation, they are identified.
Exogenous influences on BMD activ ity  were considered in term s of the 
following four dimensions; political, economic, public opinion, and technology.
The political influence concerns the d irec t Congressional reaction to  
BMD activ ity . It was expressed indirectly  in term s of public statem ents, known 
attitudes of in te rest groups, and floor debate in both houses of the Congress. It 
was expressed d irectly  in term s of program fiscal appropriations and 
authorizations.
The economic environm ent is quite direct for purposes of this study. It 
addresses only the ex ten t to  which the program was fully funded or under funded. 
In o ther words, it  re la tes to ta lly  and directly to  the Congressional budgetary 
process.
1S3
Public opinion and the level of public visibility is frequentiy a fac to r in 
the public sec to r. Jam es Webb, Administrator of the  National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) from 1961 to 1968, described this fac to r in these 
term s:
In Government enterprises, what is done, how it  is done, and who does 
it a re  almost always highly visible or open to  inspection. In addition, 
the reporting of successes and failures is frequently keyed to  the 
controversial or spectacular.
Thus, not only public visibility but its probability are  prevalent in public works.
The technology fac to r involved in a program tends to  determ ine the
types of tools and techniques th a t must be applied in the m anagem ent of th a t
program. In a  broad sense, the  technology fac to r pertains not only to  the  tools
and techniques but also to  the processes and knowledge th a t extend human
capability . Programs involving high levels of system technology, frequent
change, and nonrepetitive activ ities require the m anagement of a broader and
more com plicated spectrum  of unknown factors than do programs with low
technology, stab ility , and highly repetitive tasks.
Endogenous influences were addressed in term s of the following
dimensions: (1) the existing U.S. Army m anagement doctrine, (2) o ther
government agencies, (3) participating con tracto rs, and (4) the  m anagem ent
philosophy of th e  program m anager.
The degree to  which existing U.S. Army management doctrine e ither
did or did not a ffe c t the m anagem ent control activ ities of the  BMD community
was explored as a segm ent of the internal Influence. Doctrine in this case
connotes both specific m anagem ent systems and philosophical considerations.
^Webb, Space Age Management: The Large-Scale Approach, p. 4.
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Participation by o ther governm ent agencies and con trac to rs  from 
priva te  industry was considered part of th e  internal environm ent. Both possessed 
the  poten tia l to  influence BMD m anagem ent control to  varying degrees.
The personal m anagem ent philosophy of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Program  M anager, as the senior executive agent of the BMD program , could not 
be overlooked as a  potential influence.^ In some respects, the  m anagem ent 
contro l system  either directly or indirectly  provides highly stylized inform ation 
for th e  sole use o f the  program m anager. This influence on control requirem ents 
m ay, a t  tim es, be highly persuasive. In fa c t, this type of influence is frequently  
fe lt throughout the  to ta l organizational struc tu re .
O bjectives and Scope
The objectives and scope of the m anagement control ac tiv ity  m ust be
defined as specifically as possible. The organization m ust address its corporate
objectives a t this point and tran sla te  them  into precise definitions of what the
2
control e ffo rt is expected to  achieve in term s of specificity  of inform ation,
depth of detail required, the Im portance of and need for s tra tified  and in teg ra ted
inform ation, and the use to  be made of the information for control purposes.
Mockler summarizes the idea nicely by suggesting tha t;
A major question to  be answered at^this point is "What kind of control 
action is required in this situation?"
The im portance of this influence is discussed in C ortlandt Cammann 
and David A. Nadler, "Fit Control Systems to  Your Managerial Style," Harvard 
Business Review 54 (January-February 1976): 65-72.
2
Mockler, The M anagement Control Process, p. 26.
^Ibid.
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A precise answer to  this question in term s of needs and expectations satisfies 
this m anagem ent controi consideration.
Key F acto rs
Identification of the  key fac to rs  associated with the m anagem ent 
control activ ity  is prim arily a  m atte r of determ ining which fac to rs  in the  control 
situation a re  c ritic a l to both full definition and satisfac to ry  solution of the 
problem. Key fac to rs  are  more precise and direct than the previously described 
exogenous and endogenous influences, which tend  to  be m ore general and 
ind irec t. Key fac to rs  d iffer from  the objectives and scope definitions in tha t the 
form er address needs and expectations, whereas the la tte r  a re  concerned with 
those affirm ative "givens" th a t contribute to a tta inm ent of the objective.
Key fac to rs  are highly sensitive to the degree of program  m aturity  and 
may shift d ram atically  over tim e. In sim ilar fashion, they a re  a ffec ted  by the 
h ierarchic ievei of the decision-making process as well. Key fac to rs  are , 
therefo re , highly dynamic and should be reassessed periodically to  ascerta in  their 
continuing validity. Revisions must be made as periodic analyses d ic ta te .
Examples of key fac to rs are optimal answers to com pelling questions, 
such as the following:
1. Which organizational elem ents are involved and a t  what level?
2. What will the inform ation be used for?
3. Where will input data come from and how will i t  be obtained?
4. Is the control situation repetitive  or nonrepetitive?
5. What type of control is required?^
As an exam ple, Newman describes th ree  basic types of control as 
steering  controls, yes-no controls, and post-action controls in Constructive 
Controi: Design and Use of Control Systems, pp. 6-9.
1S6
6. How c ritica l is the  datum  elem ent as a predictive device of fu ture 
events or potential problems?^
7. Is 100 percen t m easurem ent of perform ance required or is s ta tis­
tica l sampling acceptable?
8. How critica l is the tim eliness of reporting and the age of the 
inform ation being reported?
While this lis t is by no means all inclusive, i t  dem onstrates the  flavor 
of w hat is m eant by key fac to rs  in the control situation.
Interrogation and Identification
This aspect of the exam ination considerations is concerned prim arily 
with the issue of examining the problem still fu rther in order to  define the 
specific components affecting  th e  problem and its  solution. The notion is to 
"fence" the control situation in sufficiently precise term s to  fa c ilita te  the 
developm ent of rational m anagem ent control requirem ents.
C onstraints
Just as the principles of basic economics stress th a t all resources are 
scarce , most control situations are constrained in some fashion. Even if 
constraints are not evident, rational analytic trea tm en t requires th a t they be 
sought out. If none are found, they are absent because they do not ex ist, not 
because they were overlooked or neglected.
Constraints basically determ ine the difference between what a 
m anager "ought" to do or "wants" to do in term s of resolving a control situation
Ibid., p. 15.
^Newman re fe rs  to  these elem ents as "early warning predictors" in
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versus what he is able to  do. A simple example might be a  manager's recognition 
th a t he "ought" to  manage a  given param eter a t  the  fourth level of the  work 
breakdown struc tu re . Due to  dollar or personnel constraints, however, he is 
forced to  raise his actual m anagem ent controi requirem ent to  the third level of 
the  work breakdown s tru c tu re . In o ther words, he "ought" to  manage a t the 
fourth level, but is only "able" to  afford consistent m anagement atten tion  at the 
th ird  level of the work breakdown s tru c tu re . This constraint exposes the 
program m anager to additional program risk.
L aten t Interdependencies
This topic concerns the ascerta inm ent and developm ent of latent 
interdependencies among cells in the PPL anaiysis m atrix. In other words, all 
in tegrative relationships and linkages among m atrix  ceiis m ust be sought out and 
identified where they exist.
It is apparent, as an exam ple, th a t all cost ceils contain the common 
denominator of dollars as the yardstick of m easurem ent. As a  result of this logic 
th read  through all cost cells i t  is possible, if desired, to  "roll-up" or add costs 
across ceil boundaries. In sim ilar fashion, all cells sharing a schedule dimension 
carry  a  common denominator of tim e. This logic thread also perm its integration 
and fac ilita tes analysis and comparison among schedule oriented ceils. Not so 
obvious are the logic threads among ceils with technical perform ance as a 
common dimension.
Even more difficu lt is the problem of determ ining interdependencies 
between any two of the th ree  param eters or among all three.
Essentially the  sam e philosophy holds true for the  phase and level 
dimensions of the PPL analysis m atrix . Logic threads are fairly common within
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each phase or level dimension. The sam e difficulty  occurs as it  does with the 
param eter dimension, however, when a ttem p ts are  made to  in teg ra te  across 
phases or levels.
The real problem, however, is th ree dimensional because the m atrix  is 
th ree dimensional. The in tent of this top ic, therefo re , is th e  task  of identifying 
la ten t logic threads tha t might ex ist among any of the cells in the m atrix . 
Identification of la ten t interdependencies among matrix cells is the  key to 
integration of management control activ ity . It also provides one of the means of 
assessing how to rebuild the m atrix a fte r  each cell has been individually 
examined. The identification of interdependencies and the establishm ent of 
rational logic threads among the m atrix ceils is a  compelling step  in the  analysis 
of m anagem ent control in large-scale, complex program environments.
C haracteristics
The characteristics elem ent of the interrogation and identification 
examination consideration is designed to  define any additional distinguishing 
aspects of the control situation. In some cases the characteristic  is common to  a 
com plete program perform ance param eter, phase of the  life cycle, or hierarchic 
decision-making level. In other cases the t r a i t  may be characteristic  of an 
individual cell, caused by the unique in teraction  of the three dimensions of the 
cell.
This consideration may be subjective in some cases; objective in 
others. It may involve only one aspect or i t  may be m ultifaceted. The purpose is 
to  capture any characteristics, not otherwise identified, th a t will add to  the 
com pleteness and accuracy of the definition of the control s itua tion .
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Management Control Requirem ents 
The developm ent of m anagem ent control requirem ents equates to  the 
developm ent of the solution to  th e  control problem. It pertains to  three 
fundam ental m anagem ent actions involving th e  development of;
1. Q uantified Standards
2. M anagement thresholds and to lerances
3. Reporting requirem ents
Each of these will be briefly discussed in the  following paragraphs.
Q uantified Standards
Quantified standards^ of com parison or m easurem ent must be devel­
oped in order to  accurately  assess program perform ance. While i t  may not
always be possible to  quantify the standard  or standards, it is advisable to  do so 
2
w herever possible.
On nonrepetitive activ ities, the  standards may be drawn from  the 
program  plans used to  guide the general progression of the program . In th is case, 
standards are  defined more in term s of desired results than in te rm s of 
perform ance. Where repetitive activ ity  is involved, a slightly d ifferen t view is 
frequently  typical, and standards of perform ance are established and refined 
based on continuing repetition of the  process. The goal in nonrepetitive or 
c rea tiv e  activ ity  is prim arily to  ascerta in  program progress and to  fa c ilita te  its 
optim ization, w hereas the goal in rep e titive  activ ity  is prim arily to  assure
3
stab ility  and to  "establish normal perform ance."
^For an excellent discussion on the  anatom y of control standards see 
J . M. Juran , M anagerial Breakthrough (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1964), pp. 233-56.
^Ibid., p. 13. ^Ibid., pp. 50-51.
190
It should be noted th a t standards need n o t, in fa c t probably should not 
be s ta tic . L arge-scale, complex programs norm ally ex ist in an environment th a t 
is flexible, highly dynamic, and sometimes con troversial. Under such conditions 
the m anagem ent control situation assumes th e  sam e flavor as the  program. 
Standards, th e re fo re , must be periodically reassessed and revised as required. 
This is particu larly  true  of creative  type ac tiv ity  such as research and 
developm ent, but i t  also applies to more routine  and rep e titive  tasks or 
endeavors. This does not suggest indiscrim inate or haphazard change of 
standards.
Mockler underscores the im portance of control standards by stating: 
"No control system , in fac t no control, can ex ist w ithout standards."^
Control Thresholds and Tolerances
The concept of m anagem ent thresholds and to lerances is associated
2
with th e  concept of management by exception. M anagem ent thresholds define 
either a "floor" or a  "ceiling." The idea of a  m anagem ent floor indicates th a t 
perform ance above the  floor is satisfactory  and only the  exceptions; i.e ., th a t 
perform ance falling below the floor, need be reported . The "ceiling" is the  
reverse, wherein perform ance th a t exceeds a specified  value m ust be reported. 
The concept of to lerance  combines both fea tu res and suggests a "window" of 
satisfactory  perform ance bounded by an upper lim it (the ceiling) and a lower 
lim it (the floor).
^Mockler, The Management Controi P rocess, p. 74.
^For a b rief description of the concept of m anagem ent by exception, 
see Daniel A. Wren and Dan Voich, J r ., Principles of Management: Process and 
Behavior, 2d ed. (New York: Ronald Press Corn pan y , 1976), p. 347; Johnson, K ast, 
and Rosenzweig, The Theory and Management Of System s, p. 61; and Martin K. 
S tarr, M anagement: A Modern Approach (New York; Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), pp. 451-59.
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Management control thresholds and tolerances are  used prim arily to  
trig g er a requirem ent for exception or special reporting out of sequence with 
routine reporting or as means of highlighting item s of in te rest in routine 
reporting. In either case, the appropriate use of management thresholds and 
to lerances can be of immense benefit to  m anagem ent control activity.^
Reporting Requirem ents
Reporting requirem ents a re  influenced by a number of variables. For 
purposes of this study only th ree  types o f requirem ents are recognized; 
exception reporting, routine or standard reporting, and special reporting.
Exception reporting is th a t reporting th a t occurs whenever a  prede­
fined management threshold or to lerance is exceeded or missed. This type of 
repo rt is issued on an exception basis, normally in addition to standard reporting?
Standard reporting re la tes  to the periodic status and trend reports th a t 
a re  characteristic  of typical m anagem ent control system s. Standard reports a re  
issued on some regular basis and cover a  varie ty  of topics pertinen t to  the 
program being managed.
Special reporting concerns any special reports called for by m anage­
m ent tha t are  not exception or standard  reports. They may involve a number of 
topics or they may be devoted to  a specific topic. They represent a method for 
m anagem ent to task  the m anagem ent control system  for any form of atyp ical, 
one-tim e form of output required for to ta l m anagem ent perspect.
A brief summary of the use of control tolerances may be found in 
Leslie W. Rue and Lloyd L. Byars, M anagement: Theory and Application
(Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), pp. 171-72.
2
Exception reports produced by in tegrated  inform ation system s are  
described in Granville R. Gargiulo, "Decision Makers and the Large-Scale 
System," Journal of Systems M anagement 20 (August 1969); 15-18.
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Reporting requirem ents may exceed the  th ree  described, but they 
would probably be subsets rather than additional types of reports.
Examination Methodology 
The purpose of th is section is to  describe how the examination 
considerations described in the preceding section were applied in the anaiysis of 
each of the PPL analysis m atrix ceiis. The f ir s t  subsection addresses the issue of 
how each ceil was analyzed, f irs t in term s of the assessm ent and definition 
considerations and then in term s of the interrogation and identification 
considerations. The second subsection is re la ted  to  the  first and is concerned 
with individual ceil managem ent controi requirem ents.
I t  should be noted th a t the topics and subtopics of assessm ent and 
definition and interrogation and identification did not apply in all cases to  all 
m atrix  ceils. Furtherm ore, where they did apply, th e  significance was not 
necessarily of the sam e magnitude for each m atrix ceil. As a consequence, the 
exam ination considerations were selectively utilized in the  anaiysis of each cell, 
because some considerations were not im portant enough to warrant individual 
cell application. Also, in some cases, the exam ination considerations applied to a 
number of cells with equal intensity and in a  sim ilar manner. In those cases, the 
analysis was handled "across-the-board" for the  cells affected  and not on a cell- 
by-cell basis. This resulted in the elim ination o f unneeded duplication.
Individual Cell Examination 
The initial phase of the analysis process is the examination of each cell 
in the PPL analysis m atrix . Analysis ordering is priority  sequenced through the 
param eter dimension, then through the phase dimension, and then through the
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level dimension. All tw enty-four cells of the PPL analysis m atrix  were 
individually examined in th is manner.
Assessment and Definition
Each of the individual cells was examined in term s of the pertinent 
aspects of each of the  th ree  topics of exogenous and endogenous influences, 
objectives and scope, and key factors. This examination yielded a  fairly specific 
sta tem en t of the  control problem and its environment for each cell.
Interrogation and Identification
Each cell was then analyzed in term s of applicable constraints 
affecting the m anagem ent control situation, the  latent interdependencies among 
the cell being analyzed and o ther cells in the m atrix, and additional ch arac te r­
istics. This analysis resulted  in even more precise definition of the  m anagem ent 
control problem involved with each cell. This analysis, coupled with the previous 
examination, resulted in a specification for each cell th a t defined the  problem in 
context with its  environment and its  solution.
Individual Cell Management 
Control Requirem ents
The second phase of the analysis process focused on the  BMD
management responses to  the control situations. This phase, therefore , covered
the actual evaluation of the solutions se t forth  by BMD m anagem ent to  the
management control problems defined in the  preceding phase; i.e., the  individual
cell examinations. This second phase of the  analysis process was perform ed on a
cell-by-cell basis in the  same manner as the first phase. The thrust of this
second phase was directed  toward the specific requirem ents of quantified
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standards, m anagem ent thresholds and to lerances, and actual reporting 
requirem ents.
In this phase, the  responses to  the  control situations defined by BMD 
m anagem ent are  summarized for each of the th ree  specific requirem ents (i.e., 
quantified standards, m anagement thresholds and to lerances, and reporting 
requirem ents) within each of the cells in th e  m atrix . These managem ent 
responses a re  then analyzed in term s of the ir adequacy in fulfilling the 
requirem ents of the control situation and m ajor control defic its are identified.
Conclusion
The PPL analysis m atrix  is a technically  sound method of examining 
the th ree major dimensions of a large-scale complex program. In this study it 
was s tructu red  with twenty-four cells. Figure 1 in C hapter I depicts the make-up 
of the tw enty-four cells.
This chapter has defined the conceptual foundation of the m atrix, the 
exam ination considerations utilized in the application of the analysis process, and 
the m anner in which the examination was conducted. The next th ree  chapters of 
this study document the results of the analysis for the cost, schedule, and 
technical perform ance param eters respectively.
CHAPTER V 
THE COST PARAMETER
This and the next two chapters are  similar in fo rm at, but d ifferent in 
emphasis. All th re e  chapters a re  concerned with a  c ritica l exam ination of the 
PPL analysis m atrix  cells of the ir respective param eter. This chapter 
concentrates on the  cost param eter; Chapter VI, on the  schedule param eter; and 
C hapter VII, on the  technical perform ance param eter.
This chapter opens with a  discussion of money, both as a scarce 
resource to be com petitively  sought and judiciously allocated  and as a specific 
param eter of program perform ance m easurem ent. The second section contains a 
discussion of the  common characteristics displayed by ail cells of the cost 
segm ent of the PPL analysis m atrix , when subjected to  analysis. The next four 
sections are aligned to th e  four phase dimensions of the PPL analysis m atrix with 
each fu rther subdivided into the two decision-making levels. These sections 
re flec t the individual cell analyses. The concluding section of the  chapter is a 
brief summary of the cost param eter.
Cost Control Considerations
Money is simultaneously both a resource to  be u tilized by the program 
manager in the advancem ent of his program objectives and a c ritica l means of 
measuring program perform ance. While the la tte r  aspect is the one of primary 
in te rest, discussion of th e  form er will help to  put cost in perspective . The in ten t
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is to  portray  the  ch arac te r of the financial resource In large-scale endeavors in 
order to  underscore the pervasive nature of the  cost param eter in managem ent 
contro l.
The N ature of the Financial Resource 
Program managers within the D epartm ent of the Army are chartered  
to  accomplish stipulated  mission objectives—typically , the development, produc­
tion , and deploym ent of a  specified weapon system . Equally im portant is the 
program manager's task of insuring tha t all financial resources provided for his 
program  are  adm inistratively controlled in s tr ic t  accordance with applicable 
s ta tu te s  and directives. Thus, the program m anager must be highly sensitive to 
pertin en t financial management regulations as they apply to  the legal use of
I
appropriated  funds.
D efinition and Description
The primary source of financial resources for the U.S. Army is from 
2
Congressional appropriations. While the  national budgetary process is quite 
com plex,^ Congressional activity  (particularly as i t  re la tes to DoD weapon 
system  programs) involves two primary actions. F irst, the Congress takes an 
au thorization  action  th a t sanctions the goods and services to  be acquired as 
justified  by the Executive Branch budget submission. Secondly, a separate and
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Executive Handbook for Financial 
M anagem ent, p. 1-2.
2
All Safeguard program funds were appropriated funds. Additional 
(secondary) sources of funds for the U.S. Army are relatively minor by 
com parison and are not germ ane to this study.
^An excellent artic le  which briefly describes the budgetary process is 
Francis, "The Congressional Budget and Impoundment C ontrol Act of 1974: 
Implications for Program Managers," pp. 1-24.
197
subsequent appropriations action is taken by the  Congress to  finance those item s 
already authorized plus any item s not covered previously in the authorization 
action.^ It should be noted tha t the  Congress may decrease and increase the 
President's budget submission. Financial resources, for purposes of this study, 
a re  defined as those funds appropriated by Congress to finance authorized 
expenditures.
Constraints and 
A dm inistrative Controls
In addition to  the  normal restrictions imposed by lim ited funding, the 
use of public funds is also subject to both Congressional constraints and 
adm inistrative controls.^ These additional lim itations are  also a part of the 
environment with which the program manager must contend.
The Congress, in order to discharge a constitutionally directed
3 4responsibility fo r fiscal accountability , has taken four major actions:
1. Institu ted  th e  Congressional authorization and appropriation 
processes previously described.
2. Required th e  Executive Branch to  form ulate and implement 
procedures to  insure th a t funds are  not spent beyond those made available.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Army Com ptroller Handbook, Army 
Pam phlet No. 37-4 (Washington, D.C., 15 April 1976), pp. 13-17.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Executive Handbook for Financial 
M anagement, p. 1-1.
^U.S., C onstitu tion, A rt. I, Sec. 9.
^U.S., Army War College, "Financial System Management," by 
Billy Peters, Raymond S. Allred, and James P. Edmondson in Army Command and 
Management: Theory and Practice, Vol. n  (3 vols,; Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, August 1976), p. 372.
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3. Required th a t each m ajor departm ent establish a  fiscal m anage­
ment organization to  provide s ta ff  guidance for the management of appropriated 
funds within the departm ent.
4. C reated the General Accounting Office (GAO) as the agent of the 
Congress responsible for auditing departm ent compliance with all fiscal 
procedures and regulations.
The D epartm ent of the Army requirem ents in this regard are 
docum ented in an Army regulation.^ Essentially, the  D epartm ent of the Army 
requirem ents summarize to  three key elem ents;
1. To re s tric t obligations or expenditures to  not more than the am ount
available.
2. To prohibit involving the  Government in financiai iiability or 
obligation without proper authorization and appropriation action.
3. To pinpoint individual responsibility in the event of violation and 
provide a process for reporting of sam e.
The adm inistrative control of appropriated funds applies to "...all ac tiv ities  of
the D epartm ent of the  Army to which appropriated funds are made available for
obligation and to all appropriated funds made available to  the D epartm ent of the 
2
Army." It should be added tha t these adm inistrative controls are enforced by 
severe penalties.^
1
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Financial Administration: Adminis­




C ategorization  of 
A ppropriated Funds
The th ree  principal types of Congressionally appropriated funds used in 
the weapon system  acquisition process are  functionally oriented. They may be 
categorized  as research funds, investm ent funds, and operating funds. Research 
funds a re  provided by the research, developm ent, te s t , and evaluation (RDT&E) 
appropriation to  conduct and support research  and development activ ities. 
Investm ent funds cover a  number of fiscal appropriations and are used prim arily 
to  acquire weapon system  end item s, production fac ilities including equipm ent 
and buildings, and real esta te . Operating funds also include a number of 
individual fiscal appropriations. O perating funds are  used primarily to  finance 
the day-to-day operating needs of the  D epartm ent of the  Army.^
The Army Management S tructure (AMS) is the means utilized by the 
D epartm ent of the  Army for " ...in terrela ting  program m ing, budgeting, account­
ing, and manpower control through a standard classification of Army activ ities 
2
and functions." To the extent possible, the AMS is aligned with the DoD 
struc tu re  of program planning and represents a  common language for communi­
cation. Thus, the AMS is the official Army fram ew ork for correlating the 
Congressional appropriation structu re  to Army fiscal accounting codes and 
term inology and represents the lowest level of fiscal reporting required within 
the D epartm ent of the Army.^
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Executive Handbook for Financial 
M anagem ent, pp. 2-2 -  2-3.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Financial Administration; The Army 
M anagement S tructure  (AMS), Army Regulation No. 37-100-77 (Washington, D.C., 
February 1976), p. 1-1.
^Ibid.
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Planning, Programming, Budgeting A ctivity
At the  tim e of its introduction, PPBS (Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System)^ was one of the  m ost comprehensive m anagem ent control
systems ever introduced in the public sector. Developed in the D epartm ent of
Defense (DoD) in 1961 a t  the direction of the Secretary  of D efense, the  system
was designed to  "span the  gap" between the existing and well established m ilitary
2
planning and m ilitary budgeting functions. The key elem ent in th is regard is the 
concept of programming, which Is designed " ...to  provide a  bridge between 
m ultiyear planning and a one-year budget."^
The essence of PPBS, as originally conceived, was decision-m aking. Its 
main purpose was " ...to  develop explicit c riteria , openly and thoroughly debated 
by all in terested  parties, th a t could be used by th e  Secretary  of Defense, the 
President, and the Congress as m easures of the need for and adequacy of defense
If.
programs." In addition, PPBS had a  number of concom itant ideas underlying its 
fundam ental purpose. F irst, i t  provided a basis for collective and simultaneous
For classic advocatory descriptive tex ts of PPBS, see Harley H. 
Hinrichs and Graem e M.  Taylor, eds.. Program Budgeting and B enefit-C ost 
Analysis (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1969) and 
Frem ont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller, eds.. Planning, Programming, Budgeting: 
A Systems Approach to  M anagement, 2d ed. (Chicago; Markham Publishing 
Company, 1972). For a  descriptive te x t from an adversary point of view see 
Harold A. Hovey, The Planning-Programming-Budgeting Approach to  Govern­
ment Decision-Making (New York: F i^ e r ic k  A. P r^ g e r ,  Publishers, 1968). U.S. 
Army im plem entation instructions a re  contained in U.S., D epartm ent of the 
Army, A dm inistration: Planning, Programming, and Budgeting within the
D épartaient of the Army, Army Regulation No. 1-1 (W ashin^on, D.C., 25 May  
19765: :
2
Charles J. H itch , Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley; University 
of California Press, 1965).
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Army Com ptroller Handbook, p. 1.
h
Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? 
Shaping the  Defense Program , 1961-1969 (New York: H arper & Row, 1971), 
p. 33.
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consideration of m ilitary needs and associated costs. Second, i t  accommodated 
the need for explicit consideration o f a lternatives a t  th e  upper levels of the 
decision process. Active use of independent s ta ff  assistance and analysis as a 
check-and-baiance technique was a third fac to r. Fourth, the system was 
intended to aid the prognostic capability o f the DoD by projecting fu ture 
consequences of cu rren t decisions. Finally PPBS was to  be an open system  in the 
sense th a t ail d a ta , calculations, assumptions, and c rite ria  w ere  to  be 
documented in a fashion designed to  enhance analysis and audit.^
Planning
The planning segm ent of PPBS is concerned w ith the  form ulation of 
comprehensive, rea listic , and e ffec tive  m ilitary plans required  to  accomplish 
established national objectives. The planning process is a complex and highly 
technical one. One author, discussing m ilitary planning in connection with PPBS, 
has defined it as "...the selection of courses of action  a fte r system atic  
consideration of a lternatives." Continuing, the sam e author stressed tha t 
planning "...should focus on determ ining what kinds of m ilitary capabilities were 
needed and how they were to  be achieved."^
It is the responsibility of the  National Security Council to  develop 
national objectives based on the  postulated ex ternal th rea t to  the  United S tates. 
The th rea t is assessed not only in term s of its  d irect im plications for the
h b ld ., pp. 35-47.
2
Theodore W. Bauer, National Security .Management; Requirem ents 




continental U nited S tates, but for its world-wide in te rests  as well. The Joint 
Chiefs of S taff of the m ilitary departm ents a re  responsible to the Secretary of 
Defense for the preparation of m ilitary plans responsive to  these national 
objectives. The Secretary of Defense is then responsible fo r the execution of the 
approved plans through the armed services. Army plans and the joint plans 
normally cover th ree  tim e periods identified generically as short-range, mid­
range, and long-range.^
Programming
As indicated earlier, it is the programming segm ent of PPBS that is 
the  cardinal e lem ent of the concept. It is through this vehicle tha t multiyear 
plans are u ltim ately tied to  single-year budgets. It is also through this process 
th a t the true im pact of individual and isolated budget cu ts may be assessed in 
term s of plans.
At the heart of the programming segm ent is the Five Year Defense
Program (FYDP). By definition, the FYDP is;
The official program which sum m arizes the Secretary o l  Defense 
approved plans and programs for the D epartm ent of Defense.
In other words, the FYDP is the base line document tha t serves as the audit trail
for DoD programs. It is updated th ree  tim es each year: (1) a t the tim e the
individual service five-year-program s submissions are  made to the Secretary of
Defense, (2) a t  th e  tim e of the individual service budget submissions to the
Secretary of Defense, and (3) in the DoD budget submission as p a rt of the
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Army C om ptroller Handbook, p. 1. 
^Ibid., p . 76.
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President's budget submission to Congress.^ The FYDP reflects the to ta l defense
program in term s of m ilitary output for eight years and costs and manpower
2
requirem ents for five years.
The individual service five-year programs are subm itted to the 
Secretary of Defense by means of a  Program  Objective Memorandum (POM). 
This document is the vehicle used by th e  services to translate  program guidance 
into specific proposals for resource a llocation . Following review and modifica­
tion, as required by the  Secretary of D efense, the POM becomes the approved 
service five-year program. The firs t-y ea r portion of the POM is the basis for the 
development of the annual budget for th a t  sam e fiscal year.
The programming segm ent, like the planning segment of PPBS, has 
varying levels of de tail. At the weapon system level both programming and 
planning d a ta  are detailed and specific. As information is processed upward 
through the chain of command, it  tends to  become more summarized and less 
detailed.^ This is a pragm atic consideration tha t is consistent with normal 
management inform ation processing in a layered organization structu re .
Budgeting
The third segm ent of PPBS is budgeting. It is both the end of one 
PPBS cycle and the f ir s t  step  in the following cycle.^ Since the budget is the 
fiscal expression of the plan for carrying out the desired program objectives for a
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Administration; Planning, Program­
ming, and Budgeting within the  D epartm ent of the Army, p. 6-1.
2
Bauer, National Security M anagement: Requirements for National 
Defense, p. 33.
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 112.
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given year, i t  represents a  value judgment by the  adm inistration of the funds 
required to  accomplish the m ilitary mission. Upon approval by Congress, it 
becomes a  specific control device both for the  allocation of financial resources 
and for the  execution of approved program s. To the  ex ten t tha t the approved 
budget differs from  the five-year program , the planning segm ent must be re­
energized and the  next PPBS cycle in itia ted .
The budget process is a dynam ic one. While budget form ulation 
concen trates on developing detailed fund estim ates  for individual fiscal years, a 
program m anager, a t  any given tim e, is actively involved with a t  least th ree 
d istinct annual budgets. Additionally, the  program manager is normally still 
executing not only the curren t year budget, but prior year budgets as well. As an 
exam ple, in early  fiscal year (FY) 1977, a typical program m anager is 
simultaneously: (1) executing the FY 77 (current year) budget, (2) fine tuning and 
justifying the  FY 78 (budget year) budget before Congress, and (3) form ulating 
the FY 79 (ta rge t year) budget. From a programming standpoint, the  program 
manager is also re-evaluating and reprogram m ing his FY 79 through FY 82 
program as i t  in te rre la tes to  the  FY 78 budget submission. Thus, the  FYDP and 
the programming tim e-fram e would cover the period of FY 78 through FY 82 in 
this example.^ These relationships are  depicted in Figure 11.
The th ree  year budget period for the  cu rren t through the ta rg e t year
depicts what is re fe rred  to  as the operating budget. For a weapon system  it
re flec ts  a  plan of tasks to be accomplished and the  financial resources available
2
for u tilization and a  control standard for cost control. It should be noted th a t
^U.S., Army War College, "Financial System Management," pp. 408-15. 
^Ibid., p. 409.
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FY 77 was the final budget year for Safeguard. No funding was authorized for 
th e  program in subsequent fiscal years.
A graphic illustration of the conceptual interrelationships betw een the 
segm ents of PPBS and the continuous, closed-loop nature  of the  to ta l system  is 
depicted  in Figure 12.
Program Execution 
Program execution^ is concerned with the im plem entation of programs 
through the allocation, obligation, expenditure, and reporting of funds. Several 
aspects of program execution a re  essential to an understanding of cost control 
considerations. They a re  discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
Funding Authorization
Following approval of the DoD budget by Congress, the Army must
obtain obligational authority  from DoD. This is accomplished through an
apportionm ent process th a t originates in the  Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). By public law, each government agency must submit an apportionm ent
request to  the OMB for distribution of the  financial resources appropriated by
2
Congress and signed into public law by the President. The Apportionment
In theory, the  obligation, expenditure, and reporting of cu rren t and 
prior year program funds is referred  to as "budget execution." As a process of 
financial adm inistration, budget execution is an integral part of the  PPBS 
concept. As a  p ractical m atte r, however, the execution process is m ore easily 
discussed as an adjunct to , ra ther than an in tegral part of, the PPBS. The la tte r  
tre a tm e n t is used in this study. The term inology "program execution" has been 
adopted to  underscore this slight departure from a lite ra l in terp re ta tion  of the 
PPBS concept.
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Army Comptroller Handbook, p. 19.
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Fig. 12. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Relationships
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Request, by direction, "...contains the ia te s t actual data for the cu rren t year and
significant changes in requirem ents for the  budget year."^
The Army Apportionm ent R equest to DoD is similar in form  to  the
original budget submission. Once approved by DoD and returned  to the
D epartm ent of the Army, th e  apportionm ent constitutes authority to obligate
funds. This obligational au thority  is released to the field commands with
2
direction to  proceed with the im plem entation of approved programs.
Obligation of Funds
The placing of orders with other government agencies o r  the awards of 
con tracts obligates funds. Every transaction  involving public funds m ust be 
docum ented in term s of the availability of those funds and th e  appropriate 
accounting classification. A ccurate records must be maintained for fiscal 
accounting purposes and system atically  reported upward through the chain of 
command.^
Unfinanced Requirements
Unfinanced requirem ents represent those elem ents of a  program that 
the program manager believes ought to be accomplished, but for which no funds 
have been appropriated. In o ther words, they represent a need th a t is unfunded. 
Unfinanced requirem ents may occassionally be financed through tran sfe r of funds
from one program elem ent to  another, through use of unliquidated prior year
1
funds, through reprioritization of tasks which results in previously funded tasks 




In the even t a major reprogramming ac tio n  is required involving either 
a sizable dollar am ount or a  transfer of funds from  one fiscal appropriation to  
another, i t  may be necessary to  secure Congressional approval.^
Budget execution is an ite ra tiv e  process requiring the program 
manager to keep constantly  abreast of the s ta tu s  of his program. Budget 
execution has an im pact on both the planning and programming segm ents. The 
illustration of unfinanced requirem ents is a  compelling example. As indicated 
above, unfinanced requirem ents may become funded during the  current year. It 
is also possible, however, th a t it  may not be possible to fund in the current year 
and the requirem ent must be recycled into th e  budget year, ta rget year, or 
beyond. It is also possible tha t an unfinanced requirem ent is never funded and it 
simply expires due to  the passage of tim e.
Review and Analysis
Review and analysis is a generic te rm  applied to  independent 
evaluation of program perform ance. The evaluation compares program progress 
and accom plishm ents against established plans and standards to determ ine real or 
potential problem areas, to assess program im pacts, and to provide recommen­
dations for m anagem ent action. In short, i t  is a  focused, independent audit of 
program perform ance.
The tools and techniques of review and analysis may be utilized with 
all th ree  control param eters. As applied to program  managem ent cost control, 
review and analysis activ ity  attaches prim arily to  those c ritica l statu to ry  and 
regulatory requirem ents associated with the use of public funds the thrust of the 
activ ity  being to  insure to ta l compliance. Review and analysis may also be
^Ibid., p . 19.
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applied to cost control as an independent audit of the effectiveness of the to ta l 
financial management program.
The essence of the review and analysis concept is th a t it is an 
independent assessm ent. D irection of the ac tiv ity  may be under the  aegis of the  
program m anager, but it  is separate  and d istinc t from the control ac tiv ity  of 
operating  officials. Even though review and analysis frequently  u tilize the  sam e 
base data used by operating officia ls, the analysis is perform ed independently, 
and differing conclusions may be drawn.
Cost P aram eter Analysis Overview
The cost param eter of the PPL analysis m atrix  contains eight 
individual ceils as follows:
1. RDT&E Phase/S trateg ic Level
2. RDT&E Phase/T actical Level
3. Production Phase/S trateg ic Level
4. Production Phase/T actical Level
5. Deployment Phase/S trateg ic Level
6. Deployment Phase/T actical Level
7. Termination Phase/S trategic Level
8. Termination Phase/T actical Level
These relationships, as well as the  allied schedule and technical perform ance 
relationships, were introduced illustratively in Figure 1 in Chapter I.
All cells in the cost segm ent of the  PPL analysis m atrix displayed 
common characteristics when subjected to  exam ination of the assessm ent and 
definition factors and the interrogation and identification c rite ria . These 
particu lars of commonality are discussed in term s of the  to ta l param eter prior to 
delving into the specifics of each individual cell in succeeding sections. The
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exam ination of m anagem ent control requirem ents was conducted only on a  cell 
by cell basis.
Assessment and Definition
The to ta l cost param eter is subject to  a  number of exogenous and
endogenous influences.
In th e  case of the  ABM debate, the  ex ternal or publicized focus of the
political issue was the deployment decision. The argum ents tended to polarize
around "go" and "no-go" a lternatives with l i t t le , if  any, middle ground. The
au thorita tive  debates were principally techn ica l in nature, but the vehicle of
expression was found in the  authorization and appropriation legislation.
The level of funding for weapon system  programs is increasingly
becoming an econom ic affordability issue. The service budgets under PPBS must
com pete on a priority  basis in order to  form a com prehensive DoD budget which,
in tu rn , must com pete with nondefense budgets. It is in teresting  to note tha t the
composition of federal expenditures has sh ifted  dram atically  in recent years. As
an exam ple, in 1960 defense expenditures am ounted to  over half of the to ta l
spending, while in 1976 the defense budget fell to  less than 30 percent of the
to ta l budget outlay.^ The 1976 President’s budget reflected  a  reversal of this
2
trend , as did th e  1977 budget. The 1978 budget submission to  Congress by the 
President also proposed a real increase, a f te r  ad justm ent for inflation, in defense
1
Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. Gram lich, and Robert W. Hartm an, 
Setting National Priorities; The 1976 Budget (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institu tion, 1975), p. 7.
2
U.S., Executive O ffice of the P resident, O ffice of Management and 
Budget, The United S tates Budget in Brief; F iscal Year 1978 (Washington, D.C.: 
Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1977), pp. 16, 28.
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spending. ̂  A ffordability was an economic issue in 1967 a t  the tim e of the
production decision, but the concern was aimed prim arily a t the investm ent fund
expenditure and not th e  appropriation of developm ent funds. The principal
2
concern was th a t ABM would d ivert money from dom estic programs.
Public opinion concerning the defensive u tility  of Safeguard varied 
throughout the  program 's life cycle, but it  was generally keen particularly in the 
academ ic, in te llec tual, and scien tific  com m unities. Not unlike the political 
influence, public opinion ultim ately  found expression in the authorization and 
appropriation processes.
The technology fac tor in the Safeguard program was extraordinarily 
high throughout the life  span of the  program. This was particularly tru e  of the 
RDT&E phase. This e ffo rt was subject to  considerable change in direction and 
was nonrepetitive in na tu re . Even the production program represented a high 
level of technological a tta inm en t, but many aspects of i t  were repetitive.
Endogenous influences also had a dram atic  effect on the cost 
param eter. Existing D epartm ent of the Army m anagem ent doctrine was well 
articu la ted  with respect to  cost control and i t  applied with equal intensity to all 
fiscal appropriations. All D epartm ent of the Army activ ities  participating in the 
Safeguard program w ere bound by the same regulations. Other government 
agencies outside the D epartm ent of the  Army were generally bound by similar 
regulations since all basically derived their precedent from public law.
Participating  con tractors generally had th e ir  own cost accounting 
system s. When deem ed com patible with the DoD requirem ents, contractor 
systems w ere accep tab le . When not acceptable, con trac to r cost accounting
^Ibid.
2
Adams, B allistic Missile Defense, p. 210.
213
systems generally had to  be upgraded until they  m et minimum c rite ria . The type 
of con tract specifies the cost da ta  to  be reported  by a con tracto r. D etailed and 
explicit d a ta  may be required under some form s; others may require less. This 
must be considered in defining cost reporting standards. Prime contractors were 
required to secure appropriate cost reporting from their subcontractors and 
vendors.
The original program manager held a highly disciplined view of
program management, particularly with regard to cost control. His influence
was apparent throughout the to ta l organization. The primary mechanism used by
the program manager for expressing his m anagem ent requirem ents was the
Safeguard System Master Plan (SSMP).^ Specifically, the SSMP was;
...u tilized by the 5ENSM as the vehicle for approval of major concepts 
and program actions, as docum entation for obtaining necessary 
approvals of major concepts and program actions, as docum entation 
for obtaining necessary approvals of higher authority , for review and 
analysis of program plans and accom plishm ents, for coordination of 
system  activ ities and developing standardized procedures including a 
uniform and formal planning process.
The SSMP was a  dynamic plan. It was revised as the program moved forward and 
as program direction and emphasis changed over tim e.
The objective and scope of the cost control action was very s tra ig h t­
forward. In sum, it amounted to active participation in the PPBS for all 
Safeguard ac tiv ities. This translated  into controlling the allocation and
utilization o f Safeguard fiscal resources approved in the Five Y ear Defense
The Safeguard System M aster Plan (SSMP) was redesignated the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Master Plan (BMDMP) during the 1974 reorganization. 
Both designations are used in this study interchangeably. It should be noted th a t 
only the la te s t revision of the BMDMP is c ited  in the bibliography.
2
U.S., Department of the  Army, Principles of M anagement, SSMP Part 
No. 2.01 (Washington, D.C.: Office Chief of S taff, 13 April 1968), p. 16.
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Program  (FYDP) and authorized for obligation, preparation of all budget 
docum entation, and submission of required planning and programming 
inform ation.
Several fac to rs  w ere critical in defining the  type of control action 
required for m anagem ent control of costs. F irst, the  program m anager was 
responsible for all Safeguard fiscal resources used by o ther participating 
governm ent agencies, and all such agencies w ere required to render periodic 
plans and reports to  the  program manager. Second, the  cost inform ation 
collected  was used to ; (1) p repare required higher headquarters reports and 
inputs, (2) perm it assessm ent by the program m anager of program progress, 
(3) fa c ilita te  im plem entation of corrective action and reprogram m ing as 
required, and (4) enhance the e ffec tiv e  utilization of Safeguard fiscal resources. 
Third, cost reporting data  were required from  all activ ities using Safeguard 
funds. Fourth, the  control situation was highly repe titive , requiring monthly 
reporting of many aspects a t a minimum. F ifth , proactive control was required. 
This m eant th a t the  control mechanism had to  be a  "steering" type control 
capable of providing m anagem ent with the inform ation necessary to  seek out 
positive beneficial opportunities for program advancem ent and direction through 
disciplined search of an tic ipated  future activ ities  and occurences. The control 
m echanism also had to  be capable of early detection  of fu tu re  trends by means of 
leading indicators. Sixth, cost is a  sensitive predictive device for program 
progression. This asset had to  be exploited to  the  fu llest. Seventh ̂  the cost 
control situation required essentially 100 percen t tracking or m easurem ent; 
s ta tis tic a l sampling was not an acceptable a lte rn a tiv e . Finally, tim eliness of 




There should have been few , if any, constraints in the cost control 
situation with the possibie exception of the  affordability  of desired control 
actions. Timeliness of reporting and currency of da ta  reported a re  common 
problems with large-scale  formal control system s. The Safeguard situation was 
such th a t tim ely  reporting of cost da ta  was essential to  successful managem ent 
of the  to ta l e ffo rt. The vacillation in program  guidance, m anifested in continual 
reductions in th e  number of planned sites, also caused added stress  to  the control 
situation.
A ffordability of the c o s t control system did not m aterialize as a 
significant issue a t th e  outset. I t  was only as the  Safeguard fiscal program was 
increm entally  decreased th a t th e  costs of the  cost control system became more 
expensive than the  benefits derived.
The obvious in tegrative linkage in the cost param eter is the common 
denom inator of dollars as a  yardstick of m easurem ent. C are must be used in 
exercising this linkage, however, due to  the e ffe c t of inflation on dollars, which 
is a  function of tim e. Thus, while a com pilation of figures shown in current 
dollars re flec ts  the differences in actual cash outlays by year, the "real" 
purchasing power of the  dollars m ust be equated to  a  base year, and all o ther 
year dollars e ither in flated  or deflated accordingly. This charac te ris tic  of 
dollars changing in value over tim e due to  inflation has an e ffe c t on the budget 
process in particu la r. Future year budget estim ates are  inflated by a 
predeterm ined inflation  formula which does not always m atch the  actual ra te . 
A ctual inflation ra tes  higher than the  form ula result in shortfalls in the budget, 
while inflation ra tes  lower than th e  form ula resu lt in windfalls.
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The common characteristics of the cost param eter, resulting from an 
across-the-board exam ination of the assessm ent and definition factors and the 
in terrogation and identification c rite ria , a re  summarized for convenience in 
Table 2.
RDT&E Phase
This section of this chapter contains the firs t analysis of individual 
cells in the  PPL analysis m atrix . Two cells a re  analyzed in this section and two 
each a re  analyzed in the succeeding three sections for a  to tal of eight ceil 
analyses in this chapter.
The two cells discussed in this section share a common phase 
dimension. They are  d ifferentiated  by the level dimension. The f irs t cell is 
defined by the s tra teg ic  level while the second cell is defined by the  tac tica l 
level.
The cost param eter in the RDT&E phase is concerned with research 
funds. These funds are provided under the research, developm ent, te s t, and 
evaluation (RDT&E) fiscal appropriation. It is the only fiscal appropriation 
available for use in this phase.
Strategic Considerations
Research and development activ ity , by its  very nature, is exploratory 
in ch arac te r and is best controlled in a general ra ther than a  specific manner.^
Interesting discussions on program control in research and develop­
m ent may be found in Robert W. Samuel, "Research: Meaning of the Term," in 
National Security Management: Defense R esearch and Developm ent, ed. by
Ralph Sanders (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1968), 
pp. 75-79; Chase and Aquilano, Production and Operations Management; A Life 
Cycle Approach, pp. 607-11; and Roman, R esearch and Development Manage­
m ent: The Economics and Administration of Technology, pp. 364-65.
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TABLE 2
EXAMINATION RESULTS COMMON TO ALL PPL ANALYSIS MATRIX CELLS 
IN THE COST PARAMETER






P O L I T I C A L  -  HIGH VISIBILITY IN CONGRESS
ECONOMIC .  QUESTION OF A F FO R DA BI L IT Y;  DIVERSION O F 
FUNDS FROM DOMESTIC PROGRAMS
P U B LI C  OPINION -  KEEN I NTEREST
T ECHNOLOGY -  R E L A T E D  PRIMARILY TO TECHNI CAL 
P ERF ORMA NCE
EXISTING U.S. ARMY MANAGEMENT DOCTRI NE -  ST RUCT URE D
O T H E R  GOVERNMENT AGENCIES -  BOUND BY ARMY DOCTRINE
P A RTI CI P AT ING CONTRACTORS -  UNST RUCT URE D BUT
DISCIPLINED ; FAMILIAR WITH U.S.  ARMY REQUIREMENTS




C O N T R O L  ALLOCATION AND UTI LIZATI ON OF ALL FISCAL 
RESOURCES APPRO VED FOR PROGRAM IN FIVE YEAR 
D E F E N S E  PROGRAM (FYDP)
KEY FACTORS AL L PA RT IC IP ANT S MUST R E P O R T  COST INFORMATION 
INFORMATION USED TO CONTROL COSTS
I NPUT DATA FROM PARTI CI PANT S IN REQUIRED FORMAT AND 
ON S P E C IF I ED  TIMES 
C O N T R O L  SITUATION R E PE T I T I V E  
P R O A C T I V E  CONTROL REQUIRED 
DATUM GOOD P R E DI CT I VE  DEVICE 
100 P E R C E N T  MEASUREMENT REQUI RED 







TIMELINESS O F  R E P O R T I N G ;  VACI LLATION IN PROGRAM 
GUIDANCE 
D O LL A RS  AS COMMON DENOMINATOR
DOLLARS CHANGE OVER TIME DUE TO INFLATION
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This is not to  suggest th a t research and development is uncontrollable from a 
managem ent perspective, but ra th e r th a t control of research  and development 
activ ity  re fle c t a  m anagerial philosophy consistent with program objectives. The 
control of development funds may be used as a  d irect m eans for accomplishing 
this purpose.
Assessment and Definition
Prior to  the  production and deployment decision, the development 
program was managed as an end in itse lf. Production planning was pursued, but 
i t  was in tegral to  the  development e ffo rt. The advent of the production and 
deployment decision added a whole new dimension to  the  program management 
task . The development program becam e a  portion of the to ta l activity  in lieu of 
being the soie activ ity . As a consequence, it  became necessary to in tegrate  the  
research and development program funding profile and cost control management 
activ ities into a to ta l financial m anagem ent system incorporating all fiscal 
appropriations. This e ffo rt becam e a  problem at the ou tset of the  Safeguard 
program.
The development con tractor utilized a cost reporting method tha t was 
function or task oriented and basically paralleled the organization s truc tu re . The 
method had been in use for some tim e prior to  the production decision and had 
been deemed satisfacto ry  for cost control by Army program management 
personnel. In a  program as large and complex as the  Safeguard program, 
however, an extensive quantity of da ta  had to be in teg ra ted  and summarized in 
order to  satisfy  the m anagem ent inform ation requirem ents of various levels of 
m anagem ent. This m andated the use of a  common m anagem ent s tru c tu re  with 
standard definitions. This standard s tru c tu re  was the Safeguard Project Work
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Breakdown Structure (WBS).^ Because of the  methodology used by the 
development con tracto r, developm ent costs w ere not d irectly  re la tab le  to  the 
Safeguard Project Summary WBS. This deficiency, in tu rn , precluded summa­
rization of cost data  upward to  established WBS subsystem levels and prevented 
fiscal audit downward in the  WBS to standard work package elem ents. An 
RDT&E con trac t WBS^ was utilized for cost reporting purposes, but i t  had no 
validity in the approved Safeguard Project Summary WBS. The result was th a t 
detailed developm ent program costs for the prim e developm ent con tracto r were 
re la tab le  neither to  other developm ent program costs nor to  common work 
package elem ents of o ther fiscal appropriations.
Interrogation and Identification
The developm ent con trac to r cost reporting difficulty  mentioned above 
represented a serious constraint in a ttem pts  to develop realistic  and accurate 
cost control programs involving da ta  sum m arization, audit downward through a 
common WBS with standard definitions, and fulfillm ent of higher headquarters 
cost reporting requirem ents.
The deficiency had a more subtle im pact as well. Without the ability 
to  track  costs into the  Safeguard Project WBS, the use of dollars as a common 
denominator with other fiscal appropriations was seriously undermined. In 
e ffe c t, the prim e con tracto r portion of the developm ent program under these
1
U.S., D epartm ent of the  Army, P ro ject Summary Work Breakdown 
S tructure, Safeguard System M aster Plan (SSMP) P art No. 3.05 (Revision No. 1) 
(Washington, D.C.: O ffice of the Chief of S taff, 2 November 1970), pp. iii-iv.
2
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Safeguard RDTE Develop­
m ent C ontract Work Breakdown S tructu re , Safeguard System M aster Plan (SSMP) 
Supplement No 3.05.B (Huntsville, Alabama, 27 January 1972).
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conditions becam e an independent cost program alm ost to ta lly  isolated from the 
standard cost control activ ity .
Management Control Requirem ents
The problem was never solved directly . It was finally diminished 
through passage of tim e and a  series of compromises. In O ctober, 1970, the 
program manager authorized use of th e  existing techniques for prim e develop­
ment con tracto r cost reporting. He stipu la ted , however, th a t the  developm ent 
con tract data  be incorporated into the  Safeguard Project Summary WBS through 
a process of d irect correlation . Allocation of costs was to  be made only when 
the e ffo rt could not be uniquely identified . The approval was a one-tim e 
deviation for the  specific con tracto r involved. It was granted to  preclude undue 
interruption in the program during a c ritica l tim e in the developm ent and te s t  
effort.^
The primary quantified standard used in the cost control area  was the 
fo recast of obligations for all current and prior year funds. The fo recasts  for 
obligations were derived from each agency's approved plan for execution of its  
approved program. The plans were developed a t  the budget project account or 
summary program level by fiscal year. Each installation and ac tiv ity  receiving 
RDT&E funds in support of the  Safeguard program by aliocation, sub-allocation, 
allo tm ent, or as an approved operating budget were required to  report. This
Alfred D. Starbird, Lieutenant G eneral, USA, Safeguard System 
Manager, "Management of the Safeguard Development E ffort," le tte r  to  
Commanding General, U.S. Army Safeguard System Command, 19 O ctober 1970, 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization F iles, Washington, D.C.
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sta tem en t of applicability was to insure th a t all funds were reported, but not 
more than once.^
The control to lerances were d irec t and meaningful. Variations in the
running monthly cum ulative to ta ls  exceeding plus or minus 10 percent betw een
successive monthly reports w ere to  be comprehensively yet concisely explained
a t the level of d e ta il reported. Variations in the  end of quarter (three-m onth
tim e period) or to ta l fiscal year to ta ls  exceeding plus or minus 10 percen t
between successive monthly reports  were also to  be explained. In this la tte r
case, however, explanations were only required a t  the fiscal appropriation to ta l
level. Explanations were to  accompany the standard report. No requirem ent
2
existed for exception reporting.
Reporting requirem ents were specified as monthly, and no requirem ent 
for exception reporting was established in SSMP 2.06.02.^ The potential of 
exception reporting was recognized as a principle of financial resources 
m anagem ent, however.^
T actical Considerations
T actical considerations included a philosophical need to  control 
research and development to a  lower level than required for reporting a t the 
s tra teg ic  level. This still suggests, however, a general ra ther than a  specific 
control methodology.
1
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Safeguard Status of Funds Report RCS 
SAFSM-8 (R-1), Safeguard System M aster Plan (SSMP) P art No. 2.06.02 (Revision 
No. i) (Washington, D.C.: O ffice Chief of S taff, 6 March 1970), pp. 2, 4, 6.
^Ibid., p. 4. ^Ibid., p. 1.
ii
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Sentinel Principles of 
M anagement, p. 19.
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Assessment and Definition
At the tac tica l level, the  prim e mission was one of managing the prime 
developm ent contractor expenditures. Integration of cost da ta  with similar cost 
da ta  from other installations or activ ities was viewed by many a t  th is level as 
only a concom itant and not particularly compelling requirem ent. For purposes of 
managing the prime con tracto r e ffo rt , the  system  in use had historical 
precedence and accep tance, was viewed as consistent with a philosophy of 
general as opposed to specific control o f research and developm ent activity , and 
m aintained the status quo of the m anagem ent situation.
At this level of m anagem ent and decision-making the cost control 
system  was deemed to ta lly  acceptable as a control technique. Except for the 
d ifficulties encountered in in tegrating  the  data  w ith other comparable data, the 
system was workable. In o ther words, viewed from the tac tica l perspective as a 
ta c tica l tool, the system was a t le a s t adequate.
Interrogation and Identification
Viewed as essentially a stand alone and independent management 
control situation (which is how the situation  was viewed a t this level), the cost 
control reporting system had no m ajor constrain ts, no potential for latent 
interdependencies, and no distinguishing ch arac te ris tic s.
M anagement Control Requirem ents
The primary quantified standard used in the cost control a rea  at the 
tac tica l level was the same as a t the s tra teg ic  level, with two notable 
exceptions. F irst, the data were co llected  and reported a t a significantly lower 
level of detcdl. Second, reports were subm itted to the applicable installation or
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activ ity  commanders ra ther than to th e  program manager. These reports were 
generally the base reports from which s tra teg ic  level reports were generated.
Tolerances and reporting requirem ents were consistent with strategic 
requirem ents. Individual Installation or activ ity  commanders were perm itted  to 
establish more stringent thresholds and tolerances than Imposed a t the  strategic 
level and they frequently did so.
Production Phase
The two cells discussed In this section are  d ifferen tia ted  only by the 
level dimension. The f irs t cell concerns the s tra teg ic  level, while the second is 
defined by the tac tica l level.
The cost param eter In the  production phase Is concerned with 
Investm ent funds. These funds are provided under both the Procurem ent of 
Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA)^ and the Military Construction, Army 
(MCA) fiscal appropriations.
Strategic Considerations
Production activ ity  tends to  be more certain  in charac te r than 
research and developm ent activ ity . Elements of the activ ity  may still be 
enormously complex, but, In general. It Is more predictable than research and 
development and more susceptible to specific control. The trend  tow ard more 
specific cost control is also a function of program m aturity . As an exam ple, the 
Safeguard System C harter In 1970 specifically charged the program m anager with
In FY 72, Congress revised the  PEMA appropriation to  separate  it  Into 
five separate appropriations. The appropriation cited  for missile procurement 
was designated simply Missile Procurem ent, Army (MIPA). Safeguard reporting 
documents continued to  use the designation "PEMA," so It will be used In this 
study as well.
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responsibility for insuring " ...th a t procurem ent cost is minimized through cost 
control, change contro l, contractual enforcem ent, and con tracto r motivation."^ 
The original Sentinel charter did not contain such a proviso.
Assessment and Definition
In addition to the development program problem  described above, it
was recognized early  in the Safeguard program tha t an incom patibility of system
m anagem ent control docum entation existed . The major areas of concern
involved the inconsistencies in nom enclature, defin itions, and hierarchic
descriptions of the program . Specifically, severe d ifferences existed between
the Safeguard WBS, the  weapon system generation breakdown, the system
specification tree , and the  milestone coding system . This lack of commonality of
definition and subdivision of program elem ents seriously jeopardized a ttem pts to
assure a  common understanding, recording, and reporting of data  throughout the
BMD community. Additionally, these major descrepancies were not in accord
with the sp irit and in ten t of D epartm ent of D efense requirem ents and 
2
regulations.*
The origin of the problem was alm ost identical to  the RDT&E problem 
previously m entioned. The prime production co n trac to r was re luctan t to change 
from the production planning structu re  developed th re e  years earlier by a joint 
contractor/A rm y team . S tated reservations were an tic ipated  cost impacts and
1
Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, "System C harter: 
Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense System," Memorandum for Chief of S taff, 
U.S. Army, 14 August 1970, Ballistic Missile D efense Organization Files, 
Washington, D.C.
^Billy L. Walker, Major, USA, "Implications of Approval of the New 
Safeguard Work Breakdown Structure," Memorandum for General Starbird, 
10 August 1969, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization F iles, Washington, D.C.
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loss of fam iliarity  with the m anagem ent system by experienced personnel.^ 
Additionally, the co n trac to r foresaw a proliferation of line item s in the  contract 
instrum ent with a tten d en t detailed reporting and serious im pact on contracting, 
financial, and engineering activ ities  for both itse lf and its  subcontractors.^
The basic issue was actually interwoven with the  underlying principle 
th a t common definitions and subdivision of work elem ents provided a vehicle for 
more pervasive insight into the  details of program accom plishm ents and 
progression. This, in turn , inherently form ed a  basis for more meaningful 
analysis and g rea ter control of all program activ ity  by the program m anager. It 
is distinctly possible th a t this potential for added visibility a t the  s tra teg ic  level 
was purposefully resisted  a t  the tac tica l level by the prime con tracto r.
Interrogation and Identification
The prim e production contractor's reluctance to  incorporate the 
common program WBS impeded the program m anager's a ttem p ts  to in tegrate  
cost data from all partic ipan ts except artificia lly  through pro ration and 
synthetic allocations of cost details. It also created  significant problems a t the 
s tra teg ic  level in determ ining prudent allocation of financial resources.^
S. C. Donnelly, G eneral Manager Safeguard System, Western Electric, 
"Safeguard Work Breakdown Structure," le tte r  to  Brigadier General 
R. C. M arshall, Commander, U.S. Army Safeguard System Command, 
15 Septem ber 1969, Ballistic Missile Defense System Organization Files, 
Washington, D.C.
^M. L. Fox, M anager, C ontract M anagem ent, Western E lectric, 
"Prelim inary Baselines for Safeguard Summary Work Breakdown Structure," 
le tte r  to  Commanding General, U.S. Army Safeguard System Command, 1 July 
1969, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
^Alfred D. Starbird, Lieutenant General, USA, Safeguard System 
Manager, "Safeguard System Project Summary Work Breakdown Structure (SSMP 
3.05)," le tte r  to  Commanding General, U.S. Army Safeguard System Command, 
18 December 1969, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
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M anagement Control Requirem ents
The problem was resolved, essentially w ithout compromise, when the 
prime production con tracto r was directed to accep t and utilize the Safeguard 
WBS developed by the Army.^
The quantified standards used in the PEMA and MCA fiscal appropria­
tions were notionally sim ilar to  th a t established for the RDT&E fiscal 
appropriation. D ifferences were evident in the level o f detail selected for 
reporting, however. Plans and accomplishment reporting w ere required for the 
system m ajor item  level for the PEMA fiscal appropriation. This is one level 
lower in de ta il in the WBS. Totals were summed to  the  budget project account 
and fiscal appropriation by fiscal year. The MCA fiscal appropriation was 
reported a t  th e  summary activ ity  account level, which was effectively one level 
lower still in the  WBS than the  PEMA requirem ent. Totals were summed to  the
functional summary level (i.e., planning/design, rea l e sta te  acquisition, con-
2
struction) and fiscal appropriation by fiscal year.
Control thresholds and tolerances and reporting requirem ents were as 
described above in the subsection on the cost/R D T& E/strategic cell.^
Tactical Considerations 
T actical level decision making involved a  considerably greater depth of 
detail than did the  s tra teg ic  requirem ents. From a cost standpoint, the degree of
I
Minutes of Meeting, "Minutes of Work Breakdown Structure Meeting 
in Greensboro on Septem ber 24, 1969," 25 Septem ber 1969, Ballistic Missile 
Defense O rganization Files, Washington, D.C.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Safeguard Status of Funds Report
RCS SAFSM-8 (R-1), pp. 4-6.
^Ibid., p. 1.
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control over PEMA and MCA funds is more specific than with RDT&E funds. 
Individual tasks are capable of more explicit definition and may be subdivided 
into smaller and more precise tasks. The relationships between cost, schedule, 
and technical perform ance data  are  also more definitive than with development 
activ ity , due to  the higher degree of certain ty  associated with the production 
phase. The potential for downstream costs savings in the PEMA area  are high 
through cost reduction e ffo rt during volume production.
Assessment and Definition
At the  ta c t ic a l level, the primary mission associated with the 
Safeguard BMD system was separated  into four distinct activ ities: (1) execution 
of th e  approved procurem ent and production program^; (2) supervision of the 
activation program a t tac tica l s ites, including hardware installation and testing 
from the delivery of fac ilities  by th e  Corps of Engineers until acceptance of the 
operational s ite  by the  com bat user; (3) preparation for system  equipment 
logistic support to  include a National Inventory Control Point (NICP), National 
M aintenance Point (NMP), depots, and transportation control systems;^ and 
(4) design, construction, and acceptance of Safeguard tac tica l facilities.^
^U.S., Army Sentinel System Command, O rganization and Management 
Manual, p. 3.
^Ibid., p. 4.
^Alfred D. Starbird, L ieutenant General, USA, Sentinel System 
Manager, "Sentinel System Deployment Task Assignment - USAMC," le tte r  to 
Commanding General, U.S. Army M ateriel Command, 4 O ctober 1968, Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
^Alfred D. Starbird, Lieutenant General, USA, Sentinel System 
Manager, "Sentinel System Deployment Task Assignment - Chief of Engineers," 
le tte r  to  Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 4 O ctober 1968, Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization F iles, Washington, D.C.
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The task w ith respect to cost control was one of accomplishing mission 
within resources and on schedule. As a consequence, a situation sim ilar to  the 
RDT&E control problem existed for the  prime contracto r e ffo rt. The techniques 
and tools in use were adequate for control. They lacked only the inherent ability 
to re la te  directly  to comparable data from other sources. This was not viewed as 
an insurmountable problem. As previously indicated, it  was finally resolved, and 
the base da ta  gathered a t  the tac tica l level was fully in tegratab le  through the 
common struc tu re  of the WBS.
Interrogation and Identification
The gradual conversion of all major control documents to common 
definitions and work packages enhanced the  control of activ ity  a t  the tactical 
level and perm itted  fulfillm ent of s tra teg ic  reporting requirem ents. This 
conversion also dem onstrated the use of interdependencies in addition to  dollars. 
As an exam ple, it becam e evident tha t commonality between the system 
generation breakdown and the WBS would perm it cross reference between work 
packages and engineering drawing part numbers. This was a significant 
breakthrough for summation of costs. It also had im plications for integration of 
cost, schedule, and technical performance da ta .
Management Control Requirem ents
Analysis of the managem ent control requirem ents a t the  ta c tica l level 
revealed the same basic relationship to  the s tra teg ic  level as was noted in the 
two RDT&E cells.
Deployment Phase 
As with previous sections, the two cells discussed here are identical 
except for th e  level dimension. The first cell is the  cost param eter/deploym ent
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phase/stra teg ic  level cell, while th e  second Is the cost param eter/deploym ent 
ph ase /tac tica l level cell.
The cost param eter in the deployment phase is concerned with 
operating funds. These funds a re  provided under both the  Operation and 
M aintenance, Army (OMA) and the M ilitary Personnel, Army (MPA) fiscal 
appropriations.
The deploym ent phase is not normally under the  purview of the
program m anager. In the early planning for Safeguard deploym ent, the  program
m anager's d irect responsibility fo r a ta c t ic a l  site  was to  conclude with the
transfer of th a t s ite  to  the  U.S. Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), the
using elem ent of the Army.^ This relationship was changed in the 1974 BMD
reorganization, wherein the program m anager was assigned responsibility for
2
operation of the Safeguard ta c tica l fac ilities  in North D akota, subsequently 
designated the Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex.^
S trateg ic  Considerations 
The assignm ent of responsibility for operation of the Safeguard 
Complex was an atypical m anagem ent responsibility for a program m anager. It 
presented only a minor perturbation to the cost control situa tion , but no major 
increase in cost control situation com plexity. This minim ization of im pact was 
due to  a  number of reasons. F irs t, the program manager was responsible for
■ I
Resor, "System C harter: Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense System." 
2
Howard H. Callaway, Secretary  of the Army, "Program C harter: 
Ballistic Missile Defense Program," 20 May 1974, Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, General Orders No. 21 (Washington, 
D.C., 21 June 1974).
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operation of the s ite  during installation and te s t o f tac tica l equipm ent in 
preparation for ac tiv a tio n . During the  final stages of this period, th e  s ite  was 
operated as  a te s t  fac ility  in a  pseudo-tactical mode. The cost situation closely 
paralleled th a t of ta c tic a l operation. Second, the cost situation Involved in the 
operation of a ta c tic a l site is fairly  straightforw ard and relatively  sim ple. 
Requirem ents a re  well documented in Army Regulations. Finally, only one site 
was involved and the  period of deployment lasted  less than a year.
The fac t th a t  the s ite  achieved operational sta tus was significant from 
both a  technological and political viewpoint, but it had minimal significance, for 
purposes of this study, in term s of the  cost param eter.
Assessment and D efinition
By definition the OMA and MPA fiscal appropriations are associated 
with the deploym ent phase, but use of these appropriations is not lim ited solely 
to  this phase. Both appropriations may legitim ately be used a fte r  production has 
been in itia ted . As an example, OMA funds may be used for such activ ities as pay 
of civilian personnel, procurem ent of organizational equipm ent, and fo r the 
operation and m aintenance of organizational equipment and fac ilities. The MPA 
appropriation is used for pay, allowances, and subsistence of m ilitary personnel 
within program m anagem ent offices.^ As a consequence, the  cost control 
environm ent in the  Safeguard program had already encountered these  two 
appropriations.
The minor perturbation, referenced  earlier, involved the institu tion of 
Base O perations Accounts included in the OMA fiscal appropriation. These
1
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Financial A dm inistration; The Army 
M anagement S tructu re  iAMS), pp. 4-1, 5-1.
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accounts cover costs incurred for item s which become post, camp, and station 
property and would not normally be deployed with using units. ̂
The m anagem ent cost control system included provision for the OMA 
and MPA fiscal appropriations. It was expanded in coverage to encompass the 
funds associated with th e  deployment phase, including the Base Operations 
Accounts.
Interrogation and Identification
The addition of responsibility for the deploym ent phase presented no 
m ajor constrain ts, provided no added potential for PPL analysis m atrix  cell 
interdependencies, and added no distinguishing charac te ris tics  to the cost 
param eter.
M anagement C ontrol Requirem ents
The quantified standards used in the OMA and MPA fiscal appropria­
tions were notionally sim ilar to those established for the RDT&E fiscal 
appropriation. Planned and actual data were to be reported  at the summary 
ac tiv ity  account level (similar to the MCA fiscal appropriation), with totals 
summed to  the budget project account, budget program, and appropriation levels
by fiscal year. MPA planned and actual data  were to  be reported a t  the
2
appropriation level by fiscal year.
Control thresholds and to lerances for Safeguard reporting were
3
rem oved and did no t apply to  the deployment phase of Safeguard;
^Ibid., p. 5-4.
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Status of Funds Report RCS 
BMDPM-8 (R-5), Ballistic Missile Defense M aster Plan (BMDMP) P art No. 
2.06.02 (Revision 5) (Washington, D.C.; O ffice Chief of S ta ff, May 1976), pp. 4-5.
^Ibid.
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Reporting requirem ents were monthly, with the potential for special or 
exception reporting recognized.^
Tactical Considerations 
The cost param eter/deploym ent p h ase /tac tica l level cell in the  PPL 
analysis m atrix  did not add any additional considerations to  the cost control 
situation beyond those described for the s tra teg ic  level. The depth of detail 
required is  lower in the WBS, but solution of the  s tra teg ic  level cost problem 
inherently resolves the problem at the ta c tica l level. In essence, this cell did not 
m aterially  influence the cost control problem or its solution beyond tha t already 
defined. Further description of this cell would be redundant and has been 
excluded from th is study.
Termination Phase 
For purposes of defining the cost control problem through considera­
tion of the cost param eter, the  term ination phase is prim arily an extension of the 
deployment phase. The two major fiscal appropriations a re  OMA and MPA. The 
term ination phase adds no unique considerations or characteristics to  the cost 
control situation. Therefore, fu rther description of e ither cell would be 
redundant and has been excluded from this study.
Cost Control in Perspective 
The focus of cost control in program m anagem ent is financial 
m anagem ent. This re flec ts  a  shift from the h istorical emphasis on financial 
accounting to  a  broader perspective of the cost p a ram ete r as both an input 
resource and a significant param eter for controlling program perform ance.
^Ibid.
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The co st param eter dem onstrates an indirect sensitivity to  the life ­
cycle phases, but prim arily through th e  surrogate of fiscal appropriations. S ta ted  
d ifferently , close exam ination of th e  m anagement control requirem ents estab ­
lished for the cost param eter reveals tha t they w ere a rticu la ted  by fisca l 
appropriation and not by life-cycle phase. Examination fu rther reveals th a t 
fiscal appropriations a re  related  to lif e-cycle phases, but with some overlap. As 
a consequence, fiscal appropriations tend to  define their own particu lar 
functional phases in a  slightly different manner than the typical lif e-cycle  
phases. The prim ary exception to this analysis is the d irec t correlation of the 
RDT&E fiscal appropriation to the  RDT&E phase.
M anagement control requirem ents fo r the cost param eter at the 
stra teg ic  level, i t  would appear, should be derived independently of tactica l level 
requirem ents and should be derived f irs t. The concept of reporting increasingly 
higher level inform ation sum m arizations to increasingly higher level managers 
suggests th a t ta c tic a l level requirem ents specify a g rea ter depth of detail than  
stra teg ic  requirem ents. This means tha t each succeedingly higher echelon of 
m anagement receives an increasingly higher level of inform ation sum m arization. 
It also means th a t each level of summarization is supported by a  lower level of 
detail corresponding to the lower level of decision-making. In theory, then, the  




This chap ter is concerned with the schedule param eter of m anagem ent 
control. It begins with a  discussion of tim e both as a resource of program  
m anagem ent and as a  param eter of program perform ance m easurem ent. In 
short, the f irs t section delves into the nature of the schedule param eter. The 
next section pertains to those characteris tics  determ ined to  be common to all 
cells in the  schedule segm ent of the  PPL analysis m atrix  when examined. The 
next four sections are co rre la ted  to  the four phase dimensions of the PPL 
analysis m atrix. Each section is subdivided into the two decision-making levels. 
The concluding section of this chap ter is a  brief summary of the salient fea tu res 
of the schedule param eter.
Schedule Control Considerations 
Time has been defined by one authority as " ...a  resource in system s 
m anagem ent, to  be tre a ted  w ith indifference or used well like any o ther 
resource."^ It is also a  vehicle for measuring program perform ance. In these  two 
particulars tim e is sim ilar to  money, as discussed in the previous chapter. Time 
differs from money in th a t it is neither authorized nor appropriated by Congress.
Stanley Baum gartner, "Comment on the Value of Time and Its 




Time cannot be deposited in an account, nor can i t  be stored. It is budgeted and 
scheduled nonetheless, and it may be c ritica l in tim es of m ilitary  urgency. Time 
lim itations may also be imposed on program s much as dollar constraints are 
frequently  imposed.
The schedule philosophy underlying a  program plan may influence both 
cost and technical perform ance in e ither a  positive or a negative way. It is the 
in ten t of this section to  explore some of these  relationships in general and some 
of the  major considerations of schedule control in particular.
The N ature of Schedules 
In a broad sense, program schedules tend to re flec t e ither a cost 
emphasis or a tim e emphasis.  ̂ In the form er, acquisition costs a re  minimized 
and program phases are predom inately sequential with little  overlap. In the 
la tte r , program phases are overlapped and acquisition costs are  generally higher. 
Cost-em phasis schedules tend  to be associated with peacetim e conditions while 
tim e-em phasis schedules, w ith pressures for schedule compression and earliest 
possible deployments, tend to be associated with periods of national urgency such 
as the  Korean conflict, the  Vietnam hostilities, and putting man on the moon in 
the decade of the 1960s.
Definition and Description
Program schedules depict the tim e phasing of and interrelationships 
between the  numerous activ ities and events associated with accom plishm ent of 
program objectives. Development of in itia l program schedules is accomplished 
as a function of the  planning process of m anagem ent. S teiner specifies the
^Ibid., p. 56.
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tim e-rela tedness of the planning process in defining i t  as "...deciding in advance
what is to  be done, when it is to  be done, how it is to  be done, and who is to  do
it."^ Of specific in te re s t in this definition is the reference to  a  tim e elem ent or
schedule; i.e. "when it is to  be done." Baum gartner expresses the sam e tim e-
reiatedness asp ec t in describing a program plan as a w ritten  document
"...covering w hat is going to  be done, how, when, by whom, for how many dollars,
2
and w hat the m ajor foreseeable problems are and how they will be overcom e." 
Archibald also underscores the need for program schedules in his description of 
the  pro ject summary plan.^ The time-phased program plan, depicting summary 
and detailed schedules, is th e  primary ta rg e t of schedule control activ ity .
M artino defines a schedule as "...a calendar tim etab le  for allocating or 
com m itting resources to  project activ ities w ithin th e  lim its available."^ He 
fu rther suggests th a t the  primary purpose of scheduling "...is to com plete the 
pro ject in the best tim e and at the least cost."^ A num ber of conventional 
scheduling tools and techniques are in use today to  fa c ilita te  the scheduling 
process.^ Frequently , these  models not only provide the means for scheduling
^George A. Steiner, Top Management Planning (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), p. 7.
2
J . Stanley Baum gartner, P roject M anagem ent (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 17.
3
Russell D. Archibald, Managing High-Technology Program s and 
Pro jects (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp. 136-137.
^R. L . M artino, Applied Operational Planning, (Vol. II o f Project 
M anagement and Control) (New York: American M anagement Association, 1964), 
p. 17.
^Ibid.
^For a  rep resen tative sampling see: Chase and Aquilano, Production 
and Operations M anagement: A Life Cycle Approach, pp. 250-311, 502-33;
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program activ ity , but they also serve as the basis for perform ing the  schedule
control task . In a classic a rtic le  on the  interrelationships between planning and
control, Peirce captured the  essence of the thought in this manner:
In the  modern sense of an integrated planning and control system , 
then, planning refers to  the  construction of an operating program , 
comprehensive enough to  cover all phases of operations, and detailed  
enough th a t specific  a tten tion  may be given to  its fulfillm ent in 
controllable segm ents. It may th e re fo re  be re ite ra ted  th a t the 
planning^ process must be conducted in d irec t relation to  the  needs of 
control.
Thus, the  output of the planning process may serve not only as a plan of fu ture 
activ ities  sequenced over tim e, but also as the schedule control standard against 
which to  m easure progress. Conceptualized in th is m anner, the schedule plan 
typically is a  prime candidate for change when m anagerial control ac tiv ities  
d ic ta te  the need for rem edial action.
Concurrency
The topic of schedule concurrency has already been touched upon, but 
i t  requires am plification.
Schedule concurrency is defined as the  overlapping of the RDT&E 
phase and the production phase in the execution of a  program plan. The e ffe c t of 
concurrency is program schedule compression. The g rea ter the degree of 
concurrency and the tigh ter the schedule, the g rea ter the amount of overlap 
betw een the RDT&E and production phases. Conversely, the  sm aller the  degree
R. L. M artino, Allocating and Scheduling Resources, (Vol. Ill of Project Manage­
m ent and C ontrol) (New York: American Management Association, 1963);
Steiner, Top M anagement Planning, pp. 383-85; and Robert ] . Thierauf and 
Robert C. Klekamp, Decision Making Through Operations R esearch, 2d ed. (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975), pp. 120-53.
 ̂Jam es L. Peirce, "The Planning and Control Concept," C ontroller 22 
(September 1954): 403.
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of schedule concurrency and the more relaxed the schedule, the sm aller the 
am ount of phase overlap.
In essence, schedule concurrency is a  method for attem pting to  shorten 
the  tim e required to  put a new weapon system into operational use. It may also 
be the result of having deployment dates accelerated  by higher headquarters. 
Under this concept, volume production of the  weapon system  is initiated with a 
system design configuration not yet fully te sted  and prior to  completion of final 
design specifications. It should be noted th a t concurrency is a  m atter of degree, 
since some overlap between RDT&E and production alm ost invariably exists in 
weapon system acquisition.
Viewed from a cost perspective, excessive concurrency carries with it 
a  heavy premium. Extensive redesign of a  product a f te r  it is in volume 
production is a costly a ffa ir when it  im pacts production processes, procured 
vendor item s and parts, raw m aterials, tooling, and re tro fit of already produced 
item s.  ̂ From a technical perform ance standpoint, it may result in imbalance 
between subsystem developm ents, reduction in development testing and evalua­
tion , significant increase in the number of engineering design changes, and 
im pairm ent of required perform ance characteristics.
On the o ther side of the ledger, tim e-em phasis schedules may resu lt in 
earlier deployment with the combat user, earlie r "wring-out" of the new system 
by the user, reduced influence of inflation on program costs, and longer 
operational life prior to  obsolescence. In the  final analysis, the time-emphasis
^Baum gartner, "Comment on the Value of Time and Its E ffect on 
D efense Systems Acquisition," p. 34.
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tig h t schedule may yield g rea te r economic value through prolonged operational 
life.^
In the case of the original Sentinel program and the  early Safeguard 
program a second type of concurrency also existed; i.e ., a deployment 
concurrency. This form of concurrency involved the extensive overlap of site 
construction and installation activ ities a t the many sites originally planned for 
activation . Early planning called for simultaneous construction and installation 
ac tiv ity  a t  as many as four to  five sites. While i t  is d ifficu lt to  quantify the 
significance of this form of concurrency, some insight may be gained through 
realization  th a t each s ite  was to  be roughly equivalent to  a  fully self-sufficient 
Army installation.
Concurrency is generally regarded as a contributor to  cost overruns in
weapon system acquisition. During periods of cost-em phasis scheduling, which
autom atically deemphasize the tim e elem ent, concurrency is to  be avoided. It is
2
notionally justified only when the  need is urgent.
Scheduling Models
The accom plishm ent of program effo rt in large-scale , complex 
endeavors is frequently perform ed in blocks or groupings of activ ity  by multiple 
organizations. Specific blocks of e ffo rt a re  determ ined through system analysis 
to  arrive a t a  logical m anagem ent framework for program accom plishm ent. In 
the  case of Safeguard, the  blocks of e ffo rt were defined prim arily by the  work 
breakdown structu re  (WBS).
^Ibid., p. 56.
^U.5., Congress, Jo in t Economic C om m ittee, The Acquisition of 
Weapon Systems, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on Economy in Govern­
m ent, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, pp. 441, 446.
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Two basic scheduling models w ere used in defining Safeguard e ffo rt. 
They w ere the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) and milestone 
planning and control.
PERT^
The Safeguard PERT program was based on the fundam ental concept 
th a t WBS work packages specified for PERT planning and control could be 
subdivided into subtasks and increm ental activ ities as tim e-phased flow 
diagram s. Further, the Safeguard PERT program  thoroughly em braced the basic 
PERT prem ise of requiring clear delineation and identification of project 
m ilestones, events, activ ities, and constrain ts and their sequence and precedent 
in terrelationships.^
A major feature  of the Safeguard PERT application was its capability 
to  predict future schedule progress based on known sta tus. Through use of the 
PERT d a ta  base, it  was possible to  conduct trade off and schedule simulation
Introductory explanations of the  PERT concept may be found in: 
Evarts, Introduction to PERT; Joseph Horowitz, C ritical Path Scheduling: 
M anagem ent Control Through CPM and PERT (New York: Ronald Press, 1967); 
J . J . Moder and G. R. Phillips, Project M anagem ent with CPM and PERT (New 
York: Reinhold Publishing Corp., 1964); and D. C. Robertson, Project Planning 
and Control (Cleveland, Ohio: CRC Press, 1967). Summarized descriptions may 
be found in: Arch R. Dooley, "In terpreta tions of PERT," Harvard Business
Review 42 (March-April 1964): 160; R obert W. Miller, "How to  Plan and Control 
with PERT," Harvard Business Review 40 (March-April 1962): 93-104; and
P eter P. Schoderbek and Lester A. Digman, "Third G eneration PERT/LOB," 
H arvard Business Review 45 (Septem ber-O ctober 1967): 100-110. An Army view 
may be found in: U.S., Army M ateriel Command, Army Programs; Program
Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) AMC Pam phlet 11-6 (Washington, D.C., 
January 1972).
^U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Safeguard M anagement 
Inform ation System Schedule Control Manual (Huntsville, Alabama: M anagement 
D ata Systems O ffice, n. d.), p. 4-1.
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studies in order to  analyze a lternatives prior to  ac tu a l com m itm ents to  specific 
courses of action. ̂
2
Milestone Planning and Control
The m ilestone planning and control model provided for the  scheduling 
and control of specified program m ilestones. Milestones were both PERT 
supported and non-PERT supported. PERT supported milestones were significant 
events designated in the PERT networks for ex traord inary  management a tte n ­
tion . Non-PERT supported m ilestones were significant events th a t served as 
m anagem ent schedule control points, but were no t suitable for incorporation in 
PERT networks. Non-PERT supported m ilestones were typically sufficiently 
quantified to  fa c ilita te  determ ination of the degree to  which m ilestone 
requirem ents had been m et.^
In spite of the quantification of m ilestone requirem ents, non-PERT 
supported m ilestone data were more subjective than PERT schedule status 
because of the g rea te r depth of detailed  planning and managem ent discipline 
required by PERT. By comparison, the milestone planning and control technique 
was generally less definitive than the PERT and tended to  be operative at a 
higher level of sum m arization. In con trast, the  PERT program contained a 
w ealth of detail. It was used as a means of com m unicating detailed schedule 
inform ation. It also was capable of sum m arization to those milestones which it
^Ibid.
brief discussion on the  m ilestone concept and its relationship to  
o ther scheduling techniques may be found in; U .S., D epartm ent of the  Army, 
Work Scheduling Techniques, D epartm ent of th e  Army Pamphlet No. 1-54 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, M arch 1968).
^Ibid.
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supported, provided a reliable audit tra il for applicable schedule d a ta , and aided 
in determ ining interrelationships betw een m ilestones.
For control purposes, m ilestones contained only in th e  m ilestone 
planning and control model were m onitored only through tha t model. Milestones 
contained in the PERT model w ere monitored both in the PERT model and the 
m ilestone planning and control model. ̂
Schedule Plan Execution 
Execution of the schedule plan is in tegral to and a subset of program 
execution. The im plem entation of approved programs triggers the expenditure of 
funds for goods and services in accordance with program plans.
The execution of schedule plans encompasses many re la ted  activ ities 
such as plan base-lining, determ ination of c ritica l schedule paths, perform ance 
reporting and feedback, and review and analysis. All a re  essential to 
comprehensive schedule control activ ity .
Schedule Plan Base-lining
Following completion and approval of the schedule plan, it  is base- 
lined and controlled in much the sam e manner th a t technical docum entation is 
controlled through the configuration m anagem ent technique. This process 
insures th a t all proposed changes a re  properly coordinated, th a t only authorized 
changes are  incorporated into schedule plans, and th a t an adequate audit tra il is 
established and m aintained. The base-line schedule constitutes a re fe ren ce  point 
o f departure to which all changes and deviations m ust be specifically  re la ted .
^Ibid.
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Base-lining of costs and schedules is inherent in the planning, programming, 
budgeting system, but th e  prim ary emphasis is on the  cost aspects.
Concept of C ritical Paths
Identification of critical schedule paths in tim e-phased flow diagrams
is a  means of surfacing those program activ ities  tha t will most benefit from
intensified management.^ Simplistically, the  critical path in a schedule network
is the longest tim e path through the  network. Identification of the critical path,
2
or in some cases the tw o or th ree most c ritica l paths, perm it the manager to  
redistribute resources if  he is attem pting to  shorten lead tim e or simply monitor 
the pacing program activ ities  with g rea ter intensity . Since redistribution of 
resources to  reduce tim e in the critical path (to the point where it  ceases to  be 
the critical path) autom atically , if successful, raises a lim it path to  critical path, 
the system is dynamic. It should be noted th a t this concept identifies the most 
critical schedule path, not necessarily the m ost essential or complex program 
path.
Perform ance Reporting
Once schedules are  base-lined and implemented, they must be kept up 
to  date through perform ance reporting. This feedback is essential if schedule 
control is to  be e ffec tive .
An in teresting  a lternative  m ethod of allocating m anagem ent tim e
may be found in George B. Stanton, J r., "Put Your Time on the Winners,"
Industrial Engineering 9 (November 1977); 22-25.
2
Secondary and te rtia ry  paths a re  sometimes re ferred  to  as "limit
paths" signifying th a t they  are significant bu t less c ritica l than "the critical
path."
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Schedule perform ance inputs should re fle c t sufficien t depth to  insure 
c lear understanding of all perform ance data and proposed changes. As a 
minimum, schedule perform ance data should include:
1. A dded/revised/deleted ac tiv ities/even ts  in the  network.
2. Changes in a c tiv ity /ev en t sequence occurring during the reporting
period.
3. Actual completion dates occurring during the reporting period.
4. Schedule date changes.
5. Forecast completion dates.
6. Activity tim e estim ate  changes for in-process or fu tu re  activ ities.
7. Degree to which quantified  requirem ents for completion of mile­
stones w ere accomplished during the  reporting period.
8. N arrative assessm ents and justifications.
Specific reporting requirem ents will vary with the peculiarities of the program, 
but the thrust is free and full disclosure of all relevant information.
Review and Analysis
Review and analysis ac tiv ity  applied to schedule control is generally 
focused on independent assessm ent of the  basic m anagem ent and technical logic 
underlying the base-line schedule and proposed changes to the  base line. 
Specifically, this aspect of the review and analysis work might concen trate  on 
validation of the priority sequencing of schedule events and activ ities and the 
associated  tim e factors. This e ffo rt would also seek to  identify errors of 
omission in the logic p a tte rn . D iscovery of such errors, if any exist, tends to 
elim inate or minimize the im pact of program  voids or stoppages caused by such 
omissions.
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Interfaces between blocks of e ffo rt or activ ity  representing organiza­
tional in terfaces and shared responsibility would also be prim e candidates for 
independent assessm ent. The prime concern here would be reverification  th a t 
in terfaces were fully defined not only as to  m anagement and technical logic, but 
in term s of the tem poral reference as well.
Finally, the  review and analysis activ ity  might be prudently applied to 
the non-PERT supported m ilestones. H ere the logic is norm ally m ore subjective 
and less well defined than with PERT supported m ilestones. The in te rre la tion ­
ships between activ ities may not be indicated , and m ilestones do not provide a 
detailed framework for allocation of resources.^
Schedule P aram eter Analysis Overview
The schedule param eter of the  PPL analysis m atrix  is structured 
identically to  the  cost param eter. It contains the following e igh t individual cells;
1. RDT&E Phase/S trategic Level
2. RDT&E Phase/T actical Level
3. Production Phase/S trategic Level
4. Production Phase/Tactical Level
5. Deployment Phase/S trategic Level
6. Deployment Phase/T actical Level
7. Termination Phase/S trateg ic Level
8. Termination Phase/T actical Level
As was found in the cost exam ination, all cells in the  schedule segm ent of the 
PPL analysis m atrix displayed common characteristics when analyzed. These
^Steiner, Top M anagement Planning, p. 384.
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common tra its  are  discussed fo r the to ta i param eter in term s of the assessment 
and definition fac to rs  and the interrogation and identification c rite ria .
Assessment and Definition 
The program schedule and the schedule control param eter are directly 
influenced by tim e-em phasis considerations th a t s tress  the tem poral reference. 
Cost-em phasis and technical perform ance-em phasis considerations, on the other 
hand, influence program schedule and schedule control in a  more subtle or 
indirect manner. With tim e emphasis, the schedule control param eter Is 
norm ally highlighted due to  the  d irect emphasis on schedule. When either of the  
o th er two param eters is emphasized, schedule is driven by cost or technical 
perform ance factors, but schedule control may s till be accen tuated  due to its 
im portance in helping control th e  other two param eters. As a  consequence, the 
schedule control param eter tends to  retain a high degree of im portance to 
program management Irrespective of the central th ru s t of program emphasis.
In general. Congressional in terest in the an tiballistic  missile (ABM) 
program centered on the basic validity of deployment prior to  the deployment 
decision and on the scope of th e  program following the  decision. The political 
influence emanating from this in terest took form in the authorization and 
appropriation of fiscal resources. While Congressional support existed, fiscal 
resources flowed into the program. As tha t support faded, so did the  resource 
allocations. The deployment schedule was not of d irect concern, and the 
schedule control param eter was influenced little  by th e  political environment.
This same basic conclusion is true also of national economic and public 
opinion influences. Both found expression ultim ately in the allocation of fiscal 
resources to the program ra ther than through schedule constrain ts.
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The technology fa c to r was the only m ajor external influence th a t 
directly  a ffec ted  the schedule control param eter. The RDT&E activ ity  
represented an extraordinarily high level of technological complexity and was 
nonrepetitive in nature. These tw o factors alone suggested some form of Line of 
Balance technique such as PERT as a  logical cand idate  for consideration as the  
principal schedule control technique. Additionally, the production program , 
involving construction of a num ber of in trica te  struc tu res, also seemed to 
suggest PERT as a schedule control tool.
The internal environm ent had an im pact as well on the schedule 
control param eter. D epartm ent of the  Army m anagem ent doctrine was not as 
concise regarding schedule control as it was concerning cost control. This 
m eant, therefore , th a t schedule control requirem ents were more flexible than 
cost control requirements and p erm itted  the program manager g rea ter la titude in 
establishing his requirem ents. It also meant, however, th a t there  was less 
existing uniformity in the ongoing schedule control systems operating generally 
within o ther government agencies and m ilitary/aerospace industrial firm s.
The introduction of the  Cost/Schedule Control Systems C rite ria  
(C/SCSC)^ into the Safeguard program in the  early  1970s signaled a new 
in itia tive  tow ard a tta inm ent of consistency in cost and schedule perform ance 
m easurem ent by major con tractors. Introduction of C/SCSC did not cause any 
m ajor changes in the schedule con tro l param eter. It did serve to  provide g rea te r 
confidence in the fidelity of c o s t and schedule perform ance data reported by 
validated contractors.
brief, au thorita tive  description of C/SCSC may be found in
3. Stanley Baum gartner, "C/SCSC Alive and Well," Defense Management Journal 
10 (April 1974); 32-35.
2 4 8
From the outset, the program m anager expressed his preference for 
hierarchic milestones as the prim ary schedule control tool.^ Milestones reported
to  and monitored by the program manager constitu ted  the approved schedule
2
base line. The concept envisioned th a t the milestones reported to  the program 
manager would be supported by m ore detailed schedule d a ta  a t  succeedingly 
lower levels in the chain of command.^ Concisely s ta ted , the  objective and 
scope of the schedule control action was to  control the  tem poral elem ent of 
program activ ities, events, and m ilestones in all phases of the Safeguard program 
life  cycle.
Analysis of the key fac to rs  contributing to  definition of the type of 
required control action revealed sim ilarities to the companion analysis for the 
cost param eter. The analysis also resulted in a reasonably definitive profile of 
the  type of schedule control action required. F irst, all participating government 
agencies and weapon system con tracto rs were required to  report schedule 
perform ance and change data to  the program m anager. Second, the schedule 
perform ance data were used to: (1) maintain the schedule data  base, (2) prepare 
required higher headquarters reports and schedule perform ance inputs, (3) perm it 
the  program manager to m onitor pertinent milestones, (4) fac ilita te  the effec tive  
allocation of all program resources, and (5) fac ilita te  the establishm ent and 
m aintenance of program and organizational interrelationships. Third, schedule
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Sentinel System Control and 
Reporting, Sentinel System M aster Plan (SSiMP), P art No. 2.06 (Washington, D.C.: 
Office Chief of S taff, 1 August 1968), p. 1.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Milestone Report RCS SAFSM-3, 
Safeguard System M aster Plan (SSMP), P art 2.06.01, Revision 1 (Washington, 
D.C.: Office Chief of Staff: 23 June 1969), p. I.
^U.S., D epartm ent o f the  Army, Sentinel System Control and
Reporting, p. 1.
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perform ance data were required from all organizations using Safeguard funds. 
Fourth, the control situation  was simultaneously nonrepetitive and repetitive . 
The RDT&E activ ity  was nonrepetitive and marked by a  high degree of complex 
interrelationships. The hardw are fabrication elem ent of the production program 
was predom inately rep e titiv e , while the  missile s ite  construction activity  was 
nonrepetitive. These concurrent ye t d ifferen t situations suggested the use of 
several schedule control tools and techniques. F ifth , as with cost control, 
proactive control was required in the  schedule param eter as well.
Sixth, the schedule param eter is an excellen t predictive device or 
early  warning indicator. In a tim e-em phasis environm ent, schedule is its  own 
indicator. In a cost-em phasis environment, negative schedule variances tend to 
indicate poor planning, tru e  schedule slippage, or a com bination of both. Ail 
th ree conditions im pact costs adversely and drive them  up. Negative schedule 
variance trends typically surface in perform ance d a ta  before negative cost 
trends appear. In a technical perform ance-em phasis environment, schedule 
variance tends to  lag technical perform ance variance, but i t  is frequently easier 
to  assess. As a  consequence, schedule variance is m ore visible. Seventh, the 
schedule control situation did not require one hundred percent m easurem ent or 
tracking. In some instances, tracking of m ilestones alone was sufficient. 
Finally, tim eliness of reporting and age of perform ance data were two highly 
significant fac to rs in defining the schedule control situation . This assessment 
was identical to  tha t for th e  cost param eter.
Interrogation and Identification
The in terrogation and identification aspect of the examination 
considerations, it wiil be rem em bered, is concerned with defining the constraints.
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la ten t in terdependencies, and characteristics of the control problem. Here 
again, th e re  was a  degree of commonality between the cost and schedule 
param eters.
Timeliness of reporting and currency of perform ance data  reported 
was a m ajor constrain t in the  schedule param eter. P articu larly  during the 
original Sentinel program , the high degree of deploym ent concurrency made 
tim ely reporting of schedule performance and proposed changes absolutely 
essential. Reductions in the  degree of deployment concurrency brought about by 
Safeguard planning and the  final reduction of e ffo rt to  one s ite  greatly 
am eliorated  this co nstra in t in the schedule param eter.
A ffordability of the  schedule control system was questioned in inverse 
relationship to  increm ental reductions in the program . As the  program was 
phased down to  u ltim ate  term ination , the need for a large-scale  schedule control 
system also diminished, and the cost of the system  as a function of its u tility  
rose to a  point w here i t  becam e cost prohibitive. At th a t point the en tire  
m anagem ent control system  was reduced in scope, the dedicated au tom atic  data- 
processing equipm ent released, and dedicated schedule control personnel 
reassigned.
A clearly  meaningful integrative linkage in the schedule param eter is 
the common denom inator of tim e as a reference of m easurem ent. Normally, in a 
large-scale project, th e  common unit of measure is "work days," but "calendar 
days" are also used as a  re ference . This basic unit may be expanded into weeks, 
months, or years. It may also be subdivided into shifts and hours. The basic units 
of m easurem ent and reporting and proper conversion fac to rs  are typically 
specified in the  schedule control plan. Schedule may also be converted to  dollars
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ra th e r easily, thus perm itting  both schedule and cost status and variances from
plan to be measured in a  common reference of dollars.^
An unchanging charac te ris tic  of tim e is its  finitude. The amount of
calendar tim e is finite and inflexible and can be neither expanded nor contracted.
The e ffec t of this characteris tic  on activ ity  schedule may be a ltered , however,
through the  tim e-cost function. In its sim plest form , the tim e-cost function
assumes th a t cost and tim e in a large-scale endeavor a re  re la ted  inversely and
2
linearly, although other relationships may be determ ined or assumed.
The common charac te ris tics  of the schedule param eter resulting from 
an across-the-board exam ination of the  assessm ent and definition factors and the 
in terrogation and identification c rite ria  are  sum m arized in Table 3.
RDT&E Phase
This section o f this chap ter contains the f irs t analysis of individual 
cells in the schedule param eter. Two cells in the  PPL analysis m atrix  are 
analyzed in this section. Two each a re  analyzed in the  next th ree  sections for a 
to ta l of eight cell analyses in this chapter.
The two cells examined in this section share the common phase 
dimension of RDT&E, but are d ifferen tia ted  by the level dimension. The first 
cell is defined by the s tra teg ic  level; the second by the tac tica l level.
This is the basic premise upon which the DoD Cost/Schedule Control 
System is built. Schedule is converted to and expressed in dollars through means
of a tim e-phased budget plan reflecting  the budgeted cost of work scheduled.
2
J . N. Holtz, An Analysis of Major Scheduling Techniques in the 
Defense Systems Environment, Memorandum RM-4697-PR (Santa Monica,
C alifornia: Rand Corporation, O ctober 1966), p. 42.
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TABLE 3
EXAMINATION RESULTS COMMON TO ALL PPL ANALYSIS MATRIX CELLS 
IN THE SCHEDULE PARAMETER
E X A M I N A T I O N  
C O N S I O E R A T I  O N S




EXOGENOUS P O L I T I C A L  _  C O N G R E S S I O N A L  I N T E R E S T  R E L A T E D  T O  C O S T  
E C O N O M I C  -  C O S T  A F F O R D A B I L I T Y  I N F L U E N C E D  S C H E D U L E S  
P U B L I C  O P I N I O N  -  R E L A T E D  P R I M A R I L Y  T O  C O S T
T E C H N O L O G Y -  H I G H  L E V E L  O F  T E C H N O L O G I C A L  C O M P L E X I T Y ;  









I NTEPDEPENDENCI ES 
CHARACTER! STICS
E X I S T I N G  U . S .  A R M Y  M A N A G E M E N T  D O C T R I N E  _  L E S S  
S T R U C T U R E D  T H A N  C O S T ;  L E S S  D E T A I L  R E Q U I R E D
O T H E R  G O V E R N M E N T  A G E N C I E S  _  U N S T R U C T U R E D
P A R T I C I P A T I N G  C O N T R A C T O R S  -  U N S T R U C T U R E D  B U T
D I S C I P L I N E D ;  F A M I L I A R  W I T H  U . S .  A R M Y  R E Q U I R E M E N T S
M A N A G E M E N T  P H I L O S O P H Y  O F  P R O G R A M  M A N A G E R  _
Dl  S C I  P L I N E D
C O N T R O L  T H E  T E M P O R A L  E L E M E N T  O F  P R O G R A M  A C T I V I T I E S ,  
E V E N T S ,  A ND M I L E S T O N E S  I N  A L L  P H A S E S  O F  T H E  L I F E  
C Y C L E
A L L  P A R T I C I P A N T S  M U S T  R E P O R T  S C H E D U L E  I N F O R M A T I O N  
I N F O R M A T I O N  U S E D  T O  C O N T R O L  S C H E D U L E S  
I N P U T  D A T A  F R O M  P A R T I C I P A N T S  I N  R E Q U I R E D  F O R M A T  A N D  
ON S P E C I F I E D  T I M E S  
C O N T R O L  S I T U A T I O N  C O N T A I N S  B O T H  N O N R E P E T I T I V E  A N D  
R E P E T I V E  E L E M E N T S  
P R O A C T I V E  C O N T R O L  R E Q U I R E D  
D A T U M  E X C E L L E N T  P R E D I C T I V E  D E V I C E  
100 P E R C E N T  M E A S U R E M E N T  N O T  R E Q U I R E D  
T I M E L I N E S S  O F  R E P O R T I N G  I M P O R T A N T
T I M E L I N E S S  O F  R E P O R T I N G  
D A Y S  A S  C OMMON D E N O M I N A T O R
F I N I T U D E  O F  T I M E
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S trateg ic Considerations 
The RDT&E phase of the Safeguard program was a technical 
perform ance-em phasis program . The program m anager m onitored schedule 
perform ance a t  the  s tra teg ic  level on the basis of accom plishm ent, slip, or 
change of significant m ilestones in the RDT&E program . His initiatives 
regarding management of the RDT&E program w ere driven both by his 
responsibility for m anagem ent o f the program and the  pressures of regulatory 
influences external to  th e  project. The major cause for concern in the RDT&E 
phase was the prime developm ent contractor. The con tracto r's  technical 
capability was not a t issue. The concern cen tered  on the contractor's
management philosophy.
Assessment and Definition
The use of PERT for schedule control was a con tractual requirem ent 
with the prime developm ent contractor prior to  the production and deployment 
decision.^ The utility  and true effectiveness of the PERT application in the 
RDT&E program was under scrutiny at the tim e, however, and the assessment 
of PERT utility continued for more than two years following the production and 
deployment decision.^
^For a brief description of initial e ffo rts, see R . L. Bryant, "PERT in 
the Nike-Zeus," A erospace Management 6 (January 1963): 20-24.
2
U.S., Army Sentinel System Command, Recom m endations for Sentinel 
Schedule Control, by J. A. Mullin, Interim Report SENSCOM-29160-1 (Huntsville, 
Alabama: Brown Engineering Company, Inc., February 1968), pp. 1-3.
^Approval to delete PERT from the developm ent con tract was 
contained in George Mayo, Jr., Brigadier General, USA, Deputy Safeguard 
System Manager, "Use of PERT in the Safeguard Developm ent Program," le tte r 
to  Commanding General, U.S. Army Safeguard System Command, 12 May 1970, 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
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The PERT e ffo rt was neither productive nor e ffec tive  in the RDT&E 
program for a  number of reasons.  ̂ F irst, the prime developm ent contractor 
never used the PERT system  imposed by the  Army for in ternal control. Second, 
even though the prim e developm ent con tractor imposed a similar PERT 
requirem ent on its  principal subcontractors, it was not successfully used across 
the board a t th a t level e ither. Third, the prime developm ent contractor 
consistently subm itted con tractually  required PERT reports to  the Army la ter 
than required. Fourth, the  reports frequently contained numerous errors and 
discrepancies. F ifth , the  methodology used precluded determ ination o f predicted 
progress in comparison to  established schedules. Finally, e ffo rts  by th e  Army to 
correct the  situation had m et with only m ediocre success. In short, the PERT 
system was being used principally to  record historical data  ra ther than to manage 
the RDT&E program . M anagement and technical personnel both within the Army 
and within the developm ent-contractor struc tu re  were using in ternal schedule 
control system s to manage the program at the tac tica l level.
At the  s tra teg ic  level, the  issue tended to cen ter on the fidelity of the 
milestone data being reported , the  use of the  Safeguard P ro jec t Summary Work 
Breakdown S tructure (WBS) as a common reference, and the  use of standardized 
perform ance reports to  perm it correlation and comparison of interfunctional
Reasons c ited  sum m arized from U.S., Army Sentinel System 
Command, Recommendations for Sentinel Schedule C ontrol, pp. 6-7, 24-25; 
W. O. Turney, C ontracting O fficer, "R&D PERT Report," le tte r  to  Western 
E lectric Company, 8 O ctober 1968; R. C. Marshall, Brigadier General, USA, 
Commanding G eneral, U.S. Army Safeguard System Command, "Use o f PERT in 
the Safeguard Development Program , le tte r  to Safeguard System Manager, 22 
April 1970; and M anagement D ata Systems O ffice, "Schedule Control System for 
the Development Program ," Disposition Form for Research, Development, Test, 
and Evaluation D irec to ra te , i7  June i970. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
Files, Washington, D.C.
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data .^  The change in emphasis by DoD from requiring specified m anagem ent 
system s to  requiring compliance with control systems crite ria  occasioned by the 
im plem entation of C/SCSC perm itted  the  program m anager to  shift his focus 
from  PERT itse lf  to  the  broader arena of schedule control technique. This 
tended to  ease the specificity  of Army m anagem ent doctrine, thus opening up 
new a lte rnatives to  the  program m anager for resolution of the  RDT&E phase 
schedule control issue.
Interrogation and Identification
The problems associated with schedule control in the prime develop­
m ent co n trac to r s tru c tu re  contributed to  th e  constrain ts  and lim itations 
previously described for the  cost param eter by hampering the  ability to  perform 
cost and schedule trad e-o ffs . The problems also created direct schedule control 
constrain ts. C orrelation  of RDT&E phase schedule data  to  the common WBS was 
difficu lt, determ ination of in terfaces and interrelationships was complex, and 
in tegration  of RDT&E phase schedule da ta  with schedule da ta  of o ther phases 
was inaccurate  a t  o ther than summary level.
The issues involved in the  problem were sym ptom atic of the same 
m anagem ent philosophy th a t contributed to the  cost situation. The prime 
developm ent co n trac to r took a firm  position th a t the  system of controls in use 
had evolved w ith  the  RDT&E program over a te n  year period, th a t the  system 
was consistent with the  needs of the Army and the Increasing scof>e of the prime 
developm ent co n trac to r 's  responsibilities, and th a t it was effic ien t and functional
^Mayo, "Use of PERT in th e  Safeguard Development Program," le tte r , 
12 May 1970.
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w ithout being excessively burdensome.^ These basic argum ents applied to both 
the  cost and the schedule control system s.
The prime developm ent contracto r's  lack of dem onstrated sensitivity 
to  the  broader needs of the  Army was a reflection  of the  perspective with which 
the RDT&E phase was viewed by many directly associated with it . This view, in 
its  most sim plistic form , suggested th a t the  RDT&E phase was essentially an end 
in itse lf. Given this view, a larger need to  in tegra te  RDT&E schedule data into 
production and deploym ent phase da ta  assumed secondary im portance.
M anagement Control Requirem ents
The conclusion th a t PERT was m ore a symbol than a reality  ultim ately
resulted  in its  deletion as a requirem ent in the prime contract. The program
manager's concurrent a ttem p ts  to  im plem ent C/SCSC in the prime development
co n trac t m et with less than full compliance. An analysis of the  prime
developm ent contractor's  control system revealed th a t full im plem entation of
2
C/SCSC would be "...costly , disruptive, and require considerable negotiation." 
The Army im plem entation of th e  DoD requirem ent^ recognized that a 
con tractor's  financial and schedule control system might have been previousiy
B. McMillan, Vice President, Bell Laboratories, "Safeguard R&D 
C ontract DAHC60-7l-C-0005," le tte r  to  Brigadier Générai R. C . Marshali, 
21 January 1971, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
^R. C. Marshall, Brigadier General, USA, Commanding, U.S. Army 
Safeguard System Command, "Lim ited Application of DODI 7000.2, Perform ance 
M easurement (PM), to  Produced WECo'/BTL R&D C ontract, DAHC60-7 l-C - 
0005," le tte r  to  Safeguard System Manager, 11 June 1970, Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization Files, Washington, D.C.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Perform ance M easurem ent 
Cost/Schedule Control Systems C rite ria  (Implementation Guide), D epartm ent of 
the  Army Pam phlet No. 37-2 (Washington, D.C., February 1970).
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accepted by the government under d ifferen t c rite ria . As a  consequence, the 
im plem enting instructions were conditioned w ith respect to ongoing contracts 
and only required compliance "insofar as possible." Due to the  potential 
disruption to  the  RDT&E program tha t might have been occasioned by full 
im plem entation of C/SCSC and a conviction by the program manager th a t the 
intended purpose of the requirem ent could be achieved by a lternative  actions, he 
ultim ately authorized lim ited application of C/SCSC to  the ongoing prime 
developm ent contract.^
The program m anager used base-lined m ilestones as the prim ary 
quantified standard in schedule control. The milestones were, in general, a t  a 
summary level in program activ ity  and it was anticipated th a t additional, more 
detailed, milestones would be m aintained by participating agencies and their 
contractors. The milestones were established by the program m anager. Planned 
dates for accomplishment w ere base-lined by the program manager as they were 
established.^
Milestones were established in term s of a hierarchic arrangem ent 
defined in descending order of importance as follows:
1. Key Milestones—any m ilestone designated by the program manager 
as being under his control.
2. Major M ilestone—any m ilestone identified by the program manager 
as requiring intensified m anagem ent and control by an agency commander.
^Starbird, "Management of the Safeguard Development E ffort," le tte r , 
19 October 1970.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Milestone R eport RCS SAFSM-3, 
Safeguard System M aster Plan (SSMP) P art No. 2.06.01, Revision No. 1 
(Washington, D.C.; Office C hief of S taff, 23 June 1969), p. 1.
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3. Supporting Milestones—any m ilestone established by an agency 
commander w ith performance data provided to  the program manager.
4. Minor M ilestones—any m ilestone established by an agency com­
mander or his representative for tactica l con tro l. These could be reported to  the 
program m anager, if desired, by the agency commander.
The firs t th re e  levels of milestones could also be fu rther identified, when
applicable, as in terface  milestones.^ In terface milestones w ere defined as those
milestones th a t ,  upon completion, resulted in transfer of further action to 
2
another agency.
The milestone levels, by definition, also defined the control thresholds 
and to lerances. As an example, only the program manager could establish or 
change a  key m ilestone. In Interaction with a  corollary tim e-oriented hierarchy, 
the milestones also formed the foundation for em ergency reporting requirem ents 
for accom plishm ent of and changes or proposed changes to specified milestones. 
Safeguard Emergency Action Reports (SEAR’s) were used for this exception 
reporting and were required to  be subm itted within 48 hours of key milestone 
accom plishm ent or determ ination of out-of-to lerance milestone condition.^ 
Control thresholds and requirem ents for exception reporting are depicted in
Îbid.
2
For an interesting discussion on m anagem ent of in terfaces between 
major partic ipants in a  complex endeavor see John M. Schm issrauter, "Interface 
Management o f Aerospace Systems," in The Management of Aerospace Program s, 
ed. by W alter L. Johnson (Washington, D.C.: American A stronautical Society,
1967), pp. 261-85.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Milestone R eport RCS SAFSM-3,
pp. 2-4.
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Table 4. Routine monthly reporting was required for all key and major 
m ilestones as a minimum.^
T actical Considerations 
T actical considerations centered  on the need for sufficient schedule 
perform ance da ta  with which to  (!) manage the  RDT&E program, (2) perform 
meaningful trade-o ffs analyses between schedule and cost, and (3) determ ine 
sequence and precedent in terrelationships between even ts. Companion to the 
need for da ta  was the  requirem ent to  im plem ent PERT, followed by a shift to  
C/SCSC, with the  prime developm ent contractor and PERT with the partici­
pating governm ent agencies.
Assessment and D efinition
The prime mission for schedule control a t the  tac tica l level was 
analogous to  th a t for cost control. The system in use, as it  re la ted  solely to  
m anagem ent of the  prime developm ent con tracto r, had historical precedence and 
accep tance , was viewed by ta c tica l managers as consistent with the general 
ta c tica l m anagem ent philosophy, and i t  m aintained th e  status quo of the 
m anagem ent situation . Requirem ents to  in teg ra te  schedule data  from the 
RDT&E phase with schedule data  from other phases were viewed as secondary to  
managing the  RDT&E phase by RDT&E tac tica l managers.
It is in teresting  to  note th a t the direction by th e  program manager to  
im plem ent PERT and subsequently C/SCSC in the prime development con tract 
was aimed a t upgrading both s tra teg ic  and ta c tica l level schedule control. A 
g rea t deal of e ffo rt was expended a t the tac tica l level in this regard, with little
^Ibid., p. 3.
TABLE 4
ESTABLISHMENT, CONTROL, AND EMERGENCY REPORTING CRITERIA 
FOR SAFEGUARD MILESTONES °
T Y P E  m i l e s t o n e EST A B L ISH E D  BY CHANGE A P P R O V A L EMERGENCY R E PO R T IN G
KEY PROGRAM MANAGER PROGRAM MANAGER ACCOMPLISHMENT OR ±  TH REE DAYS OR 
MORE FORECAST CHANGE
MAJOR PROGRAM MANAGER AGENCY COMMANDER FIFTEEN DAYS OR MORE DELAY
SUPPORTING AGENCY COMMANDER — SIXTY DAYS OR MORE DELAY
MINOR — — NONE
SO URCE, U S..  D E P A R T M E N T  O F THE ARMY, M ILESTONE R E P O R T  (RCS S A F S M -3 ) .  SA FE G U A R D  SYSTEM MASTER PL A N  (SSMP) 
P A R T  NO. 2 .0 6 .0 1 .  (R E V  1) (WASHINGTON, D .C .i  O F F I C E  C H IE F  O F S T A F F ,  23 JU N E  1969), P .  4 .
CHANGED TO 10 DAYS IN DEC EM B ER  1970 .
CHA NGED TO 30 DAYS IN DECEM BER 1970 .
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actual success. During the  en tire  period th a t this e ffo r t was underway, the 
method of m anagem ent a t the  ta c tic a l level did not change m aterially .
The situation  with regard to  participating governm ent agencies was 
generally d ifferen t. A separa te  technical specification for participating 
government agencies  ̂ was prepared" and im plem ented. It defined procedures for 
the  preparation, updating, and submission of schedule control data  in full 
accordance with th e  requirem ents specified by the program  m anager. Compli­
ance with the technical specification by the participating governm ent agencies 
fulfilled requirem ents for perform ance reporting to  the program  m anager at the 
s tra teg ic  level and for the proper degree of control by th e  appropriate agency 
commanders a t the  tac tica l level. The participating governm ent agencies 
complied satisfacto rily  with the schedule control requirem ents.
Interrogation and Identification
One of the major benefits of using PERT a t the ta c tica l level was that 
i t  fac ilita ted  developm ent of in terface  definitions. The PERT network logic 
formed the foundation for determ ination of interrelationships and the identifi­
cation of the techniques of integration. PERT was also a  communication link 
between participants. All perform ance data were subm itted to  a central point 
where networks w ere updated and distributed to the participants. Each 
partic ipant was furnished his own updated netw ork as well as updated in terface 
d a ta  of other agencies. The networks applied not only to  th e  RDT&E phase, but 
to  the production phase as well. As a  consequence, PERT provided a vital link
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Schedule Control 
Requirem ents for Safeguard Government Participating A gencies, SAFSCOM 
Technical Specification Number 715-51 (Huntsville, Alabama, 2 September 1969).
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between agencies within a life-cycle phase and between agencies in different 
life-cycie phases. The quality and lim itations of PERT data  in the development 
con tracto r s tru c tu re  severely restric ted  its  usefulness as e ither an integration or 
communication link in the program. It also ham pered to ta l system schedule 
review and analysis activ ity .
M anagement Control Requirem ents
Tactical m anagers tended to  m onitor the  RDT&E schedule a t the 
major m ilestone level. Milestones a t the supporting level were monitored when 
they w ere also in te rface  m ilestones. Submission of SEAR's to the  program 
manager also provided a built-in exception reporting system a t the tac tica l level. 
Typically, SEAR's had to  be authenticated  by the agency commander. The 
coordination required prior to  his authentication normally assured careful and 
comprehensive analysis of the fac ts . Since SEAR's required follow-up reports 
within ten  days,  ̂ they normally became m anagem ent a tten tion  item s until 
resolved.
Production Phase
The analysis now shifts from the RDT&E to  the production phase. The 
two cells discussed in this section are d ifferen tia ted  only by the level dimension. 
The firs t portion of the analysis is focused on s tra teg ic  considerations while the 
second portion concerns tac tica l considerations.
S trategic Considerations 
A t the ou tset, the production program was a tim e-em phasis program. 
As the number of planned sites diminished, the im portance of cost increasingly
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, M ilestone Report RCS SAFSM-3, p. 4.
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overshadowed the tim e elem ent, and th e  production e ffo rt gradually became a 
cost-em phasis program.
Assessment and Definition
The external and internal influences affecting the production phase 
were sim ilar to those affecting th e  RDT&E phase. Initial e ffo rts , by the program 
manager, were d irected  a t  im plem enting PERT In the prime production 
con tracto r structu re . Participating government agencies involved in the  RDT&E 
phase also Implemented PERT In the production phase. Government agencies 
participating primarily in the production phase implemented the PERT require­
ment without difficulty.
The two m ajor elem ents of production presented d ifferen t control 
situations. The construction activ ity  of the  s ite  activation e ffo rt was a natural 
candidate for PERT while the  rep e titiv e  aspects of hardw are fabrication were 
not so natural. To support the  s ite  activation  networks, however, the production 
contractors and participating governm ent agencies w ere required to  develop 
PERT networks. Production networks reflected  key activ ities and events 
supporting interface points. PERT was not applied to the "level of effo rt" tasks 
of production such as Value Engineering, Quality Assurance, and System 
Engineering.
PERT continued throughout the  production program as the vehicle for 
in terfacing hardware, construction, installation  and te s t ,  and allied support 
activ ities. It was supplemented and finally replaced by Line of Balance control 
systems In the hardware production a rea  as th a t activ ity  m atured and became 
more repetitive  in nature.
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Interrogation and Identification
The widespread use and accep tance  of PERT in the production phase 
provided a linkage of interdependencies throughout the  to ta i dimension of the 
hardw are fabrication and s ite  activation  activ ity . U tilizing the program work 
breakdown struc tu re  as its  foundation, the  PERT networks provided an audit tra il 
and depth of detail sufficient to  support the  milestones reported to the program 
m anager. Assessment of the  fide lity  of the milestones was relatively  
straightforw ard.
M anagement Control Requirem ents
The program m anager utilized the same concept of base-lined 
m ilestones used in the RDT&E phase for control of th e  production phase. 
M ilestone definitions were the  sam e. Hardware fabrication milestones were 
defined by major item  of equipm ent. Site activation milestones stressed site 
construction, equipment installation and te s t, and on-site training. The 
m ilestones identified were common to each site  and were to  be reported for each 
site.^
The concept of m anagem ent thresholds and tolerances defined above 
for the  RDT&E phase was also applied to  the production phase. Reporting 
requirem ents were sim ilarly imposed w ithout change.
T actical Considerations 
At this level inform ation was required to  develop and im plem ent 
schedule plans and to  monitor perform ance against those plans. Milestones were 
m onitored down to the major m ilestone level, in general, although intensified
Ibid., pp. C-1 - C-2, D—1, F-1, G—1.
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management requirem ents occasionally demanded more detailed control. De­
velopment of properly sequenced in ter dependencies was of param ount 
im portance.
Assessment and D efinition
The schedule control system implem ented a t the  tac tica l level to
support s tra teg ic  level reporting constitu ted  an effective  response to ta c tica l
level requirem ents. It was e ffic ien t, tim ely, and accurate . Participating
government agency requirem ents were the  same as for the RDT&E phase.  ̂ PERT
requirem ents and methodology for con tractors participating  in the production
program under the  aegis of the prim e con tracto r were defined in a separa te
2
contractor docum ent. The use of PERT, as noted previously, is most effective  in 
nonrepetitive ac tiv itie s  and in the early  phases of a production program. The 
PERT requirem ent for hardware fabrication was ultim ately replaced—and 
properly so—with a  requirem ent for th e  more conventional Line of Balance 
system . D ata, as required, were input into the appropriate milestones in the 
remaining PERT networks from the Line of Balance system.
Interrogation and Identification
One m inor problem involving m aintenance of two duplicative da ta  
bases existed for a  tim e a t the ta c tica l level. One was maintained by the 
program m anager and the o ther by the prim e con tracto r. The situation stem m ed
^U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Schedule Control 
Requirem ents for Safeguard Government Participating Agencies.
2
W estern E lectric  Company, Program Evaluation and Review 
Technique (PERT) System (Greensboro, North Carolina: Safeguard Project
Division, 1 March 1969).
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from the need of the prime con tracto r for selected  participating government
agency schedule data. Early in the  program, the prim e contractor had the  ability
to  rapidly process raw PERT input data by com puter and the program manager
did not. As a  consequence, participating government agencies subm itted
applicable input data simultaneously to both the program manager's data  base
and the  prime contractor.^
Following developm ent of a com parable capability for processing all
PERT data  by the  Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), the  prim e
con trac to r was re luctan t to  accep t processed da ta  from the BMDO in lieu of raw
data  direct from the participating government agencies. This procedure,
however, constitu ted  a dual control and processing system for PERT d a ta  for
networks developed, m aintained, and reported on by all of the participating
2
governm ent agencies.
The contracto r's  reluctance to accep t processed data  was prim arily 
based on the reporting delay caused by the processing by BMDO, differences in 
the  methods of processing, and differences in the in terfaces incorporated in the 
two d a ta  bases. This issue was resolved ra ther rapidly in favor of the processing 
of all input da ta , including th a t of the prime con tracto r, by the BMDO. Outputs 
were returned to  all participating government agencies and to  the prime 
con tracto r.^
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Cost Reduction Recom­
mendations on Safeguard System Command PERT Reporting and Processing 
Requirem ents (Huntsville, Alabama: Management Data Systems O ffice,




M anagement Control Requirem ents
M anagement control requirem ents for the production phase centered 
on the major m ilestones a t the ta c tica l level of m anagem ent. In terface 
milestones were also highlighted for m anagem ent a tten tion . This was due, in 
large m easure, to  the typically higher potential for error a t agency mission 
junctures of shared responsibility.
A unique capability of the Safeguard PERT processing system  was a 
sum m arization/skeletonization model. The principal function of the model was 
to  reduce large, in tegrated  networks into sm aller networks which were easier to 
study and analyze. The m anager established the level of sum m arization or 
skeletonization by specifying the  ex traction  criteria  to  be used for selecting the 
original netw ork events or milestones th a t were to  be retained in the  smaller 
skeletonized netw ork. The precedence relationships and tim e durations between 
connected m ilestones present in the original network were reta ined  in the 
skeletonized netw ork. This fea tu re  assured tha t the skeletonized network would 
re ta in  the in teg rity  of the original network.^ The sum m arization/skeletonization 
model provided improved visibility of m ajor milestone interrelationships and 
enhanced m anagem ent analysis through retention of original or paren t data 
fidelity.
Deployment Phase 
The two cells contained in this portion of the PPL analysis m atrix  are 
the schedule param eter/deploym ent ph;ase/strategic level cell and the  schedule
U.S., Army Safeguard System Command, Design Specification for the 
Safeguard PERT Sum m arization/Skeletonization Module (Huntsville, Alabama; 
Computer Sciences Corporation, September 1972), pp. I- l - 1-3.
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param eter/deploym ent phase/tactical, level cell. Viewed in te rm s of the schedule 
param eter, the deployment phase was conceptually linked to  the  production 
phase, and schedule control requirem ents for the deployment phase were a 
natural extension of production phase requirem ents.
At the s tra teg ic  and tac tica l levels, the deployment phase did not 
present any unique schedule control requirem ents. The two basic scheduling 
models (PERT and milestone planning and control) which were applicable to  the 
production phase were equally applicable to the deployment phase. Milestones 
were separately  established fo r the personnel training program and the logistics 
program. Milestones relating to the assignment of operating personnel were 
in teg ra ted  into the s ite  activation function tha t was integral to  the  production 
phase.
The deployment phase did not m aterially affect the schedule control 
param eter. Analysis of the management control situation revealed  no new 
relationships or c rite ria  beyond those already documented. In sum, the 
deployment phase was not a significant consideration in the  schedule control 
situation.
Termination Phase
The cells of in terest in this section of the chapter are  the schedule 
param eter/term ination  phase/strateg ic level cell and the  schedule 
param eter/term ination  phase/tactlcal level cell.
The term ination phase triggered the initiation of actions aimed a t 
phasing the  deployed site out of the Army inventory. It also se t in motion 
m anagem ent actions designed to  minimize costs and cu rta il managem ent 
system s. The phase did not present any unique requirem ents. R ather, it 
suggested a  gradual reduction in requirem ents as activ ities  were term inated .
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The term ination  phase did not add any new conceptual relationships or 
conditions to  the schedule control situation. Termination ac tiv ities  and events 
were planned and controlled with the same in te re st and concern for sound 
m anagem ent logic as the production and deployment activ ities and events. The 
prim ary difference was in the  type and scope of activ ities and events being 
controlled ra ther than in the nature  of the  schedule control situation .
Schedule Control in Perspective
Time is both a  resource in system m anagem ent and a vehicle for 
measuring program perform ance. T lm e-reference schedules typically serve both 
as plans for fu ture activ ities and as the control standard against which program 
progress is m easured. Time-emphasis considerations th a t stress the tem poral 
reference tend to highlight schedule contro l. Even cost-em phasis and technical 
perform ance-em phasis considerations frequently accen tuate  schedule control, 
due to  its  significance as an early warning indicator of undesirable program 
perform ance trends.
The schedule param eter dem onstrates a  fairly d irec t sensitivity to  the 
RDTiJcE and production phases of the life cycle. The nature of program activ ity  
in these two phases is highly instrum ental in determ ining the  type or types of 
schedule control model or models most appropriate for im plem entation. On the 
o ther hand, the schedule param eter is relatively insensitive to  the deployment 
and term ination phases. This observation, with regard  to the deployment phase, 
m ight be less valid if the deployment phase was the independent responsibility of 
another agency. This was not the case with Safeguard, however, where the 
deployment phase was a  natural extension of the production phase.
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It is also significant to  note th a t the tools and techniques of schedule 
control re la te  readily to  the  life-cycle  phases. In most instances this is because 
the tools and techniques w ere designed to  cope specifically with the activ ities  
associated w ith th e  phases involved. This is in con trast to observations made 
concerning th e  cost param eter, where i t  was noted th a t control requirem ents 
w ere a rticu la ted  by fiscal appropriation and not by lif e-cycle phase.
Schedule control lends itse lf very well to  hierarchic levels of decision­
making. Through the use of carefully  selected m ilestones, a  program m anager 
may manage a t  w hatever depth he desires. By setting  his thresholds or 
to lerances properly, he may also insure tha t deviations a re  handled in differing 
manners. A t one end of the  spectrum , deviations might be ignored or simply 
noted as having occurred if failing within the  to lerance o r threshold band 
specified. At the  other end of the spectrum , deviations m ight be cause for 
com plete re-exam ination of control standards involving the same degree of 
m anagem ent a tten tion  as the developm ent of the existing standards. The type 
and level of m anagem ent action  would be dependent upon the criticaiity  of the  
threshold breeched.
Properly developed, s tra teg ic  level schedule control requirem ents 
should drive ta c t ic a l level requirem ents. S trategic level requirem ents should be 
defined in te rm s th a t require increasing degrees of detail at successively lower 
levels of decision-making. The requirem ents should also be designed to  insure 
logical audit or traceab ility  of d a ta  down through lower levels. Given this 
observation, tacticail level requirem ents must be subservient to  and supportive of 
s tra teg ic  level requirem ents. They should not be perm itted  to  be developed as 
ends in them selves.
CHAPTER VU 
THE TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE PARAMETER
The technical perform ance param eter is concerned with system  design 
objectives and specifications. The purpose of technical perform ance control 
activ ity  is the anticipation or early detection of variances th a t require 
m anagem ent a tten tio n  and to provide visibility into technical perform ance 
accom plishm ents and status against the predeterm ined technical objectives. The 
goal of technical perform ance control is assurance of the  continual technical 
in tegrity  of the system .
This chapter addresses the technical perform ance param eter of 
m anagem ent control. It begins with a synoptic description of the technical 
perform ance param eter. The next section delves into those properties which are 
common to all ceils in the technical perform ance segm ent of the PPL analysis 
m atrix. The next four sections re la te  to  the four phases of the PPL analysis 
m atrix. The s tra teg ic  and tac tica l level cells are considered in each section. 
The final section summarizes the salient fea tu res of the technical perform ance 
param eter and places them in perspective in term s of the  to ta l param eter 
analysis.
Technical Perform ance Considerations
The technical perform ance param eter is a means of establishing 
objectives and determ ining program progress. For purposes of control, the
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elem ents tracked  should be key indicators of technical achievem ent. In this 
particular the  technical performance param eter is perhaps the most difficult of 
the th ree  param eters to  define. It is the  purpose of this section to provide 
insight into the  concept of technical perform ance.
The Nature of Technical Perform ance 
This initial exploration of the major considerations of technical 
perform ance is Intended to focus a tten tion  on c ritica l characteristics. The 
them e is to  reveal the nature of the param eter through exposure of its cardinal 
a ttrib u tes . ̂
Definition and Description
The technical performance param eter may be broadly in terp re ted . In 
Its fundam ental context it may be considered, from a contracto r's  perspective, 
simply as "specification compliance," meaning all con tractual requirem ents o ther 
than cost and schedule.^ Mur dick and Ross tend to  equate technical perform ance 
to quantity and quality, citing m anufacturing standards of perform ance as typical 
examples.^ Roman suggests tha t technical perform ance is related  to  engineering 
and scien tific  activ ity  involving such functions as product design, product 
developm ent, testing , production control, quality control, and product
For an interesting analysis of the a ffec t of the rapid progression of 
technology on the field of management see, R obert H. Roy, The Cultures of 
■Management (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 155-62.
^E. L. Williams and G. A. Wilson, "Project C ost Control a t Raytheon's 
Wayland Laboratory," IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management EM-10 
(September 1963): 143.
^Murdick and Ross, Information Systems for Modern M anagement,
p. 125.
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standardization among others. ̂  Sayles and Chandler emphasize the differences
between technical goals and business requirem ents. They see th e  two as having
divergent mission orientation. Technical goals are aimed a t  successful system
perform ance—ostensibly w ithout concern for business requirem ents; business
requirem ents are concerned w ith successful fiscal m anagem ent—allegedly a
2
separate  and dissonant in terest.
As used in th e  Safeguard program, the  technical perform ance
param eter was concerned w ith system design objectives, production and
operations m anagem ent, s ite  activation  and integration, system logistics support,
and system operational availability  and readiness. The im portance of the
technical performance param eter was underscored by Enthoven and Smith:
Some of the  m ost im portan t program decisions in DOD concern the 
introduction of new equipm ent. Realistic estim ates of perform ance 
must be available if the choices are to be good ones. Indeed, the 
problem of reliable perform ance estim ates has becom e m ore signifi­
cant in the past ten years, as complex e lectronic components have 
become k e y  elem ents in the effectiveness of many new weapon 
systems.
In the final analysis, equipm ent perform ance is not only the product of all other 
elem ents of technical perform ance, it is the measure of the weapon system when 
acquired under realistic  operational conditions.
Placed in perspective, the technical perform ance param eter has a 
decided emphasis on engineering and scientific endeavors, the cost param eter has
 ̂Rom an, Research and Development Management: The Economics and 
Administration of Technology, pp. 365-69.
2
Leonard R. Sayles and M argaret K. Chandler, Managing Large 
Systems; Organizations for the  Future (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1971), pp. 272-97.
3
Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense 
Program, 1961-1969, p. 318.
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a defin ite  business flavor, and the schedule param eter represents a middle- 
ground blend of both.
Q ualita tive  M ateriel R equirem ent
Sentinel developm ent e ffo rt was guided by the Q ualitative M ateriel 
Requirem ent (QMR), "Nike-X Missile Defense System." Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) requirem ents for the Safeguard system w ere initially modified by the 1967 
deploym ent. Requirem ents w ere fu rther modified by the Presidential decision 
announced in 1969. The requirem ents s ta tem en t of the QMR was modified 
through issuance of D evelopm ent Concept Papers by the Secretary  of Defense. ̂
C ontrol of Technology
Control of technical perform ance^ presents a more form idable control 
problem than e ither cost or schedule control, and i t  has been suggested th a t too 
much control will s tifle  technical creativ ity .^  Technical control is d ifficult 
because of three fac to rs . F irs t, there  is a general absence of a common 
denom inator of perform ance m easurem ent. As a consequence, each control 
requirem ent must be defined in the dimensions or units appropriate to  the 
e lem ent being controlled. This lack of commonality of units of m easurem ent
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Basic O bjectives, Safeguard System 
M aster Plan (SSMP) Vol. 1, Revision 2 (Washington, D. C.: Q ffice Chief of S taff, 
12 August 1971), p. 7-1.
2
An excellen t discussion on the m anagem ent of technological 
com plexity in a large-scale, complex m ilitary weapon system may be found in 
Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: B ureaucratic and
Program m atic Success in Governm ent (Cambridge, M assachusetts; Harvard 
University Press, 1972), pp. 249-54.
^Robert N. Anthony, Management Controls in Industrial Research 
Organizations (Boston: Harvard U niversity, 1952), p. 28.
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also fru stra tes  e ffo rts  to roll-up or summarize technical perform ance elem ents. 
Second, the selection of effective  key control indicators of project success is 
more complex than  is the case with the cost or schedule param eters. The in ten t 
is to select those techn ica l indicators most susceptible to  quantification, those 
th a t a re  readily m easurable, and those th a t provide the  earliest indication of 
variance from techn ica l requirem ents.
Third, th e re  is difficulty in identifying and defining acceptable levels 
of technical risk. "Technical risk" may be defined as the  correlation  of th e  s ta te  
of the a r t  of com ponent design technology with the c ritic a iity  of functional 
perform ance. For exam ple, the highest level of technical risk results from using 
unproven com ponent design for weapon system  equipm ent th a t m ust perform  
functions essential to  operational success. Technical risk decreases from this 
highest level as e ith e r m ore proven and technically au then tica ted  component 
design from existing technology is used and/or operational c ritica iity  of the 
component dim inishes.
The cost and schedule param eters a re  also subject to  risk. There is a 
close relationship among these two param eters and technical risk. Cost risk is a 
function of the confidence level placed on completing all increm ents of planned 
work within the fiscal resources distributed for the e ffo r t. Similarly, schedule 
risk is a  function of the confidence level which is placed on com pleting all 
increm ents of planned work within the time budget. Under typical conditions, 
the  larger the techn ica l risk, the larger the cost and schedule risk.
Cost and schedule risk may be reduced through in tentional distribution 
of contingency fiscal and tim e allotm ents. Addition of these contingency cost 
and tim e budgets helps am eliorate technical risk. Addition of contingency, or
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"m anagem ent reserve" as i t  Is popularly named, permits coping with the 
unexpected while maintaining stra teg ic  program commitments.^
Trade-off investigations among the three param eters are frequently 
re fe rred  to  as risk analysis studies. Such studies are  a continuing part of the 
acquisition m anagem ent process and are  rigorous to  perform .^ Additionally, in 
p rac tica l te rm s, project achievem ent is measured by the progress against these 
th re e  param eters and th e  relationship among them a t any one tim e.^
Targets of Technical Control
ti
M anagement control of complex technology is d ifficu lt. It is usually 
concen tra ted  on the "...w ritten  resources and the inform ation which the 
sc ien tific  and technical personnel have for th e ir use."^
While control is concentrated  on inform ation, the u ltim ate  major 
ta rg e ts  of technical perform ance control a re  the  tangible elem ents of the  
weapon system ; i.e., the hardware, softw are, and facility components th a t 
com prise the  operational system . As a rubric for focusing a tten tion , the
 ̂Joseph F. Shea, "Observations on Defense Acquisition," Defense 
Systems M anagement Review I (Autumn 1977): 33.
2
Jacques S. Gansler, "A New Dimension in the Acquisition Process," 
D efense Systems M anagement Review I (Autumn 1977): 10.
^W. J. Taylor and T. F. Watling, P ractical Project M anagem ent (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, H alsted Press, 1973), pp. 82-94.
If.
An inform ative trea tm en t of the profound e ffe c t th a t rapidly 
increasing technological com plexity is having on managem ent may be found in 
Jam es C . Stephens, Managing Complexity: Work, Technology, and Human
R elations (Washington, D.Cx University Press, 1970), pp. 280-94, 311-20.
^Bartow Hodge and Robert N. Hodgson, M anagement and the  
C om puter in Information and Control Systems (New York: McGraw -  Hill Book 
Company, 1969), p. 69.
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Safeguard generic elem ents are defined as system hardw are, system softw are, 
and s ite  facilities.^ This portion of this section briefly touches on these three 
inanim ate elem ents.
System Hardware
System hardware refers to  th a t complex of system equipment tha t 
comprises the air vehicles, missile site  and perim eter acquisition radars and 
ancillary equipment, command and control equipm ent, and various components of 
ground support equipment. Excluded, by definition, a re  system  softw are and the 
perm anent facilities a t the operational s ite . In sum, system  hardware is the 
"machinery" portion of the system and fulfills the "m echanization" purpose. 
System Software
System softw are designates those data processor programs, data- 
processing tapes, data descriptions, and o ther data used to  com m unicate with, 
opera te , te s t , monitor, and maintain the system hardw are. Thus, two major 
subsets exist within the software definition. The f irs t is th a t system softw are 
associated directly with the system data processors in tegral to  the two radars 
and the command and control cen tral. The second pertains to  conventional 
printed m atte r such as technical manuals, handbooks, and procedures used for 
manual operation and maintenance of the system . Excluded from this definition 
are design, fabrication, and perform ance drawings and specifications. The 
system softw are provides the data  required by the system and perform s an 
"in tegrative  logic" purpose.
As a point of clarification it should be noted th a t Safeguard required 
an in tegration of hardware, softw are, fac ilities, and personnel in order to  achieve 
operational readiness. Personnel added the  dimension of "rationality" to  the
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Site Facilities
Site facilities refer to  the brick and m ortar type faciiities and other 
special purpose type facilities necessary to  achieve system operational s ta tu s  at 
the system site . By definition, the reference  also includes the real e sta te , roads, 
interconnecting cables, and personnel support facilities required a t  the s ite . The 
facilities portion of the  system , in essence, constitutes the "structure" portion of 
the  weapon system . Site facilities provide the  installation required for the  fixed 
s ite  weapon system .
A graphic conceptualization of a weapon system is depicted a t
Figure 13.
Execution of the Technical Program
Execution or im plem entation of the technical portion of a program 
does not necessarily follow a prescribed or highly structured  form at. The 
technical program, however, should be comprehensive and well planned, provide 
for reasonable management reserve as required and possible, and be dynamic 
perm itting redirection due to changes in objectives and as a consequence of te st 
results.
While the technical process may be unstructured, it should not be 
approached in a piecemeal m anner. The over-all technical process m ight be 
thought of conceptually in te rm s of four functionally in tegrated  tasks. These 
tasks are design, te st, produce, and opera te . These tasks may be repetitive . Any 
given component design may cycle through the process more than once. A fifth
system . For purposes of this study, the personnel portion of the equation was not 
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ta sk , assessm ent, is operative across th e  o ther four tasks. These relationships 
a re  depicted in Figure 14. Each of the  tasks is significant for integrated control 
o f technical perform ance. The m ajor m anagem ent aspects of each of the four 
ta sk s  are  highlighted in th e  following paragraphs.
Design
The design task  is concerned with full engineering development and 
refinem ent of the  specific hardw are, so ftw are, and fac ility  configurations of the 
com ponents and elem ents to  be produced. Designs should be fully representative 
o f production item s in term s of form , f i t ,  and function.^ Normally, the only 
permissible difference from  the production item  is in the  manufacturing aspect. 
Developm ent m ateriel typically may be fab rica ted  on what is referred to  as 
"soft" tooling, in lieu of the  "hard" tooling used in the volume production phase.
Design is an ite ra tiv e  engineering process. The objective is to insure 
th a t  sta ted  requirem ents are successfully m et. The design task emphasizes 
system  integration and in te rface  con tro l, reduction of technical risk, and 
optim ization of system technical perform ance. The product of the  design task is 
com prehensive system definition accu ra te ly  reflec ted  in engineering drawings, 
specifications, and re la ted  engineering docum entation.^
Design, particularly  th a t associated with the RDT&E phase, is 
typ ically  less rigorously controlled than the  o ther tasks. Anthony, discussing
An excellent a rtic le  on the desirability  of designing for smooth and 
cost-e ffec tiv e  production during the  RDT&E phase may be found in Raymond 
Kendall and G. Wayne Talbot, "R&D and Production; The A rtificial Barrier," 
Governm ent Executive 9 (November 1977): 25.
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Principles of M anagement, Sentinel 
System M aster Plan (SSMP) Part 2.01 (Washington, D.C.: O ffice Chief of S taff, 
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research projects in particu lar, suggests tha t formal w ritten  progress reports and 
data are secondary to  inform al conversations and m eetings as vehicles for 
making decisions about technical work.^ This thought suggests the flavor of the 
control process in the in itial stages of the design task .
Test
The Safeguard te s t e ffo rt was divided into th ree  d iscrete  elem ents.
The f irs t was referred to as developm ent engineering testing . It was conducted
by the prime contractor under the direction of the developm ent agency. It was
in tegral to  the design task and encompassed all developm ent testing and
evaluation required to  assure th a t the proposed design m et all technical
2
perform ance and re la ted  characteris tics  of the system design specification.
The second major aspect of the te s t program was the system 
acceptance testing conducted under the purview of the evaluation agency. The 
main th rust of this te s t  e ffo rt was to assure tha t system characteristics were 
acceptab le in a ta c tica l environm ent, th a t the design released for production 
would satisfy  m ilitary requirem ents, and tha t all system elem ents m et 
perform ance specifications. This testing was independent of development 
engineering testing and represented an independent check and balance verifica­
tion by the program m anager^ o f the "pedigree" of the system design.
This view is suggested in Anthony, M anagement Controls in Industrial 
Research O rganizations, pp. 193-7, 201 and George A. Steiner and William G. 
Ryan, Industrial P roject M anagement (New York: Macmillan Company, Arkville 
Press, 1968), p. ^3.
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Principles of M anagement, p. 24.
^Ibid.
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The third category of te s t was the operational testing  conducted under 
the cognizance of the user. The purpose of the testing was to determ ine tha t 
operational site  personnel could operate  and maintain the system . This activ ity , 
as did all other te s t programs, stressed both hardware and softw are evaluation.^
Produce
This task Is defined by the production phase described In C hapter IV. 
In sum, the primary objective was to  produce the system design released to 
production from the RDT&E phase in a tim ely manner and a t  minimum cost. The 
e ffo r t also Included construction of s ite  facilities.
O perate
This task occurs during the deployment life-cycle phase described in 
C hapter IV. It refers specifically to  th a t aspect of deployment concerned with 
actua l operation and maintenance of the system by user personnel.
Appraise
The appraisal task is operative across the  to ta l spectrum  of the other 
four tasks. Commonly referred  to as "product assurance," the objective of this 
task is to  insure tha t acceptable levels of quality, reliability, and m aintainability 
are  incorporated in the basic development of the system; th a t conformance with 
engineering requirem ents is attained during m anufacturing; and th a t acceptable 
levels of reliability, availability, and m aintainability are achieved in service.^
Significant activ ities of a typical product assurance program include 




quality c rite ria , testing to  evaluate design, determ ination th a t production 
system s a re  accep tab le , and continuing appraisal of equipm ent in the field to  
verify product quality and durability. A program  for analysis and feedback of 
site  m aintenance and operational da ta  was also established.
Models and simulations w ere used extensively throughout the program 
to  supplement testing  of actual system equipm ent and to  reduce costs.
Additional Com m ents 
Two final com m ents on technical perform ance considerations are 
germane a t  this point. F irst, a major concern of technical perform ance control 
activ ity  is the anticipation or early detection  of technical variances. This is the 
same requirem ent for proactive control expressed previously with the cost and 
schedule param eters. In essence, it  is a s ta tem en t of need for anticipatory 
preventative action  in con trast to reactive  rem edial action . While technical 
perform ance control may be more difficult to  achieve effectively  than cost or 
schedule contro l, it  is im portant th a t it be accom plished in a manner compatible 
with the  two and on a continuing basis. ^
Secondly, the ascerta inm ent of valid fa c t  is particularly im portant to  
successful technical perform ance control. Since it  is difficult to  in tegrate  or 
co rre la te  much of the independent technical d a ta , it is essential th a t technical 
data be stripped of subjectivity and reduced to  pure technical fac t. An 
in teresting theory  on the  selection of ta rg e ts  for m anagem ent control has been 
advanced by Juran . Somewhat in contrast to  m anagem ent by exception, Juran
^M artin, Project M anagement; How To Make It Work, p. 190.
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states  th a t there  are , in many m anagem ent control situations, a "vital few"^
item s or elem ents th a t should be managed individually. These "vital few" are to
be isolated from the "triv ia l many" th a t should be m anaged as a class. This
thesis is based on a  Pareto  distribution principle that suggests th a t th e  m ajority
of the to ta l value, u tility , or o ther outputs of an endeavor resu lt from a small
percentage of the to ta l resources or other inputs. While the principle is more
evident in such areas as sales, inventory, and purchasing, i t  is also evident in the
technical perform ance p aram eter. As an exam ple, s ta te -o f-th e -a rt components
2
are  in the "vital few" category .
Technical Perform ance Analysis Overview 
The technical perform ance param eter of the  PPL analysis m atrix  is 
structured identically to  both the cost and schedule param eters. It contains the  
following eight individual cells:
1. RDT&E P hase/S tra teg ic  Level
2. RDT&E Phase/T actical Level
3. Production P hase/S tra teg ic  Level
4. Production Phase/T actical Level
5. Deployment Phase/S tra teg ic  Level
6. Deployment Phase/T actical Level
7. Term ination P hase/S tra teg ic  Level 
S. Term ination Phase/T actical Level
These elem ents a re  sim ilarly described and re ferred  to as the 
"critical few" in Louis A. Allen, Prefessional Management: New Concepts and 
Proven Practices (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), pp. 212-14.
2
3uran, M anagerial Breakthrough, pp. 43-54.
286
The relationships among these eight cells and the cells in th e  cost and schedule 
param eters were introduced in Figure 1 in Chapter I.
All cells in th e  technical perform ance segm ent of the PPL analysis 
m atrix displayed common characteristics when subjected to  exam ination of the 
assessm ent and definition fac to rs and the interrogation and identification 
c rite ria . As was done with the cost and schedule param eters, these common 
tra its  a re  discussed in term s of the  to ta l param eter before the  specifics of each 
individual cell are explored.
Assessment and Definition 
The technical perform ance param eter is especially complex. It is 
affected  by a number of external and internal influences. These influences help 
to  mold the  situational elem ents th a t define its  scope. Technical perform ance 
encompasses a variety  of engineering activities and a m ultitude of diverse 
effo rts , all of which m ust be carefully in tegrated  in to  a balanced and 
comprehensive technical program.
The feedback or cybernetic aspect of m anagem ent control is particu­
larly relevan t in the  technical a rea . This relevance applies both for purposes of 
program and/or control standard adjustm ent and for selective filtering  of the less 
im portant data. Selective filtering  perm its passage of only tha t data  of real 
significance.  ̂ Shorn of irrelevan t de ta il, such data  may be logically summarized 
for decision making.
1966), pp. 342-44.
^Stafford Beer, Decision and Control (London; John Wiley & Sons,
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The exogenous environment^ in which the Safeguard program devel­
oped was, from the ou tset, a  mixture of viewpoints. Initially, th e  mix was only 
partially antagonistic but predom inately supportive. With the  passage of tim e, 
the mix changed complexion and grew progressively m ore hostile, finally 
crippling the program . The external environment had an overpowering e ffec t on 
the Safeguard program.
The m ost visible focus of the political debates surrounding ABM 
centered on the authorization and appropriation legislation each year. There was 
an undercurrent, however, o f concern regarding the technical p rac tica lity  and 
feasibility of the  ABM system ; in short, would i t  work in accordance with its 
specifications? There was also some concern re la tive  to  the s tra teg ic  wisdom of 
deployment and the  a tten d an t reaction it might trigger in the  U.S.S.R. or with 
o ther potential enemies. Escalation of the arms race was clearly  not a desirable 
s ta te . Finally, the  validity of the design th rea t was questioned. The core issue 
Wcis whether the th rea t was accurately  defined or had been intentionally 
exaggerated in order to  justify  the deployment.
The economic issue, in large measure, was a  surrogate for political and 
technology considerations, but aiffordability was also a t  issue. The principal 
concern was th a t the  ABM deployment would divert money from domestic 
programs through reordering of budget priorities.
Two in teresting  vignettes on the e ffe c t of the ex ternal environment 
on R&D programs, the firs t contem porary with the  deployment decision and the 
second current, may be found in T. K. Glennan, J r ., "Research and Development," 
in Defense M anagement, ed. by Stephen Enke (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 269-89 and Neil V. Hakala, "Administration of 
Industrial Technology," Business Horizons 20 (October 1977): 4-10.
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Public opinion, voiced primarily by the  academ ic, in tellectual, and 
scien tific  community, was highly spirited on both sides. The opponents of the 
program a ttem p ted  to  discredit the requirem ent or need for the  system while the 
proponents argued its validity. The technology debate centered  on the ability of 
the system to function satisfactorily  in all particu lars, the  susceptibility of the 
existing system design to  enemy penetration, the ability of the  system to
perform the  mission assigned to  it ,  and the real or im aginary dangers from close
location of operational sites near population centers.
Endogenous influences also im pacted the  technical perform ance 
param eter. As mentioned in Chapter III, the  ABM system had been under study 
for over a  decade a t the tim e of the deployment decision. As a  consequence, the
system  developm ent requirem ents, operational concepts, and system character­
istics were well defined a t th e  time the deployment decision was made. They 
were to change many tim es subsequent to  the decision. Additionally, general 
D epartm ent of the Army management doctrine defined techniques for managing 
various aspects of the technical program such as the configuration management 
technique for control of engineering docum entation and the product assurance 
program for assessment of product in tegrity . O ther government agencies and 
participating  contractors were generally fam iliar with existing technical require­
m ents for acquisition of guided missile systems.
In addition to the use of existing U.S. Army m anagem ent procedure, 
the Secretary  of the  Army established a perm anent ABM (antiballistic missile) 
Review Group. Composed of the th ree  Assistant Secretaries of the Army^ and
^ASA for Research and Development (R&D), ASA for Installation and 
Logistics (I&L), and ASA for Financial M anagement (FM).
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the Chief, O ffice of Operations R e se a rc h / the group was chaired by the 
A ssistant Secretary  of the Army (ASA) (R&D). Each principal was directed to  
assign one professional-level individual from his office as a  working representa­
tive, and the ASA (R&D) also provided a  full-tim e sec re ta ry  to  the group. The 
ABM Review Group was specifically charged by memorandum signed by the 
Secretary  of the Army with the responsibility of;
...isolating and analyzing major issues in the developm ent, engineering, 
production, installation and operation of th e  system and in ABM 
advanced developm ent, and presenting them  to  me so th a t I may 
render decisions within the guidance of the Secretary  of Defense or 
make recom m endations p  the Secretary of Defense on m atters not 
within D efense guidance.
The cen tral th ru st of the group's mission was d irected  a t assuring system cost
effectiveness and perform ance reliability.^
The f ir s t  program manager held a disciplined view of technical
managem ent and firm ly believed in m anagem ent by exception. While discussing
the m ost significant ingredients a m anager utilized in managing a large-scale
complex endeavor such as Safeguard, he s ta ted :
The second ingredient, I guess is the ability to  pick out places where 
there a re  problems and work in detail on those problems. That is the 
ingredient. People do it in d ifferen t ways. I tend to try  to  do it by 
letting o thers handle things th a t are  running all right, and then going
^The C hief, O ffice of Operations Research was subsequently desig­
nated Deputy Under Secretary  of the Army for Operations R esearch.
^Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for the  
Assistant Secretary  of the Army (R&D), the Assistant Secretary of the  Army 
(I&L), the  A ssistant Secretary  of the Army (FM), and the  Chief, Office of 




down personally , and in g reat detail, into things th a t aren't running 
righ t.
This m anagem ent philosophy of managem ent by exception was, in large m easure, 
perpetuated  by succeeding program m anagers.
The objective o f the technical perform ance control action was to 
iso la te , define, analyze, and articu la te  specifications of the  technical issues and 
system  perform ance ch arac te ris tics  and to  m aintain th e  technical in tegrity  of 
the to ta l system  design. This objective was operative throughout the to ta l life 
cycle of the  system . The goal of the technical perform ance parameter was an 
operational system .
Several key fac to rs  helped define the type of control action required 
for m anagem ent of technical perform ance. F irst, all participants in the 
technical aspects of the Safeguard program were required to  report specified 
technical da ta  periodically. Additionally, all m ajor participants reported  
technical progress periodically a t program review m eetings. Second, the 
technical da ta  was used by the program manager to ensure achievement of a 
producible and operational system capability and high constancy of perform ance. 
Third, technical perform ance data were required from all participants in the 
engineering program. Fourth, the control situation contained both nonrepetitive 
and rep e titive  elem ents. The RDT&E activ ity  was nonrepetitive  and highlighted 
by a  high level of technological complexity. The hardw are fabrication elem ent 
of th e  production program was predominantly rep e titiv e  while the missile s ite  
construction activ ity  was nonrepetitive. F ifth , feedback was extrem ely
Alfred D. Starbird, Lieutenant General, USA, R etired , interview by 
Dean J. Stevens, Staff H istorian, U.S. Army Safeguard System O ffice, 
Washington, D.C., 6 August 1971.
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im portan t in the technical program, and proactive control was essential to  the 
p rac ticed  m anagem ent philosophy. Sixth, the technical perform ance param eter 
is an excellent predictive device, but is frequently d ifficu lt to  assess rapidly. As 
a consequence, the schedule and cost param eters are  typically used in preference 
to  technical perform ance. Seventh, the technical perform ance situation did not 
require one hundred percent m easurem ent or tracking  in all engineering 
a c tiv itie s . Some specific activ ities, such as configuration m anagem ent, did, 
however, require one hundred percent track ing . C ertain  elem ents of the product 
assurance program also required one hundred percent m easurem ent. Finally, as 
w ith both of the other two param eters, tim eliness of reporting was an im portant 
fac to r in defining the technical perform ance control situation.
Interrogation and Identification 
Three major constraints significantly affec ted  the  technical perform ­
ance param eter. F irst, there was the d ifficu lty  of to ta lly  quantifying objectives 
and assessing perform ance. In a program as complex as Safeguard it was 
d ifficu lt, particularly early in the design, to  specify all system design objectives 
in fin ite  term s. The design process was an ite ra tiv e  one requiring repeated 
reexam ination of the sensitivity of system perform ance to major item specifica­
tions and to changes in the design objectives and postulated th rea t. Periodic 
change was inevitable and it was essential to be prepared for changes and have 
the  procedural in itiatives available for controlling them . Simulation was utilized 
extensively in the design e ffo rt. Because of the im portance of the simulation 
resu lts, exhaustive effo rts  were made to validate them with actual te s t data.^
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Project
H istory, pp. ni-2 - III-3.
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The second major constraint a ffecting  the  technical perform ance 
param eter was the lack of an inherent common denominator. The cost 
param eter has dollars as a common yardstick of m easurem ent and the schedule 
param eter has tim e, but no such inherent dimension of commonality exists in the 
technical perform ance param eter. As an exam ple, basic radar perform ance 
characteristics typically cited are average operating power measured in 
kilowatts, detection range measured in kilom eters, signal to  noise ratio  measured 
in decibels, minimum ta rg e t cross-section detec tion  capability m easured in 
square m eters, and mean tim e between failure (MTBF) m easured in hours. By 
comparison, basic missile perform ance characteris tics  include length and 
diam eter measured in m eters; weight measured in kilograms; acceleration and 
velocity measured in m eters per second squared and m eters per second 
respectively, maximum flight tim e and maximum range measured in seconds and 
kilom eters respectively, and warhead yield m easured in megatons. This diversity 
of dimensions added to  the complexity of the control situation. "Roll-up" of data 
to  increasingly higher levels of summarization is meaningless in the sam e sense 
th a t "roll-up" of dollars suggests ability to arrive at one cumulative to ta l 
program figure.
The third and final major constraint a ttaches to  the diversity of the 
engineering activ ities  involved in the param eter. As an example, such individual 
activ ities as design engineering, te s t engineering, system support engineering, 
human factors engineering, value engineering, product and production engineer­
ing, safety engineering, m aintenance engineering, and systems analysis must be 
carefully in tegrated into a balanced and comprehensive technical program. It is
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in th e  integration of these diverse activ ities th a t both in traparam eter and 
in terparam eter trade-offs are explored to the fu llest. ̂
L atent interdependencies are  virtually nonexistent for in traparam eter 
ac tiv itie s. The diversity of dimensions used in the technical perform ance 
param eter precluded any meaningful integration a t  the  summary level.
Risk, uncertainty, and change are characteris tic  of technology­
intensive activ ity . All th ree are directly re la ted  to the s ta te  of the a r t of the 
technology involved and tend to  diminish as design matures through the life 
cycle, provided a comprehensive program is im plem ented. If a comprehensive 
program is not implemented, risk and uncertainty probably will remain a t a  high 
level. It is m anagement's task to determ ine acceptable levels of risk and 
uncertain ty  and structure  a program th a t will control them with the desired 
precision. It is here th a t technical control requires the highest level of 
m anagerial craftsm anship.
The common characteristics of the technical perform ance param eter 
resulting  from a generic examination of the assessm ent and definition factors 
and the interrogation and identification c rite ria  a re  summarized for convenience 
in Table 5.
RDT&E Phase
This section of this chapter contains the  firs t analysis of individual 
cells in the technical perform ance param eter and involves the RDT&E phase.
^E. Oakley Drumheller, Jr. Forrest L. Godden, J r . and John P. 
Schwegler, "System Engineering Process," Defense Industry Bulletin 7 (Winter 
1971); 4-9.
2
A brief introduction to  the scope and spirit of technical risk and 
uncertain ty  may be found in Scott T. Poage, Q uantita tive  Management Methods 
for Practicing Engineers (Boston: Barnes & Noble, Inc., i970), pp. 20-29.
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TABLE 5
EXAMINATION RESULTS COMMON TO ALL PPL ANALYSIS 
MATRIX CELLS IN THE TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE PARAMETER
E X A M I N A T I O N  
C O N S I D E R A T I  O N S
S UM M A R Y E X A M I N A T I O N  R E S U L T S
ASSESSMENT 
AND D E FIN IT IO N
INFLUENCES
EXOGENOUS P O L I T I C A L  -  S O M E  C O N G R E S S I O N A L  C O N C E R N  R E G A R D I N G  
T E C H N I C A L  F E A S I B I L I T Y ,  WI SDOM O F  D E P L O Y M E N T ,  AND
v a l i d i t y  o f  d e s i g n  t h r e a t
E C O N O M I C  -  C O S T  A F F O R D A B I L I T Y  U S E D  A S  S U R R O G A T E  F O R  
p o l i t i c a l  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  C O N C E R N S ;  S O M E  C O N C E R N  
B M D  W O U L D  D I V E R T  M O N E Y  F R O M  D O M E S T I C  P R O G R A M S  
P U B L I C  O P I N I O N  -  A C A D E M I C  -  I N T E L L E C T U A L  _  S C I E N T I F I C  
C O M M U N I T Y  H I G H L Y  V O C A L ,  S P I R I T E D  D E B A T E  P R O  A N D  C O N ;  
O V E R T  A T T E M P T S  T O  D I S C R E D I T  R E Q U I R E M E N T  F O R  S Y S T E M  
T E C H N O L O G Y  -  I S S U E  C E N T E R E D  O N  A B I L I T Y  O F  S Y S T E M  T O  
F U N C T I O N ,  S U S C E P T I B I L I T Y  O F  S Y S T E M  T O  P E N E T R A T I O N ,  
A B I L I T Y  T O  P E R F O R M  I T S  A S S I G N E D  M I S S I O N ,  A N D  L O C A T I O N  






IDENTI FI CATION 
CONSTRAINTS
LATENT IN T E R ­
DEPENDENCIES
CHARACTERISTICS
E X I S T I N G  U . S .  ARMY M A N A G E M E N T  D O C T R I N E  _  D E V E L O P M E N T  
R E Q U I R E M E N T S ,  O P E R A T I O N A L  C O N C E P T S ,  A N D S Y S T E M  C H A R ­
A C T E R I S T I C S  D E F I N E D ;  C O N F I G U R A T I O N  M A N A G E M E N T  A N D  
P R O D U C T  A S S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M S  S T R U C T U R E D ;  ABM R E V I E W  
G R O U P  E S T A B L I S H E D  
O T H E R  G O V E R N M E N T  A G E N C I E S  -  C O N F I G U R A T I O N  M A N A G E M E N T  
A N D  P R O D U C T  A S S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M S  S T R U C T U R E D  
P A R T I C I P A T I N G  C O N T R A C T O R S  -  U N S T R U C T U R E D  B U T  D I S C I ­
P L I N E D ;  F A M I L I A R  WITH U . S .  A R M Y  R E Q U I R E M E N T S  
m a n a g e m e n t  P H I L O S O P H Y  O F  P R O G R A M  M A N A G E R  -  D I S C I ­
P L I N E D ;  m a n a g e m e n t  b y  E X C E P T I O N ;  H I G H  I N T E N S I T Y  
F O C U S  ON P R O B L E M  A R E A S
I S O L A T I O N ,  D E F I N I T I O N ,  A N A L Y S I S ,  A N D  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  O F  
T E C H N I C A L  I S S U E S  A N D  S Y S T E M  P E R F O R M A N C E  C H A R A C T E R ­
I S T I C S  A N D  M A I N T E N A N C E  O F  T H E  T E C H N I C A L  I N T E G R I T Y  
O F  T O T A L  S Y S T E M  D E S I G N  D U R I N G  T H E  S Y S T E M  L I F E  C Y C L E
P A R T I C I P A N T S  R E P O R T  T E C H N I C A L  P E R F O R M A N C E  AS R E Q U I R E D  
I N F O R M A T I O N  U S E D  T O  E N S U R E  A C H I E V E M E N T  O F  A P R O D U C I B L E  
A N D  O P E R A T I O N A L  S Y S T E M  C A P A B I L I T Y  
I N P U T  D A T A  F R O M  P A R T I C I P A N T S  IN R E Q U I R E D  F O R M A T  A N D 
O N  S P E C I F I E D  T I M E S  
C O N T R O L  S I T U A T I O N  C O N T A I N S  B O T H  N O N R E P E T I T I V E  AND 
R E P E T I T I V E  E L E M E N T S  
P R O A C T I V E  C O N T R O L  R E Q U I R E D  
D A T U M  E X C E L L E N T  
P R E D I C T I V E  D E V I C E ,  B U T  MAY B E  D I F F I C U L T  T O  A S S E S S  
1 0 0  P E R C E N T  M E A S U R E M E N T  N O T  R E Q U I R E D  
T I M E L I N E S S  O F  R E P O R T I N G  I M P O R T A N T
D I F F I C U L T Y  IN Q U A N T I F Y I N G  O B J E C T I V E S  A N D  A S S E S S I N G  
P E R F O R M A N C E ,  L A C K  O F  C OM M O N  D E N O M I N A T O R ,  D I V E R S I T Y  
O F  I N D I V I D U A L  E F F O R T S  I N V O L V E D
V I R T U A L L Y  N O N E X I S T E N T  F O R  I N T R A P A R A M E T E R  A C T I V I T I E S
R I S K ,  U N C E R T A I N T Y ,  A N D  C H A N G E  A R E  I N H E R E N T  IN T E C H N O L O G Y  
I N T E N S I V E  A C T I V I T Y
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Two cells in the PPL analysis m atrix  a re  analyzed in this section. Two each a re  
analyzed in the next th re e  sections, for a  to ta l of eight cell analyses in this 
chapter.^
The two cells examined in th is section share the common phase 
dimension of RDT&E, but are d ifferen tia ted  by the level dimension. The firs t 
cell is defined by the  s tra teg ic  level; the  second by the tac tica l level.
S trateg ic  Considerations
Jay W. F o rreste r captured the flavor of the management of RDT&E
activ ity  in very concise and compelling term s. He w rote, some years ago, in his
classic te x t on the behavior of industrial system s;
...research m anagem ent is fraught wit^ more uncertainty than most 
o ther parts of the m anagem ent picture.
While the  uncertainty of RDT&E effo rt adds to the complexity of the  task , it
also underscores the intensity o f the  need for m anagement control.^
The methodologies o f engineering technology are fashioned in weapon
system acquisition to enhance the creative  e ffo rt required for successful
The quickening pace o f technology has contributed significantly  to  
the evolution of a dynamic and innovative environment surrounding RDT&E 
activ ity . Summarized accounts may be found in: John 5. Foster, J r ., "FY 1972 
Defense RDT&E Program: Research and Development in U. S. Defense Posture," 
Defense Industry Bulletin 7 (Summer 1971): 1-7; Paul E. Holden, C arlton A.
Pederson, and Gayton E. G erm ane, Top M anagement (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1968), pp. 77-94; Joe C. Jones, "The Impact of Technology on 
M anagement," D efense M anagement Journal 6 (February 1971): 16-18; and
Joseph A. L itte re r , "R esearch D epartm ents within Large O rganizations," 
C alifornia M anagement Review 12 (Spring 1970): 77-84. A current descriptive 
account may be found in Philip H. Francis, Principles of R&D M anagement (New 
York: AMACOM, 1977), pp. 1-20.
^Jay. W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge, M assachusetts: 
M.I.T. Press, 1961; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961), pp. 324-25.
^Ibid., pp. 324-29.
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accom plishm ent of program objectives. While technology is frequently consid­
ered as a  resource,^ i t  is the control of the methodologies of engineering 
technology th a t is of in te rest in th is  study. The effectiveness of control a t  the
stra teg ic  level is determ ined, in large m easure, by the quality of technicai
2
com petence available to  the program m anager, the technical and m anagerial 
com petence and corporate in teg rity  of the prime con trac to r, and the  form al and 
inform al relationships between the  program m anager and the prime con tracto r. 
Control effectiveness is also influenced by the m anagerial response to the 
control situation and by the m anagem ent phiiosophy employed in both the public 
and private participants in the endeavor.
Assessment and Definition
It was recognized very early in the RDT&E program th a t weapon 
system  major item  requirem ents or specifications had to  be form ulated as rapidly 
as possible. It was also recognized th a t the  requirem ents had to  be sufficiently  
definitive and unambiguous to  guide the development e ffo rt without being overly 
re s tric tiv e . It was essential th a t in terfaces be clearly delineated in order to  
assure the a tta inm ent of full synchronization of all major item s into a to ta l 
weapon system . Weapon system design in tegration  was an enormousiy complex 
task  involving a  m ultitude of in te rre la ted  technical activ ities. As an exam ple, it  
included such activ ities  as accom plishm ent of to ta l system com patibility and
^Leikind and Miles, "The N ature of Science and Technology," in 
Science and Technology: Vital National A ssets, eds. Sanders and Brown, p. 17.
^Technical com petence may be available to  the program m anager by 
means of in-house m ilitary  and civiiian (civil service) personnel, through system 
engineering support con tracts  with private industry and academ ic institutions, or 
a combination of the two methods.
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integration in term s of form , f it , and function; accomplishment of a system-wide 
parts standardization program; adm inistration of an e ffective  configuration 
management program; establishm ent of integrated production scheduling require­
ments; recommendations for repair parts provisioning; and accom plishm ent of 
technical docum entation m aintenance and control including operation of a 
technical docum entation repository.
Overly res tric tiv e  technical requirem ents, on the other hand, have a 
tendency to  unduly lim it the  range of available alternative solutions available to 
the designer. This re flec ts  a process orientation as opposed to  a goal orientation 
form of control—a focus on method rather than on outcome.^ This is also a valid 
criticism  and is to be scrupulously guarded against, particularly  in design 
activ ity .
As a practical m atte r, tim eliness and completeness of requirem ents
2
are, typically, mutually exclusive objectives. As a consequence, early 
requirem ents are  frequently Incomplete simply because all problems are not fully 
understood.
On balance, it  would seem that the problems promulgated by lack of 
specificity may be more serious than the problems associated with overly 
detailed requirem ents. It is deemed prudent, therefore , to make requirem ents 
available as early  as possible even though decisions may be made quickly and on
The concept of control of results as opposed to control of method is 
discussed in Gary Dessier, Management Fundamentals: A Framework (Reston,
Virginia: Reston Publishing Company, 1977), pp. 33^-35.
2
This is fairly common in the weapon system acquisition process. An 
excellent discussion of the saiient factors involved may be found in Merton J. 
Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic 
Analysis (Boston: Division of Research, G raduate School of Business Adminis­
tra tion , Harvard University, 1962), pp. 362-66.
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incom plete analysis. As objectives change, analysis becomes m ore com plete, and 
problems become more clearly defined and understood, the requirem ents may be 
updated as required. The desirable sta te  would be detailed requirem ents for the 
end product w ithout undue specification of the  method or process for arriving at 
the final design.
The inevitability  of change demanded close accounting and a compre­
hensive change control procedure; i.e., an effec tive  configuration m anagement 
system .^ Change control insured th a t changes were tracked  and th a t all 
designers were working with th e  most current set of requirem ents.
Interrogation and Identification
The technological complexity of the two radars in the Safeguard 
system coupled with the large number of changes experienced, particularly 
during testing , placed a  severe strain on scheduling te s t  tim e. It also 
necessitated very close coordination between hardware designers and softw are 
developers. While these complexities compounded an already difficu lt task and 
further com plicated the control situation, they did not prove to  be insurmount­
able. C onfiguration control of all changes represented a form idable management 
undertaking, but control of ta c tica l softw are presented the g rea test challenge.
The following references contain inform ative trea tm en ts  of the 
nature, function, and procedures of configuration m anagem ent; Chester P. 
Buckland, "Configuration Management: C reative Catalyst?" Defense Industry 
Bulletin 7 (Winter 1971): 1-3; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Configuration M anagement O ffice Manual (Washington, D.C.: Apollo Program 
Office, n.d.); and T. T. Samaras and F. L. Czerwinski, Fundamentals of Config­
uration M anagement (New York: W iley-Interscienci^ 1971). Regulatory
requirem ents pertinen t to  th e  Safeguard program may be found in: U.S.,
D epartm ent of the Army, Safeguard Configuration M anagement Operating 
System Manual, Safeguard System Master Plan (SSMP) Supplement No. 3.10.A, 
Revision 2 (Huntsville, Alabama: U.S. Army Safeguard System Command, 1 July 
1973).
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This was due prim arily to  the  fa c t tha t configuration m anagem ent procedures for 
hardware and s ite  fac ilities were far more m ature than corresponding procedures 
for softw are. ̂
The wide diversity of activ ities in the  RDT&E phase offered little  in 
the way of linking threads th a t might perm it developm ent of a common technical 
denominator. As a  general rule, design and te s t ac tiv ity  were in terre la ted  
technically by m eans of in tegrated  system engineering plans. F urther, all 
technical ac tiv ity  was interwoven by means of the schedule param eter. As 
previously m entioned, however, the dimensions of m easurem ent reflected  a  wide 
range of technical units.
During the  RDT&E phase, the program was technology-intensive, with 
schedule and cost of secondary and te rtia ry  im portance respectively. Program 
changes and design changes were inevitable, and th e  control situation was 
marked by highly unstructured , nonrepetitive work. Technologically, the RDT&E 
program operated alm ost continuously at the leading edge of the s ta te -o f-th e - 
art.
Management Control Requirem ents
The prim ary plan used to  guide the  RDT&E program was the approved 
Technical Developm ent Plan (TDP). The U.S. Army B allistic Missile Defense 
Systems Command (BMDSCOM) was assigned responsibility for m anagem ent of 
the missile system  development contractors and o ther developm ent agencies' 
e ffo rts in accordance with the plan. Subordinate plains such as major item 
perform ance and design specifications, the coordinated te s t  plan, the  tac tica l
^This paragraph is based partly on U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense 
Systems Command, Project H istory, p. HI-3.
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com m unications pian, and the nuclear weapons plan w ere used as specific control 
standards, even though the degree to  which various elem ents were quantified 
varied substantially.
The mission assigned BMDSCOM encompassed the design and develop­
m ent engineering testing  of the components and elem ents of the  weapon system  
to assure th a t the system m et the technical perform ance and system safety  
requirem ents specified in the component plans and technical specifications. 
BMDSCOM utilized engineering support contractors and appropriate governm ent 
agencies for design support to achieve optimal trade-o ffs  of technical considera­
tions. Independent or system acceptance testing was conducted by the Safeguard 
System Evaluation Agency (SAFSEA) under the direction of the program 
manager.^
The m anagem ent thresholds and to lerances established for the  techn i­
cal perform ance param eter were tailored prim arily to  the technical requirem ents 
of the  system . The major item specifications delineated design objectives, but 
generally did not specify requirem ents for methods of achieving th e  results. 
Control of design and developm ent te s t activ ity  was not extended or rigidly 
controlled by the program m anager below the level of the program manager 
approved specifications. The program m anager also used cost and schedule 
thresholds as proxy technical perform ance thresholds because of the ir conven­
ience and ease o f application.
Perform ance reporting took a number of forms and involved both 
w ritten  and oral reporting. Some of the more meaningful forms are  discussed in 
the following paragraphs.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the  Army, Principles of M anagement, p. 22.
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The m onthly progress report prepared by the prime con tractor 
contained s ta tu s  inform ation on all elem ents of program in te re s t, including 
unique issues not explicitly referenced. A Weekly A ctivity Summary was also 
required to  be subm itted by electrical transm ission to  the program m anager by 
all subordinate commanders. It was an inform ation docum ent containing concise 
s ta tem en ts  of fa c t regarding such significant issues as results of interagency 
m eetings or briefings, te s t  results, m ilestone accom plishm ents, s ta tu s  of results 
of ongoing studies, con tracts awarded, and special in te re st item s. The report 
fo rm at specifically precluded inclusion of opinion, conclusions, or 
recom m endations. ̂
Two separa te  major te s t  reports were required. The f irs t, the 
Q uarterly  Testing R eport, was prepared quarterly  to  provide a periodic 
consolidated report on the progress gained during the  quarter tow ard achieving 
the detailed  te s t  programs specified in the Consolidated Test Plan and more 
detailed , lower-level plans. The report also served as a means for periodic 
"closed-loop" review of te s t accomplishments against te s t plans. The coordi­
nated report was prepared by BMDSCOM with input from appropriate te s t 
2
activ itie s. The second major periodic te s t report requirem ent pertained to 
reports prepared by SAFSEA. The reports were both Single Topic Evaluation 
R eports covering a  single subject or area of consideration and Q uarterly  
Evaluation Reports for periodic sum m arization of final Single Topic Evaluation
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Weekly Activity Summary RCS 
SAFSM-7, Safeguard System Master Plan (SSMP) P art 2.06.06 (Washington, D. C.: 
O ffice Chief of S taff, 23 June 1969).
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Safeguard Test R eporting, Safeguard 
System M aster Plan (SSMP) Part 2.06.10 (Washington, D.C.: O ffice Chief of
S taff, 12 February 1970).
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R eports. These two forms of report were lim ited to  the independent evaluations 
perform ed by SAFSEA.^
Perhaps the m ost effective means of com m unicating status on 
technical perform ance was the use of periodic in-process program reviews. 
These reviews consisted of oral presentations or briefings by the principals 
involved and fac ilita ted  one-on-one dialogue between the program manager and, 
typically, the  manager responsible for the  technical aspects of the system 
elem ent involved. These encounters were commonly used as a vehicle for 
redirection of program plans. The forum for proactive m anagem ent control 
afforded by in-process program reviews was one of the  most effective and 
im portan t characteristics of the Safeguard program.
Tactical Considerations 
Management control of technical perform ance a t the tac tica l level is 
where the  real visceral technical issues are  resolved. While s tra teg ic  
considerations occasionally take on an aura of ab strac t detachm ent, tac tica l 
considerations are  typically more tangible. Tactical considerations focus on 
detailed , hard-core engineering and scientific problems. They involve the 
decisions essential to conversion of input requirem ents into output designs, 
sim ulation and testing to  determ ine performance capabilities, and analysis to 
confirm design fidelity .
Management control of this matrix cell is perhaps the most challenging 
of all of the cells. It offers almost unlimited opportunity for management
^U.S., Departm ent of the Army, System Evaluation R eports, Safeguard 
System M aster Plan (SSMP) Part 2.06.05 (Washington, D.C.: O ffice Chief of 
S taff, 12 April 1969).
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creativ ity  involving new control in itiatives. It is truly an a rea  where 
"...m anagem ent requirements...go beyond the proved capabilities of present 
forms and methods."^
Assessment and Definition
The tac tica l portion of the RDT&E phase is, in e ffec t, the  vehicle of
im plem entation of the decisions made a t the  s tra teg ic  level. The tac tica l cell is
marked by g rea te r informality and less guarded dialogue. This is not to suggest
th a t dialogue a t  the s tra teg ic  level is less than candid, but the m andatory
form ality frequently  carries with i t  a  concom m itant prerequisite fo r selective
filtra tion  of some of the more speculative inform ation.
This phenomenon is also a consequence of the sum m arization process,
which a ttem p ts  to elim inate detail to  an increasingly grea ter ex ten t with each
higher level of reporting. This predigestion of data also elim inates or minimizes
differences of opinion th a t frequently are highly significant. In a large-scale
complex endeavor, oversimplification of com plicated issues and elim ination from
consideration of divergent and confiicting views may mask a ttra c tiv e  technical
alternatives a t  the stra teg ic  level. U nfortunately, there does not appear to  be an
2easy solution to  this dilemma. It is possible, however, tha t a sufficiently  
perceptive m anager will, through probing, bring needed details to the su rface .
The development of open and frank technical discussion and debate a t 
the technical level tends to  am eliorate the negative e ffec ts  of oversim plification
^Webb, Space Age Management; The Large-Scale Approach, p. 5.
2
The loss of meaningful detail in the summarization process is 
highlighted in early missile system activ ities in John B. Medaris, Countdown for 
Decision (New York; G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), pp. 141-46.
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and predigestion. This requires a. great deal of technical excellence and 
professionalism a t this level of decision making. It also requires a high degree of 
engineering discipline. Technical problems m ust be analyzed and clarified; 
theories te sted ; causes discovered, isolated, and confirm ed; and solutions 
developed and validated. Technical actions m ust be based on solid technical fac t 
ra ther than on opinion. Each of these actions gives rise to peculiar control 
requirem ents which must be fulfilled if discipline is to  be im plem ented and 
m aintained.
Interrogation and Identification
The constrain ts, potential for la ten t interdependencies, and predom­
inant charac te ris tic s  of the  technical perform ance param eter a t the  ta c tica l 
level are  sim ilar to  those described for the stra teg ic  level. D ifferences, where 
they existed, w ere more differences of degree than differences of substance.
Perhaps the situation is best illustrated  by exam ple. At the stra teg ic  
level a prim ary concern re la tive  to system softw are was a rticu la ted  as concern 
th a t the softw are would function and function properly with the associated 
hardw are. At the  tac tica l level this same concern was thought of more in term s 
of in tegrating the  outputs of approximately tw elve hundred softw are program ­
m ers, all working simultaneously, into a com prehensive and synchronized 
softw are package. The s tra teg ic  concern was prim arily goal oriented in this 
case, while the tac tica l concern contained elem ents of both goal orientation and 
process o rien tation . ^
A brief overview of the major considerations associated with general 
softw are in tegration  may be found in Robert L. P are tta  and Stephen A. Clark, 
"Management of Softw are Development," Journal of Systems M anagement 27 
(April 1976): 21-27.
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M anagement Control Requirem ents
Probably no other two cells in the  s tra teg ic -tac tica l cells pairs
com bination dem onstrate more clearly  or conclusively the compelling need for
fittin g  control to  the task^ than the cell under discussion and the  preceding cell.
Where o th er ta c tic a l cells in the  s tra teg ic -tac tic a l cells pairs tended prim arily to
be concerned with providing input data  for s tra teg ic  reporting, the  RDT&E
ta c tic a l cell had unique requirem ents. In addition, the  relationship between th e
s tra teg ic  m anager (the program manager) and the ta c tica l m anagers was also
unique. The relationship could best be described as one of a m anager managing
m anagers, since much of the RDT&E activ ity  extended the s ta te  of the a rt and
2
no historical standard of perform ance existed.
The m anagement control requirem ents a t the tac tica l level were 
concerned form ally with input of da ta  for the preparation o f reports required for 
s tra teg ic  reporting . Of fa r g rea ter significance and utility w ere the inform al and 
frequent exchanges of technical s ta tu s  by telephone and personal visit. These 
exchanges were normally betw een con tractor and government counterparts. 
They typically  were very candid encounters and centered on technical problems 
as they arose. Consequently, on the  day-to-day issues, little  tim e was lost 
se tting  priorities and determining the  significance of technical problems.^
For a brief discussion on the  benefits of fitting  control to  the task , 
see Gary D essier, Organization and M anagement; A Contingency Approach 
(Englewood C liffs, New Jersey; P rentice-H all, Inc., 1976), pp. 361-62, 378-86.
2
The manager managing m anagers relationship is  briefly analyzed in 
Jerry  D erm er, Management Planning and Control Systems (Homewood, Illinois: 
R ichard D. Irwin, Inc7, 1977), pp. 243-59.
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile D efense Systems Command, Project 
H istory, p. III-4.
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One disadvantage of the informal exchanges was the possibility tha t 
decisions and agreem ents would not be properly documented. This void was 
normally filled with confirming le tte rs , trip  reports, or other form s of written 
docum entation. The s tra teg ic  level reports and special technical reports also 
helped provide the necessary m anagem ent audit tra il.
The advantages of this type of informal managem ent control were 
discussed earlier in this chapter and do not require elaboration here . Suffice to 
say th a t the methodology was generally employed throughout the  Safeguard 
program. It was an unstructured, but recognized requirem ent and was one of the 
most useful control techniques employed in the m anagem ent control of the 
technical portion of the program.
Production Phase
The transition  of a  weapon system from the RDT<kE phase to  the 
production phase bench marks the transition  of weapon system design from the 
relatively flexible to  the  relatively  rigid. It also triggers a  tightening of 
engineering change procedures coupled with more form ality  and greater 
government voice in the  approval process. The transition process may be 
accomplished smoothly or it may be a  source of severe turbulence in program 
progression.^ It was a relatively  smooth process in Safeguard since m ost of the 
major RDT&E contracto rs were also the m anufacturing con tracto rs. Thus, the 
expertise of the original designers was captured in the production phase.^
An in teresting contem porary account of the RDT&E to  production 
transition of weapon systems may be found in Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons 
Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives (Boston: Division of Research,
G raduate School of Business Adm inistration, Harvard U niversity, 1964), 
pp. 394-96,
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Project 
History, pp. Ill-10 -  I I I- ll.
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The two cells examined in this section share th e  common phase 
dimension of production. The first cell concerns th e  s tra teg ic  level of decision 
making while the second cell concerns the tac tica l level.
Strategic Considerations 
The governm ent-contractor relationship th a t evolved with the 
Safeguard program found formal expression in the production program, but had 
its roots deep in the  RDT&E program. The U. S. Army placed heavy reliance on 
the prime con tracto r and the subcontract struc tu re  for the successful accom ­
plishment of the production program.^ In keeping with this heavy dependency on 
the prim e, the production program assignment included to ta l responsibility for 
system integration and over all management of the  diverse production program . 
System integration was perhaps the single m ost in tr ica te , complex, and
challenging engineering and management task involved in the technical perform - 
2
ance param eter. It was managed, on a day-to-day basis, a t the  tactica l level of 
decision making.
The responsibility assigned the weapon system prime con tracto r 
included "voting" participation in many of the critical technical decisions 
affecting program progress and direction. The m anagem ent philosophy inher­
ently maximized contractor participation and influence in the  decision-making
A compelling discussion on the im portance of the  United S tates 
industrial production base to  United S tates m ilitary deterrence may be found in 
Jacques S. Gansler, "Let's Change the Way the Pentagon Does Business," H arvard 
Business Review 55 (May-June 1977); 109-18.
2
Precisely this same area was a source of concern in  the U.S. Navy 
F leet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Program. For a discussion of the  issue see Sapolsky, 
The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Program m atic Success in
Government, pp. 249-34.
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process. In essence, the  program m anager managed prim e contractor manage­
ment of its contractually binding responsibilities. In some respects, the  
governm ent-contractor relationship was closer to a  partnership than th e  more 
fam iliar custom er-contractor relationship suggests. The program was so 
immense and geographically dispersed and government in-house technical 
capability so lim ited th a t no other a lternative  appeared practical at the  tim e. In 
re trospect, the arrangem ent stands the te s t of tim e and still appears prudent.
Assessment and Definition
At the stra teg ic  level the production phase was viewed as an 
integration of several allied yet d is tinc t processes. F irst, the production phase 
involved the process of m anufacturing the hardware for the weapon system . 
Hardware designs developed during th e  RDT&E phase were base lined, released 
to production, and m anufactured by th e  prime contractor-subcontractor indus­
trial s tru c tu re  in accordance with established production schedules. Secondly, 
the production phase included tac tica l s ite  construction. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers was responsible for the execution of the construction program in 
accordance with technical c rite ria  provided by the program manager. Actual 
construction was performed by private  industry under adm inistration of the  U.S. 
Army Engineer Division - Huntsville, an organizational en tity  of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, but under the operational control of the program m anager. 
The third major process of the  production phase was tha t of site activation. This 
was the vehicle which the program m anager used to  in teg ra te  the activ ities of 
the industrial sector, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and all other 
government agencies assigned responsibility for any aspect of the establishm ent 
of the BiMD site . Site activation m anagem ent fo r any individual site began with
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the selection of the site  location and continued through the  release of the site  to 
user personnel. ̂
The production phase was a complex m anagem ent control situation. 
There were a  number of major industrial firm s involved, d irec t adm inistration of 
the activ ity  was split among several government agencies, and the number of 
things happening simultaneously was enormous. The m erger of hardware, 
so ftw are, and site facilities was followed by the addition of operation and 
m aintenance personnel in the deployment phase. All elem ents had to be 
in tegrated  into a fully synchronized operational s ite . The enorm ity of the task 
presented a very complex m anagem ent control problem.
Interrogation and Identification
A portion of the basic problem was purely scheduling in natu re  and was 
resolved through the schedule param eter as discussed in C hapter VI. There still 
rem ained as a part of the technical perform ance p aram ete r problem, however, 
the vast technical job of assuring tha t ail major item s not only fit together, but 
th a t they functioned properly together as well. These fac to rs  did not surface so 
much as constraints as they did pure m anagem ent com plexity.
With regard to the  potential for la te n t interdependencies, the 
s ta tem en ts  made earlier for the overview and RDT&E analyses apply fully here. 
There just was not any d irec t potential.
While the degree of risk and uncertainty  diminished somewhat in the 
production phase from the RDT&E phase, change was inevitable due to the 
concurrency problem mentioned earlier. Coordination of all technical activ ity .
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Principles of M anagem ent, pp. 32-34.
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and particularly  changes, becam e a  significant task  in the  production phase. As 
in the RDT&E phase, the  m ainstream  of ac tiv ity  was technology intensive, with 
schedule perform ance being next m ost im portan t. C ost, while of concern, was of 
lesser consequence than either of the o ther two param eters.
Management Control Requirem ents
The Army M ateriel Plan (AMP) was the  m aster planning document for 
the  production phase. It was the basic source docum ent for development of the 
Safeguard PEMA (Procurem ent of Equipment and Missiles, Army) fiscal appro­
priation. It was the Safeguard input to  the  Army five year financial program 
input to  the  Program Objective Memorandum (POM). It provided a medium 
through which the program m anager projected his PEMA program. It was a 
comprehensive document covering eight fiscal years; i.e ., the immediate prior, 
the current, and the succeeding six fiscal years. The purpose of the plan was to 
document a  means of achieving m ateriel objectives and maintaining balanced 
inventories. The AMP in tegrated  those e lem ents of production planning th a t 
d irectly  a ffec ted  Army m ateriel acquisition such as objectives, assets, losses, 
procurem ent, m anufacturing schedules including adm inistrative and production 
lead tim es, identity of producers, and fiscal obligation and expenditure levels.^ 
The responsibility for preparation of the AMP was assigned to  BMDSCOM. 
Approval au thority  was vested in the program m anager based upon Departm ent 
of Defense and D epartm ent of th e  Army program guidance. The AMP was also 
the root quantified standard for the  control of the technical performance 
param eter of the production phase a t the  s tra teg ic  decision-making level.
Adapted from William C. Wall, J r., "Production Planning," address at 
the Defense Weapon Systems M anagement C en ter, W right-Patterson Air Force 
Base, Ohio, 17 November 1967.
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The Product Assurance Plan, a  component plan of the TDP, se t forth  
the major objectives of the  product assurance program and the procedures 
necessary to  a tta in  the  objectives. The plan expanded the  objectives outlined in 
the TDP and established the  organization, the techniques of assessment and 
inspection, and the specific  management and technical controls required to  
assure the deployment of a  reliable weapon system . While operative  to a lim ited 
ex ten t in th e  RDT&E phase, the product assurance program was fully operative 
across-the-board in the  production and deployment phases. It was the prim ary 
technique of control over the  m anufacturing process and ta c tic a l site  construc­
tion activ ity .^
The Integrated  Site Activation Plan was a  com pilation of policy
sta tem en ts , instructions, and detailed procedures applicable to  all agencies. It
governed all actions involved in the activation of Safeguard s ite s . The plan was a
com posite of several component plans and delineated the  responsibilities of all
2
participating agencies and defined interfaces.
The Configuration Management Plan was sim ilar notionally to the 
Product Assurance Plan. Configuration managem ent procedures were operative 
in the RDT&E phase, but the  full potential was not realized until implemented in 
the production phase. The plan specified the scope and purpose of the Safeguard 
configuration m anagem ent program, th e  policies of the program, and the 
requirem ents th a t had to  be  satisfied for e ffective  im plem entation and operation
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Product Assurance Plan, Safeguard 
System M aster Plan (SSMP) Part 3.07 (Washington, D.C.; O ffice  Chief of S taff, 
13 April 1970), pp. 1-9.
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Principles of M anagem ent, p. 32.
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of the  configuration management program . Configuration m anagem ent was the 
technique utilized to  control changes to the  technical base line.^
The establishm ent of m anagem ent thresholds and tolerances was 
accom plished prim arily through means of the individual plans just described. 
They were tailored to  the tasks and requirem ents outlined in the plans. As a 
general rule, management thresholds and to lerances were reflec tive  of the  level 
of in te re s t specified by the  program manager for the  cost and schedule 
param eters. Major item technical specifications delineated the design 
objectives, and changes to the  base line were controlled through the configura­
tion m anagem ent program. As a m a tte r of in te rest, the  program manager 
reserved to  himself approval authority of all changes estim ated  to increase costs 
in excess of $1.0 million within the cu rren t fiscal year or $3.0 million to ta l for 
the approved program. Similarly, the program manager was the sole approval/ 
disapproval authority  for changes estim ated  to decrease costs in excess of $3.0 
million within the current fiscal year or $10.0 million to ta l for the approved 
program .^ This tolerance band is in teresting because i t  dem onstrates clearly tha t 
the  m anagerial indifference zone of the program m anager had both a  cost 
increase (upper boundary) and a  cost decrease (lower boundary) lim it. One might 
have in tuitively assumed that no lower lim it would be established in this specific 
case.
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Configuration Management Plan, 
Safeguard System Master Plan (SSMP) P a rt 3.10, Revision 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
O ffice Chief of S taff, 3 March 1971), pp. 1-1 - 1-4.
2
U.S., Departm ent of the Army, Safeguard Configuration Management 
O perating System Manual, Safeguard System M aster Plant (SSMP) Supplement 
No. 3.10.A, Revision 1 (Huntsville, Alabama: U.S. Army Safeguard System
Command, 4 November 1971), pp. 6-15 - 6-16.
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Reporting requirem ents were sim ilar to those discussed above for the 
RDT&E/strategic cell and will not be repeated here. One point deserves 
re iteration , however. As was the case with the RDT&E situation, the one-on-one 
encounters with the program m anager in in-process reviews and special sessions 
were clearly the most beneficial. The forum provided for discussion, rapid 
communication and response, and the potential for rapid affirm ative action.
Tactical Considerations 
Management control a t the tac tica l level in the production phase was a  more 
structured process than used in the  RDT&E phase. It was also a  more rigid 
process, essentially devoid of the flexibility enjoyed in the RDT&E phase. 
Volume production forces greater m anagem ent discipline and form ality fo r three 
major reasons. F irst, i t  is essential th a t an engineering base line be fully 
documented to assure system atic communication between engineers. This 
fac ilita tes technical visibility and provides the requisite audit tra il for problem 
resolution. Secondly, the potential cost im pacts a re  higher since a defective 
design is much m ore costly to co rrect once a design is in production. For 
example, changes to  production tooling are typically expensive, as is re tro f it of 
equipment already delivered. Third, a defective design delivered to the  user 
could result in an inoperative weapon system . This is certainly not a desirable 
s ta te .
These managem ent control requirem ents of this cell presented a 
sizable challenge because of the m ultifaceted scope of the activ ity . The 
synchronization of all of the e ffo rt was an enormous undertaking in itse lf even 
without the  technical complexities involved. The inherent technical complexity, 
coupled with the schedule and deploym ent concurrency issues, increased the
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magnitude of the m anagem ent control task significantly . The im pact of the 
deployment concurrency issue abated as the  number of sites in the program was 
increm entally decreased, but the other did not a tten u a te  as rapidly.
Assessment and Definition
Analysis of this elem ent revealed tha t the discussion recorded for this 
e lem ent in the RD T& E/tactical ceii applies equally well here. Many of the 
m anagers were d iffe ren t, the technical problems had a production orientation in 
lieu of an R&D orien tation , but the technical m anagem ent relationships were 
quite sim ilar.
The fidelity  of the engineering docum entation released to production is 
the key to  smooth transition  from RDT&E to production. Even though 
increm ental releases of item s to production may occur, the  documentation must 
be technically com plete in all particulars. D etailed end item  engineering 
docum entation is  essential in order to  accurately describe specifically what is 
being procured both in the  buying cycle and in the m aterie l acceptance cycle. 
Control of hardware and site  facility  docum entation and system softw are is 
e ffec ted  through the configuration m anagem ent program , while control of 
m aterie l quality is accomplished through the product assurance program. Both 
programs are c ritica l to  success in the production phase and are stressed 
accordingly.
The engineering doucm entation "released to  production" pertained 
solely to  the hardw are portion of the weapon system . The technical 
docum entation for the s ite  facilities was "released" from  the RDT&E phase to 
the production phase, but the docum entation was th e  basis for a construction 
process, not a m anufacturing process. Similarly, system  softw are was "released"
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from the RDT&E phase to  the  production phase, but th e re  was not a 
m anufacturing or construction process associated with system softw are. In other 
words, system  softw are possessed the unique quality of being able to transition  
directly  from the RDT&E phase to  the  production phase w ithout having to  go 
through a m anufacturing process. When released from RDT&E, i t  was equivalent 
to  the output of th e  m anufacturing process, and required installation and 
in tegration  only. As a resu lt, system  softw are was transm itted  directly from  the 
developer to the ta c tica l s ite  for installation and in tegration  with the system 
hardw are. ^
Interrogation and Identification
The constrain ts, potential for some form or dimension of common 
denom inator, and major ch arac te ris tic s  of the technical perform ance param eter 
a t  the tac tica l level w ere strikingly sim ilar to  those described for the s tra teg ic  
level.
While no m ajor differences in substance w ere noted, the characteris­
tic s  of risk, uncertain ty , and change were more discernible a t  th e  tactical level 
than a t the  s tra teg ic  level. This was due fundam entally to  the  summarization 
and predigestion of da ta  th a t occurred as it moved up the program management 
chain of command. It was also a  function of the length and frequency of 
exposure of ta c tica l level m anagers to  the near-term  rea lities  of the production 
phase. In o ther words, ta c tic a l level m anagers were closer to  th e  major sources 
of production risk, uncertain ty , and change than the  s tra teg ic  level m anager.
A broad study of Safeguard system softw are is contained in 
J . D. Musa and F. N. Woomer, Jr. "Software Project M anagement," Bell System 
Technical Journal (Special Supplement) (1975); S245-S269.
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both hierarchically  and functionally .. Consequently, the characteristics of risk, 
uncertain ty , and change were more evident a t  th e  tac tica l level than a t the 
s tra teg ic  level.
M anagement Control Requirem ents
In large m easure the m anagem ent control requirem ents a t the  tac tica l 
level were associated directly with im plem entation of strateg ically  driven 
requirem ents. Two tools, configuration m anagem ent and product assurance, are 
worthy of b rief elaboration, however, due to  the ir relevance specifically to the 
ta c tica l level situation.
The principal objectives of the  configuration m anagem ent program 
were to establish a configuration base line, control all changes to  th a t base line, 
define the approved product configuration, and document actual product 
configuration. The program also had an "early  warning" feature to  assure th a t all 
ac tiv ities concerned were notified in advance of major changes being considered 
th a t a ffec ted  their product. ̂
The configuration m anagem ent procedure specified th ree  tim e-phased 
form al review s of system design. F irst, a  C ritical Design Review (CDR) was 
required before  the design could be released  to  production. The CDR was the 
vehicle used to  perm it the U.S. Army to  assure th a t the design m et system 
requirem ents and was ready for re lease  to production. The F irst A rticle 
Configuration Review (FACR) was conducted to  compare in itia l production 
hardw are w ith the docum entation tha t described the production configuration. 
This second review was used to  confirm  the validity of production
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Arm y, Configuration M anagement Plan,
pp. 1—1 -  1-3.
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docum entation. The FACR was authorized to  be conducted as a product 
assurance function instead of a  configuration m anagement function. Third, the 
Documentation Validation Audit (OVA) was required for ta c tica l hardw are a fte r  
sufficient quantities of the  item  had been produced to  perm it stabilization of the 
m anufacturing processes. The purpose of the DVA was to  evaluate and confirm 
the fidelity  of the engineering documentation of the production base line. ̂
A separate  tim e-phased review process was required for site  fac ilities. 
The Review of Facilities Design (RFD) was required on the design of site 
facilities when design was 30 percent com plete, 60 percent com plete, and 90 
percent com plete. The purpose of these reviews was to assure th a t design was 
progressing satisfactorily  and th a t all requirem ents were being considered during 
the design activ ity .
The configuration management program also provided mechanisms for 
processing changes to  the base line and for processing waivers and deviations. 
C riteria  w ere defined for determining which of four established hierarchic 
approvals was appropriate in any given circum stance. Specific requirem ents also 
defined the  regular and special reports required and the form of m andatory 
historical files and records.^
The unique qualities of system softw are discussed previously perm itted  
it to  be base-lined la te r than the hardware and site  facilities designs. It was also 
determ ined th a t a departure from the concepts of a  CDR, FACR, and DVA was 
required since the procedures for those formal reviews reflected  a typical
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Safeguard Configuration M anagement 
Operating System Manual, pp. 5-1 - 5-30.
^Ibid., pp. 5-30 - 5-31. ^Ibid., pp. 4-1 - 4-32, 6-1 - 10-26.
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hardware approach not appropriate for system softw are. ̂  Configuration manage­
ment, as a  process, originated as a means of controlling documentation and
2
hardware, but the principles are also applicable to  system softw are.
The configuration management approach adopted for Safeguard system 
software was re ferred  to  as a "Stages of control" m ethod. Under this concept, 
the controlled docum entation passed through two stages. The first stage 
involved con tracto r control only. The second stage occurred a fte r base-lining 
and involved joint contractor/U .S . Army control. The docum entation base-lined 
included the  perform ance/design specifications; docum entation related  to  ta c ­
tics, softw are operation and te s t, and necessary support functions; and the source 
code^ for the  actual system softw are end-product used a t  each site .^
The prim ary objective of the product assurance program was to 
achieve the highest weapons system reliability and availability  levels possible, 
within the tim e and cost constraints, consistent with m aterie l need. Each of the 
more than tw o million components used in the system had to  be tested  to assure 
tha t they conformed to  the design param eters stipulated  in appropriate 
engineering drawings and specifications. Product assurance data  were used to
U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Safeguard 
Software Configuration Management Plan and Software Local Configuration 
Control Board C harter, Revision 2 (Whippany, New Jersey; Bell Laboratories, 
2 August 1974), pp. 5, 22.
2
For an enlightening discussion on Safeguard system  softw are configu­
ration m anagem ent, see D. Van Haften, "Software Change Control," Bell System 
Technical Journal (Special Supplement) (1975); S231-S244.
^Source code is the original symbolic language statem ents in which 
softw are is prepared prior to assembly or compilation.
If,
U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Safeguard 
Software Configuration Management Plan and Softw are Local Configuration 
Control Board C harter, pp. 5-13.
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define a rea listic  picture of system reliability  and availability . More impor­
tan tly , the program was m eant to  provide early warning of po ten tia l problem 
areas.
The product assurance program was operative across the  to ta l life 
cycle of the  Safeguard weapon system and was composed of several subprograms. 
The quality assurance e ffo rt was designed prim arily to  assure the  requisite 
degree of quality in all m ateriel and to  prevent quality failures. The Corrosion 
Control and D eterioration Prevention Program was aimed a t pro tecting  the 
weapon system components from corrosive environm ents. The Standardization 
Program established a means of minimizing the introduction of new components, 
item s, processes, and practices into the weapon system . Its major objectives 
w ere to  enhance in ter changeability, to  conserve resources, and to  improve the 
operational readiness of the weapon system . The Reliability Program was aimed 
a t assuring th a t established reliability characteristics of the weapon system  were 
not degraded during m anufacture, operation, m aintenance, and s to rage  of the 
weapon system . Finally, the prime objective of the M aintainability Program was 
to assure th a t the m aintainability considerations developed during th e  RDT&E 
phase were not perm itted  to  degrade during operation, m aintenance, and 
storage.^
A number of periodic and special reports were required. In addition,
special investigation and audit reports w ere stipulated  on a regular and an 
2as-required basis.





As with previous sections, the two cells discussed here a re  identical 
except for the  level dimension. The firs t ceil is the  technical perform ance/ 
deployment phase/stra teg ic  level cell, while the second is the  technical 
perform ance/deploym ent phase/tactica l level cell.
S trateg ic  Considerations 
As indicated in previous chapters, the  assignm ent of responsibility for 
operation of the ta c tic a l s ite  was not a normal responsibility of a  program 
m anager. While the phase was of short duration, it was a dichotomous situation. 
On one hand it represented  an added burden to the program m anager and his 
s ta ff. It broadened the program manager's sphere of d irect responsibility and 
added an exposure to  new and d ifferen t problems. On the other hand, one of the 
prim ary purposes of the deployment phase was to gain operational experience of 
a deployed ABM s ite . The assignment of responsibility to the program manager 
for deployment enhanced his ability  to  accomplish this aspect of the technical 
perform ance param eter.
Assessment and D efinition
Three m ajor technical activ ities were highlighted in the deployment 
phase. The f ir s t ,  the  operation of the  logistics program, is a normal function of 
the program m anager. The second, the training of instructors, operating, and 
m aintenance personnel, is usually the sole responsibility of the U.S. Army 
training community. In the case of Safeguard, the program m anager exercised 
executive authority  over the training program. Finally, the operation of an 
activated  s ite  is normally the mission of the U.S. Army user community. The
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operation of the Safeguard s ite  was conducted under th e  purview of the program 
manager.
The over-all responsibility for the establishm ent of policy and guidance 
for logistic support of the Safeguard system  was assigned to  the  program 
manager. The mission of developing, implem enting, and operating the  logistics 
system was initially assigned to  th e  U.S. Army Safeguard Logistics Command 
(SAFLOG), a subordinate command of the U.S. Army M ateriel Command.^ The 
SAFLOG had the  sole task  of providing system  mission essential logistics support 
of tac tica l equipm ent a t  the s ite . This responsibility included developm ent of 
quantitative and qualitative logistics support requirem ents, operation of the 
logistics depot, procurem ent and distribution of repair parts inventories, and 
periodic evaluation of the  results of logistics effo rts. The size and complexity of 
the Safeguard program required substantial levels of manpower and equipment 
resources for its support and justified establishm ent of independent Safeguard 
dedicated institu tions such as SAFLOG.
Responsibility for non-mission essential support of the tac tica l site
2
was the responsibility of the U.S. Army C ontinental Army Command. This non­
mission support included common services, adm inistration of contracts awarded 
in the geographical proxim ity of the site , and special transportation required 
occasionally for evacuation of weapon system equipment to m anufacturing 
facilities or the  depot.^
^The U.S. Army M ateriel Command was subsequently redesignated the 
U.S. Army M ateriel Developm ent and Readiness Command.
^The U.S. Army C ontinental Army Command was subsequently 
abolished. Its mission was divided between two newly established commands: 
the  U.S. Army Forces Command and the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Principles of Management, p. 31.
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In October, 1972, the  Secretary of the Army concurred in a  program
m anager conclusion tha t logistic support fo r a single deployed ABM site  could be
provided more effectively  by the  prime contractor than by a fully dedicated
logistics system while m aintaining the same reliability , availability, and system
effectiveness objectives.^ As a result, th e  U.S. Army system , which was not
fully operational, was deactiva ted  and conversion to  a  contractor logistics
2
support system was accomplished.
The training mission included th re e  major segments. F irst, the New 
Equipment Training (NET) responsibility was assigned to BMDSCOM. NET is 
required for the training of m ilitary  and civilian training school instructors and 
o ther selected key personnel. This training is the  initial transfer of required 
techn ical knowledge from the designer to  the training school instructor cadre 
th a t form the off-site  resident training base and other key personnel th a t 
conduct and evaluate engineering and service te s ts  and occupy s ta ff positions 
th a t require a basic understanding of the weapon system . The second elem ent of 
the training mission was associated with the off-site  resident training of 
operating and m aintenance personnel. This provided requisite training for the 
operation, m aintenance, and support of the  weapon system a t the tac tica l site . 
This training program was the  responsibility o f the  U.S. Army Continental Army 
Command. The third e lem en t of the training mission concerned the on-site
A study of co n trac to r logistics support in comparison to U.S. Army 
logistics support was perform ed in 1972 at the  direction of the program manager. 
Results are  documented in U. S., Army Safeguard System Command, Safeguard 
Site M aintenance Study Evaluation (Huntsville, Alabama, 7 August 1972)1
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the  Army, In tegrated Logistics Support Plan, 
Safeguard System M aster Plan (SSMP) Part 3.15, Revision 3 (Washington, D.C.: 
O ffice Chief of S taff, 7 November 1973), pp. 1-1 -  1-2.
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training of operating and m aintenance personnel primarily by prime contractor
personnel. This training was designed to  qualify personnel to  meet the
operational requirem ents of each s ite  through on-the-job training. This training
was the  responsibility of the user community.^
The decision by the  Secretary  of the  Army to adopt contractor
logistics support also caused a change in the  training philosophy. NET and off-
site  resident training were conducted for a lim ited  number of personnel, and the
scope of course offerings was drastically  reduced. All other required training
2
was accomplished on-site through jo in t U.S. Arm y/prim e contractor training.
Planning for both the logistics support and training programs was 
initiated early in the  RDT&E phase. While the planning was accomplished as a 
concom m itant off-line product of the  m ain-strearn design e ffo rt, it was updated 
as major design changes occurred. Plans were solidified for both tasks early in 
the production phase, and prelim inary im plem entation was in itiated. Both tasks 
were time phased to  achieve full realization  in the deployment phase, but both 
had to be modified substantially from their original form to provide for 
adjustm ent from a m ulti-site program to a  one-site program.
In early  1973, the Secretary  of Defense directed that the Safeguard 
site mission include operation for the  purpose of gaining experience relative to  
the installation, te s t, and operation of a deployed ABM site . This objective was 
in addition to the basic objective o f defense against ballistic missile a ttack  or
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Principles of M anagement, pp. 34-33.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the  Army, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMP) 
Integrated Training Plan, Safeguard System M aster Plan (SSMP) P art 3.17, 
Revision 1 (Washington, D. C.: O ffice Chief of S taff, 21 August 1973),
pp. 1-1 - 1-4.
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accidental launch. The purpose was to  secure vital data  for use in the fu tu re  
developm ent and deployment of ballistic  missile defense system s, should th a t 
becom e a reality . Operating experience was gained and a data  base developed 
during the period th a t the Safeguard s ite  was operational.^
Interrogation and Identification
The change from  a U.S. Army logistics support to con tracto r logistics 
support for Safeguard in 1972 represented  a m id-course steering control 
correction to the  planned course of action . It was triggered by control feedback 
and was an excellent exam ple of proactive m anagem ent. The m anagem ent 
in itia tive  tha t resulted in the deactivation of the dedicated U.S. Army logistics 
support system and concurrent establishm ent of a con tracto r logistics support 
activ ity  was a prudent program decision. It resulted in a substantial cost 
avoidance and simplified the  m anagem ent control situation.
The diversity o f ac tiv ities  in the deployment phase presented a 
situation , with regard to la ten t in terdepencies, sim ilar to  th a t found in the 
RDT&E and production phases. There was not an easy method of linking 
technical perform ance d a ta  w ithout the use of a surrogate. As before, the 
surrogate was the schedule param eter.
During the deployment phase, the program continued to be technology­
intensive. The development o f operational experience unique to  a tactica lly  
deployed system was considered c ritica l. Cost became a  more c ritica l param eter 
than schedule, however, as the resource crunch began to  a ffec t the program.
U.S., Army B allistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Safeguard 
O perational Experience Program (SOEP) Report P art-I (Huntsville, Alabama: 
PAR Management Office, February 1977), pp. 1-1 -  1-9.
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M anagement Control Requirem ents .
The logistics support program was driven by the In tegrated  Logistic
Support Plan. It served as the  fundam ental reference for the logistic support
e ffo rt. It established procedure, designated responsibilities, and described
required tim e sequencing of major activ ities. Two com ponent plans were
specified. The f irs t, the  Safeguard M aintenance Support Plan, was a  planning
docum ent outlining the concepts of m aintenance for Safeguard equipment. The
second, the  Safeguard Supply Support Plan, se t forth guidelines for all applicable
partic ipants to  follow in the im plem entation and use of the supply system.^
The training program was described in the In tegrated  Training Plan
(ITP). It consisted of three major sections com patible with the breakout of the
mission; i.e ., NET, o ff-site  resident training, and on-site on-the-job training.
Responsibility for consolidating, coordinating, publishing, and maintaining the
ITP was assigned to the U.S. Army Continental Army Command. The program
m anager also established a BMD Training C om m ittee to coordinate and review
2
all tra in ing  m a tte rs  prior to presentation to him for disposition.
Requirem ents for the  Safeguard Operational Experience Program were 
docum ented in a  report by the sam e title .^
Once th e  individual plans c ited  above had been approved, the program 
manager m onitored progress through schedule and cost control technique and
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, In tegrated  Logistics Support Plan, 
pp. 1-1, 5-1, 6—1 - 6-4.
2
U.S., D epartm ent of the Army, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
In tegrated  Training Plan, pp. v, 1-1 - 1-4.
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Safeguard
O perational Experience Program (SOEP) R eport P art-I.
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tools. In addition, periodic perform ance reports, both regular and special, and 
oral and w ritten  reports w ere rendered by key managers of the plans.
The m anagem ent activ ities covered in this m atrix cell were not 
su itab le for the  use of technical perform ance m anagem ent thresholds or 
to lerances. Exception reporting was driven primarily by the schedule param eter. 
In general, m anagem ent thresholds and tolerances were not u tilized for control 
purposes in this m atrix  cell.
Tactical Consideraiions 
The technical perform ance/deploym ent phase /tac tica l level cell is a 
very significant cell in th e  PPL analysis m atrix. It is here th a t the firs t 
technical feedback from the user community occurs. The initial operation of a 
typical weapon by the user is frequently a turbulent period. It is the period when 
the  system is fully "wrung out" by th e  personnel th a t  may have to  operate i t  
during actual hostilities. As a resu lt, the weapon system  is tested  to the lim it 
and often  beyond the limits of its specifications.
In the Safeguard program the organizational separation between the 
user and the developer was not nearly as distinct as it typically is in classic U.S. 
Army project m anagem ent. Furtherm ore, the prim e con tracto r m aintained 
techn ical personnel a t the s ite  throughout the to ta l period of deployment. These 
two fac to rs tended to  minimize the im pact of the transition from the  production 
to  the  deploym ent phase.
Assessment and Definition
The th ree  major technical activ ities discussed in the analysis of the 
s tra teg ic  level w ere im plem ented a t the  tac tica l level. The m anagem ent control 
situation a t the ta c tica l level was atypical for all th ree  activ ities. Two were
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unusual because of the  conversion from U.S. Army logistics support to  con tracto r 
logistics support. The third activ ity  was atypical because it was a mission 
normally reserved to the user community.
The control situation for the  logistics support activ ity  was ch arac te r­
ized as a "manage" function under the  U.S. Army logistics support system . The 
mission essential logistics support function was perform ed by SAFLOG and 
managed by BMDSCOM. The non-mission essentiai support was perform ed by the 
U.S. Army C ontinental Army Command and managed by BMDSCOM. Under the  
con tracto r logistics support concept, a  portion of the "doing" function was 
assigned to BMDSCOM and a portion was con tracted  to the prime con tracto r. 
Under this arrangem ent, BMDSCOM was assigned responsibility for perform ing 
Base Operations Support a t  the tac tica l s ite , which included such tasks as 
nontactical supply, pay of personnel, family housing, operation of nontactical s ite  
fac ilities and equipm ent, and non-tactical facilities maintenance. These tasks 
were fa r rem oved from normal program management tac tica l level responsibil­
ities, since Base Operations Support is usuaily the mission of the U.S. Army 
Continental Army Command in the continental United States.
The change occasioned by the change In training concept was not as 
g rea t. There was a sh ift of emphasis from off-site  training to on-site training, 
but not a sh ift in responsibility or mission. Task assignments rem ained 
essentially as planned, but task execution was modified consistent with a  single 
site  program.
The assignm ent of responsibility for operation of the tac tica l s ite  to  
the program m anager was a  mission foreign to a developer/producer organiza­




In a broad sense, the use of con tracto r logistics support services, the 
con tractor presence on-site throughout the deployment phase, and the assign­
m ent of site  operation responsibility to  the designer/producer cast an aura of 
continuing development on the deployment phase. In essence, these factors 
tended to  "dem ilitarize” the activities of the deployment phase in comparison to 
American com bat units deployed outside the continental United S tates. These 
fac to rs, however, did not detract from the u tility  of the operational experience 
da ta  gathered.
Probably the cardinal characteristic  of the  deployment phase for an air 
defense weapon system  is an obsession with weapon system  availability  and 
readiness. The nature  of the ballistic missile th re a t is such th a t a defensive 
weapon system m ust be in a  high s ta te  of readiness tw enty-four hours a day, 
seven days a week. This places a severe strain  on the hardware, softw are, site  
fac ilities, and personnel comprising the system . It also mandates th a t a great 
deal of managem ent emphasis be directed tow ard assuring th a t all factors 
contributing to weapon system reliability and availability be highly e ffec tive .
M anagement Control Requirements
The Integrated  Logistic Support Plan and its component plans—the 
Safeguard M aintenance Support Plan and the Safeguard Supply Support Plan— 
were th e  standards for management control of the  logistics support function. 
Additionally, the prime contractor was d irec ted  to  develop an Integrated 
Logistics Support Management Information System for collecting, processing, 
storing, manipulating, and retrieving logistics support management inform ation. 
This m anagem ent inform ation system provided th e  required degree of visibility
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for the to ta l logistics support activ ity  for the Safeguard BMD System . 
C ontractor e ffo rt was defined in a contractually  binding definitive scope of 
work. This scope of work was the standard for con tracto r perform ance and was 
controlled through normal U.S. Army co n trac t adm inistration procedures.
The training activ ity  was controlled through th e  Integrated Training 
Plan, and managem ent of training was in teg ra ted  with the  m anagement of the 
Safeguard program. The Integrated Training Plan outlined the requirem ent for 
all th ree  major segm ents of training and identified the requirem ents for 
instructors and adm inistrative personnel, training aids, equipm ent, and fac ilities. 
It also specified curriculum , schedule, and student loads.
Two techniques were used in the  m anagem ent control of the Safeguard 
O perational Experience Program. The firs t was a detailed plan th a t defined a 
system atic  methodology for obtaining, analyzing, and reporting inform ation to 
assure th a t maximum benefit was obtained. The second was the establishm ent of 
a Safeguard O perational Experience Program Steering Com m ittee. The 
com m ittee 's prim ary ch arte r was to develop and im plem ent the plan. It also 
included such specific tasks as review of experim ents proposed for accomplish­
m ent and identification of c ritica l issues for resolution by appropriate agencies.
Even though the activ ity  represented by this cell in the PPL analysis 
m atrix  represented atypical functions for a designer/producer agency, the  
m anagem ent control activ ity  was taken in stride . In large m easure, control was 
exercised through the cost and schedule param eters.
Term ination Phase 
The term ination phase is the  final phase in the life  cycle. For 
Safeguard it m eant the transfer, storage, and/or disposal of the hardw are.
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softw are, s ite  fac ilities, and personnel th a t constitu ted  the  weapon system . It 
also precip ita ted  the abolishm ent of Safeguard dedicated m anagem ent activ ities 
and conclusion of all c o n tra c t activity .
The two cells discussed in this section are  iden tical excep t for the 
level dimension. The f irs t cell discussed is the techn ical perform ance/ 
term ination phase/stra teg ic  level cell. The second is th e  technical 
perform ance/term ination  phase/tactica l level cell.
S tra teg ic  Considerations 
Most m ilitary  pro jects ultim ately move into the  term ination  phase. 
Some projects evolve from deployment to term ination only a f te r  a tta in m en t of 
com plete stabilization and satisfaction of full m ilitary usefulness in earlie r 
phases. Other p ro jects evolve a fte r experiencing tru n ca ted  ac tiv ity  in prior 
phases. The la tte r  occurred in the case of th e  Safeguard program . Although its 
full m ilitary poten tia l was never realized or dem onstrated , the  program 
term ination phase began in February, 1976, and ended in Septem ber, 1977.
Assessment and Definition
The m anagem ent control situation was defined by th ree  major 
ac tiv ities: (1) tran sfe r, storage, and/or disposal of all weapon system
components o ther than the Perim eter Acquisition R adar (PAR); (2) tran sfe r of 
th e  PAR to  the  U.S. Air Force; and (3) preparation of lessons learned.
The tran sfe r, storage, and/or disposal of weapon system  components 
had been anticipated fo r several years prior to receip t of ac tu a l direction to 
proceed. As a  consequence, the activ ity  had been thoroughly analyzed, 
a lternatives studied, and plans prepared- The technical requirem ents of those 
components destined fo r long-term  storage w ere prepared and approved.
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Transfer of the PAR to the U.S. Air Force involved reassignm ent of 
to ta l responsibility for all aspects of PAR operation, m aintenance, and technical 
control from the U.S. Army to  the U.S. Air Force. A detailed plan^ was 
developed by the program manager to provide for a  smooth and orderly 
transition . The plan described the program manager's method of operation for 
the PAR site , identified specific issues requiring resolution, and scheduled 
activ ities  and m ilestones associated with the transfer.
The preparation of lessons learned is normally associated with the 
term ination phase. The process is widely used throughout the U.S. Army 
m anagem ent s truc tu re  as a  vehicle for documenting significant positive and 
negative experiences. Contributions to  a lessons learned docum ent are  usually 
solicited from all major participants. Contributors are encouraged to  be candid 
in their com m ents and screening of submissions is minimized. Taken in 
perspective, lessons learned can be a  major input and tran sfe r of knowledge to 
the m anagem ent decision-making process of subsequent managers in allied 
endeavors.
Interrogation and Identification
The term ination phase for a large-scale complex endeavor is typically 
cost constrained. Every e ffo rt must be made to  maximize a lte rn ate  usage of 
salvageable m aterie l and facilities. Transfer of knowledge m ust be accomplished 
e ffectively  where required. Technical and program files must be put in order and 
re tired  to  records holding areas. Last, but certain ly  not le as t, the m anagem ent 
personnel associated with the program must be considered and appropriate 
personnel actions taken.
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Proposed 
Army Input; PAR Transfer Plan (PART?).
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Schedule control assumes, a  position o f secondary im portance in the 
term ination phase. This is due, in large m easure, to  its relation to the funding 
cycle. In other words, funds for the p ro ject are typically budgeted only through 
the year in which the term ination phase is planned to  be concluded. As a 
consequence, any tim e extension of schedules opens a  possible exposure to a 
requirem ent for additional funds in a  period in which none are budgeted.
Technical perform ance control drops to  third priority in the term ina­
tion phase. It is concerned prim arily with the  tran sfe r of knowledge and 
developm ent of technically adequate storage procedures for m ateriel going into 
long-term  storage.
M anagement Control Requirements
At the stra teg ic  level, th e  deactivation of the tac tica l site was 
controlled by the term ination and deactivation plans, with cost and schedule 
control as the prim ary control techniques. The transfer, storage and/or disposal 
of applicable weapon system components involved national government agencies 
within and w ithout the DoD, s ta te  governm ents, and local governm ents. Every 
e ffo rt was made to  reutilize all available elem ents.
The transfer of the PAR to  the U.S. Air Force was controlled through 
the PAR Transfer Plan; i.e., the PAR Transfer Plan was the standard for control 
ac tiv ity . C ritical milestones were developed and used to assess sta tus of actions 
taken in accordance with the plan. The to ta l e ffo rt was coordinated with the Air 
Force to  assure orderly and tim ely transfer of the PAR.
The preparation of lessons learned actually began prior to the official 
com m encem ent of the term ination phase. This action was taken in this manner 
to cap ture  as much management experience as possible before i t  was lost to the
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program. Since phase-out of management organizations and principal subcon­
trac to rs  began prior to the term ination phase, it was necessary to  in itia te  
activ ity  in this regard while the  participants still had an obligation to the 
Safeguard program . The effort was beneficial and resulted in a published report 
th a t compiled lessons learned into the three areas of program control, BMD 
weapon system, and BMD ta c tica l site.^ The report presumes th a t individuals 
using it will be fam iliar with the topics covered and favors brevity over detail.
T actical Considerations 
The technical perform ance/term ination phase/tactica l level cell in the  
PPL analysis m atrix  did not add any materially different considerations to the  
technical perform ance control situation beyond those described for the stra teg ic  
level. The detail in which tac tica l level managers operate  is a t a lower level in 
the work breakdown structure, but solution of the stra teg ic  level technical 
performance problem resolves the problem a t the tac tica l level as well. In sum, 
this cell did not influence the technical perform ance problem or its solution 
significantly. As a  result, further discussion of the cell is unnecessary.
Technical Perform ance Control in Perspective 
It is im portan t th a t the differentiation between the  "process" of 
technical perform ance and the "demonstration" of weapon system perform ance 
be understood. The "process" of technical perform ance involves the design, te s t , 
produce, operate, and appraise cycle which is a t the core of the  technical 
perform ance param eter. The "demonstration" of • system perform ance charac­
teristics involves such specifics as kill probability, system detection  range.
^U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Safeguard 
Lessons Learned (Huntsville, Alabama, January 1976).
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engagem ent range, multiple ta rg e t handling capability, and similar features of 
weapon system capability. The "process" of technical perform ance is subject to 
the management controis discussed in this chapter. The "dem onstration" of 
system perform ance characteristics is measured through direct testing and 
s ta tis tica l inference techniques. The values so determ ined a re  characteristic  of 
the weapon system , just as certa in  qualities are ch arac te ris tic  of individual 
human personality. Lack of a tta in m en t of or a  degradation in a ttained  system 
perform ance may re su lt—and frequently  does—in the re-energization of the 
technical perform ance param eter.
One of the  most d ifficu lt tasks of the technical perform ance 
param eter is the quantification of specific requirem ents w ithout overshadowing 
the purely qualitative aspects. There is a compelling need, particuiariy  with the 
technical perform ance param eter, to quantify requirem ents to assure th a t 
progress toward the ir a tta in m en t can be accurately  m easured. By the sam e 
token, however, there  are  qualita tive  elem ents th a t defy quantification, but must 
not be overlooked. The relevance of quan tita tive  and qualita tive  considerations 
was s ta ted  with g rea t clarity  in a  U.S. Air Force M anagement Manual published 
over tw enty years ago;
When we judge th e  effectiveness of an operational system , the 
number and im portance of the s tric tly  qualita tive  c rite ria  far outweigh 
the number of quan tita tive  c rite ria . To close our eyes to  these 
qualitative c rite ria  and to rely com pletely on the purely quantita tive  is 
to  court d isaster. A manager of an operational system cannot afford 
to  overlook the highly im portant qualitative aspects by taking refuge 
in the m eager inform ation made available to  him by numerical data 
which constantly  flow over his desk.
On the o ther hand, a  m anager simply cannot operate without 
running head long into the need for quan tita tive  standards of 
perform ance. He m ust know how long it will tak e  to  com plete a given 
job, how many working days of how many people will be required, how 
much of what m aterials it  will be necessary to use, and how much it 
will cost. Answers to  these questions are  based on perform ance 
standards and have one significant point in common: They all deal
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with "How many and how much" — th a t is, with quantities. Need for 
answers to  questions of th is type leads to  th e  drive for quantification  
of d a ta  which m anagers can use.
While th e  philosophy described is tru e  of the cost and schedule param eters, it  is 
particularly  applicable to  the  technical perform ance param eter. The m anage­
m ent control tools and techniques used must be orien ted  to the q u an tita tiv e  
w ithout loosing sight of the  need for and value o f th e  qualita tive .
The role of the m anager in technical endeavors is becoming increas­
ingly im portant. Stephens expressed it in these term s;
Just as the  engineers tran sla te  the discoveries of scien tists  into 
workable and p rac tica l applications to  im prove our lives, the  manager 
is a m ultiplier of both the effo rts  of sc ien tists  and engineers in 
bringing forth  and spreading the use o f technology. It is through 
organization and m anagem ent th a t the  fru its  of labor and progress of 
science are coalesced into modern society . Increasingly, m anagem ent 
is as much the fac to r advancing technology as the application of 
discoveries and the diffusion of knowiedge.
The technical m anagem ent of large-scale complex endeavors is a demanding and
compelling task involving a m ultitude of in te rre la ted  ac tiv ities. The technical
m anager has both the opportunity and the challenge to  develop and im plem ent
m anagem ent and technical initiatives tha t will have synergistic e ffec ts  upon the
to ta l endeavor.
^U.S., D epartm ent of the Air Force, The M anagement P rocess, Air 
Force Manual 25-1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, Septem ber 
1954), pp. 48-49.
^Stephens, Managing Complexity; Work, Technology, and Human 
R elations, p. 281.
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study exam ines m anagem ent control as i t  was perform ed in a 
large-scale complex endeavor. The preceding analysis assesses the application of 
in tegrated  m anagem ent control in the program and examines changes both in the 
m anagem ent control situation  and in the  associated m anagerial response. The 
technique used for th e  analysis was the PPL analysis m atrix . Each of the three 
major param eters of cost, schedule, and technical perform ance are examined 
throughout the program life  cycle a t the stra teg ic  and ta c tic a l decision-making 
levels. This chapter is a summary of this study e ffo rt and contains conclusions 
drawn from  the analysis.
Scope of Chapter
The specific objectives of this final chapter are threefold . F irst, the 
need for in tegrated  m anagem ent control in large-scale complex endeavors is 
addressed. The rea lity  of in tegrated control as experienced In the Safeguard 
program is considered in the  sam e con tex t and so is the re la tive  im portance of 
the  th ree cardinal program  param eters over tim e. Secondly, having com pleted 
the c ritica l exam ination of the individual cells in the PPL analysis m atrix, the 
m atrix is reassem bled and refined in a  manner d ictated  by the results of the 
analysis. This has resu lted  in a  reconfiguration of the m atrix  th a t differs from
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th e  original model. Finally, it  is proposed th a t management can and should have 
a  base line for m anagem ent control tha t is transferable, adaptive, and dynamic. 
This discussion cen ters on the interrelationships among the cost, schedule, and 
technical perform ance param eters and the compelling need for p roactive  
m anagem ent control in large-scale complex endeavors.
I t  is no t suggested tha t the  conclusions drawn in th is chap ter a re  the 
"one best way" in which to accomplish the m anagement control function. To the 
contrary, the  conclusions here recorded are intended to  serve as guides and to  
stim ulate the developm ent of new and advanced management in itiatives tha t 
enhance in tegrated  m anagem ent control of large-scale complex endeavors.
Need for Integrated M anagement Control 
The urgent need for integrated management control seems clear. 
While it is a convenience to  the exam ination process to analyze the  th ree  
program param eters in isolation, they cannot be controlled in tha t manner. The 
development of a lte rnatives and trade-offs among cost, schedule, and technical 
perform ance is a  consuming activity  in program management. E ffective means 
fo r accomplishing rapid and accurate forecasting of the e ffe c t of proposed 
changes to any two of the param eters on the third param eter are  required.
The Cost P aram eter 
Money is simultaneously both a resource to be utilized by the program 
m anager in the advancem ent of his program objectives and a  critical means of 
measuring program perform ance. It is probably the most im portant of the th ree 
param eters to the  general public in major m atters of substance involving 
government spending. Following initiation of the production phase of a military 
weapon system , cost is probably the m ost im portant param eter in the
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conventional judgem ent of Congress as well. The principal concern by both 
groups appears to  be th a t fiscal support to one program will divert money from 
more favored programs. The re lative im portance o f cost tends to  increase as the 
system progresses through the life cycle in the view of the U.S. Army, becoming 
param ount in the term ination phase. Because of these differing views of the 
relative im portance of cost between the U.S. Army and its environment, the 
development of pragm atic alternatives involving trad e-o ff analyses assumes 
added im portance.
Management control requirements for the cost param eter a t the 
stra teg ic  decision-making level should be derived independentiy of requirements 
for the tac tica l level and should be established firs t. T actical level requirem ents 
realistically should be an extension of s tra teg ic  level requirem ents—reaching 
several layers lower in the work breakdown s truc tu re  (WBS). Establishment and 
m aintenance of a fiscal audit tra il down through the  WBS is im perative. It is an 
essential of sound financial management. It is an autom atic  benefit of a WBS 
related financial managem ent and cost control system . Properly structured, the 
financial m anagement and cost control system  can be made to  transcend the 
boundaries of the s tra teg ic  and tac tica i decision-making levels with ease.
Dollars a re  the yardstick of m easurem ent for cost control and are the 
obvious in tegrative linkage in the cost param eter. C are must be used in 
exercising this linking thread due to the e ffe c t of inflation on dollars. Inflation 
is a  function of tim e, and while a compilation of figures in current-year dollars 
reflects the differences in actual money by year, the "real" difference in term s 
of purchasing power due to inflation must be reconciled. As a result, true 
comparisons of dollars in d ifferen t years must be equated to some selected base 
year, and all other year dollars must be inflated or deflated  accordingly.
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The Schedule P aram eter 
Time, like money, is concurrentiy both a resource in program 
m anagem ent and a convenient and e ffec tive  vehicle for measuring program 
perform ance. Time differs from money in th a t it is constant, certain , and cannot 
be stored. Schedule may be changed by the  addition or diminution of money, 
personnel, or o ther resources, but tim e cannot be changed. Schedule concurrency 
occurs through excessive overlapping of the  research , development, te s t , and 
evaluation (RDT&E) phase and the production phase. In the Safeguard program, 
deployment concurrency involving extensive overlap of s ite  construction and 
installation a t many sites was evident in original planning. The e ffe c t of 
concurrency is schedule compression. Concurrency is generally regarded as a 
major contributor to cost overruns in the weapon system  acquisition process.
It appears th a t the schedule param eter is second in im portance only to 
the cost param eter as viewed by the general public. The schedule param eter 
assumes the same level of im portance for the Congress a fte r initiation of the 
production phase. Viewed by the U.S. Army, the schedule param eter seldom 
assumes higher than second place in a rank ordering with the other two 
param eters. An exception would typically occur in a tim e-em phasis period of 
national urgency tha t c reates pressures for schedule compression.
Schedule control lends itse lf very well to  h ierarchic decision-making 
levels. Through use of carefully selected  m ilestones, a  program manager may 
manage the program schedule to  w hatever depth of detail he desires. As an 
example, the  uncertainties of the RDT<5cE phase suggest th a t the milestones 
selected be a t  a  reasonably high level in the WBS. As the degree of uncertainty 
diminishes in the maturing system , the m ilestones may be se lec ted  lower in the 
WBS. Through the proper setting  of m anagem ent control thresholds and
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tolerances, the  program manager may also assure th a t deviations a re  handied in 
differing m anners, depending upon th e  c ritica lity  of the threshold or tolerance 
breeched. Properly developed, s tra teg ic  level schedule control requirem ents 
should drive or determ ine tac tica l level requirem ents.
Tim e, as a  common reference o f m easurem ent, is a  clearly meaningful 
in tegrative thread in the  schedule control param ete r. Time Is sim ple, constant, 
and certa in . Time units may be m athem atically  m anipulated and are not subject 
to inflation. Also of significance is the fa c t  th a t tim e, unlike dollars, does not 
normally require 100 percent m easurem ent or tracking . Time is an effective 
linking th read , both horizontally and vertically , in the  WBS.
The Technical Perform ance P aram eter
The process of technical perform ance, involving the design, test, 
produce, opera te , and appraise cycle, is concerned w ith system design objectives 
and specifications. Its goal is assurance of the continual technical integrity  of 
the weapon system . The technical perform ance param eter has a decided 
emphasis on engineering and scientific  endeavors and the  advancem ent of 
technology. Technical perform ance control is a demanding and compelling task 
involving a m ultitude of in terrelated engineering and scien tific  activ ities. Of the 
three major program param eters, technical perform ance is the  most difficult to 
quantify.
The technical perform ance param eter is probably the least im portant 
of the th ree  program param eters in the  eyes of the general public. While there is 
an inherent national pride in the a tta inm ent of new plateaus of technology, the 
general public is not as sensitive to technical perform ance as it  is to  cost and 
schedule. With the exception of RDT&E activ ity , the Congress views the m atter
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in essentially the sam e light. The U. S. Army generally holds a  perspective th a t 
places technical perform ance ahead of cost and schedule through the deployment 
phase.
M anagement control of technical perform ance presents a  more
form idable challenge than e ith e r cost or schedule control. There is v irtually  no 
common denom inator of perform ance measurement, and each control require­
ment m ust be defined in units appropriate to the elem ent being controlled.
There is also difficulty  a ttach ed  to Identifying and defining acceptable levels of
technical risk. As a  resu lt, th e  establishm ent of m anagement control thresholds 
and to lerances is exceedingly complex. The difficulties associated with 
identification of e ffec tiv e  key control Indicators th a t provide the  earlies t 
possible indication of variance from technical requirem ents compounds this 
com plexity. Because of the d ifficu lties associated with the technical perform ­
ance control situation, cost and schedule control are frequently  used as
surrogates for technical contro l.
R elative Importance of the 
P aram eters  During the Life Cycle
Figure 15 depicts the re la tive  importance of the th ree  program 
param eters during a  weapon system  life cycle for the public. Congress, and 
service. It graphically portrays the thoughts discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs of this chap ter sec tion . With the exception of the RDT&E phase, it is 
suggested th a t the public and the  Congress are in harmony in their respective 
views. It is also suggested th a t the U.S. Army view and the Congressional view 
are  sim ilar in the RDT&E phase and th a t all th ree views are  identical in the 
term ination phase.
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The implications o f Figure i5  on the control situation underscore the 
need for in tegrated  m anagem ent in large-scale endeavors. The control situation 
is especially complex during the production and deployment phases. The program 
requirem ents tend to  d ic ta te  a  strong emphasis on technical perform ance; i.e ., a 
technicai perform ance-em phasis priority. External influences, however, re flec t 
a  cost-emphasis and, to a  lesser degree, a tim e-em phasis environm ent. 
Integrated m anagem ent, based on fully developed in terrelationships among all 
three param eters, would perm it analysis of any single param eter in term s of the 
o ther two param eters. Integrated management would also fac ilita te  trade-off 
analyses involving a ll three param eters. In sum, in tegrated  managem ent would 
greatly  enhance the ability to manage a program as a  technical perform ance- 
emphasis program, while responding to  a  generally cost and tim e-em phasis 
exogenous environm ent.
Safeguard Experience
The Safeguard BMD program f it  this mold perfectiy . It was basically a 
technically intensive program in a cost and tim e intensive environm ent. It was 
the  most massive, complex, defensive weapon project ever undertaken by the 
U.S. Army. It represented a significant challenge to  the DoD m anagem ent 
process and maximized centralized management within the U.S. Army organiza­
tional s truc tu re . The Safeguard BMD program did not achieve full in tegration  of 
cost, schedule, and technical perform ance, but it was a  well managed program.
Two managem ent concepts, fixed a t  the tim e of the deployment 
decision, w ere of param ount importance to the Safeguard program . F irst, the 
program was designated by th e  Secretary of the Army for system m anagem ent. 
Under this concept, the system manager exercised coordination and directive
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authority  over participating government agencies and private industry as a  Vice 
Chief o f S taff of the Army. He was to ta lly  responsible for the program and was 
given the  full authority  available to the U.S. Army to  discharge his responsibility. 
The second concept a ttaches to the relationship betw een the U.S. Army and the  
weapon system prime contracto r. Heavy reliance was placed on the prim e 
con tracto r for the  successful accom plishm ent of the  to ta l program . The prim e 
con tracto r was assigned full responsibility for system  integration and m anage­
m ent of the production program. This philosophy maximized co n trac to r 
participation and influence in the program direction. In many particu lars, the 
governm ent-contractor relationship was closer to  a  partnership than the  m ore 
typical U.S. Army custom er-contractor relationship. Both decisions were c ritic a l 
to the technical and m anagem ent successes enjoyed by the Safeguard program .
The Safeguard m anagement process resulted  in an excellent definition 
of the scope of the m anagem ent control problem , identification of the essen tial 
elem ents of the problem, assessm ent of to ta l m anagem ent control requirem ents, 
and establishm ent of meaningful quan tita tive  and qualita tive  control standards. 
The major weakness of the process was the lack of positive follow-through. This 
resulted in ineffective integration of RDT&E m anagem ent data with da ta  from 
the o ther phases. Although managem ent control o f the RDT&E phase was 
e ffec tive  a t the  tac tica l level, it  lacked the broader perspective. The lack of 
full in tegration with o ther phases hampered e ffo rts , a t the s tra teg ic  level, to  
track  to ta l program progress against a common System WBS. While not a fa ta l 
flaw in the m anagem ent control system, the  inability  to  accurately in teg ra te  the 
RDT&E program data de trac ted  from the otherw ise high fidelity system  data  
available a t the  s tra teg ic  level.
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A ccountability of individual responsibility was also a  flaw in Safeguard 
managem ent. Specifically, individual responsibility in accordance with the 
organization chain of com m and was not reconciled with accountability of 
individual responsibility in accordance with the System WBS. In some cases the 
organizational s tru c tu re  and the System WBS were not com patible and the 
differences were not fully recognized or corrected . U nfortunately, the System 
WBS was accura te , but did not to ta lly  coincide with assigned organization 
responsibilities. R efinem ent of the organization and minor redefinition of 
missions would have eased the inconsistencies, but these corrections did not 
occur.
The minor flaws in the  im plem entation of m anagem ent control in the 
Safeguard BMD program  w ere to tally  overshadowed by the  positive aspects. 
Safeguard m anagem ent control was effec tive , pragm atic, and consistent with 
dem onstrated need. The m anagem ent of Safeguard was not an issue in the 
term ination of the program . It was the gradual erosion, and ultim ate loss of the 
political base upon which the  program was founded, th a t led to  the curtailm ent 
of resources and term ination  of the program.
M anagement Control Throughout 
the Life Cycle
The prim ary purpose of this section is the restoration of the PPL 
analysis m atrix originally portrayed in Figure 1. The original model contains a  
to ta l of tw enty-four individual cells, a ll of which a re  assumed to be of equal 
im portance in the analysis of the control situation. The three-dim ensional 
analysis m atrix  developed in C hapter IV is consistent both with program 
management of the  Safeguard BMD program and with sim ilar large-scale 
endeavors. The m atrix  rows or horizontal planes are  defined by structured.
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functional param eters of cost, schedule, and technical perform ance. The 
param eters encompass those c ritica l elem ents of program activ ity  essential to 
determ ination of pro ject s ta tu s. The m atrix columns or vertical planes are 
defined by tim e sequenced, program life-cycle phases. The use of a  tim e 
dimension for column definitions is an assist in evaluating m anagem ent control 
dynamics during the life cycle of the Safeguard BMD program. The m atrix files 
or depth planes are defined by hierarchic decision-making levels. This dimension 
provides insight into the  influence of the  organizational chain of command on the 
m anagem ent control situation. I t also underscores the significance of a  macro 
managem ent view of the program in con trast to a  micro management view.
In this section, the m atrix  is reassem bled based on the results of the 
analysis of the Safeguard BMD program. The PPL analysis m atrix  model is 
depicted in an open perspective in Figure 16. The original portrayal of the 
m atrix in Figure 1 was in closed perspective. The model is shown in open 
perspective in Figure 16 to  fa c ilita te  the graphic presentation of conceptual 
changes to the m atrix in la te r illustrations. O ther than the graphic change. 
Figure 16 is conceptually identical to Figure 1 in all particulars.
Conceptual Approach to Model Restoration
The restoration  and refinem ent of the PPL analysis m atrix took into 
consideration several aspects of the  analysis results. F irst, the degree to which 
an individual cell contributed to definition of the  management control situation 
was assessed. Specifically, this consideration centered  on whether an individual 
cell was instrum ental in defining the m anagem ent control problem. Secondly, 
each cell was considered in term s of its potential for identifying essential 
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results were examined to ascertain  w hether the ceii had been pivotai in the 
establishm ent of actual management control requirem ents. If the answers to 
these considerations w ere affirm ative, the ceii was significant to the analysis. 
Ceils so categorized w ere identified as major ceils.
Matrix ceils not fulfilling the requirem ents of m ajor cells were of 
secondary im portance to  the management control situation . Cells in this 
category were labeled minor cells. The division of the  m atrix  cells into these 
two categories resulted  in a refinem ent of the PPL analysis m atrix. The 
reassembled PPL analysis matrix depicts those elem ents contributing to specific 
definition of the Safeguard BMD m anagement control situation.
PPL Analysis Matrix Major Cells 
Figure 17 is an illustration of the  major cells of the PPL analysis 
m atrix as determ ined by the individual cell by cell exam ination. It will be noted 
tha t this reassembled m atrix  has only nine cells in the s tra teg ic  level of decision­
making in lieu of the original twelve. Similarly, the tac tica l level has only seven 
in lieu of the original tw elve. In other words, the exam ination revealed th a t only 
sixteen of the  original tw enty-four cells are of constructive significance in 
evaluating the to tal m anagem ent control situation.
Analyzed in term s of the program param eters, seven of the original 
eight cells in the technical perform ance param eter are significant. This results 
from the diversity of th e  technical perform ance m anagem ent control situation. 
The technical perform ance param eter is especially complex, encompassing a 
variety of engineering activ ities and a m ultitude of assorted effo rts. As a 
consequence, the to ta l param eter reflects a  great deal of variation throughout 
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respectively, out of an original eight cells each, for the  tw o param eters. In 
to ta l, only nine of the original sixteen cells for the  cost and schedule param eters 
are meaningful in the analysis. This is because the cost and schedule control 
systems developed for early  Ilf e-cycle phases may be im plem ented with little  
change in subsequent phases. In other words, there is a  higher degree of 
commonality among phases for these two param eters than w ith the technical 
perform ance param eter.
All six cells in the RDT&E phase as well as a ll six cells in the 
production phase are considered major contributors to definition of the to ta l 
m anagement control situation . This a tte s ts  to  the significance of these two 
phases to the m anagem ent control situation. In the deploym ent phase only three 
of the original six cells are  genuinely significant. These a re  the cost and 
technical perform ance cells a t  the s tra teg ic  level and the techn ical perform ance 
cell a t the ta c tic a l level. The term ination phase is basically an extension of 
earlier life-cycle phase ac tiv ity , with only the technical perform ance cell a t the 
s tra teg ic  level being of major consequence. The major cells depicted in 
Figure 17 identify  the general areas tha t should be highlighted for special 
management a tten tion  when considering m anagem ent contro l of large-scale 
complex endeavors.
PPL Analysis Matrix Minor Cells
Figure 18 illu s tra tes  the minor cells of the PPL analysis m atrix. The 
eight minor cells identified were not necessarily less im portan t from a to ta l 
m anagement control perspective than the major cells depicted in Figure 17, but 
minor cells a re  considered to  have had only secondary influence on definition of 
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control situation representative of each minor ceii was an extension of e arlie r 
life cycle phase activ ity . As a resu lt, management control tools and techniques 
employed in the earlier phases w ere extended to the minor cells. This extension 
of control system s into subsequent phases was more prevalent in the cost and 
schedule param eters than it was in the technical perform ance param eter.
Management Control Base Line 
M anagement can and should have a base line for management control 
of large-scale complex endeavors. The base line should reflec t a system s 
perspective and should in tegrate  the  three major program param eters of cost, 
schedule, and technical perform ance. It should be transferab le , adaptive, and 
dynamic, and the conceptual base should focus on proactive management control 
tools and techniques.
The concept of in tegrated  management control may be illustra ted  
graphically. The Venn diagram depicted in Figure 19 portrays the three major 
program param eters, the three subsets of each pairs combination among the 
three param eters, and the single subset of all three param eters. The subset 
common to both the cost and schedule param eters is typically identified as cost 
perform ance reporting. The subset common to the cost param eter and the 
technical perform ance param eter is labeled work package budgeting. The subset 
common to the schedule param eter and the technical perform ance param eter is 
referred  to as quan tita tive  milestones. The single subset common to all th ree  
param eters is in teg ra ted  program m anagem ent.
Cost Perform ance Reporting 
The basic premise upon which DoD cost perform ance reporting is 
founded is th a t schedule data a re  converted to and expressed in dollars. The
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conversion process involves a tim e-phased fiscal budget plan reflecting  the 
budgeted cost of work scheduled. The technique employs the WBS as the tool for 
identifying discrete elem ents of th e  program e ffo rt, w hether they  be goods or 
services.
In the  WBS, work packages are the lowest level individual breakout of 
program  e ffo rt, and the sum of ail work packages must equate to  to ta l program 
e ffo rt. The co st param eter is re la ted  to work packages by allocating program 
dollars appropriate to  the definition of the task to be perform ed. Any of a 
number of accepted cost estim ating techniques may be used fo r this purpose. 
Since the individual work packages sum to  to ta l program effo rt, the  fiscal budget 
a llocation should sum to to ta l program dollars less th a t amount designated for 
m anagem ent reserve. The fiscal budget held for m anagem ent reserve is a 
contingency to  minimize program risk. Cost perform ance is assessed by 
m easuring the actual cost of work perform ed.
The schedule param eter is re la ted  to work packages through the use of 
PERT, m ilestone planning and control, or similar scheduling techniques. All work 
required by work packages must be scheduled in a  manner th a t will perm it 
accu ra te  evaluation of perform ance against plan. Work package schedules must 
perm it roll-up into succeedingly higher level schedules, u ltim ately linking to the 
summary m aster schedule. The conversion of schedule data  to  dollars is 
accomplished by determining the  fiscal budget applicable to the work scheduled 
to  be perform ed within the specified tim e fram e. Management control is 
exercised by determ ining the budgeted cost for work actually  accom plished. This 
technique perm its schedule variance to  be expressed in dollars.
Cost perform ance reporting is a DoD management control technique 
for assessing cost and schedule perform ance in term s of a  common denom inator.
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Properly im plem ented, it identifies the d iscrete  e lem ents of work to  be 
accomplished down to th e  work package level, the organization or individual 
responsible for the  work package, the dollar and schedule resources budgeted, 
and the  resources expended in the accom plishm ent o f the  e ffo rt. The major 
deficiency of the  technique is th a t it does not provide fo r d irect m anagem ent 
control of the technical perform ance param eter.
Q uantita tive  Milestones 
Q uantitative m ilestones in teg ra te  the schedule and technical perform ­
ance param eters. Q uantitative m ilestones represent major decision points in the 
accom plishm ent of the program. They are events of technical significance 
stra teg ica lly  placed throughout the program. Properly established, quan tita tive  
m ilestones occur at sensitive points in the program life cycle and provide a 
quantified means of measuring and evaluating technical perform ance.
The quan tita tive  m ilestone technique utilizes the WBS for definition of 
work packages. Because of the developm ental natu re  of th e  programs normally 
associated with this technique, however, it  is normally advisable to  apply i t  a t a 
higher level in th e  WBS. Typical application levels m ight be two to  th ree  levels 
higher in the WBS than the  work package level.
The th ru st of quan tita tive  milestones is to em phasize technical 
perform ance. The schedule da ta  are used prim arily to  determ ine w here to locate 
th e  quan tita tive  m ilestones. The key to  th e  technique is the  accura te  
quantification of technical requirem ents a t s tra teg ic  points in the p ro jec t or task 
being controlled. The dimensions of quantification m ust be minimum essential 
capabilities of m andatory technical characteristics. The dimensions must be so 
defined tha t failure to  dem onstrate ability to m eet objectives is suffic ien t cause 
to curtail fu rth er work until the perform ance capability can be successfully 
dem onstrated or an adequate work-around plan form ulated.
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Q uantitative milestones assure th a t technical decisions are consciously 
based on hard technical fac t ra ther than om itted inadvertently  and made by 
default m erely through passage of tim e . The technique requires th a t objectives 
be predeterm ined prior to  work in itiation. The bases fo r quantification are the 
design and perform ance specifications and allied technical docum entation. 
Q uantitative m ilestones used in conjunction with basic schedules serve both as 
the  plan for accom plishm ent of the  technical program  and as the standard 
against which achievem ent is measured.
Work Package Budgeting 
Work package budgeting is a  means of in terre la ting  the co st and 
technical perform ance param eters. It also uses the WBS as the tool for 
identifying d iscrete  work packages. Both the cost and the  technical perform ance 
param eters are  re la ted  to  the WBS work packages by the same techniques 
described above in the cost perform ance reporting and the quan tita tive  
m ilestones subsections.
Work package budgeting is a disciplined but convenient technique for 
relating cost and technical perform ance. The technique employed may be as 
fundam ental or as sophisticated as th e  endeavor w arrants. Use of the WBS as a 
base perm its summation of fiscal resources and program  activ ity  at varying 
levels of de tail. The technique has u tility  both as a plan of action for fu ture 
activ ities  and as a major standard against which to measure progress. The 
prim ary deficiency of this technique is th a t it  does not embody schedule control 
considerations.
Integrated Program M anagement 
In tegrated  program m anagem ent is a t the core of the m anagem ent 
control of large-scale complex endeavors. Its primary objective is to  in teg ra te
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the three major param eters of cost, schedule, and technical perform ance. In 
large m easure, it demands th a t the program manager think in th ree  dimensions. 
The concept is p rac ticed  typically by holding one of the th ree  param eters 
constant.
Figure 20 depicts in tegrated program management in the perspective 
in which it is normally p rac ticed . The program manager a ttem p ts  to  control the 
program boundaries as they are influenced directly by th e  endogenous environ­
ment, which tends to  be rational. This environment is less controllable than the  
program. The least controllable environm ent is th e  exogenous environm ent 
which is norm ative. The endogenous environment may occassionally ac t as a 
buffer between the program  and the exogenous environment.
In tegrated program  m anagem ent is not a reality . Initiatives in this 
regard in the  Safeguard program were term inated as the  program was reduced in 
scope. While the activ ity  th a t was accomplished showed prom ise, it was far from 
complete. It did suggest th a t the concept of integrated m anagem ent, given 
sufficient tim e, in te rest, and development e ffo rt, is achievable.
M anagement Control in Perspective
M anagement control is an in tegrative force in  the  m anagem ent process 
and a vehicle for feedback in the m anagement cycle. The control function 
introduces the  elem ent of closure to managem ent action, enhances rationality  in 
the decision-making process, and underscores the search fo r order in large-scale 
complex endeavors.
Homeostasis is typically c ited  as the perfect biological exam ple of an 
"ideal" control system. Homeostasis is concerned with self-regulation in the 
human body and it suggests a tendency toward a relatively  stable s ta te  of
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equilibrium . It is a reactive  mechanism as opposed to a  proactive mechanism. 
As an exam ple, homeostasis is the property of the  human body th a t begins, 
w ithout conscious thought, to  coagulate the blood and close the wound of a cut 
finger. It is also the property th a t causes more rapid breathing as a reaction to 
strenuous exercise.
It is the  fundam ental conclusion of this study th a t such examples 
illu s tra te  a satisfactory  reactive  system but not an "ideal" system . Q uite to  the 
con trary  of the examples, an "ideal" control system would be sufficiently 
proactive to  prevent the wound from being in flic ted . Such a proactive system 
would be sensitive enough th a t m ovem ent from the  sta tu s quo would be detec ted  
sufficiently  early tha t infliction of a wound would be avoided. Similarly, 
proactive control would suggest th a t the human organism engage in deep 
breathing to enrich the blood with oxygen before the  fa c t, much as swimmers 
and runners do, im m ediately prior to an a th letic  event. Rapid breathing during 
or following strenuous exercise would occur as a  secondary control mechanism 
ra ther than a primary mechanism. Reactive or hom eostatic control is an 
illusory prim ary protection and occurs as a secondary control tool in a proactive 
control system .
The concept of proactive m anagement control is operative in a 
changing and dynamic environm ent. Adjustments or co rrec tive  steering may 
a ffec t operational factors, control standards, or both. P roactive m anagem ent 
control suggests adaptive tools and techniques used by cognitive human managers 
in a partic ipa tive  management environment involving all resources associated 
with the  endeavor. The concept assures the inclusion o f human beings in the 
control process without denying the  possibility of au tom ated , au tom atic  controls 
and control techniques. Proactive managem ent underscores the prospective
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ra th e r  than the re trospective acpect of the control process. The essence of 
proactive  managem ent control is the  regulation or ordered progression of an 
endeavor toward its  desired goals based on to ta l situational assessm ent and 
optim al corrective action.
In tegrated  m anagem ent control, in te rre la ting  the  three major para­
m eters  of cost, schedule, and technical perform ance, m ust also become a reality . 
I t is through this in itia tive  that trade-o ff investigations, or risk-anaiysis studies, 
involving all three param eters, will become less rigorous to  perform and more 
m eaningful in application as a  m anagem ent technique. The a tta inm ent of 
in teg ra ted  m anagem ent will bring the ability to  rea listica lly  predict the future 
behavior of any one of the three param eters as a  function of change in the o ther 
two param eters. Independent analysis of individual param eters serves an 
im portan t m anagem ent control purpose, but to ta l program  risk is reduced and 
to ta l program success is enhanced, when the th ree  param eters are brought 
toge ther in an in tegrated  fashion. In tegrated  m anagem ent will also enhance the 
determ ination of program progress, because progress is typically measured, a t 
any given tim e, in term s of achievem ent against the  th ree  prim ary param eters 
and the relationship among them.
M anagement control should be offensive ra th e r than defensive, should 
be p reventative in preference to  curative, and should favor preview before the 
fa c t  in lieu of review  a f te r  the fac t. It should be equally sensitive to 
qu an tita tiv e  and qualita tive  managem ent inform ation, should satisfy manage­
m ent needs, and should enhance the decision-making process. Integrated and 
proactive  tools and techniques are the preferred  foundation for managem ent 
control of large-scale complex endeavors.
APPENDIX I 
GLOSSARY
ABM antiballlstic  missile
ABMA U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency
ABMDA Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency
ABMDA-H Advanced Ballistic Missile D efense Agency - Huntsville
AMC U.S. Army M ateriel Command
AMP Army M ateriel Plan
AMS Army m anagem ent struc tu re
AOMC U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command
ARADCOM U.S. Army Air Defense Command
ARGMA U.S. Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency
ASA A ssistant Secretary of the Army
BMD ballistic missile defense
BMDATC Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology C enter
BMDMP Ballistic Missile Defense M aster Plan
BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
BMDPM Ballistic Missile Defense Program Manager
BMDSCOM U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command
CDR C ritical Design Review
CPM C ritical Path Method
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- c / s c s c Cost/Schedule Control System C riteria
DA D epartm ent of the Army
DOD D epartm ent of Defense
DVA Docum entation Validation Audit
ERD equipment readiness date
FACR F irst A rtic le  Configuration Review
FY fiscal year
FYDP Five Y ear Defense Program
GAO General Accounting Office
GNP gross national product
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IIP Integrated Training Plan
3 A TO jet-assisted  takeoff
LOB Line of Balance
MCA M ilitary Construction, Army
MICOM U.S. Army Missile Command
MIPA Missile Procurem ent, Army
MPA M ilitary Personnel, Army
MTBF mean tim e between failure
NASA National Aeronautics and Space A dm inistration
NCA National Command Authority
NET new equipm ent training
NICP National Inventory Control Point
NMP National M aintenance Point
NORAD North American Air Defense Command




























O ffice of M anagement and Budget 
Ordnance Missile Laboratory 
perim eter acquisition radar 
P rocurem ent of Equipment and Missiles, Army 
Program  Evaluation and Review Technique 
Program  Objective Memorandum 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System 
Redstone Anti-Missile Missile Systems Office 
research , developm ent, te s t, and evaluation 
Review of Facilities Design 
re -en try  vehicle
U.S. Army Safeguard System Command
U.S. Army Safeguard System Evaluation Agency
Safeguard System Manager
U.S. Army Safeguard System Office
S trateg ic  Arms Limitations Talks
system  design review
U.S. Army Sentinel System Command
U.S. Army Sentinel System Evaluation Agency
Sentinel System Manager
U.S. Army Sentinel System Office
Sentinel System M aster Plan; Safeguard System 
M aster Plan
Technical Development Plan 
U.S. Army
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
work breakdown structu re
APPENDIX II 
WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE
The work breakdown struc tu re  (WBS) is a product-oriented hierarchic 
structu re  or fam ily tre e  tha t to ta lly  defines a  specific project or program. It 
identifies all work packages or tasks to be perform ed in the successful 
deployment of the  weapon system . The WBS is sim ilar in concept and appearance 
to an engineering generation breakdown, with one major exception. In addition 
to the hardw are item s depicted in the engineering generation breakdown, the  
WBS also includes softw are, s ite  fac ilities, services, and all other work tasks 
associated with the research, developm ent, te s t , and evaluation (RDT&E); 
production; and deployment phases of the weapon system . The WBS typically 
does not include the personnel elem ent of a  to ta l weapon system .
The System WBS reflec ts the to ta l weapon system breakout down to  
the work package level. The Project Summary WBS consists of only the top th ree 
or four levels of the System WBS. O ther subsets re flec ting  specific portions of 
the program such as an RDT&E WBS or C ontract WBS are  also possible spinoffs 
of the System WBS.
The WBS is a tiered s truc tu re  with each level subordinate to  the level 
above it .  Furtherm ore, all elem ents a t  a  given level sum to the elem ent of which 
they a re  a  part a t the  next higher level. As an exam ple, five levels and one 
com plete breakout a re  illustrated in Figure 21. The elem ents shown a t level 5
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are work packages 1.3.3.1.1, 1.3.3.1.2, and 1.3.3.1.3. These three work packages 
com pletely define and sum to  level 4 elem ent 1.3.3.1. At level 4, elem ents 
1.3.3.1, 1.3.3.2, and 1.3.3.3 com pletely define and sum to level 3 elem ent 1.3.3. 
Similarly, a t level 3, e lem ents 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, and 1.3.4 to ta lly  define and sum 
to ievel 2 elem ent 1.3. Finally, a t level 2, e lem ents 1.1 through l.n  sum to 
level 1. All elem ents are sim ilarly defined, but the  only com plete breakout 
depicted is th a t illu stra ted  by the  family associated w ith level 4 elem ent 1.3.3,1. 
The dashed line in Figure 21 shows how it is possible to  selectively audit specific 
elem ents of the program down to  the work package level.
The WBS has no predeterm ined size in term s ' of time, dollars, or 
activ ity . It is defined by the scope of the program it  portrays. As an example, 
the Safeguard program at one tim e defined eighteen level 2 elem ents and 
seventy-seven level 3 elem ents in the Project Summary WBS. Levei 4 and level 5 
elem ents numbered in the  hundreds and thousands respectively . Work packages 
were frequently  located  a t level 8 in the System WBS.
Work packages are the  term inal nodes in the s tructu re  and are the 
building blocks upon which the managem ent control system  should be founded. 
Work packages should describe d iscrete work tasks with easily defined beginning 
and ending events. L evel-of-effort activity  is not easily quantified and may be 
measured simply by noting passage of tim e or expenditure of funds.
Selection of work packages is critical. Too fine a division of work 
packages causes m anagem ent inform ation to  become overly detailed, With an 
a tten d an t loss of m anagem ent control relevance. Too coarse a delineation of 
tasks in work packages, on the other hand, causes m anagem ent information to  
become inordinately gross. Under these conditions management control 
initiatives may su ffer from lack of data refinem ent. Problems associated with
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work packages being too bulky or too minute or with defining e ither an excessive 
o r inadequate amount of e ffo r t are normally resolved early in the program life 
cycle. Typically, the  degree o f management control exercised or desired a t each 
level of decision making is a  pivotal fac to r in determ ining the WBS configuration.
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